

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
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ORVAR KARLBECK

1879 — 1967

IN MEMORIAM

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PART I

LOAN CHARACTERS IN PRE-HAN TEXTS V

BY

BERNHARD KARLGREN

This paper is a sequel to the article
Loan Characters in Pre-Han texts IV,
BMFEA 38 1966.

2033. *y i* (*ngia a*) 'right, righteousness' Kt for *w e i* (*ngiwar b*) 'high' says Chang Ping-lin on Chuang: Ma t'i phr. c.: "Even though they had high terrace-towers". — Reject. If the meaning should necessarily be 'high', it would be preferable to say that *a.* stands for *n g o* (*ngā d*) 'high' within the same Hs series. But, as pointed out by Yü Yüe, Sū Miao read *a.* not *ngia*, *k'ü sheng*, but *ngia*, *p'ing sheng*, which means that he took it to stand as short-form for *y i* (*ngia e*): "Even though they had ceremonial terrace-towers". Yü adduces as parallel Huai: Lan ming phr. f., by Kao Yu explained as = *g.* This in itself is quite plausible.

It should, however, be emphasized that there existed one text version (ap. Shīwen) which had *h i* (*χia h*) instead of *a.* This *χia h.* occurs as short-form for *h i* (*χia i*) 'sacrificial animal' and *c.* could then mean: "Even though they had sacrificial terrace-towers". But since the famous name Fu-hi *j.* could also be *wr. k.* (Sün: Ch'eng siang), which shows that the char. *χia h.* and *h i* (*χia l*) 'to sport' are interchangeable, the text version with *h.* instead of *a.* could mean: "Even though they had pleasure towers". This would suit the context best.

2034. *yi* (*ngia a*) 'proper demeanour, dignity, ceremony' Kt for *li* (*lieg b*) 'mate, companion' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 45 phr. c. — Reject. *c.* = "He is my (proper one:) mate".

2035. *y i* (*dia a*) 'lower border of robe' "is the same word as *b.*" says Wang Yin-chi on Yili: Shī hun li phr. c.: "The host has brown lower garment and black lower border". The word *b.* occurs in Yili: Ki si li phr. d., there defined as = 'border ornament on lower garment'. Lu Tê-ming reads *b.* Anc. *t'iei* = Arch. *t'ieg*, but Liu reads it Anc. *iğ* = Arch. *dia*, evidently, like Wang, identifying *a.* and *b.* — Reject. As shown by the Phonetic in *b.* Lu Tê-ming is obviously right. The two words *a.* and *b.* are not the same, not cognate and not even synonymous.

2036. *y i* (*djët a*) 'to escape, to retire; ease, idle' Kt for *y i* (*·jēd b*) 'good, beautiful' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ch'u: Li sao phr. c. This because Wang Yi defines *a.* as = *d.*: "I saw the beautiful daughter of the lord of Sung". — Reject. Chu's Kt is impossible, and for Wang's definition there is no support whatever. *c.* = "I saw the lord's of Sung (retired daughter:) daughter who lives in retirement" (shut up in a jade tower).

2037. *y i* (*djět* a) 'to escape; ease, idle' etc. Kt for *y i* (*djāk* b) 'successive, one after another' says Ch'en Huan on Ode 220 phr. c. — Refuted in Gloss 706. c. = "They poculate and offer response cups at their ease".

2038. *y i* (*djět* a) 'to overflow' etc. occurs in the Mao text version of Ode 267 phr. b. Since other text versions (in Shuowen and in Tso: Siang 27) instead of a. have *m i* (*mjět* c) 'quiet, to tranquillize' and *s ü* (*sjwět* d) 'to be solicitous about', there have been various Kt speculations. Ch'en Huan and Ma Juei-ch'en believe that *djět* a. is Kt for *mjět* c. and that *sjwět* d. is likewise Kt for *mjět* c.; refuted in Gloss 758, also cf. LC par. 1070 and Gloss 1271.

Wen Yi-to would take a. as variant for *y i* (*·jčk* e) 'to increase' (observe that e. is not Kt in a., the latter being a *h u e i y i*), and this *·jčk* as Kt for *s i* (*siek* f) 'to give'; reject.

In Ode 267 there are, in fact, several unreconcilable text traditions. That of the Mao version (b) means: "With (ampleness:) ample blessings he overwhelms us".

2039. *y i* (*djět* a) 'to overflow' occurs in Yili: Sang fu chuan phr. b.: "In the morning [he eats] one *y i* of rice". While Cheng Hsün says that *y i* here is a term for a measure (20 ounces), Wang Su and Liu K'uei say that it means c. 'a full hand'. Tuan Yü-ts'ai thinks that Wang and Liu took a. to be Kt for *k o* (*klčk* d), which occurs a few lines earlier in the chapter and means 'a handful', but that was surely not their theory. They must have thought that a. is a variant of *y i* (*·jčk* e) (wrongly' enlarged by Rad. 85) and that this again is a short-form for *o* (*·čk* f) 'to grasp' (ex. of this in Mo: Fei kung, hia), thus here meaning 'a handful'. This is convincing. Consequently *klčk* d. and *·čk* f. (the latter here wrongly wr. a.) are merely synonymous.

2040. *y i* (*ngjad* a) 'to cultivate; accomplished' etc. Kt for *n i* (*niər* b) 'dead father's tablet and temple' say Ma Jung and Pan Ku on Shu: Yao (Shun) tien, Ku-wen version, phr. c: "When he returned, he went to [the temple of] his dead father and grandfather". This because the Kin-wen version had d. — Refuted in Gloss 1265 and LC par. 239. The a., originally wr. e., with Yü Yüe stands for *s i e* (*sjat* f) 'familiar, near-standing': "... The temple of the (near-standing ones:) father and grandfather", thus the same meaning as the Kin-wen version.

Again, on Shu: Si po k'an Li phr. g. Yü sing-wu proposes that *c h i h.* is a corruption of *ngjad* e. and that this is Kt for *ê r* (*ñjär* i) 'near'. *Vice versa*, Yü thinks that *ñjär* i. is Kt for *ngjad* e. 'accomplished' in Kuan: Ta k'uang; refuted in LC par. 239. Finally, Yü believes that in Shu: Kao-yao mo (Yi Tsi) phr. j. the *k.* is a corruption of *ngjad* e. and that this is Kt for *n i* (*niok* l), which again would be cognate to *n i* (*niər* m). — All these phonetically impossible speculations should be rejected.

2041. *y i* (*ngjad* a) 'to cultivate; accomplished' etc. Kt for *n i e* (*ngjat* b) 'law' in the cases where it means 'law, rule, norm' (common: Li: Li yün; Tso: Wen 6, Chao 13 etc.) says Wang Yin-chi. — The ancient tradition read a. as usual also in this sense (Lu Tê-ming gives no sound gloss for a. in these passages). It is therefore safer to say that *ngjad* is Kt for a homophonous *ngjad* 'law, rule, norm' closely cognate to *ngjat* b.

In the Mao Kung Ting inscr. phr. c. the first char. has by various epigraphists been taken to be a variant of d., the primary form of a. Yang Shu-ta says this *ngiad* is Kt for *ngiat* b., but Kuo Mo-jo, more cautious, takes it as an extension: *ngiad* 'to plant > to establish', which makes good sense without any Kt.

2042. y i (*ngiäd* a) common in phrases like b. in Shu (K'ang kao) and Shī (Ode 172) and similar cases is said by Yü Sing-wu (after Wang Kuo-wei) to stand for sie (*sjat* c). Sun Yi-jang, better: c. Kt for a., see in detail LC par. 1318.

2043. y i (*ngiäd* a) 'to govern, to regulate' Kt for k i e (*g'iat* b) 'eminent, heroic' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Shu: Kao-yao mo phr. c. — Unlikely. a. is a short-form for a i (*ngäd* d) 'white-haired, old', c. = "The eminent and the aged (i.e. experienced) are in the offices", see Gloss 1304.

When d. means 'white-haired' (properly: 'artemisia-coloured') and hence 'old', Ma Sü-lun (Chuang: Wai-wu) says it is Kt for t i e (*d'iet* e) 'old'. — Reject.

2044. y i (*ziäd* a) 'toil, fatigue' Kt for y i (*diäd* b) 'toil' says the Kuangyün on Ode 194 phr. c.: "Nobody knows (understands) my toil". This because in Tso: Chao 16 the line is quoted d. — Reject. Lu Tê-ming reads a. Anc. *iai* = Arch. *ziäd*, which is correct with a view to the Phonetic *siäd* in a. Kuangyün alternatively follows Lu Cf.. Gloss 566.

Lu, on the other hand, in Gloss on Tso's phr. d. says b. (Anc. *iai* = Arch. *ziäd*), Kt for a. whereas Sü Miao correctly, read b. Anc. *i* = Arch. *diäd*. The same mistake on Lu's part (and the same correctness on Sü's) recurs in Ode 35 phr. e.: "You have given me toil".

2045. y i (*ied* a) 'to kill' Kt for y i (*iäd* b) 'to sacrifice by burying the gifts' in Yili: Kin li, Ku-wen version (ap. Cheng Hüan) where the orthodox version has d.

2046. y i (*iäd* a) 'good; beautiful' Kt for y i (*iæk* b) says Wei Chao on Kyü: Ch'u yü, hia phr. c.: (The king) "made the y i warning", which would refer to the Ode 256 that has the title b. Lu Tê-ming there reads b. *iæk*, and that is the ordinary reading of the char. as an initial particle, e.g. in Ode 78 phr. d.; as a full

2033 a 義 b 巍 c 雖有義臺 d 峨 e 儀 f 容臺 g 行禮容之臺 h 義 i 儀 j 伏羲 k 伏戲 l 戲 2034 a 儀 b 麗儷 c 實惟我儀 2035 a 迤 b 緡 c 主人纁裳緡迤 d 緡緡緡 2036 a 佚 b 懿 c 見有娥之佚女 d 美 2037 a 逸 b 繹 c 舉疇逸逸 2038 a 溢 b 假以溢我 c 謚 d 恤 e 益 f 錫 2039 a 溢 b 朝一溢米 c 滿手 d 搗 e 益 f 搗 2040 a 藝 b 禰 c 歸格于藝祖 d 禰祖 e 執 f 替 g 大命不摯 h 摯 i 通 j 下民昏墊 k 墊 l 溺 m 泥 2041 a 藝 b 臬 c 藝小大楚賦 d 執 2042 a 乂艾 b 保乂保艾 c 辟 2043 a 乂 b 傑 c 俊乂在官 d 艾 e 耄 2044 a 勸 b 肄 c 莫知我勸 d 莫知我肄 e 既詒我肄 2045 a 瘞 b 瘞 c 祭地瘞 d 祭地瘞 2046 a 懿 b 抑 c 作懿戒 d 抑磬控忌 e 威儀抑抑 f 抑若揚分 g 美 h 抑

verb meaning 'to repress' etc. it is likewise normally read *·iək*, and a *·iəd* a. Kt for a *·iək* is phonetically excluded. But in Ode 249 phr. e. and in Ode 106 phr. f. Mao Heng say b. means g. 'beautiful', and the Ode 256 alluded to in Kyü above starts precisely with phr h. In phr. f.: "How beautiful her forehead" this meaning is undeniable; in phrases e. and h. it is clearly an extension of the fundamental meaning: 'repressed, restrained: dignified': "The deportment is dignified, stately". Furthermore 'stately, fine: beautiful' is a natural further extension (phr. f.).

A remarkable fact is, however, that both in Ode 249 and Ode 220 in the phr. e. the b. rimes in the *-et* class, not in the *-ək* class, and this may reveal that the char. *·iək* b. 'restrained, dignified, stately, beautiful' was used for a word *·iēt* with the same meaning (this would then be a "synonym Kt", not a phonetic Kt). Thus Wei Chao may be right that in phr. c. a *·iəd* a. is Kt for this *·iēt*. See Gloss 895.

In Ode 264 phr. i. Cheng Hün would take a. to stand for b. as an initial particle "denoting pain", i.e. for *·iək* b. — Reject. Here a. has its ordinary meaning: "Beautiful is the clever woman", see Gloss 1055.

2047. y i (*ngiəd* a) 'boar; bold' Kt for y i (*ngia* b) 'ring on the horse's yoke for passing the reins' says Sun Yi-jang on the Mao Kung Ting inscr. phr. c. — Reject. Phonetically too bad, and moreover the word b. (Erya: Shī k'i) is known from no pre-Han text.

Sü Chou-chuang says a. Kt for n i (*nīər* d) 'stopper for carriage' as in Yi: Kua 44 phr. e. Kuo Mo-jo says a. Kt for n i (*nīər* f) 'cross-bar at front of carriage box'; this f. is only known from the Yü p'ien. — Though phonetically poor, Sü's interpretation may be acceptable.

2048. y i (*dīəd* a) 'to practise; toil' etc. occurs as Kt for a word meaning 'remnant, surviving branch on a tree' in Ode 10 phr. b. Here Tuan Yü-ts'ai says a. Kt for ngo, nie (*ngāt*, *ngiat* c) 'shoot from stump of a tree'. — Reject. Lu Tê-ming reads a. Anc. i = Arch. *dīəd*, thus a. Kt for a homophonous *dīəd* 'stump, shoots on a fallen tree'.

2049. y i (*giwəd* a) 'to leave over; to transmit' etc. Kt for s u e i (*dzwia* b) 'to follow' says Cheng Hün on Ode 223 phr. c.: "Nobody is willing to lower himself and follow". — Reject.

Wang K'ai-yün says *giwəd* a. Kt for s u e i (*dzīwəd* d), explaining: "Nobody is willing to proceed downwards" (sc. with favours towards the henchmen). — Reject.

Yü Sing-wu says *giwəd* a. Kt for ch u e i (*d'īwəd* e) 'to fall down' (Sün: Fei siang quotes the line with f., which is there merely a variant of e); cf. LC par. 1399 where Wang Yin-chī wrongly took f. as Kt for a. in Ode 257. — Reject, see in detail Gloss 724. There were unreconcilable text traditions. The Mao version c. means: "There is nobody who is willing to be rejected" (left out of office).

2050. y i (*giwəd* a) 'to leave over; to transmit' etc. Kt for y i (*dīəg* b) 'to give' says Ma Sü-lun on Lao 9 phr. c. — Reject. c. = "Having wealth and honours and then being proud — (oneself brings disaster on oneself:) disaster is of one's own making".

2051. y i (*·iər* a) 'garment' Kt for Yin (*·iən* b) says Cheng Hün on Li: Chung yung phr. c. which is a quotation from Shu: K'ang kao phr. d.: "To kill the great Yin".

— Plausible, see Gloss 1625. A Kt of a. for b. in the sense of name of a sacrifice occurs already in early bronze inscr. e.g. Ta feng Kuei inscr. phr. e. which, with Sun Yi-jang (Ku chou yü lun), is equal to f.

Similarly y i (·iər g) 'to lean upon' etc. Kt for y i n (·iən b) in the sense of 'ample' (common) says Yü Yüe on Kuan: Chou ho phr. h. Phonetically quite possible; but the context shows that i. is a corruption of j. 'strickle for grain measures': "He does not (rely on:) exactly use his strickle".

2052. y i (·iər a) 'to rely on' etc. Kt for y i n (·iən b) 'suffering' says Wang Yin-chi on Shu: Wu yi phr. c.: "You will know the sufferings of the people". — Plausible, see Gloss 1830.

2053. y i (·iər a) 'to rely on' etc. occurs in Yili: Ki si li, where it is spoken of bows buried as funerary gifts, phr. b., for which Cheng Hün gives a very strained explanation (y i t' a would be protecting leather straps wound round the bow). The Kin-wen version (ap. Cheng), however, reads c. and Sun Yi-jang proposes that ·iər a. stands for y i n (iən d) and e. is a variant for f., so that c. corresponds to the well-known y i n - k u o g. 'correcting frame used by carpenters' (ex. of this in Sün: Ta lüe). — Plausible, as far as the Kin-wen is concerned. What the orthodox b. means remains obscure.

2054. y i (d̥iər a) 'Barbarian; level; easy' etc. Kt for s i (s̥iəd b) says Tuan Yü-ts'ai on Shu: To shī, Kin-wen version phr. c., because the Kin-wen version reads d. — Refuted in Gloss 1819. c. = "I shall tranquillize you all and pity you"; d. = "I shall pardon you all and pity you". The two versions are not identical and we cannot decide which of them is the original.

2055. y i (d̥iər a) 'Barbarian; level, easy' etc. Kt for s h i (s̥iər b) 'corpse' says Tuan Yü-ts'ai on Chouli: Lung jen phr. c.: "He delivers the ice for the corpse tray". This because Cheng Hün defines a. by b. — Plausible.

2056. y i (d̥iər a) 'Barbarian; level, easy' etc. Kt for y i (d̥iəg b) says Tuan Yü-ts'ai on Ode 191 phr. c.: "If the noble man is peaceful". This because Mao Heng defines a. by b. — Reject. a. often serves for a word d̥iər 'level' and, by extension, 'smooth, easy, peaceful'.

2057. y i (d̥iər a) 'Barbarian; level, easy' etc. Kt for t' i, c h i (t' iər, d' iər b) 'to clear off weeds' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Tso: Yin 6 phr. c.: "He cuts and clears

抑威儀 i 懿厥哲婦 2047 a 衰 b 義 c 金衰 d 杞 e 繫于金杞 f 軌
2048 a 肄 b 伐其條肄 c 擗猷 2049 a 遺 b 隨 c 莫肯下遺 d 遂 e 墜 f
隨 2050 a 遺 b 貽 c 富貴而驕自遺其咎 2051 a 衣 b 殷 c 壹戎衣 d
殪戎殷 e 衣祀 f 殷祀 g 依 h 不依其樂 i 樂 j 樂 2052 a 依 b 隱 c
則知小人之依 2053 a 依 b 設依據也 c 設依鋤 d 樂 e 鋤 f 格 g 樂
格 2054 a 夷 b 肆 c 予惟率夷憐爾 d 予惟率肆矜爾 2055 a 夷 b 尸
c 共夷槃冰 2056 a 夷 b 易 c 君子如夷 2057 a 夷 b 薙 c 芟夷蕪崇

them (sc. the weeds), collects them and heaps them". — Possible but unnecessary. a. itself often means 'to kill' as an extension from the meaning 'level': 'to level, to cut short, to kill'.

2058. y i (*ḍiər* a) 'Barbarian; level, easy' etc. Kt for c h ' a i (*dz'ər* b) 'equal' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Li: K'ü li phr. c.: "When among equals, not to quarrel". — Unnecessary. This is an extension of meaning: "level, to be on a level with, on a par with".

On Ode 90 phr. d. Chu says *ḍiər* a. Kt for y i (*ḍiæg* e) 'pleased'. — Reject. see Gloss 41. a. = 'level, even, calm, at ease, happy': d. = "How should I not be happy".

2059. y i (*·iər* a) 'screen, cover' Kt for y i (*·ied* b) 'to kill' says Wang Yin-chi on Ode 241 phr. c.: "The dead trees, the [fallen] dead trees". The Han version has instead d., which is demanded by the rime, see Gloss 822. Wang confirms his theory by Kyü: Chou yü, hia phr. e.: "That is to abduct its stores and to kill its people". *·iər* a. Kt for *·ied* b. is phonetically too bad. a. 'to cover' is here = 'to bury': "to abduct its stores and bury its people". In phr. c. the a. is evidently a wrong character, as proved by the rime.

When in Ts'ê: Ts'i ts'ê 5 we find phr. f., Sun Yi-jeng says *·iər* a. stands for y i (*·iad* g-) 'to sacrifice by burying'. This is likewise excluded, and a. here again has the meaning 'to bury'.

2060. y i (*·iər* a) 'this' Kt for y i (*·iər* b) 'this' says Cheng Hün on Ode 35 phr. c.: "You have yourself (bequeathed:) caused this trouble". — Both words occur as empty particles (for instance, a. in Ode 192, b. in Tso: Yin 1), apparently closely cognate words. a. is undoubtedly a pronoun 'this' in phr. c. and also in Ode 129 phr. d. The b., on the other hand, occurs, clearly meaning 'this' in Tso: Hi 5 phr. e. (a quotation from the now lost Shu chapter Lü ao): "Only the virtue — that they estimate" (Lu Tê-ming: b. Anc. *·iei* = Arch. *·iər*, meaning f.) and in Kyü: Wu yü phr. g.: "That would be to raise (from the dead) the dead men" (Wei Chao: b. = f.).

That both *·iər* a. and *·iər* b. should exist, so read, both as empty particles and as demonstrative pronouns seems somewhat doubtful; in such a case, they would be two closely cognate words meaning 'an empty particle' and two closely cognate words meaning 'this'. No wonder that Cheng doubted this. Now *·iər* a. = 'this' is common and well attested. *·iər* b. 'an empty particle' occurs, written h., in the Shī Ku wen ("stoned drums" inscr.). It is tempting to conclude that when a. is an 'empty particle' it should be Kt for *·iər* b., and that when b. means 'this' it is Kt for *·iər* a.

2061. y i (*·iəp* a) 'to ladle out' Kt for y i (*·iək* b) 'to repress, to suppress' say the K'anghi editors on Sün: Yu tso phr. c.: "This is what is called the principle of repressing and reducing". This because Yang Liang defines a. here as = d. 'to repulse'. Yang probably had in mind Lao 77 phr. e. — Reject. The text deals with vessels that are empty, half-filled or full. c. = "the principle of pouring out and reducing".

2062. y i (*·iəp* a) 'to ladle out' Kt for t s i (*dz'·iəp* b) 'to assemble' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Shan mu phr. c.: "The disciples did not assemble before him". —

Reject. a. is well attested as Kt for the homophonous *y i* (·iəp d) 'to make obeisance'. c. = "The disciples did not [come and] bow to him".

2063. *y i* (·iəp a) 'to make obeisance' Kt for *t i e* (d'iap b) 'tablet' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: T'ien Tsī Fang phr. c.: "All the scribes received the tablets and stood (in attention)". — Reject. With Wang Sien-k'ien we should punctuate after *sh o u*: "All the scribes came and received (the order); they made obeisance and stood (in attention)".

2064. *y i* (ngiäk a) 'to go against; to go to meet; refractory' etc. Kt for *y ü* (ngiö b) says Wang K'ai-yün on Shu: Kin t'eng phr. c. and this b. would mean d. 'to receive' (a meaning which it never has). He punctuates after *k i a*: "I, the little child, have recently received our state". — Reject. For this line and its various explanations see in detail Gloss 1583. Ma Jung's text had e. instead of f. c. = "I, the little child, will in person go and meet him; the rites of our Royal House also justify this".

2065. *y i* (ziäk a) 'besides, also' etc. Kt for *y i* (diëk b) 'to change' says Yü Yüe on Meng: Wan Chang, hia phr. c.: (Yao went to Shun's mansion and) "changingly feasted with Shun". "Changingly" would mean that now he adopted the part of a guest, whereas earlier he had regaled Shun as his guest. Yü adduces, *inter alia*, that in Lun: Shu er phr. d.: (If I could get some years more) "for fifty of them I would study the Yi, then I could be without great faults" the Lu version (ap. Cheng Hüan in Shīwen) read a. instead of b. This, however, does not mean that a. was taken as a Kt for b., for the Lu school (as shown by the stele inscr. of Kao Piao) punctuated after *h ü e*: "for fifty of them I would study, and then I could . . .", the *y i* a. being the common adverb. Sī-ma Ts'ien follows the d. text and hence Cheng declined the Lu version. — Yü's *ziäk* Kt for *diëk* is phonetically unacceptable. c. = "He also feasted with Shun".

Again, on Kuan: Ch'ī mi phr. e. Yü Sing-wu says a. Kt for b. — Reject. Yü Yüe says a. here is a corruption of the char. *t' i e n* 'Heaven' (a. and f. being very similar in archaic script), the phr. *t' i e n p i e n* being a well-known binome; this is clearly preferable.

2066. *y i* (ziäk a) 'fluid, to moisten' Kt for *y i* (diäk b) 'bitter spirits' says Cheng

之 2058 a 夷 b 儕 c 在醜夷不爭 d 云胡不夷 e 台怡 2059 a 翳 b 殪
c 其苗其翳 d 其苗其殪 e 是去其藏而翳其民 f 君翳(懷)懷 g 瘞
2060 a 伊 b 繫 c 自詒伊阻 d 所謂伊人 e 惟德繫物 f 是 g 繫起死人
h 毆 2061 a 挹 b 抑 c 此所謂挹而損之之道 d 退 e 高者抑之下者
舉之有餘者損之 2062 a 挹 b 集 c 弟子无挹於前 d 揖 2063 a 揖 b
膝 c 衆吏皆至受揖而立 2064 a 逆 b 御 c 惟朕小子其新逆我國家
禮亦宜之 d 受 e 親 f 新 2065 a 亦 b 易 c 亦饗舜 d 五十以學易可
以無大過矣 e 視之亦變 f 天 2066 a 液 b 醴 c 春液角 d 釋 e 釋 f

Chung on Chouli: Kung jen phr. c. Since b. makes no sense, it has been concluded that it stands for another char. in the Hs series and Lu Tê-ming says it is here read either (Anc. *ṣāk*=) Arch. *dṣāk*, serving for d.: "In the spring one (continues with:) again works the horn"; or (Anc. *ṣṣāk*=) Arch. *ṣṣāk*, serving for e.: "In the spring one (dissolves:) softens the horn". The latter was probably Cheng Chung's idea, since a. in phr. c. 'to make moisture of'='to soften' comes to the same meaning. But then there is no need of a Kt, a. itself making good sense. Cf. that in Lao 15 there is the phr. f. which in Wen-tsī: Shang jen recurs as g. The a. is not Kt for e. nor *vice versa*; they are approximately synonymous.

2067. y i (*ṣṣāk* a) 'to increase' Kt for s i (*siēk* b) 'to give' says Wen Yi-to on Yi: Kua 41 and Kua 42 phr. c.: "Someone gives him ten pairs of tortoise-shell; it must not be opposed". (Some comm. punctuate after c h ī which makes poor sense). — Reject. Besides being phonetically unsatisfactory Wen's Kt is unreasonable. Kua 41 has the name s u n d. 'to reduce' and Kua 42 is called y i a. 'to increase'. It is obvious that a. in phr. c. has the meaning demanded by this nomenclature. c.= "Someone (increases:) enriches him with ten pairs of tortoise-shell, and it must not be (opposed:) refused".

2068. y i (*dṣṣāk* a) 'to change' Kt for c h ī (*ṣṣṣāk* b) 'one single' says Wang Yin-chī on Kung-yang: Hi 33, one text version (ap. Shīwen) phr. c., where the orthodox version has d. Ho Hiu defines b. as=e. 'one-footed' (ex. of this in Kyü), i.e. 'single'. — Plausible.

2069. y i (*dṣṣāk* a) 'to change' and y i (*dṣṣṣg* a) (changeable:) 'easy' Kt for y i (*dṣṣṣ* b) 'to transfer, to spread' says Ma Juei-ch'en on Ode 211 phr. c.: "The grain is (spreading:) ample all over the acres". — Refuted in Gloss 681. a. is really Kt for the homophonous y i (*dṣṣṣk* d) 'to work': "The grain is (worked:) well-cultivated all over the acres".

Again, on Sün: Ju hiao phr. e. studied in LC par. 1497 Ho Yi-hang says a. is Kt for *dṣṣṣ* b. — Reject.

2070. y i (*dṣṣṣk* a) 'to change' and y i (*dṣṣṣg* a) 'easy, at ease' Kt for s h ī (*ṣṣṣṣṣ* b) 'to expand' and y i (*dṣṣṣṣ* b) 'to spread to' says Ho Yi-hang on Ode 199, Mao version, phr. c., where the Han version has d. — Reject. The b. of the Han version is obviously a variant for s h ī (*ṣṣṣṣṣ* e) 'to slacken, to relax' (b. and e. within the same Hs series are often interchangeable): "My heart his relaxed". But the b. of the Han version fails in the rimes of the stanza and it is evidently a gloss word which has crept into the text. c.= "My heart is at ease", see Gloss 611.

Again, in Yi: Wen yen phr. f. Yü Yüē says a. Kt for b. — Reject. Again, on Li: Yüē ling phr. g. Yü Yüē says *dṣṣṣg* a. is Kt for *ṣṣṣṣṣ* e. — Reject. g.= "One (makes easy:) alleviates the [charges at] the frontier gates and the markets".

2071. y i (*dṣṣṣk* a) 'to change' and y i (*dṣṣṣg* a) 'easy, at ease' Kt for c h ī (*d'ṣṣṣ* b) 'to fall, to collapse' says Yü Yüē on Tso: Siang 26 phr. c.: "Luan and Fan (throw down:) reduce their ranks [of soldiers] in order to deceive them". — Reject. c. either= "L. and F. alter (*dṣṣṣk*) their ranks"; or= "L. and F. (alleviate:) reduce (*dṣṣṣg*) their ranks".

2072. y i (*dṣṣṣk* a) 'to change' and y i (*dṣṣṣg* a) 'easy, at ease' Kt for c h ī (*d'ṣṣṣ* b)

'to gallop, to run after' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Ying ti wang phr. c., without explaining how he understands the binome. — Reject. Kuo K'ing-fan: s ü y i c. means the same as the phr s ü t' u d. 'an underling' (see Chouli) who carries out y i (dǐèk e) 'menial service', a being Kt for the homophonous e., as often (see Gloss 871) Convincing.

Ma Sü-lun has the wildest Kt ideas. On Chuang: K'o yi phr. f.: "He is restful and so he is (even, level:) calm and at ease", a simple and natural phr., he says dǐèk, dǐèg a. is Kt for t s' i (dz'iar g) 'even'='calm'.

2073. y i (dǐèk a) 'lizard' Kt for s i (siek b) 'lizard' says Lu Tê-ming on Ode 192, Mao version, phr. c.: "Why are they lizards?" This because the Ts'i version read d. — The two words are merely synonymous (and possibly cognate); no reason why a. should be read like b. or *vice versa*.

2074. y i (dǐèk a) 'raised borders between fields; boundary', as in Ode 210 phr. b.: "The boundaries and divisions are orderly", Kt for h i (g'iweg c) 'an agricultural area' says Chang Ping-lin (Wen shī 4). — Reject.

2075. y i (dǐèk a) 'work' etc. Kt for y i n g (giěng b) says Tuan Yü-ts'ai on Ode 245, Mao version, phr. c., the b. here not having its ordinary meaning 'ear of grain' but 'stalk of grain'. This because another text version (ap. Shuowen) reads d. — Refuted in Gloss 871 (see a detailed discussion there). The two versions are not reconcilable. c.: "(The culture of grain:) the grain cultivated . . ."; d.: "The ears of grain . . .".

2076. y i (dǐèk a) 'work' etc. Kt for t' o u (t'u b) says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: K'ie k'ie phr. c. Hū Shen defines b. as meaning 'clever. shrewd' (no text; b. means 'to slight, to despise' in Tso), and Li (ap. Lu Tê-ming) defines our y i y i a. as='sly, shrewd'. — Reject. The phr. y i y i occurs in Chuang: Ts'i wu lun phr. d., and there it clearly means e. 'to toil', analogous to a. 'work'. It should have the same meaning here in phr. c.: 'to work, to elaborate'. c.=(One rejects the simple-minded people and) "one likes the eloquence of the elaborately arguing ones".

2077. y i (giæk a) 'wing; to protect; to aid; respectful' etc. Kt for k o (kək b)

若冰之將釋 g 若冰之液 2067 a 益 b 錫 c 或益之十朋之龜弗克違
d 損 2068 a 易 b 隼 c 匹馬易輪無反若 d 隼輪 e 踦 2069 a 易 b 移
c 禾易長畝 d 役 e 若夫充虛之相施易也 2070 a 易 b 施 c 我心易
也 d 我心施也 e 弛 f 不易乎世 g 易關市 2071 a 易 b 弛 c 藥范易
行以誘之 2072 a 易 b 馳 c 胥易 d 胥徒 e 役 f 休焉則平易 g 齊
2073 a 錫 b 蜥 c 胡為虺蜥 d 胡為虺蜥 2074 a 場 b 疆場翼翼 c 畦
2075 a 役 b 穎 c 禾役穰穰 d 禾穀穰穰 2076 a 役 b 踰 c 悅夫役役之
位 d 終身役役而不見其功 e 勞 2077 a 翼 b 革 c 越予小子考翼 d

'leather' says Chang Ping-lin on Shu: Ta kao phr. c., in which the b. would mean 'leather-faced'='old', the k' a o y i thus being a synonym binome: "My, the little child's ,elders". — Refuted in Gloss 1602. A great many interpretations of this k' a o -y i have been advanced, see in detail that Gloss. c. probably means: "My, the little child's, old coadjutors".

Again, on Shu: To shī, Ma Jung's version, phr. d. Chang Ping-lin says a. Kt for b., here in the sense of 'to change' (common): "It was not that our small state dared to change Yin's mandate". — Refuted in Gloss 1799. The orthodox Pseudo-K'ung version reads e., and since Ma Jung defined his a. by f. 'to take', PK'ung (followed by Chu Tsün-sheng and others) probably took *giək* a. to be Kt for y i (*djak* g) 'to shoot'='to catch' and altered a. into g.; reject. — Probably the a. is a corruption of the very similar k i h. 'to hope for': "It was not that our small state dared to aspire to Yin's mandate". For further details see Gloss 1799.

2078. y i (*giək* a) 'wing; to protect; to aid; respectful' etc. occurs in Sün: Fu kuo phr. b. Yang Liang first explains the text as it stands: "Then the state . . . will be more long-lived than the K'i and the Yi constellations" (on the firmament). The const. Ki c. has the variant K'i d. in Shī ki: T'ien kuan shu; the const. Yi a. is known from Li: Yüe ling.

But then Yang alternatively refers to Li: K'ü li phr. e., where y i (*giæg* f) 'chin' means g. 'to nourish'. Cheng Hün curiously takes h. to mean i.: "When one is a hundred years old, it is said that one k' i (seeks:) is anxious to y i nourish him". But Ch'en Hao, more reasonably, punctuates after k' i: "When one is a hundred years old one is called k' i h. aged (properly: one who has reached the time limit); he is fed" (cannot himself eat). Yang now proposes, alternatively, that in phr. b. the d. stands for h. (within the same Hs series) and that *giək* a. is Kt for *giæg* f. b.: "Then the state will be more long-lived than the aged and fed ones". An amusing idea.

Sun Yi-jang (Cha yi) says *giək* a. is Kt for y i (*djak* j.) 'flanges' on Ting tripods mentioned in Erya: Shī k'i, a word known from no text. The word would here serve as *pars pro toto* for Ting.: "Then the state will be more long-lived than the banners (with commemorating texts) and the (flanged ones=) Ting tripods (with inscriptions)". Still more comical than the preceding and phonetically unsound. — Yang's first explanation is obviously best.

Sun's theory, however, recurs in another context. On Mo: Keng chu phr. k. Sun says that the y i (*giæg* l) is a short-form for *giək* a. and the phr. refers to the famous "nine Ting tripods". Here again a. would mean the same as j.: "the flanged ones". Yü Sing-wu then proposes that *giək* a. is Kt, not for *djak* j. but for k o (*klək* m) 'partition'='flange'. Rather, then, the *giək* a. would have its proper reading='wing': "the winged (flanged) ones". But even so the idea is too far-fetched.

2079. y i (*·iək* a) 'to suppress'. For the relation of this word and char. to y i (*·iəd* b) 'beautiful' see par. 2046 above.

On Ode 193 phr. c. Cheng Hün says a. Kt for y i (*·iæg* d) 'oh!' which we have in Ode 277 phr. e., where Lu Tê-ming has a text variant f. Thus c.: "Oh, this Huang-fu". Cheng may have known that the Han version instead of c. had the reading g.,

and Sū Miao follows Cheng. Lu Tê-ming, however, in phr. c. reads a. in its ordinary way as an initial particle *·iək*. Thus c.: “However, this Huang-fu” as in Ode 78 phr. h. and in Lun: Tsī Chang phr. i. — Cheng’s Kt should be rejected. We should keep apart the two form words: *·iæg* ‘oh!’ and *·iək* ‘initial particle’, often with an adversative nuance, see in detail Gloss 552.

Yü Yüe on Meng: Liang Huei wang, shang phr. j. would again take a. as Kt for d., f. but there is no reason for so doing; here it is clearly not the interjection ‘oh!’ but the initial particle. The scribes of the Han stone classics have made the same mistake when in Lun: Hüe er phr. k. they have replaced a. by g.

2080. y i (*djak* a) ‘to shoot with string attached’ Kt for t’ê (*d’ək* b) ‘single’ says Yang Shu-ta on the Nung Yu inscr. phr. c. “Do not cause Nung to be single” (unmarried). — Plausible, confirmed by the context.

2081. y i (*djak* a) ‘to shoot with string attached’ Kt for chī (*īək* b) ‘slice of dried meat’ says Sun Yi-jang on Yen-tsi: Nei p’ien tsa hia phr. c.: (The poor scholar Yen-tsi) “cooked three slices of dried meat and five eggs”. Lu Wen-ch’ao refers to Ta Tai li: Hia siao cheng phr. d.: “y i a. that means a bird” (which you shoot with an arrow that could be hauled back): “He cooked three birds and five eggs”. This demands no Kt.

2082. y i (*ngieg* a) ‘young and weak’ Kt for a i (*ngëg* b) ‘bank, limit’ says Lu Tê-ming on Chuang: Ta tsung shī phr. c.: “They do not know the beginning or the (limit:) end”. — Plausible. b. in the sense of ‘limit, terminal’ occurs in Chuang: Yang sheng chu phr. d.: “Our life has a (limit:) end”, and in the phr. e. in Chuang: T’ien hia phr. f.: “speeches without beginning or end”, discursive speeches. — Whereas Lu says a. is read like b. (Kt for b. as above), Sū Miao says it “has the sound y i g.” This g. was Anc. *ngiei*. An anc. *ngiei* can correspond to Arch. *ngiar* but also to Arch. *ngieg*, and Sū by his *ngiei* may have meant the same as Lu: “the limit, the terminal”. If so, this *ngieg* a. would be Kt for a homophonous *ngieg* ‘limit, terminal’, a stem variation of *ngëg* b. ‘bank, limit, terminal’. — It should be added that in phr. c. Tuan Yü-tsai says *ngieg* a. is Kt for t’i (*d’ieg* h), which, of course, is excluded.

2083. Y i (*ngieg* a) ‘young and weak’ Kt for b. ‘absent-minded, dull-witted’ says Yü Sing-wu on Kuan: Cheng shī phr. c. (In Kuan: K’ing chung, mou there is the

非我小國敢翼殷命 e 戈殷命 f 取 g 戈 h 冀 2078 a 翼 b 則國壽於
旗翼 c 策 d 旗 e 百年曰期頤 f 頤 g 養 h 期 i 要 j 錢 k 三棘六異
l 異 m 隔 2079 a 抑 b 懿 c 抑此皇父 d 噫 e 噫嘻成王 f 意嘻 g 意
此皇父 h 抑磬控忌 i 抑末矣 j 抑王興甲兵 k 抑與之與 2080 a 戈
b 特 c 毋俾蓑戈 2081 a 戈 b 職 c 及三戈五卯 d 戈也者禽也 2082
a 倪 b 涯崖 c 不知端倪 d 吾生也有涯 e 端崖 f 无端崖之辭 g 詒
h 題 2083 a 倪 b 荅蘭 c 力罷則不能毋隨倪 d 歸市亦惰倪 e 隨 f

phr. d. and Yü Yüe rightly says e. in c. stands for f.). The word b. would here be the same as in Chuang: Ts'i wu lun: phr. g.: "Dull-minded and weary", and Lu Tê-ming there reads it n i e (*niat*), but the Ts'ing scholars identify it with a Shuowen word n i (*niar* h) 'ignorant and weak' (which is known from no text). Yü's Kt is phonetically impossible.

The a. in phrases c. and d. has been variously explained, but it is, after all, obvious that t o - y i is a binome of either synonymous or kindred components. Since a. is well attested in the sense of 'young and weak' (Meng: Liang Huei wang, hia), we need not operate with any Kt at all. c. = "When their strength is exhausted, there cannot be but laziness and weakness"; d.: "[Even for] going to the market they are too lazy and (weak:) sluggish".

2084. y i (*giæg* a) 'different, strange' etc. Kt for k i (*kieg* b) says Wang Sien-k'ien on Ode 42, Mao version phr. c. where the Han version has d. The Han school has defined b. as meaning e. "She is truly beautiful and lovable". b., however, is known from no other pre-Han text; when occurring in Han time (Shī ki), it means 'quiet', and in our Ode it fails in the rime (the rime word being *dīæg* f). Evidently the Mao version c. is superior and a. is not Kt for b.

2085. y i (*giæg* a) 'different, strange' Kt for k' i b., which would be short-form for k' i (*k'ia* c) 'one-footed' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Shan mu phr. d. — Reject.

2086. y i (*ngiæg* a) 'to doubt, to suspect' etc. Kt for y i (*ngiæt* b) 'powerful' says Cheng Hūan on Yili: Hiang yin tsiu li phr. c. (he repeats this under Yili: Shī hun li). — Reject. a. is a short-form for y i (*ngiæk* d): "He stands firmly".

2087. y i (*·iæg* a) and y i (*·iæg* b) as its short-form have often been stated to be Kt for the particle y i (*·iæk* c). — Refuted in par. 2079 above.

On Chuang: Tsê yang phr. d. Ma Sü lun says a. is Kt for s h i (*šięg* e) 'only': "That is only empty talk". — Reject. d. = "Oh, is not that empty talk".

2088. y i (*dīæg* a) 'I, me' etc. When a. has this meaning it is Kt for w o (*ngá* b) says Ho Yi-hang (Erya yi shu). His reason for this is surprising. Corresponding to Ode 223, Mao version, phr. c. the Han school had d. instead of e., defining this d. as=b. (*ngá* b being Phonetic in *ngia* f.) Ho concludes that *ngia* f., d. could mean 'I, me' and further proposes that *dīæg* a. could be Kt for this *ngia*. — It is hardly necessary to point out that *ngia* d. is a variant for *ngia* e. (both p'ing sheng and etymologically the same word) and that the "I, me" idea is wholly wrong. A *dīæg* Kt for a *ngia* is, of course, excluded.

2089. y i (*dīæg* a) 'I, we' etc. Kt for y i (*giæg* b) 'to nourish' says Yü Sing-wu on Ode 245 in the version of Ts'ien fu lun and Lie nü chuan (as quoted in T'ai p'ing yü lan) phr. c.: "And then he has nourishment in his house". — Reject, phonetically unsound. The orthodox Mao version has d. "An then he has his house in T'ai", which is quite satisfactory.

2090. y i (*dīæg* a) 'I, we' Kt for s i (*dzīæg* b) 'to succeed' says Chang Ping-lin on Shu: Yü kung phr. c. "respectfully to succeed to the virtuous ancestors". In favour of this could be adduced the two divergent versions in Shu: Yao (Shun) tien d. ~ e. For this intricate line and its various interpretations see, however, Gloss 1253. — On phr. c. Yü Sing-wu, better, says a. is here an enlarged variant of y i (*zīæg* f),

as often in bronze inscriptions. c.=“Only according to their virtue they advanced”, see Gloss 1383, where various other attempts have been discussed.

2091. y i (*djæg* a) when meaning ‘to give’ (the ordinary meaning) Kt for y i (*giwed* b) ‘to leave, to transfer’ says Chu Tsün-sheng. — Reject.

2092. y i (*zjæg* a) ‘to take, to use, by’ etc. is, *inter alia*, Kt for y u n g (*djüng* b) ‘to use’ says Chang Ping-lin (Wen shī 8). — Reject.

2093. y i (*zjæg* a) ‘to take, to use, by’ Kt for y ü (*zjo* b) says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 22 phr. c. This y ü b. has several meanings but Chu refers to Kuangya: Shī ku phr. d. Thus b.: “She would not endow us”. Chu’s reason is that Cheng Hūan on phr. c. says e.: “y i a. is equal to y ü b.”. — Reject. Chu has misunderstood Cheng. In the next stanza we have phr. f.: “She would not associate with us”, and Cheng’s gloss e. means, not that a. is Kt for b. but merely that the line c. is analogous to the following line f. c.=“She would not take us”.

Again, on Lao 20 phr. g. Ma Sü-lun says a. Kt for b.: “The multitude of men all have something which they give”. — Reject. g.=“... all have their use”.

2094. y i (*zjæg* a) ‘to take, to use, by’ etc. Kt for y u (*giüg* b) ‘again’ says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Yü yen phr. c.: “How much the more then [when they] again have something they depend on?” — Reject. c.=“How much the more then y i (because) since they [in their turn] have something they depend on”. Or, possibly, a.=d. (both *zjæg* and often interchangeable); c.=“How much the more then (when) they already have something they depend on”.

2095. y i (*zjæg* a) occurs in Yi: Kua 41 phr. b., and there Shīwen records that Yü Fan read c.: “For sacrificial services, quickly to go — no fault”. It is not clear whether Yü took *zjæg* a. as Kt for s ī (*dzjæg* d) ‘sacrifice’, or he had a text reading c. The orthodox interpr. is: b.=“Having finished one’s task, quickly to go — no fault”. There was a variant (ap. Shīwen) e. (a. and e., both *zjæg*, being interchangeable).

2096. y i (*zjæg* a) ‘to finish’ etc. Kt for s h ī (*djæk* b) ‘to know’ says Chu Tsün-sheng on Li: T’an Kung phr. c.: “Because the dead person is one whom we cannot know apart (from others)”. Chu says that Cheng Hūan in gloss on Chouli: Siao

情 g 忝然疲役 h 闕 2084 a 異 b 慈 c 洵美且異 d 洵美且慈 e 悅 f
貽 2085 a 異 b 奇 c 跼 d 覩一異鶴 2086 a 疑 b 仇 c 疑立 d 疑 2087
a 噫 b 意 c 抑 d 噫其虛言與 e 營 2088 a 台 b 義 c 如食宜鉅 d 儀
e 宜 f 義 2089 a 台 b 頤 c 有台家室 d 有郇家室 2090 a 台 b 嗣 c
祇台德先 d 舜讓于德弗嗣 e 弗台(怡) f 以 2091 a 詒貽 b 遺 2092 a
以 b 用 2093 a 以 b 與 c 不我以 d 以予也 e 以猶與也 f 不我與 g
衆人皆有以 2094 a 以 b 乂 c 而況乎以有待者乎 d 已 2095 a 已 b
已事遄往 c 祀事遄往 d 祀 e 以事 2096 a 已 b 識 c 以死者為不可

chu quotes the line with b. instead of a., but that is erroneous. — Reject. b. is the ordinary final particle. c.=“Because the dead person is one whom we can no longer distinguish (from others)”.

Again, on Sün: T'ien lun phr. d.: (What we know about Heaven is) “that we can register those phenomena that can be expected” he says a. Kt for b. But here, with Liang K'i-hung, a. is clearly a corruption of e. Liang would apply this likewise to phr. c.; possible but unnecessary, since c. makes good sense without tampering with the text.

2097. y i (zǐəg a) ‘different, remarkable’ occurs in Shu: Yao tien phr. b.: “He is remarkable”. Cheng Hüan says a. is equal to y i (gǐəg c) ‘different’, and probably he took a. as Kt for c. (the Arch. initials lost at Cheng’s time). — Reject; the two words were merely synonymous, cf. Gloss 1239.

2098. y i n (·iǎn a) ‘to rest upon; because of’ etc. Kt for y i n (·iǣn b) ‘covering wall in front of city gate’ in Kung-yang: Chao 21 phr. c., corresponding to phr. d. in Ode 92.

2099. y i n (dǐǎn a) ‘to pull, to stretch’ Kt for y i n (·iǣn b) ‘to govern; to regulate, regular’, says Chu Tsün-sheng on Tso: Chao 1 phr. c.: “They regulated their boundaries”. This because Tu Yü defines a. by d. — Reject. c.=“They (stretched out:) laid out their boundaries”.

2100. y i n (·iǣn a) ‘to govern, to regulate, regular’ Kt for y ü n (gǐǣn b) ‘rind of bamboo’ says Cheng Hüan on Li: P’ing yi phr. c., in which the qualities of jade are praised. He further says that d. is a short-form for e. and he defines his f. as describing the g. rich colour of the jade: the “floating bamboo-rind [colour]”. — Very strained. Y i n a. is well attested meaning ‘regular, correct’ (Li: k’ü li phr. h.) which goes well together with f u d. ‘sincere, truthful, to verify’: c.=“Its (the jade’s) genuineness being apparent on all sides”.

2101. y i n (·iǣn a) ‘great; Yin dynasty’ etc. Kt for y e n (·iǣn b) ‘smoke’ says Tu Yü on Tso: Ch’eng 2 phr. c.: (A warrior had bled profusely:) “My left (chariot-) wheel is reddish (smoky:) black”. Sü Miao still reads a. here y i n (·iǣn). But Lu Tê-ming has not accepted this; he reads a. y e n (·ɛn), taking ·iǣn a. as Kt for a word ·ɛn ‘purple’: “My left wheel is ch u-y e n purple-coloured” (by the blood). If this is right, this ·ɛn seems to be a *hapax legomenon*.

2102. y i n (·iǣn a) ‘to conceal’ etc. Kt for y e n (·iǣn b) ‘dyke, a conduit, a drain’ says Sun Yi-jang on Kuan: K’ing chung, hia phr. c.: “I beg that by your order they shall (dyke off:) drain the three streams”. — Possible but unnecessary, a. itself meaning ‘a low wall’ (ex. in Tso: Siang 23) will give the same meaning: ‘to wall off, to dyke off’=‘to drain’.

Again, on Ta Tai li: Pao fu phr. d. Sun says a. Kt for y e n (·iǣn e) ‘to bend down’: “If he lays aside the lute and citre”. — Unnecessary. a., ‘conceal’=‘to put aside’ will give the same meaning.

Similarly, when on Kyü: Ts’i yü phr. f. Yü Yüe says a. Kt for e., this is likewise unnecessary.

2103. y i n (·iǣn a) ‘to conceal’ etc. Kt for y i (·iǣr b) ‘to lean upon, to rely on’ says Yü Yüe on Yen: Wai p’ien, Chung er yi chē phr. c.: “They rely upon the ruler’s

authority". — Possible. But there is a question of the common phr. d. "to lean upon a stool" (e.g. Meng: Kung-sun Ch'ou, hia) where all tradition has it that *·iən*, shang sheng, 'to conceal' is Kt for a *·iən*, k'ü sheng, 'to lean upon'. This would suit phr. c. equally well.

2104. *y i n* (*·iən a*) 'to conceal' Kt for *y i* (*·iək b*) 'to calculate' or for *y i* (*·iəg c*) 'to think, to estimate' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Shu: P'an Keng phr. d.: "May you all (calculate, estimate:) consider"; this because in Li: Shao yi Cheng Hūan defines a. by c., see below. — Refuted in Gloss 1483, where various explanations of phr. d. have been examined. a. is probably, with Pseudo-K'ung and others, a short-form for e. 'a carpenter's correcting frame': d. = "May you all correct yourselves".

The idea that a. could mean 'to estimate', though not as Kt for b., c., is in itself quite plausible. The a. is homophonous with the char. *y i n* (*·iən f*) — both shang sheng and interchangeable in Ode 26, see Gloss 65 — and this f. in Shu: Yao tien phr. g.: "in order to determine exactly the middle of the spring" has the fundamental sense of 'to hit the mark (h.), make a precise calculation'. Two instances should be studied here:

In Li: Shao yi phr. i. Cheng Hūan (as said above) defines a. as = c.: "He (the commander) estimates the conditions" (for the battle); this could be admissible in taking a. as Kt for f. But Ch'en Hao interprets: "He conceals his (feelings:) intentions" (not showing his hand to the enemy), which will do with a. in its primary sense, without any Kt.

Again, on Kuan: Kin ts'ang phr. j. Chu Tsün-sheng says a. Kt for b., c.: (The noble man . . . observes those who fall short, are deficient)" in order to estimate himself"; this since Yin Ch'ang defines a. by k. 'to measure'. This could be accepted, with a. as Kt for f. But it is certainly more simple and plausible to take a. as short-form for e., as in d. above: "in order to correct himself".

2105. *y i n* (*·iən a*) 'to conceal' Kt for *t s' ü n* (*ts'üwən b*) 'to draw back' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Yili: Sh' siang kien li phr. c.: "He draws back and withdraws and puts on his shoes". This because Cheng Hūan in his free paraphrase employs the word b. — Reject. a. has its fundamental meaning: "He (hidingly withdraws:) keeps out of sight and puts on his shoes". This is what in Li: K'ü li is called d.: (He goes to his shoes and) "screens himself off at the side".

別已 d 已其見象之可以期者矣 e 記 2097 a 昇 b 昇哉 c 異 2098 a
因 b 閏 c 因諸 d 閏閏 2099 a 引 b 尹 c 引其封疆 d 正 2100 a 尹 b
筠 c 孚尹旁達 d 孚 e 浮 f 浮筠 g 玉米色 h 尹祭 2101 a 殷 b 煙 c
左輪朱殷 2102 a 隱 b 匿偃 c 請以命隱三川 d 隱琴瑟 e 偃 f 隱武
事 2103 a 隱 b 依 c 隱君之威 d 隱几 2104 a 隱 b 憶 c 意 d 尚皆隱
哉 e 隳 f 殷 g 以殷仲春 h 中 i 隱情 j 以自隱也 k 度 2105 a 隱 b

2106. yin (·iəm a) 'shade, darkness; to shade, to shelter' etc. Kt for k i a n g (kəŋg b) 'to let down, to lower' says Liu Feng-lu on Shu: Hung fan par. c.: "Heaven lowers or raises the people here below". — Refuted in Gloss 1520. c.= "Heaven shelters and raises the people here below".

2107. yin (·iəm a) 'shade, darkness; to shade, to shelter' Kt for a n (·əm b) 'to know' says Ma Juei-ch'en on Ode 257 phr. c.: "I know you". — Refuted in Gloss 984. c.= "I have gone to shelter you".

2108. yin (d̥iəm a) 'to soak; excess, licentious, to let loose, to liberate' Kt for h i n (χiəm b) 'to lift up, to display' says Cheng Chung on Chouli: Sī fu, "an old text version" ap. Cheng, phr. c. The orthodox version reads d.: "Displayed garments". The same contrast a.: b. in the text versions obtains again in Chouli: Sī k'iu, Ta shī, Sī ping, and Cheng Chung repeats his Kt, defining a. as meaning e. — The Kt is phonetically unsatisfactory. In the versions with a. this latter has an extension of meaning: "the garment (let loose:) liberated" i.e. taken out of their store rooms. The meaning 'to liberate, to let loose' of a. is well attested (Shu: Pi shī etc.).

On the other hand, in Chouli: Tsiang jen, where the orthodox version has phr. f., Cheng Chung, true to his theory above, says a. is Kt for b., which would mean: "A good dyke, the water (lifts it up:) augments it", makes it thicker by its sediments; a desperate explanation. Cheng Hūan declines it and keeps the a. which he explains as=g. 'to moisten' which, as interpreted by Tuan Yü-ts'ai, would give the same meaning as Cheng Chung's above: "A good dyke the water (moistens:) enriches it" (by its sediments); just as bad. — f.= "A good dyke, the water [only] moistens it" (but it does not give way).

2109. yin (d̥iəm a) 'to soak; excess' etc. (see 2108 above) Kt for s h e n (d̥iəm b) 'excessive, very' etc. says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 284 phr. c.: "He has great dignity". — Unnecessary. a.: 'excess, excessive'='great' is a natural *nuance*.

2110. ying (·iǎŋg a) 'flower' etc. Kt for k' i u n g (g'iwǎŋg b) 'precious stone' says Ma Juei-ch'en on Ode 108 phr. c. — Reject, see Gloss 273. c.= "He is beautiful like a flower".

On Lü: Ku yüe phr. d. Ma Sü-lun says a. Kt for p' e n g (b'ǎŋg e): (To beat with his tail on his own belly) "it sounded b'ǎŋg-b'ǎŋg". — Reject. d.: "it sounded ·iǎŋg-·iǎŋg".

2111. ying (·iǎŋg a) 'to press against' Kt for j u n g (·iwǎŋg b) 'to entwine, to entangle' says Kuo Siang on Chuang: Ta tsung shī phr. c.: "Entangled (sc. by the external world) and yet calm". This was accepted by Sū Miao and Ts'uei Chuan, but Li read it in its ordinary way: ·iǎŋg. The word occurs in Meng: Tsin sin, hia phr. d.: "Nobody dared to (press against:) go near to him" (the tiger), where Chao K'i defines a. by e. 'to press'. — Kuo's theory is phonetically admissible but no Kt is necessary, in view of the good Meng parallel: c.= "(Pressed:) disturbed (by the external world) and yet calm".

a. recurs in several more Chuang passages. Chuang: Tsai yu phr. f. (where Lu Tê-ming again records both readings ·iwǎŋg and ·iǎŋg; here Sī-ma Piao defines a. as=g.: "do not allure people's hearts" (kindred to the "entangle" of Kuo's). Chuang: Keng Sang Ch'u phr. h. (Lu gives both readings but here Sū Miao prefers ·iǎŋg

and Lu refers to Kuangya: a.=i. 'to disturb'). Chuang: Sū Wu Kuei phr. j. (Lu both readings). — We should probably in all these cases, with Li above, read *·iěng* 'to press against, to disturb'.

2112. *y i n g* (*·iěng* a) 'tumour, goitre' (ex. of this in Chuang: Tê ch'ung fu) Kt for *y i n* (*·iəm* b) 'dumb' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Lü: Tsin shu phr. c.: (Where there is much light water) "there are bald and dumb men". This because Kao Yu defines a. here as=d. 'gullet-sick'. — Reject. Kao may merely have meant that a goitre made the swallowing difficult. c.= "there are men who are bald and who have goitres".

2113. *y i n g* (*dǐěng* a) 'surplus' etc. Kt for *t' i n g* (*t' ieng* b) 'slow, slack' says Cheng Hüan on Ode 258 phr. c.: "(Heaven's brilliance) comes without slackening". — Refuted in Gloss 961. c.= (Oh, you noblemen) "come brightly forward (without surplus, none remaining:) all of you".

a. is etymologically the same word as *y i n g* (*dǐěng* d) 'full' (see the said Gloss, discussing a line in Ode 256) and one could argue that in phr. c. above the a. is a variant for d. as short-form for b. The latter, however, (a Shuowen word, there defined as meaning 'slow, slack'), is not known from pre-Han sources, with one possible exception: in the Shen-tsi T'o inscr. phr. e. Kuo Mo-jo would take f. as variant for b. and he explains it as Kt for *t' i n g* (*t' ieng* g) 'to hear, to listen, to obey'; hence, since this *t' i n g* would form the verb of the clause, he takes *t s o* h. as short-form for *t s o* i. 'yesterday'. — This is all very speculative. In the inscriptions h. mostly stands for *t s o* j. (so taken by Yü Sing-wu in phr. e.) and then f. is a direct object of j. and cannot mean 'to hear'. — The line e. remains obscure and cannot save Cheng's interpr. in phr. c.

2114. *y i n g* (*giwěng* a) 'point of an ear of grain, sharp point' Kt for *k i n g* (*kǐěng* b) 'to warn' says Chu Tsün-sheng on the word a. in Li: Shao yi in an enumeration of objects handed over with certain rules of propriety. This because Cheng Hüan defines a. by c. "a warning pillow", whatever that may mean (there have been various weird attempts at expl.). Since there is a variant in certain text versions: *k i u n g* (*kiweng* d) 'bright' matters become even more confused. — Cheng's idea (which later comm. have not dared abandon) that in a. it is a question of a "pillow" is very arbitrary and misleading; the list of objects presented in a cere-

送 c 隱辟而履 d 屨於側 2106 a 陰 b 降 c 惟天陰 蔭下民 2107 a 陰
b 語 c 既之陰女 2108 a 淫 b 厥 c 淫衣服 d 厥衣服 e 陳 f 善防者
水淫之 g 淫液 2109 a 淫 b 甚 c 既有淫威 2110 a 英 b 瓊 c 美如英
d 其音英英 e 彭 2111 a 櫻 b 紫 c 櫻盛 d 莫之敢櫻 e 迫 f 汝慎無
櫻人心 g 引 h 不以人物利害相櫻 i 亂 j 勿櫻 2112 a 瘠 b 瘠 c 禿與
瘠人 d 咽疾 2113 a 羸 b 綴 c 昭假無羸 d 盈 e 乍紹于周公采 f 紹
g 聽 h 乍 i 昨 j 作 2114 a 穎 b 傲警 c 警枕 d 穎 e 刀卻刃授穎

monious way is highly heterogeneous: *h u* tablets, *sh u* documents, *siu* dried meat, *pao tsü* wrapped-up viands, *kung* bow, *yin* bed mat, *si* mat, *chen* pillow, *ki* stool, *ying a.*, *chang* staff, *k'in sê* lute and citre, *kuo* dagger-axe etc. Observe that since the *ying a.* is separated from the *chen* pillow by *ki* stool, there is no reason why it should have anything to do with a pillow. In an immediately following line it is said *e.*: (In presenting a sword) "one turns away the edge and presents the *ying a.* pointed ring on the handle". Here the meaning is unambiguous. Evidently *ying a.* has the same meaning: 'pointed ring handle' in the enumeration immediately preceding, *d.* being wrong for *a.* (GSR 828 should be corrected accordingly).

2115. *ying (giwǝng a)* 'to delineate, to plan, to build' etc. Kt for *b.* says Wang Sien-k'ien on Ode 97, Ts'i version, phr. *c.*, where the Mao version has *d.* — *b.* in its proper reading was Arch. *g'wan* with a fundamental meaning of 'to turn round'. It was synonymous with and often used for *sü an (dziwan e)* 'to turn round' (this is then not a phonetic Kt but a "synonym Kt"), and so it is read (*dziwan*) in phr. *d.*, the meaning by extension being 'agile'. — Wang's Kt should be rejected; *b.* fails in the rime in the stanza and *c.* is evidently a faulty text.

2116. *ying (giwǝng a)* 'to delineate, to plan, to build' etc. Kt for *b.* says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Keng Sang Ch'u phr. *c.*: "Do not let your thoughts be (striving:) anxiously searching". This because Hsü Shen defines *b.* as=*d.* — On the contrary. The char. *b.* has two readings: *hü an (xiwan)* and *hiung (xiwǝng)*, the latter acc. to Lu Tê-ming in Ku-liang: Wen 14. Neither reading is Kt for the other, they were two independent words, both meaning 'distant' but placed under the same char. (just as char. *e.* both *kü e/kiwat* and *mei/miad*). The phr. *ying-k'iu d.* 'to plan for and seek' (to strive for) was well known in Han time and when Hsü Shen defined *b.* 'distant' as meaning *d.* 'to strive for', he evidently knew of some text where *xiwǝng b.* 'distant' was Kt for our *giwǝng a.* in the sense of *d.* 'to plan for, to strive for'. Thus our line *c.*, without any Kt. has the meaning given above.

2117. *ying (diǝng a)* 'to accompany' Kt for *ch'eng (diǝng b)* 'to continue' say Kuo Mo-jo and Yang Shu-ta on the Tou Pi Kuei inscr. phr. *c.*: "Follow up (carry on) your ancestors' services". — Plausible.

2118. *yu (giǝg a)* 'to repeat; again, moreover': Kt for *huo (g'wak b)* 'some; perhaps' etc. says Wu K'ai-sheng on Shu: To shī phr. *c.*: "Now perhaps you will say". — Unnecessary and phonetically poor. *c.*= "Now you further say".

Again, on the Mao Kung Ting inscr. phr. *d.* Yang Shu-ta says *a.* Kt for *b.*: "Do not perchance dare . . ." (Kuo Mo-jo says *a.* here stands for *e.* which makes poor sense). — Reject. *d.*= "Do not, however, dare . . .".

The propositions above are closely connected with the wide-spread theories that *huo (g'wak b)* could be Kt for *yu (giǝg e)* 'to have' etc.: Kiang Sheng on Shu: P'an Keng phr. *f.*; refuted in Gloss 1453; Pseudo K'ung on Shu: To shī phr. *g.*; refuted in Gloss 1828. See further LC par. 494.

By the same trend, the char. *yü (giwak h)* 'territory, boundary' etc. has been said to be Kt for *giǝg e.*, e.g. Mao Heng on Ode 303 phr. *i.*; refuted in Gloss 875.

Inversely, *giǝg e.* has been taken to be Kt for *giwak h.*, e.g. by Wang Nien-sun

on Sün: Li lun phr. j.: “If a man (has for territory:) dwells in that . . . (he is a gentleman)” (Shiki: Li shu correspondingly: k). — Unnecessary and phonetically poor; j.=“If a man possesses that . . .”. The k., however, shows that Sī-ma Ts’ien already had the same Kt speculation.

Again, on Kyü: Lu yü, shang, phr. 1. Wang Nien-sun says e. Kt for h.: “When Kung Kung was hegemon over the nine territories”, — Unnecessary. 1.=“... was hegemon over the nine possessions”.

Again, on Ode 303 phr. m. Wang says e. Kt for h., since the Han version is said, in comm. on Wen sūan, to have had n. This may here be a commentator’s attempt to improve the original *giüg* e., for the *giwək* h. is unsatisfactory in the rime series (*giüg*: *d’æg*: *tsiæg* o.), see Gloss 1183.

Again, on Lao 14 phr. p. Liu Shī-p’ei says e. Kt for h.; this is arbitrary and, moreover, makes poor sense. p.=“In holding on to the Way of antiquity one governs that which exists at present” (beautifully rendered by Waley: “By seizing on the Way that was you can dominate the things that are now”).

Finally, the word *y u*, *y ü* (*giüg*, *giük* q) ‘park’ in Kyü: Ch’u yü phr. r. (quotation from Ode 242) is defined by Wei Chao as=*giwək* h. ‘enclosure’, and this has caused Yang Shu-ta to propose that in the Ts’in Kung Kuei inscr. phr. s. the words *t* (*tsóg-giüg/k*) correspond to and are Kt for the *ch a o - y ü* (*dïog-giwək* u) in Ode 303 phr. i. (“They delimited and set boundaries for those [states between] the four seas”). This is phonetically weak, and Kuo Mo-jo, better, says *t*. is Kt for *t s a o - y u* (*dz’óg-giüg* v), s.=“to (fashion:) arrange and help the [states of] the four quarters”.

2119. *y u* (*giüg* a) ‘to have’ etc. Kt for *y i* (*ziæg* b) ‘to take, to use, by means of’ says Yü Sing-wu on various early passages, *inter alia* on Ode 241 phr. c.: (Shang-ti) “looks down with majesty”. — Reject. c.= (Shang-ti) “looking down (has majesty:) is majestic”.

2120. *y u* (*giüg* a) ‘friend, comrade’ Kt for *h i u* (*xióg* b) ‘grace’ says Kuo Mo-jo on the Po K’o Hu inscr. phr. c., which would mean d.: (P.) “presumes in response to extol Heaven’s blessing and Wang Po’s grace”. But on the Kuo Ts’ung (Pi?) Sü inscr. phr. e. Kuo says *giüg* a. is Kt for *h u e i* (*xwæg* f) ‘gift, to present’: “He gave back to Kuo Ts’ung his fields”. Here, in spite of the phonetic divergence

2115 a 營 b 還 c 子之營兮 d 子之還兮 e 旋 2116 a 營 b 寔 c 無使汝
思慮營營 d 營求 e 袂 2117 a 併 b 承 c 併乃祖考事 2118 a 又 b 或
c 今爾又曰 d 毋又敢 e 有 f 不其或稽 g 時予乃或言 h 域 i 正域
彼四方 o 肇域彼四海 j 人有是 k 人域是 l 共工氏之伯九有 m 奄
有九有 n 九域 o 有殆子 p 執古之道以御今之有 q 圓 r 王在靈囿
s 寵囿四方 t 寵囿 u 肇域 v 造佑 2119 a 有 b 以 c 臨下有赫 2120
a 友 b 休 c 敢對揚天右王白友 d 天祐王白休 e 復友辭 从 其 田 f

(*gǐǔg*: *χwəg*) the Kt is admissible since a. and f. belong to the same Hs series. Kuo Mo-jo could with good reason have applied this to phr. c. as well: "P. presumes in response to extol Heaven's blessing and Wang Po's (a.=f.) gift". — This latter is certainly superior to the first explanation, which is phonetically unsatisfactory. Neither, however, is necessary; a. could have its proper meaning: "Heaven's blessing and Wang Po's friendliness".

2121. y u (*gǐǔg* a) 'fault, guilt' Kt for y i (*gǐǎg* b) says Chu Tsün-sheng on Tso: Chao 8 phr. c.: "When there are strange beings". This because Tu Yü defines a. by b. — Unnecessary. c.= "When there are (faulty, aberrant:) unnatural beings".

2122. y u (*gǐǔg* a) 'a place name (Yu-li)' Kt for y u (*zǐǒg* b) 'to lead, to entice' says Ma Jung on Shu: Ku ming phr. c.: "They greatly received the inducement and agreed". — Refuted in Gloss 2012. a. is merely a corruption of char. d., and c. means: "They grandly received its approval".

2123. y u (*ǐǒg* a) 'young' Kt for y a o (*ǐǒg* b) in the sense of 'important, essential' says Yü Sing-wu on Kuan phr. c. "Yu kuan" (title of a chapter): "The essential (indispensable) officers". — Plausible, confirmed by the context.

2124. y u (*ǐǒg* a) 'dark' Kt for y a o (*ǐǒg* b) says Ma Juei-ch'en on Ode 228 phr. c., taking b. to mean 'ample, rich'. — Refuted in Gloss 736. c.= "Their leaves are dark".

2125. y u (*dǐǒg* a) 'to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow' etc. Kt for y u (*zǐǒg* b) 'similar to, like, as' in Meng: Kung-sun Ch'ou, shang phr. c.: "like turning the hand". Also for b. 'still, yet' in Meng: Kung-sun Ch'ou, hia phr. d.: "The king is still one who may be used for doing good". On the other hand, *zǐǒg* b. is Kt for *dǐǒg* a. for instance in Meng: Kung-sun Ch'ou, shang phr. e. "Wen Wang started from one hundred square li". Several more instances of these Kt could be adduced.

2126. y u (*dǐǒg* a) 'to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow' Kt for y u n g (*dǐung* b) says Mao Heng on Ode 67 phr. c.: "He calls me to use the [private] chamber". — Refuted in Gloss 200: "He beckons to me from the [private] chamber". Cheng Hsüan on Ode 197 phr. d.: (The lord) "should not lightly (use words:) utter his words", — Refuted *ibid.* d.= (The lord) should not lightly (follow his words:) let the tongue run away with him". (The same phr. d. recurs in Ode 256). In scores of cases in Shī and Shu and other pre-Han texts the scholars of all periods have taken a. to be Kt for b., but certainly erroneously. Cf. Glosses 898, 942, 1413, 1414, 1481, 1629. In some cases, e.g. phr. d., Chu Tsün-sheng prefers to say that *dǐǒg* a. is Kt for y i (*zǐǎg* e). — Reject.

2127. y u (*dǐǒg* a) 'to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow' Kt for y u (*gǐǔg* b) 'fault, guilt, blame' says Sun Sing-yen on Shu: K'ang kao phr. c.: (The people) "will quickly draw upon them guilt . . ." — Refuted in Gloss 1649. c.= "May you speedily follow Wen Wang's [rules of] punishment".

2128. y u (*dǐǒg* a) 'to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow' Kt for t a o (*d'ǒg* b) 'way, norm' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 220 phr. c.: "What is not (the proper way:) proper should not be told". — Reject. c.= "What is (not to be followed:) inadmissible, should not be told". This is clear from the following line d.: "If you (follow:) admit the speeches of the drunkards".

Again, on Li: Li yün phr. e. Chu says a. Kt for b.: “Therefore drink and food have their proper norms”. — Reject. Cheng Hūan says a. here=f. (to be rejected, see par. 2126 above), but in fact a. has its proper value: “Therefore drink and food have their (provenience:) source” (will be sufficiently supplied; Couvreur: potus et cibus habent unde veniant). This is confirmed by the context.

2129. y u (*dîôg* a) ‘to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow’ Kt for y ü (*gîuk* b) ‘to wish’ says Wang Nien-sun on Mo: Ming kuei, hia phr. c., taking d. as standing for e.: “The prince of Ts’i wished to kill them both, but he feared that they were innocent; he wished to release them both . . .” — Reject. With Pi Yüan *dîôg* a. and *zîôg* f. which are interchangeable (see par. 2125 above) are both the common adverb and d. stands for g.: c.=“The prince Ts’i still (was in doubt:) hesitated to kill them, since . . .; he still hesitated to release them . . .”.

2130. y u (*dîôg* a) ‘to proceed from, from, to go along, to follow’ Kt for y u (*gîüg* b) (variant for *gîüg* c. in Ode 220) ‘fault, guilt’ says Wu K’ai-sheng on Shu: Li Cheng phr. d.: “Be careful about your crimes and prosecutions”. — Reject. d.=“Be careful about the prosecutions which you (follow:) attend to”, cf. Gloss 1966.

2131. y u (*dîôg* a) ‘place; the place where, that which’ etc. Kt for h i u (*xiôg* b) ‘grace’ says Yang Shu-ta on the Tsing Ting inscr. (Cheng sung t’ang k. 3) phr. c. which would be equal to d.: (The king) “favoured him and presented him fish”. — Reject. It is doubtful whether the arch. char. is really a. since it lacks the central vertical stroke. If it is, it could be short-form for e.: (The king) “prepared and presented him fish”.

2132. y u (*dîôg* a) ‘place, the place where, that which’ etc. Kt for t i (*d’iôk* b) ‘to advance; to lead, to direct’ etc. in Shu: To fang, Ma Jung version, phr. c., where the orthodox version reads d.: “to be stimulated by God’s guidance”, see Gloss 1906.

2133. y u (*dîôg* a) ‘pendant of a banner’ in Chouli: Kin kü phr. b.: “The Ta-ch’ang banner with 12 pendants” and ‘pendant of a cap’ in Chouli: Pien shī phr. c.: “A prince’s braid and pendants” (on the cap) corresponds to the li u (*liôg* d) with the same two meanings in Li: Ming t’ang wei phr. e.: “A banner with 12 pendants” and in Li: Li k’i phr. f.: “The cap of the Son of Heaven has . . . 12 pendants”.

賄 2121 a 尤 b 異 c 夫有尤物 2122 a 美 b 誘 c 誕受美若 d 厥 2123
a 幼 b 要 c 幼官 2124 a 幽 b 蓼 c 其葉有幽 2125 a 由 b 猶 c 由反
手 d 王由民用為善 e 文王猶方百里起 2126 a 由 b 用 c 招我由房
d 無易由言 e 以 f 於 2127 a 由 b 尤訖 c 乃其速由文王作罰 2128
a 由 b 道 c 匪由勿語 d 由醉之言 e 故飲食有由也 f 用 2129 a 由
b 欲 c 齊君由謙殺之恐不辜猶謙釋之 d 謙 e 兼 f 猶 g 嫌 2130 a
由 b 郵 c 尤訖 d 敬爾由獄 2131 a 攸 b 休 c 攸易魚 d 休錫魚 e 修
2132 a 攸 b 迪 c 勸于帝之攸 d 帝之迪 2133 a 游 b 大常十有二游

This has caused Lu Tê-ming to consider *dîôg* a. as Kt for *lîôg* d.; both in his gloss on phr. b. and in that on phr. c. he says a. is read Anc. *lîəu* = Arch. *lîôg*. — Reject. The *dîôg* a. is the same word-stem as *dîôg* g., h. 'to float, to ramble' etc., thus a. = "a floater"; *lîôg* e. in the same way is the same word-stem as *lîôg* e. 'to float': "a floater". a. and d. are thus synonymous, but Lu is wrong in reading a. like d. 2134. y u (*dîôg* a) 'to ramble, diversion' Kt for y u (*zîôg* b) 'still, yet' says Tu Tsî-ch'un on Chouli: Shî shî phr. c.: "All the noble juniors in the state still (though they are noble) study with him" (the tutor). — Reject. The word sequence should then be: f a n k u o c h î k u e i t s î t i y u (b) h ü e y e n. c. = "All the noble and leisurely juniors of the state study with him".

2135. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' Kt for y u (*dîôg* b) 'to proceed from, from, to follow' and *vice versa* see par. 2125 above.

2136. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' Kt for y ü (*gîuk* b) 'to wish' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 244, Ts'i version (ap. Li: Li k'i) phr. c.; this because the Mao version has d. "He did not urge his wishes". — Reject. The Ts'i version c. which simply means: "He did not alter his plans", is superior to Mao's since it fits into the rime series of the stanza, see Gloss 860.

In par. 2129 above we saw how Wang Nien-sun on a Mo passage erroneously took *dîôg* a. as Kt for b.

2137. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' Kt for y a o (*dîog* b) 'to shake, to move' says Cheng Hüan on Li: T'an Kung phr. c.: "When he sings, he sways". — Possible.

2138. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' Kt for y a o (*dîog* b) 'distant' says Yü Sing-wu on Ode 296 phr. c.; the line a. would be equal to d. — Arbitrary and unlikely. For various comments on phr. c. see Gloss 1143. a., often synonymous with e., here means 'to accord with, to accomodate oneself to': "They followed the roaring River".

2139. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' Kt for y ü (*dîu* b) 'sickness, fault, flaw' says Cheng Hüan on Ode 208 phr. c.: "His virtue has no flaw". — Refuted in Gloss 658. c. = "His virtue is unequalled".

Again, on Ode 189 phr. d. Cheng says a. Kt for b.: (Brothers should love each other) "and not hurt each other". — Refuted in Gloss 496. *zîôg* a. is here a variant of y u (*zîôg* e) 'to plan' (the characters a. and e. are often interchangeable, see next par.) and d. means: "... and not (plan:) plot against each other".

Chu Tsün-sheng follows another theory (mentioned by Cheng) that a. in these phrases is Kt for y u (*gîüŋ* f) 'fault'; reject.

2140. y u (*zîôg* a) 'similar to, like, as; still, yet' often serves as variant for y u (*zîôg* b) 'to plan', as in Ode 254 phr. c.: "Since your plans are not far-seeing", and Ode 178 phr. d.: "He is able to make strong his plans". Chu Tsün-sheng then says *zîôg* a. is Kt for y i (*ngia* e) 'to deliberate', a wild idea. Similarly on Ode 110 phr. f.: "May he still come and not remain [there]" Chu says a. is Kt for y i (*ngia* g): "He should come"; just as bad.

2141. y u (*zîôg* a) 'to plan, to discourse' etc. Kt for y a o (*dîog* b) but not with the ordinary meaning of this b. ('flourishing, abundant; to follow') but as an inter-

jection says Yang Shu-ta on Shu: Ta kao phr. c.: "Oh, I will grandly tell you [princes of] the numerous states". Ts'ai Ch'en had already proposed that a. here was itself such an interjection, but this theory has no text support, see Gloss 1585. Cheng Hūan, however, had a text version reading d. and Ma Jung (ap. Shīwen) another e., and Yang now "corrects" Ma by inverting his e. into f.: "Oh, I will grandly tell . . .". In support he adduces the Lu Po Tung inscr. phr. g.: (The king said:) "Oh, all from your ancestors . . .", the b. here taken to be the said interjection. — Reject. The archaic graph in the inscr. is decidedly not y a o b., though Liu Sin-yūan and Kuo Mo-jo have so deciphered it. Wu Shī-fen and Sun Yi-jang (Yü lun) deciphered it as h. (cf. a similar graph in the Shī Yüan Kuei inscr., again deciphered as b. by Kuo but as h. by Liu, the former clearly wrong). Nothing can be based on this unsafe testimony. In the Ta Kao phr. the word sequence d., e. is confirmed in a paraphrase by Wang Mang, and it means: "I will grandly tell and discourse to you", see the said Gloss 1585. Ma's *d̥iog* b. in phr. e. is here a Kt for *z̥iog* a.

2142. y u (*z̥iog* a) 'weeds; worthless' Kt for c h' o u (*t̥'iog* b) 'ugly, evil' says Chu Tsūn-sheng on Ode 192 phr. c.: "Ugly words come from your mouths". This because Cheng Hūan defines a. by b. — Unnecessary. c.= "(Worthless:) bad words come from your mouths".

2143. y u n g (*giwǎng* a) 'long, distant, eternal, forever' Kt for y u n g (*d̥iung* b) 'to use, using, by, with' says Yang Shu-ta (Kin wen shuo p. 56) on Shu: To fang phr. c.: "May you y u n g l i with force cultivate your fields". — Reject, phonetically unacceptable. c.= "May you forever forcefully cultivate your fields", Yang applies his Kt a. for b. to certain inscriptions, which is not plausible.

2144. y u n g (*'iung* a) 'city moat' often used for a homophonous word 'harmonious, concordant', e.g. Ode 240 phr. b.: "Very concordant he was in the palace". It is then, says Chang Ping-lin (Siao hūe ta wen), Kt for y ü (*d̥iu* c.) 'pleasant, agreeable'. — Reject.

2145. y u n g (*d̥iung* a) 'to use' etc. Kt for c h' u n g (*t̥'iong* b) 'full, to fill' was probably Pseudo-K'ung's idea on Shu: Wei tsī phr. c.: (They steal the Spirits) "one-coloured and faultless victims and the (filling:) contents [of the sacrificial vessels]",

c 諸侯之縹旒 d 旒 e 旒十有二旒 f 天子冕……十有二旒 g 游 h 遊
i 流 2134 a 遊 b 猶 c 凡國之貴遊子弟學焉 2135 a 猶 b 由 2136 a
猶 b 欲 c 匪革其猶 d 匪棘(匪)其欲 2137 a 猶 b 搖 c 詠斯猶 2138 a
猶 b 還 c 允猶翕河 d 峻遠挾河 e 若 2139 a 猶 b 齋 c 其德丕猶 d
無相猶矣 e 猷 f 訖 2140 a 猶 b 猷 c 猶之未遠 d 克壯其猶 e 儀儀
f 猶來無止 g 宜 2141 a 猷 b 猷 c 猷大告爾多邦 d 大告猷 e 大
告猷 f 猷大告 g 猷自厥祖考 h 謫 2142 a 猷 b 醜 c 猷言自口 2143
a 永 b 用 c 尚永力攸爾田 2144 a 難 b 難難在宮 c 愉 2145 a 用 b

since he says a. means d." the (filling:) contents of the vessels". — Reject. The y u n g a. belongs to a following phrase, see Gloss 1508.

2146. y u n g (*djung* a) 'to use, by, with' Kt for y i (*ziag* b) 'to use, by, with' says Wang Nien-sun on Yi: Kua 23 and Kua 55 phr. c. — Reject.

2147. y u n g (*djung* a) 'to use; by, with' Kt for h i a n g (*xiang* b) says Ma Sü-lun on Lao 35 phr. c. — Reject. c.="If you use it, it cannot be exhausted".

2148. y u n g (*djung* a) 'puppet placed in tomb', common e.g. Meng: Liang Huei wang, Li: T'an Kung. Since Hū Shen defines a. as meaning 'to suffer' b., Tuan Yü-ts'ai says that when used in the sense of 'puppet' it is Kt for o u (*ngu* c) 'statue'. — Reject.

2149. y u n g (*djung* a) 'to use; service; merit; ordinary' etc. Kt for j u n g (*diong* b) 'steam, to heat, warm' says Yü Yüe on Kyü: Chou yü, chung phr. c.: "He himself will be illustrious and bright." This because in Kyü: Chou yü, hia there is the phr. d. — On phr. c. Wei Chao defines a. as=e. (a. and e. are cognate and homophonous but for the tones:) "He himself will be illustrious and (used:) in office"; on phr. d. he says b. means f. long": "Manifest and extensive brightness". There is a third phr. in Chouyü, chung (shortly after phr. c.): g., where Wei says a. means h. 'merit': "The items of apparel are bright and [showing] merit, the adornments are distinguished and bright". The phr. g. was already discussed by Wang Yin-chi (Yü seems to have overlooked this) and he likewise says a. Kt for b. Wang adduces Ode 247 phr. i. and Tso: Chao 5 phr. j. in both of which he says b. means 'bright'. Both parallels are unhappy, for in phr. i. the b. is Kt for the homophonous j u n g (*diong* k): "May your brightness be extensive" (in accord with Wei Chao on d. above), as confirmed by the following Ode line (see in detail Gloss 885); and in the Tso phr. j. Wang's interpr. will make poor sense, j.="Brightness but not (extensive:) durable". Cf. also LC par. 546. — The Kt theory a. for b. thus does not hold water. Wei Chao is safer.

2150. y u n g (*djung* a) 'to use; service; merit; ordinary' etc. Kt for c h u n g (*iiong* b) 'numerous, multitude' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Kyü: Ts'i yü phr. c.: "the prince's many servants". Similarly, on Chuang: Tê ch'ung fu phr. d.: "He must be very different from the multitude". — Reject. a. is common in the sense of 'ordinary' but this is by extension: 'to be in use, to do service'. c.="The ordinary servants of the prince" (Wei Chao: a.=e.); d.: "He must be very different from ordinary men".

2151. y u n g (*djung* a) 'to use; service; merit; ordinary' etc. Kt for s u n g (*dzung* b) 'quarrelsome' says P'i Si-juei on Shu: Yao tien, Ma Jung's version phr. c., where the orthodox version has d.: "He is deceitful and quarrelsome; will he do?" — Possible but not necessary. For various other attempts of explanation see Gloss 1232.

2152. y ü (*ngio* a) 'to drive a chariot, to direct, to manage' etc. Kt for y a (*ngä* b) 'to go to meet' says Cheng Hūan on K'ü li phr. c.: "A dignitary or officer should go in person to meet him". Cheng means the same when in Ode 12 phr. d. he defines a. by e. — Plausible; there are many other early instances, see Gloss 37.

On the other hand, when in Shu: Lo kao instead of an original phr. f. the orthodox

version has g. the a. in f. is not Kt for b. (b. here being a corruption), see Gloss 1774.

2153. y ü (*ngjo* a) 'to drive a chariot, to direct, to manage; to attend on' etc. Kt for w u (*mjwo* b) 'foot-prints' says Ch'en Huan on Ode 246 phr. c. in an attempt to understand an obscure gloss of Mao Heng's. The ts'i y ü would be equal to d. 'to connect the foot-prints' = 'to walk with small steps'. — Refuted in Gloss 618. c. = "In presenting the stools there are (continuous:) a row of attendants".

2154. y ü (*ngjo* a) 'to drive a chariot' etc., variant of b., Kt for s h u o (*sák* c) 'north' says Yang Shu-ta on the Pu K'i Kuei inscr. phr. d., which would be equal to the name of a northern state (tribe) Shuo-fang e. Yang says: In the char. c. one element is y i (*ngjāk* f) and since this had the same initial as a., the d. is Kt for e. — Reject.

2155. y ü (*ngjo* a) 'prison; frontiers' etc. Kt for y ü (*giwo* b) 'eaves, abode, territory, boundary' say Ho Yi-hang and Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 257 phr. c.: "They greatly harass our borders", and several phr. with a. = 'fontier, border'. — Reject. In the stanza with phr. c. the *ngjo* a. serves as rime to the *giwo* b. written with its proper char. Both the meanings 'prison' and 'frontiers' are based on the fundamental sense of 'enclosure'.

2156. y ü (*jo* a) Kt for y ü (*giwo* b) 'to be in, at, on' says Ho Yi-hang on the ordinary cases where a. means 'to be in, at, on'. — In Erya, Mao Heng's comm. and in Shuowen b. is said to mean a., and in Kuangya a. is said to mean b. Yet a. was never read *giwo*, nor b. ever read *jo*. The two distinct words are partially (but only partially) synonymous.

2157. y ü (*djo* a) 'I, we' Kt for y ü (*zjo* b) 'a kind of gem' says Ch'en Meng-kia (K'ao ku hüe pao 1955 p. 92) on the Siao ch'en Chuan Yu inscr. phr. c. Hü Shen has a word d. or, in certain versions, e. In Tso: Ting 5, and in Lü: An si we find phr. e. 'gem for girdle pendant'. Ch'en proposes that the fei y ü (*piwər-djo*) in phr. c. is Kt for the f a n - y ü (*b'jwän-zjo*) e. in Tso and Lü, c. = "Shi T'ien-fu conferred on Siao-ch'en Chuan a pendant gem" — Phonetically very unsatisfactory.

2158. y ü (*djo* a) 'remains; surplus' Kt for c h u (*ijo* b) 'all' etc. says Chu Tsün-sheng on Yi Chou shu: Ti K'uang phr. c.: "The many [noble] sons devote themselves to the polite arts". This because K'ung Ch'ao defines a. here by d. — Possible

充 c 犧牲牲用 d 器寶 2146 a 用 b 以 c 終不可用也 2147 a 用 b 享
c 用之不可既 2148 a 備 b 痛 c 偶 2149 a 庸 b 融 c 自顯庸也 d 顯
融昭明 e 用 f 長 g 服物昭庸采飾顯明 h 功 i 昭明有融 j 明而未
融 k 彤 2150 a 庸 b 眾 c 君之庸臣也 d 其與庸亦達矣 e 凡庸 2151
a 庸 b 訟 c 罷庸可乎 d 罷訟可乎 2152 a 御 b 訝逆 c 大夫士必自
御之 d 百兩御之 e 迎 f 御衛 g 逆衛 2153 a 御 b 武 c 授几有緝御
d 接武 2154 a 馭 b 御 c 朔 d 馭方 e 朔方 f 步 2155 a 圉 b 字 c 孔
棘我園 2156 a 於 b 于 2157 a 余 b 與 c 師田父令小臣傳非余 d 璫

but not necessary and, in fact, unlikely. The phr. *y ü t s i* recurs in various texts (Chouli: Siao *s i t'u*; Kuan: Wen etc.) but in Tso: Sün 2 phr. e. the term is clearly definable: (He gave offices to the eldest first-wife sons and assigned them lands), "he further gave offices to the remaining [first-wife] sons and constituted them under the title *yü-tsi*; the Shu-tsi concubines' sons were made [leaders of] the prince's columns [of chariots]". The terms *ch u-t s i f.* and *sh u-t s i g.* 'concubines' sons are synonymous and our Tso text e. clearly shows that there, at least, *y ü a.* does not stand for b. This testimony should probably be binding for all the cases of *yü-tsi*.

2159. *y ü (d'io a)* 'I, we; to give' Kt for *y ü (z'io b)* 'to give' says Chu Tsün-sheng on the numerous cases where a. means 'to give'. — Reject. All ancient tradition has it that *d'io* 'I, we' is Kt for a homophonous *d'io* 'to give'.

Again, on Sün: Ta lue phr. c. Yang Liang says a. Kt for b. in the sense of 'to be together with, to agree with, to concur with': "Those who speak of taste concur with Yi Ya". — Plausible. In the same Sün chapter we find phr. e. where Yang says a. Kt for b.

2160. *y ü (d'io a)* 'I, we' (text variant b.) Kt for *ch u (t'io c)* 'to stare' says Wen Yi-to on Ch'u: Siang fu jen phr. d.: "She (the daughter of Shun) with her beautiful eyes sadly stares". Both Chu Hi and Hung Hing-tsu take a. as it stands and the line could then mean either: "Her eyes so beautiful — she pities me", or: "Her eyes so beautiful — it makes me sad". — Wen's Kt is possible. But there are no pre-Han instances of the word b. Tuan Yü-ts'ai quotes Ch'u: Si mei jen phr. e.: "I brush away my tears and stand staring" and he proposes that the last words could be corrected into f.: "... and I stare", which would make a good binome; but this is arbitrary and in no way conclusive. Of the two alternatives above with a. kept, the former ("she pities me") suits the context best; the girl drowned herself like the poet was going to do, and she has compassion for him who shares her fate.

2161. *y ü (d'io a)* 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *ch' u (d'io b)* 'to store up' says Yü Yüe on Mo: Fei ju, hia phr. c.: "They conceal their knowledge and spare (do not use) their strength". Sun Yi-jang says *d'io a.* is Kt for *sh ê (s'ä d)*: "... they set aside their strength", citing Mo: Tsie tsang, hia phr. e. — Pi Yüan explains: yin ch'i-yü li "They conceal their (power:) capacity of knowledge and foresight", which makes good sense without any Kt speculation.

2162. *y ü (d'io a)* 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *s i e (dz'äg b)* 'archery hall' says Cheng Hüan on Yili: Hiang shê li phr. c.: "In the archery hall he turns round the pillar". — Reject. a. stands for *s ü (dz'io d)* 'school' (within the same Hs series), the Kin-wen version having d. instead of a.: "In the [archery] school he turns round the pillar".

2163. *y ü (d'io a)* 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *y ü (z'io b)* 'to participate' in Yili: Hiang yin tsü li, Ku-wen version, phr. c.: "The guest and the assistant do not participate [in the meal]", where the orthodox version has d.

Similarly, in Yili: Sh'i hun li, Ku-wen version, phr. e. stands for the orthodox version f.

The interchange *d- : z-* in Kt may seem curious, but it should be remembered that *djōg* g. can be Kt for *zjōg* h. and *vice versa*, as described in earlier paragraphs. 2164. *y ü* (*djō a*) 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *s ü* (*dzjō b*), 'to arrange in order, series, *seriatim*' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Li: Chung yung phr. c.: "In all matters, arrange them in order, then they will be (established:) achieved". This because Erya: Shī-yen has an entry d. — Unnecessary. c.= "In all matters, (think beforehand:) take preparatory measures, then they will be achieved".

2165. *y ü* (*djō a*) 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *k' ü* (*g'jū b*) 'to look about when walking' (Shuowen; no text) says Ma Sü-lun on Lao 15 phr. c.: "They look about like those who in winter wade through a stream". — Reject. Kao Heng says a. is Kt for the homophonous *y ü* (*djō d*) 'to walk quietly' (Shuowen; no text). — Unnecessary. The context shows that a. has its ordinary meaning: "Hesitant, like those who . . .".

2166. *y ü* (*djō a*) 'slow and deliberate, to think beforehand; joy' etc. Kt for *y e n* (*·jam b*) 'fed up with, weary of' but not in that sense since both *djō* and *·jam* are Kt for *s i e* (*dziäg c*) 'to decline, to make excuses' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Ying ti wang phr. d. — This illustrates Ma's extreme ignorance of the archaic sound categories.

On phr. d. Yü Yüe already quoted the Erya entry a.=b.: "Why do you ask without (disliking to do so:) diffidence". In support he adduces Ch'u: Si sung phr. e.: "He acts refractorily and without diffidence", where Wang Yi says a.=b.

Sī-ma Piao (ap. Shīwen) takes a. in its normal sense: "Why do you ask without (thinking beforehand:) due preparatory consideration", why so brusquely, so hastily, why do you put unprepared, unconsidered questions. This could do for the Ch'u phr. e. as well.

Ch'eng Hsün-ying, quoting the Kien-wen, takes a. in the sense of f.: "Why do you ask without pleasing me"; a poor attempt. The context favours Sī-ma's explanation.

2167. In par. 2163 instances were given where *y ü* (*djō a*) was Kt for *y ü* (*zjō b*). In other cases b. is Kt for a.:

璵 e 璵璠 2158 a 餘 b 諸 c 餘子務藝 d 衆 e 又宦其餘子亦為餘子
其庶子為公行 f 諸 g 庶 2159 a 予 b 與 c 言味者予易牙 d 有所共
予也 2160 a 予 b 舍 c 時 d 目眇眇兮愁予 e 擊涕而辟眇 f 眇眇
2161 a 豫 b 儲 c 隱知豫力 d 舍 e 舍餘力 2162 a 豫 b 榭謝 c 豫則鉤
極 d 序 2163 a 豫 b 與 c 賓介不豫 d 不與 e 子有言我豫在 f 我與
在 g 由 h 猶 2164 a 豫 b 敏 c 凡事豫則立 d 豫敏也 2165 a 豫 b 趯
c 豫焉(兮)若冬涉川 d 趨 2166 a 豫 b 厭 c 謝 d 何問之不豫也 e 行
辟而不豫兮 f 悅 2167 a 豫 b 與 c 與兮若冬涉川 d 豫焉(兮) e 無有

In Lao 15, corresponding to the Ho-shang Kung version phr. c., the Wang Pi text has d., and this is preferable, b. in c. being Kt for a., see par. 2165 above.

On Mo: Hao ling phr. e. Sun Yi-jang says b. is Kt for a.: "They have nothing to (anticipate:) worry about, they do not pay taxes". — Unnecessary. e.= "They have nothing in which they participate (sc. compulsory service) and they do not pay taxes"; these two things: f. and taxes being the ordinary burdens of the common people.

Again, on Sün: Cheng lun phr. g. Yang Liang says b. is Kt for h. (variant of a.). This making poor sense, Wang Nien-sun says b. is a short-form for k ü i.= 'all': "If he holds that it is of use to people, and then [however] it all is of no use to people". Liang K'i-hiung better: the two words ts ê y ü have been inverted; the phr. should run j.: "Will he hold that it is of use to people? Then, if it is of no use to people, he will be greatly disgraced".

2168. y ü (zjo a) 'to give; together with' etc. Kt for y ü (djo b) 'to give; I, we' but not with that meaning but meaning 'enemy, feud, to hate' says Wang Nien-sun on Ku-liang: Hi 10 phr. c.: "How deeply do you hate me?" This because Fang yen k. 3 has an entry d. — Reject. Even the painstaking Ts'ien Yi has not been able to find any text confirming Fang yen (which records Han-time dialect words). Our zjo a., from the meaning 'to be together with', by extension can mean 'to place oneself on a par with, to stand up against', as in Lao 68 phr. e.: "The skilful conqueror of enemies does not (stand up against:) defy anybody" (he vanquishes without battle). Phr. c.= "How deep is your defiance of me?"

2169. y ü (zjo a) 'to give; together with' etc. Kt for h ü (xjo b) 'to admit' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Lun: Shu er phr. c.; this because Huang K'an defines a. by b. — Reject.

2170. y ü (zjo a) 'to give; together with' Kt for s ü (dzjo b) 'to walk slowly' says Huang K'an on Lun: Hiang tang phr. c.: "When the prince was present . . . he was slowly-moving". — Possible. Yet Lu Tê-ming still reads (Anc. iwo=) Arch. zjo, p'ing sheng, 'dignified' (Ma Jung).

In Ode 209 phr. d.: "Our millet is abundant" Lu reads it in the same way, zjo a. being Kt for a zjo, p'ing sheng, 'abundant' (Cheng Hüan).

2171. y ü (zjo a) 'to praise; fame' Kt for y ü (djo b) 'joy' says Chu Hi, rightly, on Ode 193 phr. c.: "And so there is joy and tranquillity", see Gloss 449, where several parallels are adduced. The same Kt recurs in Odes 218, 261, 278.

When Yü Yüe would apply this to Ode 240 phr. d. as well, he is not convincing. d.= "The men of old were untiring; renowned and fine was that gentleman"; cf. Gloss 818.

Again, on Lü: Hiao hing phr. e. Kao Yu already proposes this Kt since he defines a. by f.: "... the whole world rejoices". Here this is neither necessary nor probable. e.= "When the ruler is filially pious, his fame is splendid and brilliant; (those below:) his subjects submit and obey, the whole world praises him". The last three words emphasize the first eight words.

It may be added that when a. means 'joy, to rejoice' and when b. has this meaning, Chu Tsün-sheng says they are both Kt for y ü (ngiwo g) 'to rejoice'; reject.

2172. y ü (zjo a) 'carriage' Kt for y ü (dju b) 'flourishing' (Erya) says Ch'en Huan on Ode 135 phr. c., the c. corresponding to Erya's d. in the sense of 'sprouting'='beginning'; see in detail Gloss 328. Probably c. *g'jwan-zjo* and d. *k'jwan-dju* were two variations of one binome in the way discussed in LC par. 294 and in Gloss 98.

2173. y ü (*giwo* a) 'to go; in, at, on' etc. Kt for wei (*gwia* b) 'to do; to be; in favour of, for' says Cheng Hsian on Yili: Shī kuan li phr. c., paraphrasing d.: "y i c h ī it (sc. the name) will suit him, that wei k i a is greatness". — Reject. Yi wen lei tsü and T'ung tien both quote e., y ü a. clearly being the preposition, thus: "It will suit him, in felicity".

Again, on Yili: P'ing li phr. f. Cheng says a. Kt for b. (h u e i are the prince's gifts to the ambassador, p'ing are the ambassador's gifts to the prince): "As to the h u e i-gifts, according to the p'ing-gifts he (the prince) y ü (=wei) makes the h u e i-gifts". — A dreadful construction. y ü a. often means 'to go'. f.= "When making h u e i-gifts, according to the p'ing-gifts one goes and presents them".

The idea that a *giwo* could be Kt for a *gwia* should be severely rejected. We know hundreds of Hs words in the -o class and hundreds in the -a class, but never an -o word is Phonetic in an -a word or *vice versa*. Now, the Phonetic in a Hs char. is fundamentally a Kt, as fully described in LC I, introduction. Thus Cheng's Kt is inadmissible. His idea, however, has made fortune:

On Ode 50 phr. g. Wang Yin-chī says a. Kt for b.: "He t s o y ü (=wei) made the Ch'u palace". — Reject. g.= "He started work on the Ch'u palace".

On Shu: K'ang kao phr. h. Yü Yüe says a. Kt for b.: "The one who y ü (=wei) is father cannot cherish his son". — Reject. y ü f u= "the one in the position of father", see Gloss 1647.

On Ode 259 phr. i. where, as shown by Ma Juei-ch'en, the j. stands for the similar k., Ma says a. Kt for b.: "To the states of the four quarters they were a wall". — Refuted in Gloss 1006. i.= "The states of the four quarters, them they went to (wall:) defend".

On the other hand, it has been said that *gwia* b. is Kt for a.:

On Sün: Fu kuo phr. l. Wang Nien-sun says b. Kt for a.: "(The things) are not

所與不租稅 f 徭役 g 將以為有益於人則與無益於人也 h 預 i 舉
j 將以為有益於人與 o 則無益於人也則得大辱 2168 a 與 b 予 c
何與我之深也 d 予讐也 e 善勝敵者不與 2169 a 與 b 許 c 惟我與
爾有是夫 2170 a 與 b 徐 c 君在...與與如也 d 我泰與與 2171 a 譽
b 豫 c 是以有譽處分 d 古之人無數譽訖斯士 e 人主孝則名章榮
下服聽天下譽 f 樂 g 娛 2172 a 與 b 藩 c 權與 d 藩藩 2173 a 于 b 為
c 宜之于假 d 宜之是為大 e 宜之於嘏 f 賄在聘于賄 g 作于楚宮
h 于父不能字厥子 i 四方于室 j 宣 k 垣 l 無宜而有用為人數也

appropriate (for special purposes) but they are of use to men; *shu ye* that is (art:) technique". — Reject. The *wei b.* in *k'ü sheng* makes good sense: "They have their use for men; that is [due to] technique".

On Tso: Chuang 1 phr. *m.* Yü Yüe says *b.* Kt for *a.* The first half is the Ch'un ts'iu text, the second the Tso text; the latter, acc. to Yü, has replaced the *y ü a.* by *wei b.* as a Kt.: "They built a reception house for the king's daughter outside [the city wall]; (*wei wai=y ü wai*) outside, that was proper". — Reject. *m.*="... *wei wai* to treat her as an outsider, that was proper".

2174. *y ü (giwo a)* 'to go; in, at, on' has had the misfortune to be taken to be Kt for all kinds of words. Chu Tsün-sheng says for *y ü e (giwät b)* in Ode 177 phr. *c.*; for *p u (puo d)* or for *k ü (kio e)* in Ode 154 phr. *f.*; for *j u (nio g)* in Ode 6 phr. *h.* Chang Ping-liu says for *y ü a n (giwän i)* in Shu: K'ang kao phr. *j.* (see Gloss 1645). Kuo Mo-jo says for *y ü (zio k)* in the Huan ts'i Meng Kiang Hu inscr. phr. *l.* Wen Yi-to says for *h u (xo m)* in Meng: Wan Chang, shang phr. *n.* etc. — All to be definitely rejected for phonetical reasons.

On the other hand, Yü Sing-wu and Kuo Mo-jo say *giwo a.* is Kt for *y ü (ngiwo o)* in the Ti Shī Hu inscr. phr. *p.*, name of a state. — Plausible.

2175. *y ü (giwo a)* 'reed organ' Kt for *h u a (g'wä b)* see LC par. 1669.

2176. *y ü (giwo a)* 'Colocasia', by Mao Heng taken to be Kt for *h ü (xiwo b)* 'great' is really Kt for *h u (xmwo c)* 'to come' says Cheng Hün on Ode 189 phr. *d.* — Refuted in Gloss 499. *a.* stands for *y ü (giwo e)* 'eaves' (so in Yang Hiung's text version, probably Lu school). *d.* (with Wang Yin-chi)="Where the lord is (eaves-covered:) sheltered".

2177. *y ü (giwo a)* 'sacrifice for rain' Kt for *y ü e (giwät b)* says Wu Shī-fen, followed by many later epigraphists, on several phrases in the Mao Kung Ting inscr.; in one of these cases Kuo Mo-jo says *a.* Kt for *y ü (zio c)*. Kuo also says *a.* Kt for *b.* in the Siao Yü Ting inscr., and Wen Yi-to says *a.* Kt for *c.* in the Mi Po Kuei inscr. — All phonetically unacceptable.

2178. *y ü (giwo a)* 'sacrifice for rain' Kt for *h u (xo b)* says Pi Yüan on Mo: K'i shī phr. *c.* — Wang Nien-sun gives good reasons for believing that *a.* is a scribe's corruption of *b.*

2179. *y ü (giwo a)* 'feather, wing' Kt for *h u (g'o b)* which would here mean *c.* 'slack' says Cheng Hün on Chouli: Kung jen phr. *d.* "The bow will be slack and (*sh a i:*) reduced [in strength]". — Even the diligent Sun Yi-jiang has not been able to find any support for this meaning of *b.* Chu Tsün-sheng instead proposes *a.* Kt for *y ü (iwo e)* 'bent, crooked': "the bow will be warped and weak". This is certainly better.

2180. *y ü (ngiwo a)* 'forester' is very common as Kt for a homophonous *ngiwo* 'to calculate, to prepare beforehand, to plot, preoccupied, anxious', e.g. Ode 256 phr. *b.*: "And so prepare against the unforeseen". Chu Tsün-sheng then says it is Kt for *l ü (liwo c)* 'to think of, to foresee'. The same says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Keng Sang Ch'u phr. *d.* "When one keeps in mind the unforeseen". — Reject.

It may be added that when *a.* has its proper meaning 'forester', as in Chuang: Shan mu phr. *e.*: "The forester pursued him", Ma Sü-lun says *ngiwo a.* is Kt for

s h ê (*djäg f*) 'to shoot' — a wild idea.

2181. y ü (*ngiwo a*) 'forester' etc. Kt for y a (*ngā b*) 'tooth' says Chang Ping-lin on Tso: Chao 1 phr. c.: "He had a graph in his hand, reading 'tooth' (strokes forming the picture of teeth)". He adduces that t s o u y ü d. could be written e. (this, however, not earlier than in Han Shu). — an amusing idea.

2182. y ü (*ngiwo a*) 'forester' etc. Kt for w u (*ngo b*) 'I, we, my, our' says Kuo Mo-jo on the Yüe Wang Chung inscr. phr. c., equal to d. — Plausible.

2183. y ü (Anc. *·iwo*, Arch. *·io?*) 'to satiate' Kt for y ü (*·iu b*) 'satiated with wine' says Tuan Yü-ts'ai on Ode 164, Mao version, phr. c., where the Han version has d.: "Drink your (satiety:) fill of wine". — Refuted in Gloss 414. a. fails in the rimes of the stanza and is evidently a gloss word which has been substituted to the proper b. (=e.) of Han, which is correct. For the manipulations with the readings in Ts'ieyün see in detail that gloss.

2184. y ü (*djüg a*) 'to call' Kt for k i a o (*kiog b*) 'to shout' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Shu: Li cheng phr. c. — Reject. c.= "They called prominent men to honour God on High".

2185. y ü (*·iwat a*) 'fragrant herb; to block; oppressed, depressed' Kt for y ü n (*·iwän b*) 'to block; oppressed, depressed' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Keng Sang Ch'u phr. c.: (Have you purified yourself thoroughly) "are you [still] oppressed?" — There is no Kt. We have a large word-stem *·iwän*: *·iwän*: *·iwat* with this fundamental meaning, the words of which are synonymous and interchangeable in the texts, see in detail Gloss 323.

The difficulty in phr. c. is, on the other hand, that though the meaning above seems quite clear, Ts'uei Chuan says that c. means 'purified': (Have you purified yourself thoroughly) "are you purified?" His idea probably was that since *·iwat a*. properly means 'a fragrant herb' (Li: Kiao t'ê sheng: y ü k' i 'a fragrant aroma'), the char. further Kt for the homophonous *·iwat* 'to block' etc. as above, a. should here in c. have that primary meaning: "are you (fragrant, fine-smelling) purified?". The following line runs d., and the decisive question is whether to carry c. to the preceding, with Ts'uei, or to the following: "are you oppressed, then there is still within you something hateful". Since j a n - e r normally has a clearly adversative

m 築王姬之館于外為外禮也 2174 a 于 b 曰 c 王于出征 d 捕 e 舉
f 畫爾于茅 g 如 h 之子于歸 i 援 j 殺越于貨 k 與 l 于大嗣命 m
呼 n 奔號泣于昊天 o 虞 p 鮮于 2175 a 芋 b 椒 2176 a 芋 b 訐 c 憮
d 君子攸芋 e 字 2177 a 零 b 粵 c 與 2178 a 零 b 虎 c 零旗 2179 a
羽 b 扈 c 緩 d 弓而羽綢 e 紆 2180 a 虞 b 用戒不虞 c 慮 d 藏不虞
e 虞人逐 f 射 2181 a 虞 b 牙 c 有文在其手曰虞 d 騶虞 e 騶牙
2182 a 虞 b 吾 c 台樂虞家 d 以樂吾家 2183 a 飲饁 b 醢 c 飲酒之飲
d 飲酒之醢 e 鉅 2184 a 顙 b 嗽 c 顙俊尊上帝 2185 a 鬱 b 蘊 c 鬱

meaning, Ts'uei would seem preferable: "Have you purified yourself thoroughly, are you (fine-smelling:) purified; j a n e r but [in fact] there is still within you something hateful". But his interpr. implies an unnecessary tautology, and we may just as well explain: j a n if so e r then . . ., and the former interpr. gives our y ü a. a more common and natural meaning.

2186. y ü (*·i̯wət* a) 'fragrant herb; to block, oppressed, depressed' Kt for y ü (*·i̯o* b) 'withered' (ex. of this in Ch'u) says Chu Tsün-sheng on Li: Nei tsê phr. c.: (The meat of birds with such and such a colour and such and such a cry) "is foul-smelling"; likewise on Sün: Cheng ming phr. d.: "aromatic or stinking, fragrant or foul-smelling". — Reject. a. has in both cases an extension of meaning: odorous: strong-smelling: stinking.

2187. y ü (*b̥i̯wət*?) 'pencil; empty particle'. There are 7 words which are well attested as being empty particles and more or less synonymous. Besides this a. there is y ü (*g̥i̯wət* b) 'to follow; then, thereupon; empty particle'. There is s h u (*d̥'·i̯wət* c) 'to follow; then, thereupon; empty particle'. There is y ü e (*g̥i̯wät* d) 'to say; empty particle'. There is y ü e (*g̥i̯wät* e) 'to transgress; empty particle'. There is y ü e (*g̥i̯wät* f) 'empty particle'. There is y ü (*g̥i̯wət* g) 'empty particle'. They are all in the -t class, and moreover, are often interchangeable in the early texts. Thus Ode 235, Mao version, phr. h.=Lu version phr. i. Ode 244, Mao version, phr. j.=Shuowen's version phr. k. Ode 244 phr. l.=Ts'i version phr. m. Ode 223, Mao version phr. n.=Han version phr. o.; etc.

The commentators have therefore been tempted to identify them all and to propose that the one is Kt for (and should be read as) the other. This tendency appears very early. Sun Yen (3rd c. A.D., of the Cheng Hsüan school) in comm. on Erya (ap. Shüwen) says p.: "The b. is the ancient form for c. and is read a."; thus acc. to Sun b. and c. would be Kt for a. In Sun's wake have followed many scholars. Lu Tê-ming on Ode 244, says b. Kt for c. Tuan Yü-ts'ai under b. says "it is often Kt for c. in the ancient texts". Tuan under g. says a., b. and d. are Kt in early texts for g. Chu Tsün-sheng on phr. h. says a. Kt for c. Wu K'ai-sheng on the Yü Ting inscr. says b. Kt for a. The idea may be even older than Sun, for in Ode 236 Cheng Hsüan defines a. by c. and probably had a Kt in mind.

These various identifications are highly doubtful. That d., e. and f., all *g̥i̯wät*, are three modes of writing the same word is obvious. But that *g̥i̯wət* and *d̥'·i̯wət* should be identical, either b. to be read *d̥'·i̯wət* inst. of *g̥i̯wət* or c. to be read *g̥i̯wət* inst. of *d̥'·i̯wət* is quite unconvincing (*g̥*- and *d̥*- never go together in the Hs series, i.e. the "authorized Kt"). It is just as unacceptable that both or either of them should be Kt for and read as *g̥i̯wät* (d.) or *vice versa*. And most improbable of all is that they all (*g̥i̯wət* b, *d̥'·i̯wət* c, *g̥i̯wät* d-f. and *g̥i̯wət* g) would be Kt for and read as a. or *vice versa*. A great difficulty is caused by our a. which was Anc. *·i̯uēt* but the Arch. reading of which is a moot question. It had certainly neither a guttural initial like the words b. and d. (e, f), g.; nor a dental or palatal initial, like the word c. The a. properly means 'stylus, pencil' and is closely cognate to p i (Anc. *p̥i̯ēt* q), in the graph of which it forms a part, and it is Phonetic in l ü (Anc. *l̥i̯uēt* r). Now Hsü Shen (Shuowen) says that "a pencil" is called a. (Anc. *·i̯uēt*) in the region

Ch'u, it is called p u-l ü (Anc. *puət-liuət*) in Wu and f u (Anc. *piuət t*) in Yen. Erya: Shī k'i has an entry u. (on which Kuo P'o: "the people of Shu call a p i q. by the name p u-l ü s."). All this shows conclusively that one or several words in this group had initial cluster, *pl-* or *bl-*: q. Arch. *pl̥iət*, r. Arch. *bl̥iət*. Our a. cannot have been *bl̥iət*, for then the *l* would have remained; nor could it have been *pl̥iət*, for then the *p-* would have remained. Probably (like the t. Arch. *piuət* in Yen) it had a simple initial, quite clearly a labial: probably Arch. *bi̥wət* (since a *pi̥wət* would have kept its *p-*).

From all the testimonies above it is evident that neither *gi̥wət* b. nor *d'i̥wət* c. nor *gi̥wāt* d.-f. nor *gi̥wət* g. could have been Kt for and read as a., which was definitely a word (*bi̥wət*?) with labial initial.

To sum up: the words *bi̥wət* (?) a., *gi̥wət* b., *d'i̥wət* c., *gi̥wāt* d.-f. and *gi̥wət* g. were all "empty particles", more or less synonymous and therefore interchangeable in the texts; but no one of them was Kt for and read as any of the others.

2188. y ü (*gi̥wət* a) 'rapid' Kt for y ü (*gi̥wət* b) 'to follow' and 'perverse, awry' in Ode 195, Han version, phr. c. where the Mao version has d.: "The counsels and plans are crooked and awry". The Ts'i version had the short-form e. for a., see Gloss 572.

2189. y ü (*gi̥wək* a) 'territory', primarily written b., Kt for y u (*gi̥üg* c) 'to have, to possess' says Mao Heng on Ode 303 phrs. d. and e. — Reject. In par. 2118 above some attempts to take *gi̥üg* c. as Kt for *gi̥wək* a. were refuted. Here we have, *vice versa*. a. said to be Kt for b. — Refuted in Gloss 875. d. = "He regulated and set boundaries for . . ."; e. = "He delimited and set boundaries for . . .".

2190. y ü (*d̥i̥ók* a) 'to nourish, to rear'. The char. a. was properly c h o u (*i̥iók* a) 'rice gruel' but was then used as Kt for a word meaning 'to nourish' etc. in Ode 155 phr. b.: "My (children in rearing:) young children, for them you should have pity". Here Sūo Miao takes a. as Kt for k ü (*k̥iók* c) 'to nourish'. This was undoubtedly because in Shu: K'ang kao there is the synonymous phr. d. — Reject. *i̥iók* a. is here clearly (with Lu Tê-ming and others) Kt for y ü (*d̥iók* e; cf. par. 2191 below), see Gloss 379.

2191. y ü (*d̥iók* a) 'to rear, to breed, to nourish' Kt for c h o u (*d'iók* b) 'descendant' says Wang Yin-chī on Shu: Yao (Shun) tien, Kin-wen version, phr. c. where the Ku-wen version has d. Tuan Yü-ts'ai, on the contrary, says b. in the Ku-wen is

鬱乎 d 然而其中... 猶有惡也 2186 a 鬱 b 蒸 c 烏嚙色而沙鳴鬱 d
有臭芬鬱 2187 a 聿 b 通 c 述 d 曰 e 越 f 粵 g 吹 h 聿修厥德 i 述
修 j 通求厥寧 k 吹求 l 通追來孝 m 聿追 n 見睨曰消 o 見睨聿消
p 通古述字讀聿 q 筆 r 律 s 不律 t 第 u 不律謂之筆 2188 a 歆 b
通 c 謀猶曰歆 d 謀猶曰通 e 穴 2189 a 域 b 或 c 有 d 正域 e 肇域
2190 a 鬻 b 鬻子之聞斯 c 鞠 d 鞠子 e 育 2191 a 育 b 育 c 教育子

Kt for the a. in the Kin-wen. — Neither is necessary, cf. LC par. 152 and a full discussion in Gloss 1288.

Again, on Shu: P'an Keng phr. e. Wang Yin-chī says b. is Kt for a. — Reject, see again LC par. 152 and Gloss 1471.

2192. y ü (*dîók* a) 'to rear, to breed, to nourish' has a variant b. This latter char. is common in oracle bone inscriptions and there, says Wang Kuo-wei (Kuan t'ang tsi lin 9:14) it is Kt for the "phonetically similar" h o u (*g'u* c) 'posterior, descendant, after'. In the phrs. d. and e. (*dîók*) and f. (*kîók*) — see paragraphs 2190, 2191 above — Wang says both *gîók* and *kîók* because of this "sound similarity" were Kt for *g'u* c. — Reject.

2193. y ü (*ngîuk* a) 'jade, precious' Kt for h ü (*χîók* b) 'to rear; to cherish' and this again is Kt for h a o (*χóg* c) 'fine' says Sun Sing-yen on Shu: Hung fan phr. d.: "It is the ruler who eats the fine food". This idea, though phonetically unacceptable, is kindred to another one (*χóg* c. Kt for *χîuk* e) which is quite old, refuted in LC paragraphs 351 and 501; see further in detail Gloss 1547. c.= "It is the ruler who eats the precious food".

Similarly, on Ode 253 phr. f. Yüan Yüan says a. Kt for b. — Refuted in Gloss 920. f.= "The king wants to (consider you as jades:) find you like jades".

Again, Ma Sü-lun refers to the preceding case phr. d. and says that in Chuang: T'ien ti phr. g. (*χîuk*), where there is a text variant h. (*χîuk*), these words are Kt for *χóg* c. On Chuang: Sü Wu Kuei phr. i. he says *χîók* b. is Kt for h ü (*χîu* j) 'warm'. — Refuted in LC par. 504.

All these Kt should be rejected for phonetical reasons. The h ü (*χîuk*) in phr. g. means 'disconcerted' and the h ü (*χîuk*) in phr. h. is Kt for that word.

2194. y ü a n (*gîwan* a) 'round' (ex. in Meng: Li Lou, shang) is sometimes Kt for y ü n (*gîwän* b) the particle, e.g. in Ode 93 phr. c.: "She will make me happy" (the Han school here reads *g'wän* d. 'soul' inst. of a., which is less convincing, see Gloss 238). But in some cases where it has been stated to be this particle (or, with Wang K'ai-yün, the particle y ü a n/*gîwän* e) it really has its primary reading and meaning, as in Shu: Ts'in shī phr. f.: "as if they would not (turn round, return:) recur", see in detail Gloss 2104.

Again, on Ode 192 phr. g. Mao Heng says a. is Kt for a word y ü n (*gîwän*) meaning h. — Refuted in Gloss 545. a. is here a short-form for i. 'to fall': g.= "(The cargo) will fall down on your spokes".

2195. y ü a n (*gîwan* a) 'round' Kt for k ü n (*kîwän* b) 'even, equal, to equalize' says Mao Heng on Ode 303 phr. c. and Ode 304 phr. d. — Refuted in Gloss 1187. c.= "The great (circle:) encircling boundary was the River"; d.= "The wide (circle:) encircling boundary was long".

Again, on Kuan, the chapter called Ti yün e. Ch'en Huan says a. Kt for b. because Yin Chī-chang expounds that the term e. means that "high and low ground, deep and shallow water each has its proper status", thus: the soil being "equalized, well-balanced". — There appears to exist only one possible parallel: Chouli: Sou jen phr. f., where Cheng Hsüan's gloss g. is ambiguous. Hsü Shen defines a. as meaning h. 'numerical word for things' ("so-and-so many X"), and Cheng first builds

on this: "He selects those [horses] that can fill the proper number", but he adds "and p'ing ch'i (equalizes them:) makes them have their right proportions", here, it would seem, taking a. as meaning b. The a. with Hū's meaning is otherwise only known from Han-time and later texts (e.g. phr. i.). And for a.=b. there are no other safe parallels. Since *giwan* for *kiwēn* would be a poor Kt, the phrs. e. and f. remain obscure.

2196. y ü a n (*dīwān* a) 'to go along, to follow' Kt for s ü n (*dziwān* b) 'to follow' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Yang sheng chu phr. c.; this because Li Yi defines a. as meaning d. — Reject. a. itself gives the same meaning. Li explains the curious t u e. as=f. and later commentators have referred this to the medical terms in the Su wen: g.= 'central veins'. "(Go along:) follow the central veins and have them as your leading rules, then you can preserve your body"; in other words, be intent on your central organs, not the peripheral and less important. It seems doubtful, however, whether the t u e. in the sense of t u - m a i g. was a term current as early as Chuang (the Su-wen, of course, being much later). It is possible that t u e. simply has its normal meaning: "Follow your inspection (introspection) and make that your norm . . .".

2197. y ü a n (*giwān* a) 'to drag' Kt for h u a n (*g'wān* b) 'to change to exchange' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Tso. Hi 15 phr. c.: "He made rearranged fields" (a new distribution of fields as a measure for giving rewards). This because Fu K'ien defines a. as=d. — The story recurs in Kyü: Tsin yü 3 but there we find phr. e. The y ü a n (*giwān* f) means 'chariot shaft'. Kia Shī-chung knowing of the Tso parallel here again says f. means 'to change' d. (thus f. Kt for a. in Fu K'ien's sense). This however is unlikely. The word *giwān*, p'ing sheng, f. 'chariot shaft' is etymologically the same word as *giwān*, p'ing sheng, a. 'to drag', properly meaning "the dragger", the pulling pole and thus both versions, independently, offer the idea of 'to drag, to pull'. Some comm. have proposed that y ü a n t'ien ('shaft-fields' *pars pro toto* for:) "chariot-fields" were fields for which the tax took the form of war chariots. But since it is here a question of rewards, it may simply mean fields given as rewards to chariot-warriors (?). For lack of parallels the proper meaning of chariot-fields cannot be verified.

2198. y ü a n (*·iūwān* a) 'to resent; enemy' Kt for y ü n (*·iūwān* b) 'to accumulate,

d 教育子 e 無遺育 2192 a 育 b 毓 c 后 d 育子 e 鬻子 f 鞠子 2193
a 玉 b 畜 c 好 d 惟辟王食 e 旭 f 王欲玉女 g 項項然不自得 h 旭
旭然 i 堯畜畜然仁 j 昀 2194 a 員 b 云 c 聊樂我云 d 魂 e 爰 f 若
弟員來 g 員于爾輻 h 益 i 預 2195 a 員 b 均 c 景員維河 d 幅員既
長 e 地員 f 正校人員選 g 選擇可備員者平之 h 物數 i 官員 2196
a 緣 b 循 c 緣督以為經可以保身 d 順 e 督 f 中 g 督脈 2197 a 爰
b 揆 c 作爰田 d 易 e 作轅田 f 轅 2198 a 怨 b 蘊 c 無怨財 d 怨利

to hoard' says Yang Liang on Sün: Ai kung phr. c.: (He is so rich that he owns the whole world) "but he has no hoarded riches". Again, on Yen: Tsa hia 14 phr. d. Wang Nien-sun says a. Kt for b.; indeed, Tso: Chao 10 correspondingly has e.: "To hoard gain produces misfortune". We should rather say that *·iŵǎn*, k'ü sheng, a., stands for *·iŵǎn*, shang sheng g. = *·iŵǎn*, shang sheng h. (within the same Hs series), both meaning 'to accumulate, to pile up, heaped'. This word forms part of a large word-stem together with *·iŵən* b. (i.) and *·iŵət* j. (see Glosses 323, 330 and LC paragraphs 1946 and 2185). These various aspects of the stem, being largely synonymous, are often interchangeable in the texts, and the commentators therefore juggle with the readings, often saying that a *·iŵǎn* (g., h.) should be read now *·iŵən* (like b., i.), now *·iŵət* (like j.), and so on. For yet another reading of a. see next paragraph.

Again, on Yen: Kien phr. k. Wang says a. Kt for b.: "Outside, he has no hoarding government, inside, he has no disorderly conduct". — Here this meaning is less convincing, the line making good sense as it stands: "Outside, he has no (inimical:) tyrannic government, inside he has no disorderly conduct".

2199. y ü a n (*·iŵǎn* a) 'rich foliage' etc. (many Kt applications, see GSR 260) Kt for h u a n (*g'wan* b) 'brilliant, beautiful' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Ode 128 phr. c.: "The (covered:) ornated shields are beautiful". — This will not do. Mao Heng says a. = d. 'decorated', which tells us nothing. But in our Ode the word rimes, not in the *-an* class but in the *-ən* class. Lu Tê-ming, curiously, has no sound gloss on a. here but in Li: Li yün phr. e.: "The affairs are greatly heaped but not crowded", Lu says a. is read Anc. *jüən* = Arch. *giŵən*. This is evidently applicable to our Ode phr. c.: "The ornated shields are (full of ornaments:) luxurious". This word *giŵən* may be identical with y ü n (*giŵən* f) 'ample, rich, numerous', for which *·iŵǎn* a. is then Kt.

2200. y ü a n (*·iŵǎn* a) 'rich foliage' etc. Kt for y ü n (*·iŵən* b) 'smoke' says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Chī pei yu phr. c. — Refuted in LC par. 280. The b. is known from no pre-Han text.

2201. y ü e (*giŵăt* a) 'to transgress, to extend, far away' etc. Kt for y ü (*giŵo* b) 'in' says Yü Sing-wu on Shu: P'an Keng phr. c. That a. could mean b. here was already stated by Pseudo-K'ung and accepted by a great many later scholars, but there is no safe support. In the same way a. is said by Cheng Hüan (Ode 266) to mean y ü (*·iŵo* d) 'in'; unconfirmed, cf. par. 2206 below. In any case, a *giŵăt* cannot be Kt for *giŵo* or for *·iŵo*. In phr. c. the word l u a n is a corruption of s ī e. = 'to regulate' (as often, see Gloss 1464) and *giŵăt* a. also means 'to regulate' (see Gloss 1479), s ī-y ü e forming a binome: c. = "regulating our house".

2202. y ü e (*giŵăt* a) 'to transgress, to extend, far away' etc. often means 'to fall down, to throw down', e.g. Shu: P'an Keng phr. b.: "Fallen and disrespectful" (for full documentation see Gloss 1468) and Chu Tsün-sheng then says it is Kt for k ü e (*küwăt*, *g'üwăt* c) 'to stumble, to fall' (Cheng Hüan on a phr. in Li: Tsī yi says a. means c.), but all ancient tradition has it that it in this sense as well was y ü e (*giŵăt*), with an extension of meaning expressing movement: 'to pass on: to change place: to fall', see that Gloss.

2203. y ü e (*giwät* a) 'to transgress, to extend, far away' etc. Kt for k u o (*kwät* b) 'to bind' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Tso: Huan 2 phr. c. "a grass mat"; this because Fu K'ien defines c. as=d. 'to bind grass into a mat'. — Lu Tê-ming in phr. c. reads a. not k u o (*kwät*) but h u o (*g'wät*) and this points to a word cognate to b.: h u o (*g'wät* e) 'to join' (ex. in Ode 66).

2204. y ü e (*giwät* a) 'to transgress, to extend, far away' etc. is loan for a word meaning 'opening, hole [in a lute]', e.g. Yili: Hiang yin tsiu li phr. b.: "They insert the hand in the lute hole". Chu Tsün-sheng would then take a. as Kt for h ü e (*g'iwet* c) 'hole'. But Lu Tê-ming still reads it *giwät* (since he has no sound gloss on it) and in fact it forms part of a large word-stem in the -at class (*k'iwät* d., *g'iwät* e. etc.).

2205. y ü e (*giwät* a) 'to transgress, to extend, far away' etc. Kt for t o (*d'wät* b) 'to snatch' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Shu: K'ang kao phr. c.: "They kill and rob for (goods:) spoil". — Reject. c.= "They kill and (overthrow:) destroy and y ü go for (goods:) spoil; see Gloss 1645.

Again, on Chuang: Siao yao yu phr. d. Ma Sü-lun says a. Kt for b.: "The representative of the dead and the prayer-master would not grab the cups and stands". — Reject. d.= "... would not (go away from:) leave their cups and stands".

2206. y ü e (*giwät* a) 'to say; a particle'. Tuan Yü-ts'ai, referring to Erya: Shī ku phr. b.: "*giwät*, *giwo* and *giwän* mean *giwät* a"., says that since they all had the same initial they were used as Kt for one another. Similarly Chu Tsün-sheng under *giwän* c. says it serves as Kt for d. It has also often been said that c. serves for yü (*·io* g), a word synonymous but by no means identical with f. It should be emphasized that the particles *giwät* (e.), *giwän* (c.), *giwo* (f.) and *·io* (g.) certainly never are Kt one for other. They are phonetically well distinguished. Sometimes *giwän* c. and *giwät* e. (possibly cognate) are more or less synonymous, but neither c. nor e. were ever synonymous with or Kt for f. or g., in spite of Erya and a long row of early commentators. For *giwät* e. see for full documentation Glosses 1645, 1667, 1676, 1785, 1902, 1991. For *giwän* c. see Glosses 461, 1473, 1834, 1981.

2207. y ü e (*ngiwät* a) 'to break' Kt for w u (*ngwät* b) 'to move' says Wei Chao on Kyü: Tsin yü 2 phr. c.: (The root is solid) "therefore it cannot be moved", since he defines a. by d. — Unnecessary. Shuowen defines a. as='to break' which

生孽 e 蘊利 f 委利生孽 g 宛 h 苑 i 蘊 j 鬱 k 外無怨治內無亂行
 2119 a 苑 b 晚 c 蒙伐有苑 d 文貌 e 事大積焉而不苑 f 芸 2200 a
 苑 b 煨 c 紛乎苑乎 2201 a 越 b 于 c 亂越我家 d 於 e 嗣 2202 a 越
 b 顛越不恭 c 蹙 2203 a 越 b 括 c 越席 d 結括草以為席 e 佞 2204
 a 越 b 撓越 c 穴 d 闕 e 掘 2205 a 越 b 越 c 殺越于貨 d 尸祝不越
 樽俎 2206 a 曰 b 粵于爰曰也 c 爰 d 于粵曰 e 粵越曰 f 于 g 於
 2207 a 扞 b 扞 c 故不可扞也 d 動 2208 a 闕 b 蟬蟬掘闕 c 穴 d 不失

makes good sense: “Therefore it cannot be broken”.

2208. y ü e (*d̥iwa* a) ‘hole’ as in Ode 150 phr. b.: “The mayfly digs through its hole” is Kt for h ü e (*g̥iwa* c) says Tuan Yü-ts’ai. — Reject.

On Chuang: Tê ch’ung fu phr. d. Ma Sü-lun proposes that t u e i (*d’wád* e) ‘glad, merry’ is a short-form for a. and this again Kt for c. — Reject. d.=“Do not lose the feeling of pleasure” (Lu Tê-ming: e. Anc. *d’uái*=Arch. *d’wád*).

2209. y ü e (*g̥iok* a) ‘medicine, to cure’ Kt for l i a o (*l̥iok* b) ‘to cure’ says Wang Yin-chi on Tso: Siang 23 phr. c. — Reject. Moreover unnecessary, since a. and b. can be synonymous. c.=“Meng-sun’s hatred against me was [like] a medical stone” (a puncturing instrument for draining bad blood).

2210. y ü e (*·iok* a) ‘to bind; to restrict; essential’ etc. Kt for y a o (*·iok* b) ‘to seek, to demand; essential’ says Yü Yüe on Sün: Jung ju phr. c.: “For the important things he has boxes and trunks for storing, yet when travelling he dare not use carriage and horses”. — Unlikely. The parallelism with preceding lines confirms Yang Liang’s interpretation: “The (restricting:) parsimonious man has stores in boxes and trunks, yet . . .” Cf. LC par. 1988 where b. was proposed as Kt for a. In certain contexts the two words can be synonymous.

2211. y ü e (*·iok* a) ‘to bind; to restrict; essential’ etc. Kt for k a i (*kag* b) which would here mean ‘regulations’ says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Jang wang phr. c. He refers to Shuowen where Hū defines b. as meaning d. ‘the (restrictions:) regulations in the army’. There is no pre-Han example of this but there is a word k a i (*kag* e., within the same Hs series) which means ‘to bind’ (thus synonymous with a. in its primary sense). — Reject. a. is good as it stands: c.=“Now the great king wants to reject the laws and destroy the (binding rules:) social compacts”.

2212. y ü e (*·iok* a) ‘to bind; to restrict; straitened; essential’ etc. Kt for p i e n (*p̥iam* b) ‘to diminish, to reduce’ says Ma Sü-lun on Chuang: Shan sing phr. c.: “Not because of destitution and reduction run with the vulgar”. — Reject. y ü e a. ‘to restrict’ is well attested meaning ‘straitened’ e.g. Lun: Li jen phr. d.: (The man without jen goodness) “cannot long abide in straitened circumstances”. K’i u n g - y ü e is a good and natural binome. Thus c.=“Not because of destitution and straitened circumstances run with the vulgar”. — Ma seriously takes his *·iok* for *p̥iam* to be a phonetic Kt!

2213. y ü n (*g̥iwa* a) ‘to say, to have said’ when used as an “empty particle” (common) is Kt for y ü e (*g̥iwa* b) ‘to say’ used as an “empty particle” says Chu Tsün-sheng. — Reject.

2214. y ü n (*g̥iwa* a) ‘to drop, to lose’ Kt for y ü n (*g̥iwa* b) ‘to fall down’ says

於兌 e 兌 2209 a 藥 b 療 c 孟孫之惡我藥石 2210 a 約 b 要 c 約者有
筐篋之藏然而行不敢有與焉 2211 a 約 b 該 c 今大王欲廢法毀約
d 軍中約 e 綏 2212 a 約 b 貶 c 不為窮約趨俗 2213 a 云 b 曰 2214
a 松 b 隕 c 松於漢水 2215 a 經 b 鯁 c 經鯁

Kao Yu on Lü: Yin ch'u phr. c.: "They fell into the Han river." — The word *giwən* a. is well attested also in Ts'ê: Ch'u ts'ê 4 and Ts'i ts'ê 4 and there is no reason for doubting its reading (Ts'ieyün). The *giwən* b. is a closely cognate word but a. will make good sense and no Kt is needed.

2215. y ü n (*·iwən* a) 'floss; confused' etc. Kt for h ü n (*χiwən* b) 'purple' says Chu Tsün-sheng on Li: Yü tsao phr. c.: "purple knee-covers". — Cheng Hüan defines our a. as a mixture of *ch' i* red and *h u a n g* yellow. "reddish-yellow knee-covers". Lu Tê-ming says *·iwən* a. is here Kt for a word *w e n* (*·wən*) with that meaning. Ch'u's Kt is phonetically too unconvincing to motivate a rejection of this ancient tradition.

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NOTES ON SOME CHINESE WHEEL AXLE-CAPS

BY

ORVAR KARLBECK

In his classical work *The Bronze Age* V. Gordon Childe gives a brief account of the invention and diffusion of the wheeled vehicle and states that "the earliest vehicles known as yet (1925) have recently been brought to light in tombs at Kish and Ur dating from before 3000 B.C. The wheels are clumsy affairs, just three solid pieces of wood The draught animals, asses and oxen, were harnessed to either side of a pole fixed to the middle of the fore axle Light two-wheeled chariots are but slightly, if at all later than the four-wheeled carts".

Since the chariot proper was drawn by horses it probably originated in a type of country suitable to the raising of horses, and the grassland to the north of the Caucasus has been suggested as a likely region. Thence it spread in various directions and probably reached China in the Yin era.

Chariot remains as well as oracle bones with the glyph for chariot have been unearthed at Anyang, the last capital of the Yin dynasty, and in his book *The Birth of China* H. G. Creel tells of such a bone which, because of the inscription, can be definitely dated to the reign of Wu Ting, the fourth king after the removal of the capital to Anyang in 1300 B.C. He reigned for 59 years from about 1208. Whether chariots were in use earlier is not known. Amongst the chariot remains from Anyang those uncovered at Ta-ssü-k'ung ts'un are undoubtedly the most informative. It was in 1953 that the Chinese Academy of Science excavated an untouched chariot pit at the above-mentioned village located southwest of Anyang, and although nothing remained of the woodwork, this had been replaced by earth in such a manner that a reconstruction of the vehicle could be undertaken. Objects of bronze were, however, still preserved, notably a pair of axle-caps. They are of tumbler-shape and decorated in typical Yin style with four blades and a pair of k'uei dragons. They have a length of 15.3 cm and an inner diameter at the base of 4.8 cm.

The contents of the pit were described in *K'ao ku hsüeh pao* No. 9, 1955. Long before this event took place museums and collectors in the West had acquired extensive collections of this interesting and often exquisite material, and this was notably the case in Sweden where His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf, the Hallwyl Museum and the MFEA had brought together extensive collections. Most of the specimens discussed and described below come from these collections. Four specimens from other collections have also been included, a magnificent one from the Museum of Decorative Art, Copenhagen, and three interesting specimens from the M. H. de Young Memorial Museum, San Francisco. Use has also been made of illustrations and descriptions in catalogues of well-known collections.

I have divided the material into the two groups *A* and *B*, and the distinguishing feature of the latter, which also is the later, is a flange which forms the inner extremity close to the hub. And it is interesting to note that not a single specimen with *décor* in *Huai* style lacks such an attribute.

A striking fact about axle caps with *Yin* *décor* is their great length. In his catalogue of the Eumorfopoulos collection of bronzes etc. Yetts gives a length of 20.6 cm to one of them. The longest in Swedish collections measures 20.0 cm and another 19.5 cm. Those with Middle Chou *décor* are generally shorter, but none is less than 9.8 cm.

The axle-tree was the part of the chariot on which the wheels were mounted. It also carried the chariot-box, and if these had been its only functions it need only have projected from the wheels a distance sufficient to hold a linchpin. The fact that it was made ever so much longer indicates that the two ends outside the wheels were intended to serve some definite purpose, and the only one that suggests itself is that they were to serve as steps for the crew when mounting the vehicle.

Now, the diameter of the axle-tree where it left the wheel-hub varied somewhat, but slightly under 5.0 cm might be considered as a fair average, and a cylindrical piece of wood of such a thickness would have been able to support the weight of a man, but by wear the strength would be gradually reduced. The risk of breakage would then have been considerable, and it was partly in order to strengthen the axle-tree that the ends were fitted with axle-caps which, in order to serve as reinforcements, had to penetrate into the hub and be supported on it. Out of 25 caps studied all but one had entered the hub for a distance from 1.0 cm to 2.5 cm. A *c* forms an exception. It represents a pair, and it is significant that one of the pair has split lengthwise, the crack extending from the inner base to the linchpin slot and continuing from the other side of the latter almost to the outer end.

The axle-cap also protected the axle-tree from wear and tear but if this had been its only function it would have stopped at the edge of the hub.

As for the axle-tree the part between the wheels was probably considerably thicker than outside the hub in order to carry the accumulated weights of the box, the crew and their equipments. Thence it continued with the same thickness well into the hub where there was a sudden thinning to a diameter equal to the outer diameter of the axle-cap.

The wheel was kept from slipping off by a linchpin, both ends of which were pierced by holes. A strap or tendon passed through the two holes and both ends being tied together prevented the pins from dropping out. The pins will be described below in a separate paragraph.

Although many of the *B*-type axle-caps are not caps in the strict sense of the word but tubes, the name has been retained throughout.

There is a wide variation of forms in this *B*-group. Some pieces are long and tapering, others short and cylindrical, and the outer part of some has a ten-sided exterior. All are, however, shorter than the *A*-caps. Only a few reach a length of over 8.0 cm but many are considerably shorter. Since these caps are far too short ever to have served as steps, the mounting of the vehicle must have been done in

some other way and probably by means of a board fixed at the back. This was the method employed in the ancient Near East and apparently also in China in the Han era as suggested by a flat tin model of a chariot with two occupants and a man standing at the back with one foot resting on something about level with the axle-tree, most likely a foot-board.¹⁾

It will be realized that this new type of axle-cap must have resulted in a less wobbly turning of the wheels which were now steadied all round and not, as earlier, at two diametrically opposed points. That this type must have been regarded as an improvement is indicated by the fact that the old type was eventually discarded in favour of the new one. But was this new type a Chinese invention? The pair of axle-caps *B34* might furnish an answer to the question.

The two axle-caps which probably formed a pair were bought in Peking from a trustworthy dealer who volunteered the information that they had come from *Suiyuan*. He might as well have said the Ordos proper because the only ornamentation is in typical Ordos style. Since this seems to be the only non-Chinese axle-cap so far published, a detailed description follows.

It is a slightly tapering tube oval in cross section, the diameter being 3.2×2.6 cm, and in this respect it somewhat resembles axle-caps from the Near East which are pear-shaped. The only ornamentation occurs around the two linchpin slots and is in the form of the outer parts of a prone hare in the round with the four legs stretched well away from the body. The slot occupies the part where the back should have been. The head of the linchpin is also in the form of a prone hare in the round, smaller, and with the legs pressed against the body. It is to be noted that it is not pierced by any hole, which latter obtains in every Chinese linchpin head. When in position in the cap the smaller hare rested on the back of the bigger one, a not uncommon motif in the art of the Ordos. The outermost part of the flange is formed into an extra flange which is quite narrow except in front of one of the two slots, i.e. the one from which the plain end of the linchpin projects. There are two small holes in it, and the linchpin was kept from dropping out by a string or tendon which was threaded through the holes, the ends being tied to the two bars that formed the sides of the slot in the linchpin. The other cap lacks the low flange. Instead, the bending up of the platform begins further in and is achieved in a gentle curve, in order to keep the two holes well away from the edge of the hub.

This method of securing the pin demanded the presence of a flange whereas the Chinese method of the *A*-group does not require any such attribute. They must, however, have realized that a flange to steady the wheel was superior to a linchpin and adopted the flange, although they stuck to their old method of securing the linchpin.

The chariot was designed for a complement of two horses and the chariot pit at Ta-ssü-k'ung ts'un referred to above contained *inter alia* the skeletons of two horses. Four horses were, however, also employed at Anyang. In "China before the

¹⁾ D. Lion-Goldschmidt, *Arts de la Chine*, there dated as "Han".

Han Dynasty" William Watson tells of a chariot pit at Hsiao-t'un with the skeletal remains of four horses, and in the Middle Chou era four horses to a chariot seems to have been the rule. In Karlgren's translation of Shih Ching, the Book of Odes, a number of the odes describe hunting and war expeditions in which special stress is laid on the excellent conditions of the four stallions that were harnessed to each chariot.

The inner pair was harnessed to the chariot pole, and the inner traces of the outer pair were probably attached to the box. The outer traces must have been fastened to the axle-caps: As will be shown later, in Huai time there were special features on the axle-cap which prove that the outer trace was fastened on to it. But since our caps of category *A* offer no clues as to how this was effected we must try to figure out how this may have been accomplished. One end of the trace may have been bent into a loop which was made permanent by stitching the flap on the opposite part of the trace. A strap was then passed through the loop and the ends tied to the bars that form the two sides of the linchpin slot. The pin itself must have been in a horizontal position with the plain end pointing forward.

Another method may have been to give the loop such a width that it could be pushed over the axle-cap right down to the linchpin and then tied to it.

Among axle-caps of our category some show evidence of having been equipped with a contrivance for such a purpose. The most primitive of the methods studied occurs on *B16*. The indications are very slight; a small cylindrical cavity in the flange and, in horizontal line with this a pointed knob projecting from a collar on the cap. The cavity once held a rod, now lost, to which the trace was tied with a strap, the former having been bent into a loop as described above. When the trace had been attached, the rod was tied firmly to the axle-cap.

In the Huai valley an improved device was evolved, probably based on the above-mentioned method. The detachable rod was replaced by a knee-shaped one, one arm of which rested on the flange, the other one projecting from the side of the cap. There are no less than four and a half pairs in the MFEA and the Hallwyl Museum with such a contrivance, all of them from the Huai valley; *B2*, *19* and *20* are described below. The fourth pair is, however, too corroded for a description and reproduction.

Caps *B2* are of considerable interest, being of tin with a possible admixture of lead. Since tin soon takes on a dull surface the caps were painted with dark brown lacquer, parts of which still remain. They were sold to me by a Shou-chou dealer some forty years ago when I was stationed at Peng-pu, a small town on the Huaiho, not far from Shou-chou. He was a frequent visitor who sold to me hundreds and hundreds of bronzes, mostly small, and amongst them were several pairs of strap terminals, some of which were interesting since they were covered with thick coats of almost black lacquer. The metal has not been analyzed, but when scratched one of them showed a white surface. This happened a long time ago and I cannot remember whether some of them were brought with the axle-caps or not but the fact that both were lacquered and that the smaller objects were strap terminals has made me believe that they belong together.

One of the specimens measures 4.1×3.2 cm, the latter figure indicating the width of the trace, fragments of which still remained at the time of purchase. It was cast as a double blade with a space between for the trace which was held in place by four small pins. There was a swivel at one end, with a small hole for the string or tendon by which the terminal was tied to the knee. A different device was adopted by the foundry that turned out the many small and beautifully decorated bronzes found at Chin-tsun (Old Loyang), many of which were described by Bishop White in his book *Tombs of Old Loyang*. *B27* was fitted with the contrivance which is in the form of a stout hook projecting from a collar and pointing inwards, and to which the trace loop was tied firmly by a tendon. *B26* shows a similar device, and in White's book another one is illustrated.

B29 represents a pair and a single specimen, all fitted with a stout rectangular frame, a buckle in fact, with a hook in the form of a bird's head on a short neck pointing outwards. The buckle is hinged on to two half-hoops projecting from the side of the cap. The trace loop probably enclosed a bronze ring which passed under the buckle and then was laid over the hook.

A number of similar buckles which, however, served other purposes have been found in the Huai valley, and small belt-buckles of more or less circular form have been found in fairly large numbers in the Ordos and adjacent districts. The hook is invariably in the form of a bird's head which points outwards. All these buckles are of nomad origin. Now, the three axle-caps came from Yü-lin-fu and I venture to suggest that the Chinese got the idea of a buckle from their nomad neighbours.

Although most of the axle-caps of cat. *B* lack any kind of contrivance for the attachment of a trace, many of the linchpins were constructed with this purpose in view, the plain end being pierced by a slot to which the trace could be fastened.

One-horse-chariots were also much in use, notably in the Han period and probably earlier as well and the smaller caps probably belonged to such chariots. A pair of outer horses, however, could also be attached to such a chariot, the outer traces being attached to the linchpins in the manner described above.

Ornamentation

Four blades form the décor on the outer part of *A1-6*, all of which are of Yin and early Chou dates. Those of *A1* and *2* are filled with patterns borrowed from Ku goblets such as straight lines, spirals, T-scores and the like, and on *A2* pairs of vertical dragons have been added, a feature that occurs on the bulbous part of the Ku. Amongst the décor elements on the inner parts are k'uei dragons (*A2* and *5*), buffalo masks (*A3* and *4*), and on the closed end t'ao t'ieh masks (*A1* and *2*). Fig. 1 reproduces an inked impression of part of the décor on *A2*, and fig. 2 one of a buffalo mask.

The blades on *A3-6* are perfectly plain but the closed ends of *4* and *5* carry a significant pattern in the form of a knob on a platform which occupies about half of the space. The pattern can hardly be regarded as ornamental but in combination

with the four blades it surely forms a floral design, the knob and the platform constituting the stigma and the stamens and the four blades the petals.

The pattern on the end of *A 4* is different and it is composed of a flat spiral with striae as filling.

The décor on *A 7* is of a totally different order, being composed of a single mask and some typical Yin elements. The eyes of the mask are oval, the nose broad, the mouth U-shaped and the horns curving. It is interesting to note that the upper part of the mask gives the impression of forming another mask, but whether this was intentional or not is doubtful. Although there are some typical Yin décor elements, the piece is probably not older than early Chou. Figs. 3 and 4 reproduce inked impressions of the décor.

A 8 shows a type of pattern that does not occur on any ritual vessel. On the closed end there is the figure of a coiled snake in low relief, with a broad head, and the outer half of the side is filled with diagonal stripes in low relief, which probably represent the coils of a snake. A snake is known to strike with lightning rapidity, and the pattern might be regarded as being of magical import. An early Chou date is suggested.

What probably represents a floral design occupies the outer part of *A 9*. The pattern is composed of four triangular blades superimposed on as many rectangular ones with slightly rounded tops and joined at the base by small semi-circles, thus forming a wave band. The triangular blades probably represent the sepals and the rectangular blades the petals of a flower. The outer part is set off from the inner plain one by a collar, a characteristic feature of most Middle Chou axle-caps; this indicates the period of the piece which, however, probably dates at the beginning of the period. Fig. 5 reproduces an inked impression of the pattern.

The outer part of *A 10* is occupied by a typical Middle Chou pattern and consists of a wave band formed by three billows, on each of which a smaller wave is superimposed. The similarity to the floral design discussed above is so striking that some such pattern must have influenced the artisan when he conceived his wave pattern.

A 11 carry simplified and probably later versions of the pattern. Fig. 6 reproduces an inked impression of the pattern.

Karlgren's "broad figured band" occurs on the outer part of *A 13* and *14*. On the former this is composed of two broad S-shaped figures terminating in dragon's heads. The décor belt is bordered on the inside by a narrow collar formed of "scales", elongated ones alternating with shorter, more or less heart-shaped figures. These resemble to a remarkable degree the head of a praying mantis when viewed from above, and since that insect has a long and compressed body there can be no doubt that this is what the "scale" pattern represents. We do know that the insect served as a model for pre-Han lapidaries, although they preferred to carve them in profile. Fig. 7 reproduces an inked impression of part of the pattern. The "broad figured band" on *A 14* occupies two décor belts each with four dragons with S-shaped bodies. Two strips formed by stylized bodies of the praying mantis frame the band. Fig. 8 reproduces part of the décor.

Four dragons occupying a narrow belt form the sole décor on *A 15*. The dragon

has a U-shaped body which encloses an eye, and it was derived from such a design as occurs on the foot of a Hu vessel reproduced in "Chinese Bronzes in the Buckingham Collection", Plate XXXIV. Fig. 9 illustrates part of the décor.

Two arrow-like patterns form the principal décor on *A16* and *17*, and it is unnecessary to point out that such a pattern does not occur on any ritual vessel. Since the arrow was the speediest of all weapons it must have been of symbolic import. Figs. 10 and 11 reproduce the pattern.

The repertories of the foundries in operation after the close of the Middle Chou period were far more varied than earlier. Highly decorative designs with almost endless variations were evolved, but some Yin patterns were also revived and some Middle Chou schemes of décor taken over.

The "interlocked T's" motif, a typical Yin pattern, occurs on *B1*, which represents two specimens with but slight differences, the fillings on one consisting of spirals and those on the other of squared spirals. The outer ends of both are faceted. There are 13 facets on the one and 16 on the other. When fresh from the foundry they must have produced a scintillating effect, and might have been regarded as a form of décor. Part of the pattern is reproduced in fig. 12. The squared spiral, another Yin element, occurs on *B2*, which represents one pair and a single specimen, all with identical décor. The surface is unfortunately so corroded that only portions of the ornamentation can be identified. The principal motif, which is repeated four times, consists of a dragon with very small head and a U-shaped body composed of squared spirals; similar spirals form angular transversal and longitudinal bands, which fill the surface. The dragon's head is of considerable interest. It has not the vicious look that characterizes the heads of most dragons on pre-Han mirrors and which makes them resemble the head of some poisonous snake. This one has an almost benevolent look and resembles the head on mirror *E27*, plate 13 in Karlgren's "Huai and Han". The mirror came from the Shou-chou region and was considered by Karlgren to date from the second half of the third century B.C. It is interesting to note that the axle-caps came from the Ku-shih-hsien region which is in the Honan part of the Huai valley. Fig. 13 illustrates part of the pattern.

The décor on *B3* consists of four strips of squared spirals. The outer part has a ten-sided exterior. The head of the linchpin is unusually large and will be described under the heading "Linchpins".

On *B4* coarsely executed squared spirals form the background for a stylized dragon design occurring on four narrow décor belts. The dragon, which is in low rounded relief, is of a compressed U-form with a hump in the middle enclosing an eye. The pattern recalls the dragon design on *A15*.

Another Middle Chou décor occurs on *B5* and *6* and comes under Karlgren's "broad figured band". On the former this is composed of two different elements. Four broad S-curves, each with a heart-shaped ear or horn, in two back-to-back pairs constitute the outer part of the band. This is followed on the inside by four dragons' heads, in two back-to-back pairs, rising from a W-shaped band. The figures are filled with spirals, striae and granulation. The S-curves bring to mind

a dragon pattern on two Ting vessels from the so-called Li-yü find reproduced by Umehara in *Senkoku shiki dōki* plates 1 and 11. Even though the curves terminate in dragons' heads with heart-shaped ears, the similarity of the S-curves is so striking that we have reason to believe that the axle-cap came from the foundry that turned out some of the Li-yü bronzes. They did not, however, belong to the Li-yü find. Fig. 14 illustrates part of the décor.

The décor on *B6* is composed of two broad elements placed back-to-back and occurring four times. Each element consists of three "hooks" with beak-like tips, combined so as to form a single unit. There are also two incongruous "talons" which seem to have been added in a haphazard manner. The piece probably came from the same foundry as *B5*. Fig. 15 illustrates the pattern.

The "entwining snakes" pattern on a granulated ground occurs on *B7* as well as on two pairs, one of which came from the Huai valley. A narrow belt with a cord pattern forms an outer border, and immediately inside the outer end there is a collar with a diamond pattern formed by ovals back-to-back and possibly representing cowries. On the Huai valley pair there is no collar, only a narrow belt with incised cowries.

Entwining snakes with similar twists to their bodies but on a plain ground constitute the ornamentation on a Kuei vessel formerly in the Eumorfopoulos collection. The vessel carries an inscription by which it can be associated with the reign of Duke Ling of the Ts'ai state (583-554 B.C.).

Two narrow scale bands form what might be regarded as the main décor on *B8*. They are of normal length and proper representations of scales, both ends being rounded, the one convexly, the other concavely, so as to fit into one another. To avoid monotony the scales of the two belts face opposite directions. Two collars with the cowrie pattern frame in the outer belt, and a narrow zone with incised cowries occupies the concave approach to the flange. The piece came from Shih-chia-chuang not far from the Honan-Shansi border. Fig. 16 illustrates part of the décor.

The ornamentation on *B9* differs but little from that on the preceding piece. The outer of the two scale bands has been replaced by one formed of oval rings, every second one with two "hooks" pointing inwards. The pattern probably represents the links of a chain. The other scale band has been replaced by a broad belt with a loosely twisted cord pattern. Fig. 17 reproduces part of the décor.

The principal décor on *B10* consists of rectangles, every second one enclosing an S-shaped figure; the latter has two projections resembling sharp arrowheads and probably representing dragon's horns or ears. The rectangles occupy three narrow belts and were grouped so as to form a stepped pattern. A cowrie pattern occupies a narrow belt on a broad collar, and a row of incised cowries occupies the concave approach to the flange. Fig. 18 illustrates the pattern.

The principal décor on *B11* is composed of half-ovals, the curving sides of which form narrow strips, one encircling the cap and four at right angle to it. Each crossing point is emphasized by a depressed diamond. Each half-oval encloses two pairs of broad figures somewhat resembling the upper part of a bird's head. The pattern

with its four diamonds recalls that on the collar of *B7*, and as it is quite unusual we have reason to believe that the two came from the same foundry. Fig. 19 reproduces the pattern.

B12 is covered with a pattern occurring four times. Its principal feature is a mask with bulging eyes, curving tusks and heart-shaped ears, and it is flanked by a pair of wings. Below, there are two C-shaped figures back-to-back, each one formed of two hook-like figures, probably stylized animal heads with pointed snouts. There are also symmetrically disposed spirals. Striae and spirals fill the principal elements. A narrow collar with the cowrie pattern constitutes the outer border. The piece came from Yü-lin-fu, north Shensi, on the border of the Ordos. Fig. 20 illustrates part of the décor.

The greater part of *B13* has a pattern occurring four times and showing a stylized mask. Comma-like spirals form the eyes and C-shaped figures the ears and cheeks. The nose is of the snubby type, and the mouth is set with what might represent front teeth. Eyebrows and a moustache are indicated by striations. The forehead, finally, carries two curving figures, the significance of which is obscure. Fig. 23 illustrates the pattern.

B14 is probably one of the most minutely decorated axle-caps now existent. The pattern, which occurs six times, consists of a jumble of overlapping "commas" all covered with extremely fine striae. There are also two small rings, probably once set with bits of turquoise. A collar with a cowrie pattern forms an outer border. The cap came from Shen-mu, a town east of Yü-lin-fu, on the border of the Ordos. Fig. 22 reproduces the pattern.

The cowrie seems to have been a favourite motif with some of the designers of axle-caps, whereas the pattern does not occur on any of the many vessels reproduced by Umehara in *Senkoku shiki dōki*. It forms, however, the collar on the figure of a tapir in the Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, which belongs to the Li-yü find. It is one of a pair; the collar of the other one is, however, in the form of a rope. The cowrie collar thus indicates the female of the species. Designers of mirrors also made use of this pattern, which occupies narrow zones on mirrors *A2* and *A4* in Karlgren's "Huai and Han", BMFEA No. 13; he dates these mirrors in the 6th century B.C.

The outer part of *B15* has a ten-sided exterior, and the inner part of each panel carries a jumble of comma-like figures on a granulated ground. A narrow collar with striae terminates the outer part. An inner belt follows with masks, commas and U-shaped figures, all of them striated. The outer closed end shows a pattern similar to that on the panels. This pattern resembles the décor on a bowl in the MFEA reproduced in Bulletin No. 21, plate 30. The piece came from Yü-lin-fu. Fig. 21 reproduces the pattern on the end.

The principal décor on *B16* fills two broad belts and seems to be composed of small "commas" and other figures in low rounded relief, scattered over a granulated ground. The décor resembles that on *B15*. Two collars with bands of continuous S-curves frame in the outer belt, and immediately outside the flange is a narrow band with an arrow-like pattern.

B17 is a cap, not a tube, and almost as long as the shortest of the category *A* caps. We have reason to regard it as one of the earliest of the caps with a flange. It was reported to have come from Yü-lin-fu. Outside each of the two linchpin slots is a frame, the two opposite sides of which are pierced by circular holes which must have corresponded to similar holes in the linchpin. Above one of the frames is the figure of a leopard modelled in the round and with its head just above the crossbeam. The body is covered with flattened nodules which represent the spots on the leopard, and a cup-like depression above each leg indicates the upper joint, a not uncommon feature in the nomad art. The linchpin is unfortunately missing, but the head of it must surely have been in the form of some animal on which the leopard was ready to pounce. The heads of the only nomad linchpins that we possess were in the form of prone hares (*B34*), and the heads of several linchpins from the Huai valley are in the form of animals. It need hardly be pointed out that the motif of a feline beast attacking an animal was a nomad conception.

Only the inner part carries a décor; it fills two belts and is composed of comma-like figures of several shapes which lie scattered on a granulated ground. That some of them represent birds' heads is indicated by a median line which forms the dividing line between the upper and lower jaws. The upper part of the head ends in a spiral which constitutes the eye, an unusual but not unique method of representing the optic, as proved by the mask on *B13*. It was mentioned above that a bird's head serving as a hook on belt-buckles was a common motif in the nomad art, and we have therefore reason to believe that the "commas" on our axle-cap were of nomad origin. In addition to the bird's-heads pattern there are short straight bands, each with an S-curve and with a bird's head on a neck standing at each end, the three forming a trough-like pattern. The reason why I regard this as one of the earliest of the *B* caps is not only its length but also the method by which the pin was secured. Both ends were tied to the frame by two pieces of string which did not pass round the cap as on caps that lack such frames. Fig. 24 reproduces part of the décor.

A broad belt with an intriguing pattern occupies the greater part of *B18*. This is formed by elements of elongated S-shape terminating in dragon's heads. The elements form a stepped as well as interlocked pattern, the inner head at one end of the "neck" also serving as the outer head of the one below. The belt is followed by a collar with the "volutes and angle" pattern, and an innermost broad belt is decorated with curves of moot origin. Fig. 25 illustrates the pattern.

The décor on *B19* consists of equilateral triangles, the sides of which are formed by "scales" and straight "commas". Similar elements occupy the rest of the belt. A collar with a rope pattern forms the outer border. The triangular pattern recalls the floral décor on *A9*, fig. 5, and such a pattern might well have served the artisan as a model. The piece came from Shou-chou. Fig. 26 reproduces the pattern.

The décor on *B20* falls under Karlgren's "zigzag lozenge" and is composed of swastika-like figures occurring four times. Angular spirals serve as fillings. The piece came from Shou-chou. Fig. 27 reproduces the pattern.

B21 has an unusual décor composed of an element which resembles a blunt arrowhead, with granules for fillings. It occupies three broad belts as well as two

narrow collars. The design, notably on the collars, resembles the markings on the back of a snake with the name of *Agkistrodon Blomhoffii*. It is the only poisonous species in those parts of Kiangsu and Anhui that lie north of Yangtsekiang, where it is extremely common. It is beautifully marked with dark brown transversal bands, some similar to the "blunt arrowhead", and such a reptile must have served the artisan as a model. If my surmise is correct, the head of the linchpin, which is unusually broad, might well represent the head of the snake. The piece came from Ku-shih-hsien. Fig. 28 reproduces the pattern.

The outer half of *B22* is perfectly plain and set off from the inner part by a collar with a row of short ovals, possibly representing cowries. A narrow belt with S-shaped curves follows, and the concave approach to the flange carries a succession of T-shaped spirals. On the closed end are two concentric rings, one with a scale pattern, the other with spirals. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a crouching beast, a feature to be described under the heading "Linchpins". The pair was brought by a Shou-chou dealer together with a pair of Hu, a pair of Ting and a ladle all of which he claimed to have come from a grave at Ku-shih-hsien, a statement I had no reason to doubt, since all were covered with an identical patina. The ladle is of considerable interest being exactly like one retrieved from the storehouse of Yu Wang at Shou-chou and excavated in the early thirties. The king died in 228 B.C.

The "hooks and volutes" pattern occurs on a number of axle-caps in forms that differ somewhat from those on the pre-Han mirrors, the inner windings being in somewhat higher relief. When comparing the two groups of artifacts one cannot escape the feeling that the workmanship on the axle-caps was far inferior to that on the mirrors. This was the case on *B23* and *24*, both of which came from the Huai valley. The former is completely covered with the pattern, whereas this only occurs on the inner part of the latter, the outer half being ten-sided and perfectly plain.

The décor on *B25* is quite different; it consists of straight and curving elements all embellished with lines parallel to the sides and arranged in neat order.

The décor on *B26* was achieved in broad or narrow strips of silver foil, much of which still remains. The pattern on the two thick collars is composed of T-shaped and angular spirals, and round the outer belt is a broad, undulating band combined with spirals. The side of the flange also carries an undulating band which is formed by a pattern occurring four times; it shows the figure of a stylized dragon with an arched back. A gaping mouth at one end and a short tail at the other are the only indications that the pattern represents a dragon. Eyes and ears or horns have been dispensed with. The walls are unusually thick, and a stout hook projects from the outer of the two collars.

B27 belongs to the Chin-ts'un find and is decorated with designs formed by inlay of gold and silver foil of varying widths. The patterns have already been described by J. G. Andersson in BMFEA No. 7, and I will confine myself to some general remarks. On the décor belt enclosed by the two collars the pattern consists of "volutes and angles" as well as of other curves which form a continuous band of ovals.

Similar elements on the approach to the flange are combined so as to form a series resembling the fig. 8. The pattern on the side of the flange is of a different kind; it forms an undulating band which resembles the pattern on *B26*, although all traces of a dragon origin have disappeared. The two caps resemble one another in many respects such as the thickness of the walls and the hook, and we thus have reason to believe that they must have come from the same foundry. This does not, however, imply that *B26* also belonged to the Chin-ts'un find. See further the discussion under the heading "Linchpins".

B28 also belongs to the same find, but it is considerably smaller and carries a décor in silver foil. On the belt between the collars this is formed by diamonds, each of them enclosing a pair of spirals. The approach to the flange carries the "volutes and angle" pattern, and somewhat similar elements form a continuous but not undulating band on the side of the flange.

Linchpins

The linchpin is defined as a pin inserted through the end of the axletree in order to keep the wheel on, and, although the many specimens existent in our collections are of metal, other and more perishable material might have been used for their manufacture, just as was the case in certain countries in the ancient Near East. In the chariot-pit at Ta-ssü-k'ung ts'un referred to above a pair of axle-caps was found but apparently no linchpins. In K'ao ku hsüeh pao No. 9, 1955, where the work of excavation was described, the axle-caps are reproduced but not the linchpins, and in the reconstruction of the pit with all the objects *in situ* the axle-caps are shown with two rectangular holes instead of the linchpin heads. It is unthinkable that they should have been overlooked and highly improbable that they should have been stolen under the eyes of those who supervised the work. There is of course the possibility that they were removed before the chariot was lowered but there would have been no reason for doing so. The probability is that they were of some perishable material such as wood which had left no traces.

This might be the reason why axle-caps with typical Yin décor and probably from Anyang are reproduced without any linchpins. Such is the case of *A1* and 2, of two in the catalogue of the Pillsbury collection and of one in that of the Eumorphopoulos collection. There are, however, indications that although the pins themselves might have been of wood the heads were of bronze. In Selected Chinese Antiquities from the Collection of Gustaf Adolf, Crown Prince of Sweden, Plate 6, Nils Palmgren reproduced a pair of axle-caps (our *A1*) together with a pair of small bronzes; the latter, he suggests, might have served as fastenings for the wooden hub, but they were probably the heads of wooden linchpins to which they were attached by means of two square pins. In the William Rockhill Nelson Gallery of Art in Kansas City there is an axle-cap with typical Yin décor and with a linchpin head in position. The specimen was reproduced by Creel in *The Birth of China*, plate XIV. The reproduction shows the pin head in profile. If the pin itself had been of bronze it would undoubtedly have projected from the opposite side of the axle-

cap but it does not. Although the reproduction is very small you can see that the head itself has the same shape as that published by Palmgren. Be that as it may, there are numerous linchpins preserved, which can give us an idea of the motifs the artisans made use of when designing the heads of the pins. The chariot was used not only in warfare but in hunting expeditions as well and it is only natural that the artisans should have chosen the heads of the big game of that part of the country. They were to serve as mascots, and also enhanced the artistic effect of the axle-caps. I have found the following species represented: the elephant, the rhinoceros, the buffalo, the wild boar, the argali ram, and amongst the felines the tiger, which latter seems to have been the motif par préférence.

The heads were beautifully and not seldom realistically executed and mounted on a slab in the manner present day hunters of big game exhibit their trophies. The slab has a curving underside to correspond to the curvature of the end of the hub, and there is a hole through the "neck" of the head and a slot through the other end of the pin, and this latter might be either round or rectangular.

An interesting and in a sense amusing linchpin was reproduced by Yetts in the catalogue of the Eumorfopoulos collection of Chinese bronzes, Vol. I, Pl. LXIV. The head is in the form of the upper part of a man with round face and prominent ears, each pierced by a hole; he is placed at the back of the head of a tiger which he appears to be holding up to show his prowess in the hunting of a dangerous animal. There is a round hole through the pin between the man and the tiger head and a slot through the other end of the pin.

Although many of the heads are beautifully fashioned and easy to identify, there are exceptions showing that the artisan took little care when forming the head. The one on *A 6*, for example, is quite difficult to define. It might represent the head of a boar. Although it was the flange on the category *B* axle-caps that kept the wheel on, the linchpin did so indirectly. The artisan must, however, have believed that it only prevented the axle-cap from dropping out, and he made them therefore far more slender than before. The linchpin head, which now rested on the flange and never came in contact with the hub, was also made smaller and generally in the form of a feline mask or a t'ao t'ieh mask. There were, however, exceptions, and one such occurs on *B 3*, where the linchpin head is in the form of a human mask which has big oval eyes with slits right across and a wide, straight mouth partly obscured by the nose. On the sides, as well as below, are entwining snakes in rounded relief.

It has been mentioned above that the head of an Ordos linchpin was in the form of a prone hare in the round, and the figure of a prone animal as a linchpin head is not uncommon, notably on several from the Huai valley and probably fabricated in a Shou-chou foundry. This is the case with *B 22*, 30-33. They are in the form of a recumbent beast in the round, with the legs tucked in under the body leaving a hole for a string. It is difficult to figure out what species were used as models. All have a stubby tail with turned up tip, but there the similarity ends. On one the body is covered with scales, on another with spirals, and on *B 22* deeply incised spirals mark the upper joints of the legs. The figure of a recumbent animal also

forms the head on *B13*. The figure is rather indistinct but granules are plainly visible. The provenance is unknown. The Huei hsien fa chüeh pao kao, Pl. 52, however, reproduces an axle-cap with its linchpin and this latter has a head similar to those described above; this specimen was found in the carefully carried out excavation in grave number 1 of the set of tombs in the vicinity of Ku-wei-ts'un in the Huei-hsien district.

It was stated above that there were linchpins of other material than bronze and this is the case with *B27* and *28* as well as with several pairs reproduced by Bishop White in Tombs of Old Loyang. Here we meet with an interesting combination, the pin head being of bronze and the pin itself of iron. What could have been the reason for substituting iron for bronze? It is difficult to believe that the foundry had run short of copper or tin. The axle-caps themselves are unusually thick. Neither can it have been a question of strength, iron being considered stronger than bronze. The only reason that I could suggest is that at Chin-tsun iron may have been cheaper than bronze.

Fabrication

There is ample evidence that the axle-caps were cast in sectional moulds, taken from the sides of a model which had to be complete in every respect with all the elements of the décor present. The first step in the process was then to create a model, and in following the process of delineating the various patterns we will use *A2* and fig. 1 as a suitable specimen. There was first of all the model on which the patterns were to be rendered. This was of clay and baked to such a hardness that the graving tool would not force up the margins of the incisions.

The décor on the outer part consists of four isosceles blades which should have been of the same shape and size. This is, however, not the case, the tip of the right blade covering that of the middle one. This indicates the use of a templet to obtain the contours, and a wooden one was probably used. The contours were scored with a knife. When the artisan was to draw the last blade he must have noticed the overlapping but instead of carving a somewhat smaller templet he went on with the work. The principal décor on the blade consists of pairs of dragons placed back-to-back, all identical, and when drawing their contours he made use of a templet. This work was, however, not done with sufficient care, the space between the dragon's beak and the base of the blade varying somewhat. Whether templates were used for the dragons occupying an inner décor belt it is impossible to tell. With the contours already obtained, he now painted the various décor elements in red pigment, and when the work was completed the engraver took over. Before the four strips of clay that were to form the side sections could be pressed against the model, this had to be brushed over with soot or powdered mica or some such substance to keep the plastic clay of the section from sticking to the model. When the impressions had been taken, the sections were provided with tenons and mortices as well as with lugs which were to project from the ends of the sections to the surface of the core. There were two pairs of rectangular shape

which were to create the slots in the axle-caps but which also served as spacers, and there were also two pairs of semicircular ones, their purpose being to steady the core at the time of pouring in the molten metal. Before the sections could be assembled a core had to be made. When the mould was complete it was placed in a pit upside down and clay was rammed all round to prevent the "seams" from opening up.

The décor on *A 3* is of a different kind. The four blades are in relief and likewise the buffalo masks, and a different method was therefore employed. A model of the blade with its mask was made, probably of wood. This was used as a stamp on a clay mould into which four impressions were made and applied to the surface of the model.

A similar method was used in the Huai style period, and *B 14*, fig. 22 will serve to illustrate the process. The pattern, which occurs six times, is composed of "commas" as well as of two small rings. The various elements were first painted on a flat slab of hard-baked clay and then carved. This was used as a stamp for a mould into which impressions were taken and then applied to the model. It is to be noted, however, that six mould sections had to be used.

Catalogue

A 1 A pair. Length 19.5 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.3 cm.

On the outer part are four heavily decorated blades and, further in, two t'ao t'ieh masks. A similar mask also occupies the closed end. More than halfway from the base are two small circular holes which were caused by lugs from the mould sections in order to steady the core at the time of pouring in the molten metal. Grey and green patina. Anyang given as provenance. Yin.

Collection: His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf.

A 2 Length 16.7 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.7 cm.

On the outer part are four heavily decorated blades with pairs of vertical dragons. This is immediately followed by a narrow belt with a dragon design, and a broad belt with two antithetical dragons. Close to the inner end a narrow band of U-shaped spirals. On the closed top a t'ao t'ieh mask. The two small holes described under *A 1* recur here. Dark grey and green patina. Provenance: Anyang. Yin.

Collection: The Museum of Decorative Art, Copenhagen.

A 3 A pair. Length 15.6 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.0 cm.

Four plain blades occupy the greater part, and on the base of each of the blades is a buffalo mask. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a boar(?) and the pin itself appears to be somewhat too short. Glossy grey-green patina. Yin—Early Chou.

Collection: The M. H. de Young Memorial Museum, San Francisco.

A 4 Length 20 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.6 cm.

Similar to *A 3*. The two small holes noted under *A 1* and 2 were present but

were filled in with pins the patina of which differs from that on the cap itself. Glossy green and blue patina. Yin—Early Chou.
Collection: MFEA K. 10406.

A5 Length 17.6 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.8 cm.

On the outer part are four blades and further in two k'uei dragons. The outer end has a spiral in low, flat relief. Two small holes as on *A1*. The head of the linchpin has an angular shape and carries a tiger mask. Grey and green patina. Yin—Early Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 11276:142.

A6 A pair. Length 15.5 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.3 cm.

Four plain blades occupy the outer part. A stylized animal mask forms the head of the linchpin. Blue-grey patina with some glossy black spots. Early Chou.
Collection: MFEA K. 11000:490.

A7 A pair. Length 12.5 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.2 cm.

A single mask and some typical Yin décor elements occupy the outer part. The end is filled with a spiral pattern. A stylized animal mask forms the head of the linchpin, and it is so similar to that on *A6* that they were probably cast by the same foundry. Glossy, black and green patina. Early Chou.

Collection: M. H. de Young Memorial Museum, San Francisco.

A8 Length 12.7 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.6 cm.

On the outer end a pattern representing a coiled snake with broad head and on the outer half of the cap diagonal strips probably representing the coils of a snake. The pattern was probably a symbol of speed. Dark green patina with grey spots. Probably Early Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 11276:141.

A9 Length 12.7 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.6 cm.

On the outer half is a pattern composed of four triangular blades superimposed on as many rectangular ones with slightly rounded upper parts. The pattern probably represents a flower. Black and red patina. Probably Early Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 11034:85.

A10 One of a pair. Length 13.5 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.3 cm.

The outer half is occupied by a wave band composed of three billows with a small wave on each. On the end, a whorl pattern. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a beautifully modelled bore's head. Grey and red patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 11033:57.

A11 One of a pair. Length 11.7 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.8 cm.

A simplified version of the preceding. Green and red patina. Middle Chou.
Collection: MFEA K. 10599:250.

A12A pair. Length 12.5 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.0 cm.

On the outer part two bands of broad, flat spirals separated by a collar. On

the end a whorl pattern. The head of the linchpin is rather flat and in the shape of a tiger mask. Dull green patina with black spots. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 11033:59.

A 13 Length 11.3 cm. Diameter of the opening 5.1 cm.

The outer part is occupied by two broad S-curves, each terminating in a dragon's head. A band formed by stylized representations of the praying mantis forms an inner border. Green patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 10408.

A 14 Length 13.4 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.7 cm.

The décor consists of two bands of angular spirals, each of them ending in the head of a dragon. They are framed in by two narrow décor belts showing scale-like figures which represent the bodies of the praying mantis. Grey, red and brown patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 10409.

A 15 Length 9.8 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.6 cm.

The décor consists of four stylized dragons in U-shape. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a stylized animal head. Grey patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 10410.

A 16 One of a pair. Length 10.2 cm. Diameter of the opening 3.8 cm.

On the outer part are two arrows, a speed symbol. Then follows a band of the praying mantis type. Green and red patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: MFEA K. 10599:249.

A 17 A pair. Length 11.8 cm. Diameter of the opening 4.4 cm.

Fairly similar to the preceding. The heads of the praying mantis have, however, been left out. Green and brown patina. Middle Chou.

Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.

B 1 Length 5.6 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.9 cm.

All but a narrow outer belt is covered with the "interlocked T's" pattern with square spirals for fillings. Black, green and red patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 14486.

There is a similar one in the collection. Only the fillings differ, being proper spirals. The dimensions are: length 6.3 cm, diameter 5.6 cm.

B 2 A pair. Length 5.3 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.3 cm.

The material is tin with a possible admixture of lead. On the side the remains of a knee-shaped rod, the other end of which rested on the flange. Traces of dark brown lacquer indicate that the surface was once covered with such material. The décor covers most of the surface right down to the flange and consists of narrow strips of squared spirals; four of them form U-shaped figures, each one terminating in a dragon's head. Dull grey patina. Provenance: Ku-shih-hsien in the Honan part of the Huai valley.

Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.

In MFEA there is a similar piece, from the same locality.

- B3** A pair. Length 8.0 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.8 cm.
The outer part is ten-sided and plain, and set off from the inner part by a collar with a cord pattern. The inner part down to the flange is covered with four narrow strips of squared spirals. Outside each of the two linchpin slots is a frame, the two parallel sides of which are pierced by a circular hole. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a human head, partly surrounded by entwining snakes. Green patina.
Collection: MFEA K. 11474.
- B4** A pair. Length 8.1 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.5 cm.
The principal décor motif is a figure in low relief and in the shape of a U with a "hump" in which there is an eye. Such figures occur on four narrow bands and on a ground of coarsely formed squared spirals. The figure is akin to that on *A 15*. Green patina.
Collection: The H. M. de Young Memorial Museum, San Francisco.
- B5** Length 4.5 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.1 cm.
The ornamentation of the "broad figured bands" type has been described in detail under "Ornamentation". Dark grey patina. Probably from the foundry that turned out some of the Li-yü bronzes.
Collection: MFEA K. 11033:62.
- B6** Length 5.6 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.6 cm.
The décor has been described under "Ornamentation" above. Scoured black patina. Probably from the same foundry as *B5*.
Collection: MFEA K. 11000:435.
- B7** A pair. Length 4.2 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.6 cm.
Round the outer part a collar with strips of ovals, four and four forming diamonds. The broad belt between the collar and the flange is occupied by the "entwining snakes" pattern on a granulated ground. Dull grey patina.
Collection: MFEA K. 11276:144.
There is a similar pair in the collection of His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf. The dimensions are: Length 5.0 cm. Diameter 5.0 cm. Another pair is in the Hallwyl Museum. The dimensions are: Length 4.7 cm. Diameter 5.4 cm. This pair came from the Huai valley.
- B8** Length 7.0 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.6 cm.
Two bands of scales form the principal décor, and two collars with a row of cowries on each frame in the outer band. The inner band is bordered by a cord-patterned belt. A narrow belt of incised cowries occurs on the concave approach to the flange. Black patina. Provenance: Shih-chia-chuang, West Honan.
Collection: MFEA K. 11074:5.
- B9** Length 8.3 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.0 cm.
Two narrow collars with the cowrie pattern in low relief borders a row of oval rings, every second one having two hooks pointing inwards. Then follows a belt with a loosely twisted cord pattern. A band of scales occurs on the concave

approach to the flange, and on the flange itself is a row of incised cowries. Dull dark green patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 11033:61.

B10 Length 6.6 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.5 cm.

Close to the outer end is a broad collar, in the middle of which there is a row of cowries in relief. Then follows a broad belt with a checkered pattern of rectangles, plain ones alternating with others enclosing an S-shaped spiral. A narrow cord pattern occurs on the approach to the flange, and on the flange itself is a row of incised cowries. Dark grey patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 4046.

B11 Length 6.2 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.5 cm.

A narrow collar with a cord pattern occupies the outermost part and is followed by a broad belt with a pattern occurring twice; it consists of four half-ovals, the curving contours of which form a cross with a diamond in the centre. Every oval carries two pairs of spirals. A narrow strip with incised cowries occupies the concave approach to the flange. Glossy black patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 11000:436.

B12 Length 6.7 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.2 cm.

A pattern occurring three times occupies the greater part, and is composed of the following elements: A mask with curved tusks and C-shaped ears flanked by a pair of wings. Below are two C-shaped figures back-to-back, and symmetrically disposed "commas" complete the pattern. A collar with a cowrie pattern forms an outer border. Smooth black patina. Provenance: Yü-lin-fu.

Collection: MFEA K. 11071:75.

B13 A pair. Length 7.4 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.4 cm.

A stylized mask on a granulated ground, occurring three times, occupies most of the surface. Spirals form the eyes of the mask and C-shaped figures the ears and cheeks. The nose is of the snubby type, the mouth long and straight, and the moustache and eyebrows are indicated by striae. Pairs of S-shaped curves complete the pattern. A narrow collar with the "volutes and angle" pattern forms an outer border. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a prone beast with granulated body.

Collection: His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf.

B14 Length 7.4 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.1 cm.

A pattern composed of interlacing and overlapping "commas", occurring six times, occupies the greater part of the surface. There are also two small, hollow knobs to each of the panels. A narrow collar with a cowrie pattern forms an outer border. Smooth black patina. Provenance: Yü-lin-fu.

Collection: MFEA K. 11071:73.

B15 A pair. Length 7.6 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.0 cm.

The outer part has a ten-sided exterior, and every panel carries a décor composed of small comma-like figures on a granulated ground. A collar separates the outer from the inner part, which is embellished with masks and commas.

The outer end has the same kind of décor as the ten panels. Grey, green and brown patina.

Collection: His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf.

B16 A pair. Length 7.4 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.1 cm.

Two broad belts have a décor of small patterns on a granulated ground. They are bounded by narrow collars, two of them with continuous S-curves and one with an arrow-like pattern. A pointed knob projects from the outer collar, and in horizontal line with it is a cylindrical depression in the flange. Dull green patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 11276:146.

B17 Length 8.9 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.3 cm.

Outside each of the two linchpin slots is a frame and above one of them is the figure of a leopard in the round with its head resting on the horizontal beam of the frame. The inner part is filled with commas of various shapes, in two bands and scattered over a granulated ground. Black patina. Provenance: Yü-lin-fu.

Collection: MFEA K. 11071:2.

B18 A pair. Length 6.8 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.1 cm.

A broad belt on the outer part has a décor of flattened S-curves terminating in dragon's heads. This is followed by a narrow collar with continuous S-curves, and close to the flange is a belt of curves. Grey and green patina.

Collection: His Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf.

B19 A pair. Length 5.1 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.4 cm.

Round the outer end a collar with a cord pattern. The inner part is occupied by equilateral triangles, the sides of which are formed by scales and straight commas. On the flange is a stout knee-shaped rod. Grey-green patina. Provenance: Shou-chou.

Collections: MFEA K. 11000:431 and The Hallwyl Museum.

B20 A pair. Length 5.4 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.3 cm.

Round the outermost part a collar with a cord pattern. The rest of the surface has a swastica-like pattern with angular spirals for fillings. There is a knee-shaped rod on the flange. Grey-green patina. Provenance: Shou-chou.

Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.

B21 A pair. Length 5.2 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.7 cm.

The whole cap except a plain outer band has a décor in the form of blunt arrow-heads, plain ones alternating with granulated ones. Smooth grey-green patina. Provenance: Shou-chou.

Collections: MFEA K. 11000:434 and The Hallwyl Museum.

B22 A pair. Length 5.5 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.3 cm.

An oval-adorned collar midway from the outer end sets off the outer part from the inner, which latter has a narrow belt with S-shaped spirals. On the end are two concentric rings, one with scales, the other with spirals. The head

of the linchpin is in the form of a prone beast. Grey patina. Provenance: Ku-shih-hsien.

Collections: MFEA K. 11000:438 and The Hallwyl Museum.

B23 A pair. Length 4.4 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.7 cm.

All except a plain narrow belt covered with the "hooks and volutes" pattern. Grey patina. Provenance: The Huai valley.

Collection: MFEA K. 10599:229.

B24 A pair. Length 8.0 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 6.3 cm.

The outer part is ten-sided and plain and the inner part has the "hooks and volutes" pattern. On the outer end a whorl pattern. Outside one of the two linchpin slots is a frame pierced by a square hole. Grey patina. Provenance: Ku-shih-hsien.

Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.

B25 Length 4.7 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 5.2 cm.

A broad belt with straight and curving commas fill the greater part of the surface, and a collar with a cord pattern forms an outer border. Dark green patina.

Collection: MFEA K. 11000:439.

B26 Length 8.6 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.7 cm.

The décor has been described under "Ornamentation" above. From an outer collar projects a hook with broken tip, to which the traces of an outer horse have been tied. The cap has been cleaned to bring out the décor.

Collection: MFEA K. 12412.

B27 A pair. Length 8.3 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.1 cm.

Some of the décor has been described under "Ornamentation". A hook similar to the one on *B26*. The linchpin itself, not the head, is of iron and was discussed in our paragraph "Linchpins". The surface has been cleaned to bring out the patterns. Provenance: Chin-tsun (Old Loyang).

Collections: MFEA K. 14483, and Mrs. Nora Lundgren, Stockholm.

An axle-cap with a similar hook and covered with incrustations is reproduced in Bishop White's book *Tombs of Old Loyang*.

B28 A pair. Length 8.3 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.2 cm.

The décor has been described under "Ornamentation" above. The pieces have been cleaned. Provenance: Chin-tsun.

Collection: MFEA K. 11276:149.

B29 Length 7.5 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 4.8 cm.


A ten-sided tube with two eyelets formed by half-hoops; these proceed from animal masks and support a rectangular buckle with a hook in the form of a bird's head. Glossy black patina. Provenance: Yü-lin-fu.

Collection: MFEA K. 11071:74.

There is a similar pair in the same collection. The dimensions are length 6.7 cm, diameter 4.8 cm. Provenance: Yü-lin-fu.

- B30** A pair. Length 8.1 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.7 cm.
The only décor on the outer end is spirals. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a recumbent beast. Grey-green patina. Provenance: Shou-chou.
Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.
- B31** Length 6.8 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 3.3 cm.
Plain except for two collars. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a recumbent beast. Smooth lead-like patina. Provenance: Shou-chou.
Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.
- B32** Length 5.5 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 2.9 cm.
Quite plain. The head of the linchpin in the form of a recumbent beast. Green patina. Provenance: The Huai valley.
Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.
- B33** A pair. Length 4.7 cm. Diameter of the opening at the base 2.5 cm.
Quite plain. The head of the linchpin in the form of a recumbent beast. Grey-green patina. Provenance: The Huai valley.
Collection: The Hallwyl Museum.
- B34** A pair. Length 5.6 cm. Dimensions of the hole at the base 3.3×2.6 cm.
Quite plain except around the two linchpin slots, which are framed by the contours of a recumbent hare. The head of the linchpin is in the form of a prone hare. Green, partly scoured, patina. Provenance: Sui-yuan.
Collection: MFEA K. 11040.

Pls. 15,16. Examples of linchpins.



A 1



A 2



A 3



A 4



A 6



A 5



A 8



A 9



A 7



A 11



A 10




A 12



A 14



A 13



A 15



A 16





B 3



B 4



B 2



B 2



B 1



B 7



B 5



B 9



B 8



B 6



B 10



B 11



B 12



B 13 a



B 13 b



B 14



B 16



B 15



B 17



B 19



B 18



B 20



B 21




B 23



B 25



B 22



B 24



B 28




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
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
Figs. 2, 4-6




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
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
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


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Figs. 10-12



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
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


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Figs. 18-21




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
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
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
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
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27



28

SIX PAINTINGS BY HSÜ WEI

BY

BO GYLLENSVÄRD

The collection of Chinese paintings in the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities in Stockholm is mainly concentrated within the Ming and Ch'ing periods. Many of these paintings have already been published by the founder of the collection, the late Osvald Sirén. In two previous papers in the BMFEA some more were described and reproduced.¹⁾ This time we wish to deal with the paintings by Hsü Wei; the fascinating artist of the 16th century who has been the subject of an ever-increasing interest both in the East and in the West.

Hsü Wei was born in 1521 in Shanyin, Chekiang, and died in 1593. His *tzü* was Wên-ch'ang and he had a long list of hao's, among which may be mentioned Wên-ch'ing, Ch'ing-t'eng, T'ien-ch'i, Shu, Seng-hui, Hai-li, Ta-huan and T'u-hai. There is no reason to repeat here the biography which was issued first by Sirén²⁾ and most extensively by Yü-ho Tseng in *Ars Orientalis*,³⁾ with all important references given from the Chinese records.

However, to provide some background to the description of our paintings and make it easier to understand their meaning, it may be useful to add a few notes about his *curriculum vitae* quoted from Yü-ho Tseng. Hsü Wei was the son of the prefect Hsü Ts'ung and a concubine and was first brought up by his stepmother to whom he was deeply devoted. When she died in his fourteenth year he was in desperate grief. From then on up to his 20-ies he was taken care of by his elder stepbrothers, to whom he was likewise warmly attached. At 20 he became a "chu-shêng" after passing the first test in the Government examinations, and he married in the same year. After four years his wife gave him a son, but she died in the following year. At about the same time both his stepbrothers passed away and left him desolate. He now tried to start a new home together with his real mother; this, however, turned out very unsuccessfully. His mother brought with her a maid who was abominable, and he tried in vain to get rid of her. Instead Hsü Wei became involved in a lawsuit, which broke him down. He failed in his further examinations but was fortunately given a district scholarship, which meant a monthly supply of rice and meat. He became a professional writer and began to write plays, some of which are excellent. He also wrote two fine studies on southern-style opera and started to paint. At about this time the Commander-governor Hu heard about him and took him under his special protection. Hsü Wei became his secretary and the Governor gave him a large house with land comprising fish ponds and a bamboo grove. This period must have been the happiest in his life. Although the living

¹⁾ BMFEA, No. 36, 1964, pp. 159-170. D:o No. 37, 1965, pp. 231-238.

²⁾ Osvald Sirén, *Chinese Painting, Leading masters and principles*, Vol. IV, pp. 226-233.

³⁾ Yü-ho Tseng, *A Study of Hsü Wei*, *Ars Orientalis* V, 1963, pp. 243-254.

conditions were good, his tendency to a split personality now appears. He often writes about his dreams and becomes more and more aware of his other self, which began to take command. He tries another marriage but fails. His own comment on it is this: "In summer (1560) I married into the Wang family of Hangchou. It was awful. I was thoroughly cheated. In the autumn I renounced the bond, until now it disgusts me." In the age of 41 he tried again and his comment is: "I married Chang. I failed again in the examination. From now on, evils began to possess me. I fought them desperately. This was the last time I had anything to do with the government examination." Now various troubles followed. Governor Hu was put in prison suspected of being involved in the so-called Yen Sung and Shih-fan scandal, and he committed suicide. Hsü Wei had to work for another official, Li, who did not have the understanding for his odd personality which Hu had and very soon became annoyed with his eccentric assistant. As a result Li stopped his right to take part in the examination, which of course meant the end of Hsü Wei's official career. He was now 45 years old and on his return from his official work in the capital he collapsed. "Derangement seized me. I hurt my ear" is his own comment. The idea of suicide came to his mind. "Upset by current affairs, I was afflicted with mental derangement (yi). When attacked, I had to run around as if possessed by a demon. While thus running, I pulled out a nail about three inches long from the wall and stuck it into my left ear. I stumbled and fell. The nail penetrated deep into my ear, but I felt no pain. Several hsün (the Chinese 10-day period) later, the wound became inflamed. Every three days blood streamed out by the cupful." At another time he cracked his head with an axe and later on smashed his testicles. He had now reached such a state in his mental disease that his accumulated depression bred violence. He was insane and tried to obviate the affliction imposed upon him by killing parts of his physical self. Now he also killed his wife Chang. Probably he did it under the pressure of jealousy believing that she had deceived him. He found himself in the same kind of schizophrenia as van Gogh 300 years later. For the homicide brought he was imprisoned and sentenced to death, but he was saved by some influential friends. After his release from prison he travelled around Peking and Nanking but his mental disease recurred ever more frequently and his last years were spent in poverty. His extensive library and all his belongings were sold successively, and when he died in 1593 at the age of 73 he was destitute.

In his own opinion Hsü Wei was most successful in calligraphy, somewhat less in poetry, essay writing and least of all in painting. To-day, however, we are most impressed by his paintings, as they evince a personal style at a time when so many artists followed the fixed classical tradition. Hsü Wei started his painting rather late in life—around the fifties—but he had already had a long and sound training in calligraphy. He undoubtedly wielded the brush in order to express himself, his feelings and moods, often in order to avoid depression. His style had to become spontaneous and free in contrast to the traditional style of painting. Consequently he mostly used the so-called *p'o mo* technique, working with wet ink in splashes and broad strokes by the aid of big brushes, and seldom using colours. Very often his handling of the ink reminds us of *taschism* in modern art or absolute spontaneism.

When he uses the line it likewise vibrates with his temperament and reveals his taste for exaggeration as do the lines in a drawing by van Gogh. It was natural for Hsü Wei to paint in this free style real *hsieh i*, as it suited his mind and he was not bound by any long training in classical painting. Thus it is not easy to place Hsü Wei's *œuvre* in any special category or school. He might have had several teachers, but none of them were direct teachers since he never mentions any special one in his own obituary, written at a moment when he was planning suicide. A master of great importance to him was, however, Ch'en Shun, for whom he entertained a warm friendship. Some of Hsü Wei's paintings no doubt remind us of Ch'en Shun's. The chronology of Hsü Wei's work is not easy to establish as his productive age was comparatively short and very few of his paintings are dated. The variety of style in the preserved paintings shows more of his changing moods and varying mental conditions than any real development.

The following description of six paintings by his hand may give some idea of Hsü Wei's artistic personality.

No. 1 (Pls. 1-3).

The Four Seasons.

Handscroll. Height 30.5 cm, length 338 cm.

Indian ink on paper. Good condition. Acquired by Osvald Sirén in China in 1929.

The seasons are represented by four different trees arranged in a rhythmically very expressive composition. The trees are rendered one after the other and can be seen separately or as a continuous composition. It is like a series of waves rising into breaks, a similar movement repeated four times without monotony.

The first is the plum tree (*prunus*)—the symbol of winter—with a gnarled dark trunk and arrow-like branches covered with transparent white flowers. The trunk makes a strong energetic curve—like the wave—and when reaching its top it breaks into a cascade of small stems with flowers. The main branch turns back, rendered in a lighter ink and thus reminiscent of the foam. Counterbalancing this movement a minor trunk grows up behind the first knee of the tree and joins the young bamboo shoots of the Spring tree. The *prunus* is painted in a rather sketchy way without the slightest hesitation and with a heavy brush. (See detail.) The ink is lustrous black in the principal stems but wet and more greyish in the branches meant to appear further the back. Thus an illusion of space is achieved around the blossoming tree. The main trunk starts with dry brush strokes which leave the white paper bare in some spots and give the impression of moss covering the trunk. The small flowers are very light and summary in design and suggest that they have just been opened by the sunlight. The petals are drawn with thin greyish strokes, only the points of attachment and the stamens being rendered in darker black.

The Spring is represented by four slender bamboo stems grouped as a water fountain, thus describing the wave just as it breaks. The stems are still more spontaneous in design than the plum tree described above. The characteristic joints are thus made only by a quick turn of the brush which results in a hook instead of

the ordinary horizontal stroke with points used by most bamboo painters. The leaves were also drawn at great speed and the design appears in three different grades of ink, from intense black to watery grey. The dark leaves cross over the lighter ones rather freely, again giving depth to the picture and opening the surface. The artist does not seem to follow any traditional style in his painting of bamboo but wishes to grasp the freshness of the green sprout in Spring.

After the intense and sparkling movement in the first section of the handscroll, the painter arrives at a calmer tempo in the central part. He has come to the Summer with its lazy heat and the banana tree represents that season of the year. Two large leaves dominate, one to the right forming a bridge to the bamboo, the other to the left with a shorter and broken curve connecting up with the rocky ground and its grass tufts. The broad leaves are rendered in a greyish wet ink and with smooth outlines. The energy of the brush is here concentrated upon the veins, which are drawn with a sweeping movement and backstrokes at their ends. To accentuate the even green surface of the banana leaves, Hsü Wei arranges the left one against a dark rock with grass tufts. Not only do the diagonal parallel strokes modelling the stones give a deep colour effect to the rocks; the artist has added the sharp strokes of the grass and dots of "woollen" ink, thus announcing the bright colours of the impending autumn.

The fourth season is represented by the grape-vine which rises from the rock. Here the painter uses strong accents of dark ink on a thin scroll which coils around the vine. Like a snake the runner moves over the paper joining a bunch of leaves and clusters of grapes. A new wave has broken into cascades, the grapes being the foam. With thin and playful scroll the vine continues, sending out tendrils and bearing another cluster of grapes and leaves. The painting ends in a last tiny cascade of two curled-up tendrils, and the movement has ended in harmony.

The autumn with its deep and bright colours and ripened fruits has been skillfully symbolized by Hsü Wei, again with graded ink and a free handling of the brush. The plasticity of the leaves and grapes is also convincing, and yet the calligraphic pattern of the painting is not lost.

At the end is an inscription which may be read in free translation: "When last year's mid-autumn moon was full, the oysters of the southern sea could find no sleep. But nobody cared for the bright pearls that night. They sprang out and fixed themselves on paper. Whose paper? The Taoist Ch'ing-t'eng painted this long scroll in the *p'o-mo* (sling ink) manner and wrote the poem about the grape-vine while dwelling on the Rock of Freedom from Care."

Seal: Hsü Wei Chih Yin.

Seen in its entirety the theme of this hand-scroll is very firmly kept together through its composition. At the same time each section may be seen as a separate piece of scenery with its own character. This is not common in Hsü Wei's other hand scrolls. The paintings in The Freer Gallery,⁴⁾ The Honolulu Academy of Art,⁵⁾

⁴⁾ Op. cit. pls. 6-8.

⁵⁾ Op. cit. pl. 3.

Thu Sumitomo collection⁶) and other reproduced specimens are all split up into separate sections, representing different flowers or fruits with poems and writing in between the various themes. This later type of composition gives more the impression of being album leaves mounted together on a scroll.

Published in: Osvald Sirén, *Kinesiska och Japanska skulpturer och målningar i Nationalmuseum*, Pls. 48–53, Malmö 1931. D:o, *Nationalmusei avdelning för Ostasiatisk konst, Beskrivande katalog*, Stockholm 1945 No. 64. D:o, *Chinese Painting, Leading masters and principles*, Vol. IV, p. 231, London, New York 1958. D:o, *Kinesisk Konst, En konstabok från Nationalmuseum* 1959, p. 138.

No. 2 (Pl. 4).

Grape-vine.

Folded fan. Height 18.5 cm, length 59 cm.

Indian ink on gilt paper.

The paper is worn and the gilding partly flaked off.

The fan was acquired by Gunnar Martin in Peking in 1948.

The grape-vine starts from the left and grows over the surface of the fan with a curling motion towards the right. It gives the impression of hanging from a string or trellis with two fixing points. At the left is the first bunch of grapes partly hidden by big leaves. After a jerked curve of the tendril the second bunch of grapes and leaves are placed in the centre of the fan and towards the end are two smaller bunches with leaves.

Here again the grading of the wet ink is well mastered, thus giving the illusion of space and different colours. The brush has swept over the surface and with swift strokes and splashes described the most characteristic elements of a grape-vine, leaving out all disturbing details. It is true play with the brush controlled by a steady hand and inspired mind. Instead of the smoothly winding tendril on the hand-scroll No. 1 above the artist has here substituted a more forceful vine with sharper turns. A row of energetic short strokes is added in an almost staccato rhythm. The technique can best be described as splash-work of an impressionistic kind.

To the left is an inscription which may be read: The purified dew coming late at night / A tree is dotted with mountain pearls.

Signed: Wei.

Seals: 1. Hsiu Li Ch'ing Shê

2. Hsiang Kuan Chai.

The design on this fan is related to that on the hand-scroll in the Sumitomo collection and on another hand-scroll reproduced in the *Pageant of Chinese Painting* Pl. 623.⁷) Especially the grapes on the latter are depicted in the same p'o mo technique as on our fan. A hanging scroll in the present Palace Museum of Peking⁸)

⁶) Yoshiho Yonezawa, *Painting in the Ming Dynasty*, Mayuyama and Co., Tokyo 1956, pl. 17.

⁷) *The Pageant of Chinese Painting*, Tokyo 1936, pl. 623.

⁸) *Selected Bird and Flower Paintings from the Palace Museum*. Wen wu Press. Peking 1965, pl. 55.

shows a hanging grape-vine in a style intermediate between that on our hand-scroll and that on the fan. The ink is applied in wet splashes, but details in the grapes and the leaves are still visible. In *Shina Nanga Taisei*, Vol. 5, No. 201, we find an album leaf reproduced which shows another similar composition of a hanging grape-vine. Thus our fan can be placed in a category of Hsü Wei's paintings which is well documented.

No. 3 (Pl. 5)

Garden rock with banana, plum and bamboo.

Hanging scroll in Indian ink on paper. The paper damaged and repaired.

Height 166 cm, width 91 cm.

The painting was acquired by Osvald Sirén in China 1935. This specimen is the one among Hsü Wei's works in our Museum that has been achieved with the greatest spontaneity. With a heavy brush the artist has here created a fantastic garden rock placed to the left in the picture. It rises from a narrow base, widens in the middle around a hole, and protrudes, bending to the left, to a point above, thus giving the illusion of a large mountain with several ledges. This type of rock is well-known from many Chinese gardens such as the famous Lion garden at Soochow. The stone is modelled by Hsü Wei with heavy parallel strokes in intense black ink contrasting with others in greyish ink, thus presenting the rough surface of the stone without any "naturalistic" details. The outline is accentuated by curving strokes in extra dark ink which also stress the movement of the rock. The rock is an abstract sculpture modelled by Nature itself and used as an artefact in the garden and here it is contrasting with the living trees.

Behind the rock five large banana leaves are depicted; they appear in almost pathetic rags after the winterstorms. Drawn with a dry brush, the fragmentary leaves are excellently characterized in their brittleness against the solid rock. The new life of the early spring is represented by two branches of a plum tree. The larger one points towards the sky above the rock, just behind one of the banana leaves. From the old branch thin arrowlike shoots sprig out with pure white flowers just opened. Another twig is seen lower down to the right, peeping out behind the rock. In both cases the flowers are drawn with a thin brush in light, wet ink, the petals in a single circle. The stamens are, of course, in darker ink.

The third tree represented is the bamboo, which we find to the left of the rock and behind its lower part. A stem with a horizontal joint is seen to the left, together with a young sprig with lancet leaves. Another sprig peeps out to the right of the rock. The bamboos are all painted in outlines only, in the early Sung-style thus being dissimilar from the bamboo on the hand-scroll No. 1. The reason for this is probably that solid black leaves and stems would have made the composition too heavy, the bamboo competing with the solidity of the rock.

At the right upper part of the painting is a three line poem; it is in strong and splendid writing like the painting itself. In free translation it reads: The winter banana is ragged; its shoots will sprout in the spring. Over the wall is the old plum-

tree as if smiling at it. Who can possess two good things simultaneously in this world? Gulping down fish and yet grabbing for shrimps as well.

Signed: The joking writing of Ch'ing-t'eng-shou-lao.

Seals: 1. T'ien Chih Shan Jên.
2. Ch'ing T'eng Tao Shih.
3. Hsiang Kuan Chai.

This painting was published earlier in: Osvald Sirén, *Kinas konst under tre årtusenden*, del II, p. 553. Stockholm 1943. D:o, Nationalmusei avdelning för Ostasiatisk konst, *Beskrivande katalog*, Stockholm 1945, No. 65. D:o, *Kinesisk konst*, *Konstbok från Nationalmuseum* 1959, p. 110. D:o, *Chinese Painting . . . Vol. IV*, p. 231.

No. 4 (Pls. 6, 7).

Banana tree, prunus and bamboo at a garden rock.

Hanging scroll, in Indian ink and light brownish red on paper. The paper damaged but only small repairs on the painting. Height 115 cm, width 52 cm.

Acquired by Osvald Sirén in China in the 1930s and given to the Museum in 1967.

This painting depicts a subject similar to that of No. 3 but is of different composition. Again, the banana tree is placed to the right in the picture but is here the main subject. The new sprouts that were mentioned in the poem on No. 3 have come out with fresh green leaves in the Spring and some of them are just unfolding. Thus Hsü Wei has painted them here in a different way with wet, broad strokes of the brush, and the trunk is executed with a few lines only, giving an impression of light green colour. The variety of ink from dark to light creates the atmosphere and gives an illusion of depth. Behind the trunk is a small garden rock in Y-shape, its base mostly hidden behind the tree. A small stone is added to the right, on the ground. Behind the rock are two sprigs of bamboo, the leaves made of filled strokes. Parallel with the banana are slender stocks of prunus painted in light reddish brown. On two of them are sparrows, one sitting close to the rock with its head turned upwards (see detail); another has just perched on the higher branch and looks down towards the other bird and twitters with him. The birds are also depicted in reddish brown with a few details in black.

On the ground are grass tufts in dark ink on the greyish surface. To the right is a long poem in three lines which may be read in free translation:

A bamboo bench, a rattan bed and a small ink-slab case / a fragrant breeze through a loose screen makes the hazy green sway.

Some days of "yellow-plum rain" outside the peaceful study- / will enrich the greenness of the banana tree so as to fill the courtyard.

Signed: T'ien Shui Yüeh.

Two seals: 1. Hsü Wei Chih Yin.
2. T'ien Chih.

Compared with No. 3 this hanging scroll is less dramatic in design and with more nuances in the ink and composition. Probably Hsü Wei was in a more balanced mental condition when he made this painting and it is interesting to compare the two variations of a similar subject. To the same category can also be referred a hanging scroll in The Shanghai Museum,⁹⁾ which has the big banana tree in the foreground.

The painting is recorded in Osvald Sirén; Chinese Painting, Leading masters and principles, Vol. VII, p. 195.

No. 5 (Pls. 8, 9).

Lotus flower and bird.

Hanging scroll, in Indian ink and some colour on paper. The paper somewhat damaged. Height 110 cm, width 47 cm.

The painting purchased by Osvald Sirén in China in the 1930s and given to the Museum in 1967.

In this painting Hsü Wei has depicted a lotus plant with one stalk ending in an open flower, three with leaves and one with a bud at its point. The stems grow diagonally over the picture starting from the right lower corner and intertwine with a long reed and with water plants in a smooth but elastic movement. The watery stalks are translucent, the flower white with only the points of the petals reddish and the large leaves painted in darker but wet ink. They are depicted with large splashes without any outlines and the bird on the largest leaf is made as a spared out figure in the inked surface. (See detail.) The artist has been content to draw a few details on the wing and the head in black, and the chin in reddish colour. Real black ink is used for the reeds which give an extra emphasis to the composition and remind one of bamboo painting. The hydrophyte is depicted in light ink, thus giving the illusion of being seen through the water.

To the left is a two line inscription, which may be translated:

The taoist Ching T'eng painted it in the Ch'ing Liang Pavilion.

Seal: Hsü Wei.

The painting is noted in Osvald Sirén; Chinese Painting, Leading Masters and Principles, Vol. VII, annotated list . . . p. 195.

No. 6 (Pl. 10).

Sketchy landscape.

Hanging scroll, in Indian ink on paper. Height 97.6 cm, width 37.5 cm.

The painting purchased in China by Osvald Sirén in 1935.

A man is sitting on a projecting mountain terrace in front of three pine trees. Behind is a high peak and below the cliff is a wood of fir trees, partly hidden in misty clouds. The cliff is drawn with sharply angled strokes done as if *in furioso*. The same hooked lines are also used for the pines and the mountain peak. While

⁹⁾ Shanghai Po Wu Kuan Ts'ang Hua, Shanghai 1959, pl. 61.

the terrace and pines are done in dark and lustrous ink, the peak in the background is modelled with light greyish ink thus giving the illusion of distance. The fir trees in the valley below are also depicted in deep black horizontal strokes and the clouds are suggested by thin sweeping lines.

The melancholy of the landscape is striking and this mood is also reflected by the sitting figure, probably the painter himself, depicted with only a few strokes. The poem above him expresses the feelings of the painter in the following words: How useless to try to find a remedy in time of sickness! If you have a dwelling, why seek another site? When you pick at random the yellow leaves that are all over the grove, you, my master, are truly like a weeping child. Venerable Master Lung, your disciple Hsü Wei makes a hundred obeisances.

Seals: 1. Wen Ch'ang.
2. Hsü Wei Chih Yin.
3. Hsiang Kuan Chai.

There are very few landscape paintings in Hsü Wei's *œuvre* and Sirén has only listed two other landscape scrolls and some album leaves with landscapes among 50 works.¹⁰⁾

The paintings has been published in: Osvald Sirén; Chinese and Japanese Sculptures and Paintings in the Nationalmuseum, Stockholm. Malmö 1931. — Osvald Sirén; Kinesiska och japanska målningar och skulpturer. Beskrivande katalog, Stockholm 1945, No. 66. — Osvald Sirén; Kinas konst under tre årtusenden, del II, p. 552, Stockholm 1943. — Osvald Sirén; Chinese Painting, Leading Masters and Principles, Vol. VII, p. 195.

¹⁰⁾ A hanging scroll showing Hsü Wei's studio is reproduced in *Pageant of Chinese Painting*, pl. 624.

PLATES



a.



b.




c.



No. 1. Detail.



No. 1. Detail.







No. 4.



No. 4. Detail.





No. 5. Detail.



PART II

THE RESTORATION OF THE HAN DYNASTY

VOLUME III

THE PEOPLE

BY

HANS BIELENSTEIN

PREFACE

This book is a direct sequel to *The Restoration of the Han Dynasty*, volumes I and II.¹⁾ The first volume analysed the reasons for the fall of Wang Mang and the restoration of Han. The second volume investigated the civil war, covering the period from the enthronement of the Keng-shī Emperor on Mar. 11, A.D. 23, until Kung-sun Shu's death during the night of Dec. 24, A.D. 36.

The present work discusses the Chinese population, as well as China's relations with the barbarians within and beyond the borders of the empire.²⁾ Certain aspects which more properly belong in chapters on economy, bureaucracy, cliques, law, education, social mobility, etc. are not considered here but will be taken up in volume IV.

I follow Professor H. H. Dubs in rendering Chinese titles and the conversion of measurements.

The locations of prefectural cities, districts, mountains etc. are given in footnotes. Where such information has already been supplied in the notes to volumes I and II, it has not been repeated.

If not otherwise indicated, all years refer to the Han calendar, which overlaps with the Western calendar. For the sake of convenience, I frequently use modern geographical terms, including the names of provinces.

The Council for Research in the Social Sciences of Columbia University has helped to finance the printing of this work, for which I wish to express my sincere thanks.

¹⁾ The first volume appeared in a limited edition, Göteborg 1953, and was subsequently included in the *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (BMFEA)*, vol. 26, Stockholm 1954, pp. 1-209. The second volume was published in *BMFEA*, vol. 31, Stockholm 1959, pp. 1-287. They will be referred to here as vol. I and vol. II.

²⁾ The section on Emperor Kuang-wu and the Hiung-nu is a much expanded and somewhat revised version of my Seventeenth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology, published by the Australian National University, Canberra 1956.

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ABBREVIATIONS

SK	= Shī ki
HS	= Ts'ien Han shu
HHS	= Hou Han shu
TKK	= Tung kuan Han ki
SHS	= Sū Han shu
HHK	= Hou Han ki
SKC	= Shui king and its commentary
HYKC	= Hua yang kuo chī

If not otherwise indicated, all quotations are from HHS.

23,53:1b means page 1b in chapter 23 of the Ki ku ko edition of the HHS (as used by the Hou Han shu tsi kie) which corresponds to chapter 53 of the Palace edition.

The T'ang commentary is referred to as *Commentary*. The collected explanations of Wang Sien-k'ien are referred to as *Tsi kie*.

EXPLANATION OF MAPS

The maps are based on the atlas of 90. Ting, and on sheets 22, 23, 34, 46 of Map of Asia (Geographical Section General Staff, War Office, London 1926). All maps are drawn by the author.

- prefectural city
- settlement smaller than a prefectural city
- △ mountain
-)(pass
- ↪ military force
- × battle

INTRODUCTION

Liu Siu ascended the throne on Aug. 5, A.D. 25, and is known in history by his posthumous title, Kuang-wu, or by his temple name, the Epochal Founder (Shi-tsu). Since he was born on Jan. 13, 5 B.C. (1B:23a), he was then just over 30 years old. He died on Mar. 29, A.D. 57, at the age of 62 (1B:22b).¹⁾

It is a challenge to attempt an evaluation of the contributions for better or worse which Kuang-wu made as the founder of Later Han. The HHS continuously stresses the point that he was a restorer. Even before Kuang-wu had ascended the throne, he supposedly followed the precedents of Han (1A:7b) and reintroduced the terminology in use before Wang Mang (1A:8b). But the situation had not been static during Former Han. Changes had taken place in all fields, in the social structure, the attitude towards the nobility, the bureaucracy, the legal system, the power balance, the economy, education, foreign policy etc. How did Kuang-wu react to the problems which he had to face? Did he simply continue where the Former Han had left off? Did he act as the founder of a new dynasty, whatever the lip service paid to the restoration? Or did he compromise between the two extremes? The answers to these questions will emerge, cumulatively, in the present and following volume, and will be summed up at the end of this series.

The historical role of Emperor Kuang-wu cannot be properly assessed without placing his reign in relief against the Former Han period. It is not possible, of course, to write a complete history of Former Han. I have tried to steer a middle course, giving, as I hope, enough perspective in order to reach a balanced verdict. Where relevant, I have also traced the later developments, after Kuang-wu's death.

¹⁾ This means that, Chinese reckoning, Kuang-wu died at the age of 63. 1B:22b states that he was 62 at his death, a mistake corrected by Tsiang Kuo (1683-1714). See 1B:22b, *T'ai k'ie*.

CHAPTER I. POPULATION FIGURES

The first eleven years of Emperor Kuang-wu's reign were filled with battles against rival emperors and warlords. By the end of A.D. 29, the whole northern part of the Great Plain was in his hands. Southern Ho-nan and northwestern Hu-pei were conquered in campaigns lasting until the same year (A.D. 29). The Shan-tung peninsula and the southern part of the Great Plain were pacified by A.D. 30. China south of the Yang-tsi was never involved in the civil war and surrendered voluntarily in A.D. 29. Northwest China was incorporated at the end of A.D. 34. Kung-sun Shu's state in Si-ch'uan ceased to exist on Dec. 25, A.D. 36. This left only the pretender Lu Fang, who died in A.D. 42.

After Kuang-wu had become emperor, he no longer devoted all his time to the war. Although briefly commanding campaigns in A.D. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 32, he increasingly turned his activities towards the reorganization of the empire. With each victory, new millions of the Chinese population were brought under his rule, creating added administrative problems and, sometimes, local tensions.

When finally the empire was unified again, the obvious question arose how large the population was. Without a census, or at least a reasonable estimate of the total, it was not possible to control whether the poll tax was honestly collected from the correct proportion of the population. How many attempts at enumeration were made is not known. The sources only inform us about an ambitious census in A.D. 39, which seems to have failed,¹⁾ and provide us with a set of figures for A.D. 57, whose validity is open to doubt.

It has been shown in an earlier article²⁾ that all Chinese population totals are suspect, provided that they are not broken down in the sources by commanderies. A major cause for error is the fact that the census were rarely complete and that figures for large and populous commanderies could be missing. The degree of completeness of national totals cannot be judged, as long as subtotals do not permit an exact check on the territory covered. Secondly, where checks are possible, it is found that the subtotals invariably have been added wrongly, so that the national totals are inaccurate. For example, the treatise on administrative geography in HS (28A-B) records the census figures of A.D. 2 commandery after commandery and then gives the national totals as 12.2 million households and 59.6 million individuals (HS 28Bb:49b). Adding the subtotals ourselves, we find that the households numbered 12.4 million and the individuals 57.7 million.

¹⁾ No totals are preserved from this attempt. It bogged down through corruption.

²⁾ 64. Bielenstein.

If unsupported national totals must be discarded as too vague a material for serious conclusions, only two census remain for the Han dynasties, the just-mentioned one for A.D. 2, which is in fact the earliest preserved census not only in China but in the world, and another for A.D. 140 in HHS (chī 19-23). All discussions on the population history of Han times must take these two census as their starting point. The respective sizes of the various commanderies and kingdoms in A.D. 2 and 140 can be ascertained with considerable accuracy, since most ancient sites of the prefectural cities can be identified.¹⁾ Population dot maps can be drawn on the basis of these sites and the general topography. I reproduce here the maps for A.D. 2 and 140 from the above-mentioned article.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the two maps. From A.D. 2 to 140, the total number of individuals decreased from 57.7 to 48 million. The census of A.D. 140 omits the figures for two large territories, so that the national total must have been slightly higher than 48 million. The actual decrease from A.D. 2 to 140 was perhaps about 8-9 million people. Not only had the total population been reduced in size, but great changes had occurred in the regional distribution. Northern China had lost, and southern China had gained. The increase in the south was so enormous that the numbers of inhabitants of Hu-nan, Kiang-si, and Kuang-tung had quadrupled. Clearly, the losses in the north were to a considerable extent balanced by gains in the south. These gains were much too large to be explained by a sudden increase of birth rate. A vast, voluntary migration from north to south must have taken place.

The population maps permit conclusions on the migration routes. Voluntary migrants leaving the northwest usually crossed the Ts'in-ling Range and proceeded into Sī-ch'uan and Yün-nan. Refugees from the southern part of the Great Plain settled in the remaining territories of southern China.²⁾

The reasons for this first, great, voluntary migration from north to south are two: the change in the course of the Yellow River on the Great Plain, and the increasing pressure from the barbarians in the northwest.

The former of these events took place when Wang Mang was in power. A break of the dikes occurred at some time not before A.D. 2 and not later than the death of the boy emperor P'ing on Feb. 3, A.D. 6. The Yellow River inundated large parts of the southern plain, sending a mighty branch into the Huai River. This was in A.D. 11 followed by a second, somewhat lesser, catastrophe, in which the northern branch of the Yellow River shifted from its earlier more northward course to enter the sea just north of the Shan-tung peninsula, roughly where the present river mouth is situated. The cumulative consequences of these changes in the course of the Yellow River brought about the popular unrest and uprisings which led to the fall of Wang Mang.³⁾ The depopulation of the northwest due to pressure from the barbarians, on the other hand, began only under Kuang-wu's reign, and

¹⁾ See vol. II, pp. 258-259, maps I and II, for the commanderies and kingdoms in A.D. 2.

²⁾ Except Fu-kien, which was not part of the Han empire.

³⁾ See vol. I, pp. 145-154.

therefore in no way affected the overthrow of Wang Mang. This question will be discussed later.

With the above-mentioned facts in mind, let us now analyse the national totals preserved for Later Han. They are recorded in HHS, chī 23B:31b, and in the commentary to that passage. The sources, apart from the one entry in the treatise itself, are Fu Wu-ki's (fl. A.D. 151) *Ku kin chu*, and Ying Shao's (ca. 140–206) *Han kuan yi*. All figures of the *Ku kin chu* are given for the death years of emperors.

A.D	Households	Individuals	Number of members per household (calculated)	Source
57	4,279,634	21,007,820	5.0	<i>Ku kin shu</i>
75	5,860,573	34,125,021	5.8	<i>Ku kin shu</i>
88	7,456,784	43,356,367	5.8	<i>Ku kin shu</i>
105	9,237,112	53,256,229	5.8	<i>Ku kin shu</i>
125	9,647,838	48,690,789	5.0	<i>Ku kin shu</i>
126–144	9,698,630	49,150,220	5.1	<i>Hou Han shu</i>
136–141	10,780,000	53,869,588	5.0	<i>Han kuan yi</i>
144	9,946,919	49,730,550	5.0	<i>Ku kin chu</i>
145	9,937,680	49,524,183	5.0	<i>Ku kin chu</i>
146	9,348,227	47,566,772	5.1	<i>Ku kin chu</i>

Table 1. The national population totals of Later Han.

As we have seen, the detailed census of A.D. 140, preserved in HHS, gives a total of just over 48 million inhabitants for the empire. Judged against that figure, the totals in table 1 for A.D. 125, 126–144, 144, 145, and 146, though not verifiable in detail and probably deficient in various degrees, are at least reasonably probable. The totals for A.D. 105 and 136–141 are implausible. Those for A.D. 75 and 88 cannot be right, and the one for Kuang-wu's death, A.D. 57, is grotesque. Superficially, one might get the impression of gradual recovery from 57 to the turn of the century, but since the first figure is utterly impossible, serious doubt is also thrown on the two following totals.

The figure of 21 million inhabitants for A.D. 57 has met with little disbelief. Wan Kuo-ting¹⁾, Liu Ping-jen²⁾, and Ho Tsī-ts'üan³⁾ accept it. Martin Wilbur speaks of a tremendous drop from A.D. 2 to 57, which "eloquently bespeaks the leeching which relieved the fever if it did not cure the malady of China's ancient agrarian economy".⁴⁾ While Lao Kan does not exclude the possibility of under-estimation, he admits a large decrease, and tries to correlate this and the subsequent totals with famines and wars.⁵⁾ Such correlations are not useful, since the dynastic historian did not record famines with the intention of providing complete statistics of natural disasters. He only listed those famines which, for the purpose of indirect criticism against the emperor and his court, had become portents by having been mentioned in memorials.⁶⁾ As to wars, it is true that raids by barbarians, and the

¹⁾ 121. Wan, p. 138. ²⁾ 117. Liu, p. 176. ³⁾ 113. Ho, pp. 102–103.

⁴⁾ 109. Wilbur, p. 30. ⁵⁾ 132. Lao, pp. 85–86. ⁶⁾ Cf. 65. Bielenstein.

irreconcilable irritations arising from Chinese farmers and nomads, or semi-nomads, living at close quarters, did bring about a large-scale Chinese evacuation of the northwest. The great civil war, however, seems to have left few traces. The southern plain is a case in point. It was not depopulated through any impact of that civil war, but due to the change in the course of the Yellow River. An automatic reciprocity between warfare and population decrease can therefore not be assumed.¹⁾

Looking at the totals in table 1 dispassionately, the striking improbability is the ratio of increase from A.D. 57 to 75, from 75 to 88, and, to a lesser degree, from 88 to 105. As John Durand has pointed out, if the figures are correct, the average annual rate of population increase from A.D. 57 to 75 would have been 2.7%, rivaling the present growth rates in countries where the birth rate is highest, and where the death rate has been cut very low through modern medicine. "It is beyond belief that such a rate of increase could have been achieved in ancient China." The average annual increase from A.D. 75 to 88 of 1.9% is also suspiciously high.²⁾

We may approach the problem in a different way by considering the information available for the years between A.D. 2 and 57. HS 24B:27a states: "Before [Wang] Mang had been executed, the population of the empire had been reduced by half."³⁾ But at the death of Wang Mang, the civil war was still in its earliest stage, and the evacuation of the northwest had not yet begun. The only reason for population decrease and migration so far was the change in the course of the Yellow River. This enables us to check the statement in HS 24B:27a, since the decrease was severely restricted to a definite area. In A.D. 2, the population of China had numbered 57.7 million. If it decreased by half before Wang Mang's death, the loss would have been close to 29 million. The census of A.D. 2 shows that ca. 28 million people were settled on the southern plain, in the area later affected by the flood⁴⁾. The assertion of the decrease by half under Wang Mang would therefore postulate that every man, woman, and child on the southern plain had been wiped out, which is not only impossible but which would make the increase in South China's population inexplicable. This is patently absurd. Furthermore, from Wang Mang's death in A.D. 23 to Kuang-wu's in 57, the population would have further shrunk from 29 to 21 million. Kuang-wu's reign was, in the long run, a period of recovery in at least the major part of the empire, so that from that point of view also the figures do not support each other. H. H. Dubs, accepting the migration southwards due to the flood, has argued that Pan Ku was unaware that millions had departed, and simply based his remark on the situation in the north.⁵⁾ Even so, Pan Ku's statement would be an exaggeration. I am inclined to think that the

¹⁾ Cf. also *infra* pp. 142-143.

²⁾ 125. Durand, pp. 217-218.

³⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 504. Tsien Po-tsan is not content even with such a gigantic drop and estimates the population at the time of the restoration at 15 million. He prefers to believe that Wang Mang, Kuang-wu, and the powerful clans butchered peasants by the millions, in addition to which starvation and epidemics took their toll. See 45. Tsien, p. 481.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 93, 153.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 504, note 27. 1.

“reduction by half” is no more than a stereotype, applied to rulers who for one reason or another were under strong criticism. When in 72 B.C. Emperor Sūan wished to honour Emperor Wu, the high officials approved. Only Hia-hou Sheng argued against it and claimed that through Emperor Wu the empire had become bankrupt and “half of the people” had died (HS 75:3b-4a).¹⁾ This criticism is repeated by Pan Ku in his eulogy of Emperor Chao: “[Emperor Hsiao-chao] inherited the evils of extravagance and indulgence remaining from [the rule of Emperor] Hsiao-wu and his military expeditions. [The country] within the [four] seas was depopulated and exhausted, the population was reduced by half” (HS 7:10b)²⁾. This is an obvious parallel to the accusation against Wang Mang, a cliché³⁾ which is not to be taken at face value. We may safely assume that neither under Emperor Wu nor Wang Mang, the population was reduced on any drastic scale. It follows that if the population did not drop by half in Wang Mang’s time, the figure of 21 million for A.D. 57 is badly out of step with both the preceding and the subsequent totals.

It should be noted that the average numbers of members per household in table 1 are more or less normal for census enumerations. If only the taxpayers in each household had been counted, the average would have been considerably lower. The 21 million total can therefore not be explained away as representing taxpayers. The reasonable interpretation of the extraordinary totals for A.D. 57, 75, and 88 would seem to be this: A proper census requires a smoothly operating bureaucracy and a more or less sedentary population. The census attempts at the end of the first three reigns failed on both counts, but those of 75 and 88 were each somewhat more complete than their predecessors. The increasing totals indicate the central government’s gradually firmer grasp on the country. By the earlier half of the 2nd century A.D., the bureaucracy functioned routinely and well, and the great migration was reaching its end. Proper census could be attempted, and the return to normalcy is reflected by the figures.

It seems plausible that the actual population total at Kuang-wu’s death cannot have been much below the 48 million of A.D. 140. While the emigration from northwestern China was still in full force, the period of catastrophe on the southern plain was over. The cumulative effects of the migration undoubtedly continued to take lives, but this may have been balanced by single migrants settling and forming families in the south. The population, in all probability, fluctuated around the 50 million level, and continued to do so throughout the entire Later Han dynasty.

Since in A.D. 742 the population total was still no more than 51.5 million, the stubborn refusal of the Chinese population to increase requires explanation. While this is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion, and the reasons necessarily

¹⁾ See also 72. Dubs, II, p. 17.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 175.

³⁾ A similar, though opposite, cliché is that under a good administration the population “doubled”. E.g. we are told that during Kuo Ki’s five years as Grand Administrator of Yü-yang (A.D. 29-33), “the households and individuals doubled” (31, 61:1b).

must be complex, a perhaps decisive factor may be pointed out: infanticide, particularly the abandoning of baby girls.

The ancient historian shows no interest in the custom of infanticide, and is not particularly shocked by it. If he mentions it at all, he wants to bring out fiscal, altruistic, and perhaps ironic aspects. Such a matter-of-fact attitude is in itself proof of the prevalence of infanticide. A few examples will illustrate this point.

When Kung Yü had become Grandee Secretary in 44 B.C. (he died before the end of that year), he proposed that the poll-money on children henceforth should be levied from the seventh year of age instead of from the third. He justified his petition by pointing out that "when a commoner has a child and it is in its third year, then he [has to] pay the poll-money [for it]. Hence the common people are doubly distressed, so that when a child is born they immediately kill it, which is very lamentable" (HS 72:13a).¹⁾ This proposal, which was approved by the emperor, was perhaps motivated less by humanitarian than by fiscal reasons. It may have been expected that the measure in the long run would increase the tax intake.

Chao Fei-yen (the "Flying Swallow" Chao), who in 16 B.C. became the empress of Emperor Ch'eng, had a humble origin. "Previously, at the time when she was born, her father and mother had not lifted her up. When after three days she had not died, they took and reared her" (HS 97B:9b).

HHS describes how a certain Yü Yen had a niece, a brother's daughter, who was not yet weaned. Her mother could not raise her and abandoned her in a ditch. Yen heard the baby's crying, felt pity, and brought her up as his own daughter (33, 63:9b). This episode is all the more interesting, since it shows that infanticide was not restricted to the common people. Nothing is said about Yü Yen's family background, but he obviously was an educated man and must have belonged to the lower gentry. In A.D. 60, he was appointed Grand Commandant, and in 65 he became Minister over the Masses, the highest post in the career bureaucracy.

When Chou Sie was born, he had a crooked jaw and a bent nose. He was so ugly that he scared people. His mother wished to abandon him, but his father did not permit it (53, 83:2b-3a).

In the last three cases, the point is not that children had a good chance of survival because sooner or later someone would interfere, but on the contrary that it required unusual circumstances to prevent infanticide. If, for instance, Yü Yen's action to save his niece was considered extraordinary enough to be especially mentioned in his biography, it must have been exceptional indeed.

Taken in conjunction, the examples justify the conclusion that infanticide was common in Han China. Since sons were preferred and daughters an economic liability, this normally meant the abandonment of newborn girls. The female population was decimated at birth. The children were not killed outright, of course, but simply not fed and permitted to die.

If infanticide was a regular Chinese response to hardship, this would go a long way towards explaining why birth and death rates, and consequently the population totals, persistently continued to fluctuate around the same level.

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 170, note 8.7.

No vital statistics are preserved from Han China, although the original census records may well have included information on sex, age, occupation etc. We only have stray notices in the histories for particular categories. As a matter of routine, the *pen ki* give the year, month, and day of the deaths of emperors, empresses, and kings. The death dates of the Lieutenant Chancellors (Grand Ministers over the Masses) and Commanders-in-chief (Grand Commandants) are recorded throughout both dynasties, provided that they died in office, and from 102 B.C. onwards the equivalent dates are also listed for the Grandee Secretaries (Grand Ministers of Works). In HHS, the deaths of Grand Tutors are mentioned, and both histories record the deaths of regents. Excluding doubtful dates and violent deaths, the remaining cases of natural death may be grouped by annual quarters:

Quarter	Former Han	Later Han	Total	%
Jan.-Mar.	26	32	58	26%
Apr.-June	22	47	69	31%
July-Sep.	23	48	71	32%
Oct.-Dec.	7	17	24	11%
Total	78	144	222	100%

Table 2. The dates of natural death in the imperial family and of high officials dying in office during Former and Later Han.

The figures are too low for definite conclusions, yet it is noteworthy that both dynasties show a marked ebbing of deaths during the last quarter of the year.

While the life expectancy in Han China cannot have been high, the historian does not mention age consistently enough to permit the computation of an average. He may make the point that someone lived to a particularly ripe age. For instance, the longest recorded life among Kuang-wu's officials was that of Fu Kung, who died at 90 (Chinese reckoning). But for the more than 400 known contemporaries of Kuang-wu, the age is given in only 37 instances:

Age	Number of individuals
90	1
80-89	13
70-79	10
60-69	4
50-59	5
40-49	2
30-39	2
Total	37

Table 3. The recorded age at natural death of Emperor Kuang-wu's contemporaries.

The reason for the erratic recording of age is undoubtedly that the historian did not know. He is not even properly informed about the men who died in office. If an official died in retirement, the standard phrase is simply that "he died at home".

In another category, the historian seems to follow a consistent rule. Seven feet (*ch'i*) were in Han times considered as the normal height of a man (5'3.7" or 1.62 m).¹⁾ For at least Kuang-wu's time, the history records when that height was exceeded. The given measurements are as follows:

Kuang-wu:	7 <i>ch'i</i> 3 <i>ts'un</i>	=5'6.4"	or	1.69 m (1A:2a)
Ma Yüan:	7 <i>ch'i</i> 5 <i>ts'un</i>	=5'8.2"	or	1.73 m (TKK 12:1a)
Ko Yen:	8 <i>ch'i</i>	=6'0.8"	or	1.85 m (18,48:8b)
Kuo Liang:	8 <i>ch'i</i>	=6'0.8"	or	1.85 m (22,52:6b)
Yao K'i:	8 <i>ch'i</i> 2 <i>ts'un</i>	=6'2.6"	or	1.89 m (20,50:1a)
Kia K'uei:	8 <i>ch'i</i> 2 <i>ts'un</i>	=6'2.6"	or	1.89 m (36,66:12b)
Feng K'in:	8 <i>ch'i</i> 3 <i>ts'un</i>	=6'3.5"	or	1.92 m (26,56:11b)
Yü Yen:	8 <i>ch'i</i> 6 <i>ts'un</i>	=6'6.2"	or	1.99 m (33,63:9b)
Li Shou:	9 <i>ch'i</i> ²⁾	=6'9.8"	or	2.08 m (15,45:1a)

Amusing is the entry that Feng K'in's grandfather had seven strapping brothers, among whom he alone was not fully 7 *ch'i* tall. He was ashamed of his short stature and feared that it might be inherited by his descendants. Therefore, he selected for his son a tall wife. She gave birth to K'in, whose height certainly could give no cause for complaint (26,56:11b).

¹⁾ Wang Ch'ung (1st century A.D.) twice mentions that figure as the norm. See 126. Forke, pp. 96, 183.

²⁾ HHK 1:2a says 8 *ch'i*.

CHAPTER II. THE CHINESE

1. *The imperial family*

Liu Siu, the future Emperor Kuang-wu, was a very distant relative of the former imperial house. He descended from Emperor King (reigned 156-141).¹⁾ His great-great-grandfather had been a marquis, but his great-grandfather, grandfather, and father had been commoners. This makes it next to certain that Liu Siu was no longer entered into the register of the imperial house, which was kept by the Director of the Imperial Clan (chī 26:1a). Liu Siu's grandfather had moved to Nan-yang commandery, where many others members of the Liu clan were living.

While all great clans of Nan-yang were intermarried, and Liu Siu had many relatives, his intimate family was not large. He had two brothers and three sisters. The father had died early, whereupon the boys were educated by their paternal uncle Liang (14,44:8a). The mother died just before the uprising in Nan-yang, i.e. in about A.D. 22 (14,44:6a). In the battle of Siao-ch'ang-an at the end of that year, Liu Siu lost his brother Chung and his sister Yüan (14,44:1b, 6a; 15,45:7b).²⁾ Liu Liang, who had bitterly opposed the uprising in the first place, lost his wife and two sons (14,44:8a). Po-sheng, Liu Siu's eldest brother, was executed by the Keng-shī Emperor in A.D. 23.³⁾ This means that when Liu Siu ascended the throne on Aug. 5, A.D. 25, the only close relatives alive were his sisters Huang and Po-ki, and his uncle Liang. Whether Liang's son Hū already was born at this time is not certain. There were also Po-sheng's two orphaned sons Chang and Hing.

All three of Emperor Kuang-wu's sisters had been married, so that he had three brothers-in-law. The widower among them, husband of the unfortunate Yüan, was Teng Ch'en (15,45:7a).⁴⁾ Po-ki had been married to Li T'ung in A.D. 24 (15, 45:2b). Huang's husband was a certain Hu Chen.⁵⁾ Teng Ch'en and Li T'ung belonged to prominent and powerful clans in Nan-yang, the former in Sin-ye prefecture and the latter in Wan prefecture. There is every reason to believe that Hu

¹⁾ See vol. I, pp. 96ff.

²⁾ The deaths of Yüan and her daughters happened under circumstances which may not be flattering to Liu Siu. See vol. I, pp. 108-109.

³⁾ See vol. I, pp. 120-121; vol. II, p. 23.

⁴⁾ This marriage must have taken place before the civil war, so that Liu Siu had nothing to do with it. It must have been approved by either the eldest brother, Po-sheng, or possibly the uncle, Liang. HHK 1:1b, which in the usual fashion centers all events on the future emperor, says that the Epochal Founder gave Teng Ch'en his elder sister as a wife.

⁵⁾ He does not appear in HHS. Hung Liang-ki draws attention to SKC (29:22a-22b), according to which a stèle mentioned the Grand Administrator of Ji-nan, Hu Chu, and his son, the Chief Commandant of Cavalry and husband of the Elder Princess of Hu-yang (i.e. Huang), Hu Chen (26,56:9a, *Tsi kie*).

Chen also was from Nan-yang and that his clan was settled in Hu-yang prefecture.¹⁾

In A.D. 26, the emperor enfeoffed his sisters Huang as Elder Princess of Hu-yang, and Po-ki as Elder Princess of Ning-p'ing.²⁾ Yüan received the posthumous title of Chaste and Righteous Elder Princess of Sin-ye.³⁾ Her eldest son, Fan, was put in charge of the sacrifices and simultaneously enfeoffed as Marquis of Wu-fang⁴⁾ (14,44:6a; 15,45:8a). The husbands Teng Ch'en and Li T'ung were either marquises already or created marquises at this time. The fact that Hu Chen is not mentioned at all, seems to be for the simple reason that he had died. We know that Huang was widowed soon after her brother had come to the throne, and that the emperor wished to assist her in getting remarried. He discussed the various ministers of the court with her, whereupon she showed a marked preference for the Grand Minister of Works, Sung Hung. The latter had been appointed to that office on Mar. 26, A.D. 26, and was dismissed from it on Feb. 8, 31 (1A:19b; 1B:2b). The following event must have taken place about 26. The emperor said: "We will forthwith plan for it." Unfortunately, Sung Hung was married already. He was summoned to an audience, at which the Elder Princess of Hu-yang was present, sitting behind a screen. Since she was older than Kuang-wu, she probably was in her middle thirties at that time. The emperor turned to Sung Hung and remarked: "A proverb says that [those who] become honoured change their connections, and that [those who] become rich change their wives. Is that the nature of Man?" Sung replied that one does not divorce a wife who has shared one's poverty. The emperor turned his head and said to the princess: "The matter does not harmonize" (26,56:9a). Huang does not seem to have remarried at all and to have consoled herself otherwise. More will be heard about this in the chapter on law.

Emperor Kuang-wu had entered Lo-yang on Nov. 27, A.D. 25. Before the end of 25, he summoned his harem ladies from Nan-yang (10A:6a; 32,62:8b).⁵⁾ Among them was Yin Li-hua, belonging to a great clan of Sin-ye prefecture in Nan-yang. She had been offered to the future emperor in A.D. 23 (10A:6a). Soon thereafter, Kuang-wu selected as his first empress Kuo Sheng-t'ung from a powerful clan on the northern plain. She had been presented to him in A.D. 24, and became the empress on July 10, 26.⁶⁾ Yin Li-hua was made an Honourable Lady (10A:6a). Kuo Sheng-t'ung and Yin Li-hua both played important roles in Kuang-wu's private and political life. On Dec. 1, 41, he divorced the former and replaced her as empress with Yin Li-hua (1B:13b). He had five sons with each of these women,

¹⁾ The stèle, mentioning him and his father, was located near Hu-yang.

²⁾ The Ning-p'ing prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Huai-yang kingdom (which during Later Han became the Ch'en kingdom). It was situated 50 li SW of the present Lu-yi hien, Ho-nan.

³⁾ Huang in all probability and Yüan with certainty were enfeoffed with the home prefectures of their husbands. This must have been a courtesy.

⁴⁾ The Wu-fang prefecture during Han belonged to the Ju-nan commandery and was situated 40 li W of the present Sui-p'ing hien, Ho-nan.

⁵⁾ He sent the Palace Attendant Fu Tsün to escort the ladies. Fu Tsün was probably promoted to another post before the end of the year 25 (20,50:4a), so that Kuang-wu seems to have acted immediately on arriving in Lo-yang.

⁶⁾ See vol. II, pp. 70, 123.

and an eleventh son with the Beauty née Hū. In addition, he had five daughters, whose mothers are not known.

Summing up all facts, we obtain the following genealogy:¹⁾

Liang †41	{ Hū †June 14, 81	{ Chang †46
	{ Po-sheng †23	{ Hing †Sep. 18, 64
	{ Chung †22	{ a) K'iang †July 2, 58
		{ a) Fu †July 28, 84
		{ c) Ying †71
		{ b) <i>Emperor Ming</i> †Sep. 5, 75
		{ a) K'ang †Apr. 22, 97
		{ b) Ts'ang †Mar. 7, 83
		{ a) Yen ^a †Dec. 8, 89
		{ b) King ^a †67
		{ b) Heng †Aug. 15, 41
		{ a) Yen ^b †July 27, 90
		{ b) King ^b †Mar. 16, 81
		{ Daughters:
		{ Yi-wang
		{ Chung-li
		{ Hung-fu
		{ Li-liu
		{ Shou †59
K'in	{ <i>Emperor Kuang-wu</i>	
∞ Fan Hien-tu †22	{ *Jan. 13, 5 B.C.	
	{ †Mar. 29, A.D. 57	
	{ ∞ a) Kuo Sheng-t'ung	
	{ †July 22, 52	
	{ b) Yin Li-hua	
	{ †Feb. 26, 64	
	{ c) Hū X	
	{ Huang	
	{ Yüan †22	
	{ Po-ki	

Table 4. The genealogy of Kuang-wu's intimate family.

Kuang-wu continued earlier practice and enfeoffed his daughters as princesses. In A.D. 39, Yi-wang, Chung-li, and Hung-fu became the princesses of Wu-yin,²⁾ Nie-yang, and Kuan-t'ao³⁾ respectively. Li-liu was enfeoffed as princess of Yü-yang in 41, and Shou as Princess of Li⁴⁾ in 45 (10:14b-15a).

¹⁾ For Liu K'in's ancestry, see the genealogy in vol. I, facing p. 166, where he is shown as number 54. Kuang-wu's sisters Huang and Yüan were older and Po-ki younger than he. Since Huang's and Yüan's positions in relation to Kuang-wu's elder brothers are not known, the three sisters are shown following on the three brothers. 42,72:1a records the names of Kuo Sheng-t'ung's and Yin Li-hua's sons separately. The biographies, which follow, intersperse the sons of the two empresses as well as the one of the Beauty née Hū. The sequence is obviously by age, irrespective of mothers. This is helpful, since otherwise the sequence could not be reconstructed. The future Emperor Ming has no biography in *kuan* 42,72. Since *pen-ki* 2:1a says that he was Kuang-wu's fourth son, his name can be inserted in the right place.

²⁾ 10:14b writes Wu-yang. Such a prefecture existed in Han times, but, since 16,46:8b and 34,64:4b both refer to the fief as Wu-yin, the latter is to be preferred.

³⁾ The Kuan-t'ao prefecture during Han belonged to the Wei commandery and was situated SW of the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung.

⁴⁾ The Li prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated 10 li NE of the present Nei-hiang hien, Ho-nan.

It will have been observed that Kuang-wu's sisters and daughters all were given prefectures as fiefs. This followed standard procedure. The position of an Elder Princess in the noble hierarchy corresponded to that of a Feudal King, whereas the position of a Princess corresponded to that of a Full Marquis. They all were granted prefectures, and these fiefs were inherited by sons. In contrast, the daughters of kings, although also given the title of Princess, received as a rule only districts or communes, and these fiefs were not inherited (10B:14a-14b).

In theory, the fiefs of imperial sisters and daughters could be handed down as long as the dynasty lasted. In practice, their span of existence was limited. The husbands of imperial princesses were drawn from the first families of the nation. Actively or passively, these men were involved in the ruthless clique struggle, where defeat frequently meant demotion if not extinction. None of the fiefs of Kuang-wu's five daughters was inherited by even a second generation, and four of the husbands were executed (10B:14b-15a).

As far as the localities of the fiefs are concerned, Kuang-wu showed a marked preference for his home commandery, Nan-yang. Six of the eight fiefs of his sisters and daughters were situated there. Of the remaining two, one was in Wei, and the other, the posthumous fief of Yüan, in Huai-yang. Kuang-wu's successors gave less preference to Nan-yang, but continued to centre the fiefs within a radius of about 160 miles (250 km) from Lo-yang. This is a much smaller territory than the one used for marquisates. Although the princesses did not normally reside in their fiefs, the concentration was undoubtedly intentional and dictated by politeness.

While imperial sisters and daughters traditionally were made princesses, it was an equally unvaried custom in Former Han to enfeoff all sons of emperors as kings.

When Emperor Kao had founded the Han dynasty, he took the retrograde step of establishing kingdoms. These were not only given to members of the new imperial house, but also to chief supporters of the civil war years. Emperor Kao came to regret his early policy of granting kingdoms to other than his relatives, and reversed it. He also made a solemn covenant with his high officials that henceforth only members of the imperial Liu family should become kings. At his death in 195 B.C., the number of kingdoms was ten, all but one of which were held by the imperial house.¹⁾ The covenant was broken by the Empress née Lü, who appointed four nephews of her own family as kings, but, after her death in 180 B.C., the situation was rectified by the high officials.

Since the kings enjoyed a great degree of independence, and thereby posed a danger to the government, steps were taken from 164 B.C. onwards to reduce the size of the kingdoms. This led to the uprising of the Seven Kingdoms in 154 B.C., which was easily quelled. During the following decade, the kings were stripped of all political power. The central government incorporated the kingdoms fully into the empire. It appointed career officials to administrate them and to provide the kings with their allotted proportion of income. Although, as a courtesy, the

¹⁾ The exception was the kingdom of Ch'ang-sha, which remained in the hands of the Wu family until 157 B.C.

chief administrator of a royal fief was given the title of Chancellor, his duties were not substantially different from those of the Grand Administrator of a commandery. The kingdoms differed from the commanderies in name only.

No conclusions can be drawn from the number of kingdoms, since the total depended on the imperial birth rate. The highest figure is for 144 B.C., with 25 kingdoms. In A.D. 5, the last year of Emperor P'ing, the figure was 23. This is not to say that each kingdom was irrevocably granted to its particular branch of the imperial house. The government kept a close check on the conduct of the kings, and interfered either to abolish a fief altogether, or to demote or execute its current holder. While in a much stronger position than the marquises, the royal lines were not guaranteed automatic continuance. That depended on the relation between each king and the central government.¹⁾

Since the chapter on administrative geography of HS lists all prefectures which belonged to the 20 kingdoms existing in A.D. 2, it is possible to show their sizes accurately on a map.²⁾ With the exception of the sparsely inhabited Ch'ang-sha kingdom, all were of relatively small dimensions and situated on the Great Plain. It is noteworthy that the kingdoms were scattered, with few adjoining borders.

When the Han dynasty had been restored after Wang Mang's interregnum, the court naturally must have been under great pressure also to restore the old kingdoms to their rightful heirs, as well as to create new kingdoms for imperial relatives. The reign of the Keng-shī Emperor is too short to permit safe conclusions on his attitude. He seems to have re-established at least some of the old kingdoms. The new ones he created were, interestingly enough, extremely small, consisting as a rule of a single prefecture each.³⁾ When Kuang-wu became a pretender, he encountered the same pressure. In the early years, he found it unwise to resist it.

Considering first the new kings enfeoffed by Emperor Kuang-wu, i.e. men who were not heirs to Former Han kingdoms, the information is fairly detailed. In the autumn of A.D. 25, the warlord Liu Mao was defeated by Kuang-wu's forces and surrendered. He was the grandson of Kuang-wu's great-grandfather's brother. It was clearly opportune to treat him well, so that other members of the Liu house would be encouraged to join the new emperor. For political reasons, Liu Mao was enfeoffed as King of Chung-shan.⁴⁾

On May 7, A.D. 26, Kuang-wu turned his attention to the surviving male relatives of his own intimate family, who, as we have seen, were his uncle Liang and his nephews Chang and Hing (the sons of Po-sheng). Liang was made the King of Kuang-yang, Chang the King of T'ai-yüan, and Hing the King of Lu. In addition, Liu Chī was enfeoffed as King of Ch'eng-yang (1A:20a; 14,44:4a, 5b, 8a, 10b). Soon afterwards, on June 22, the emperor created Liu Hi the King of Sī-shui, and, on July 18, the latter's son Chung the King of Tsī-ch'uan (1A:20a, 20b; 14, 44:11a).

¹⁾ I will return to this point in the chapter on social mobility.

²⁾ See map 3.

³⁾ See vol. II, pp. 53ff.

⁴⁾ See vol. II, p. 105.

Liu Chī, Liu Hi, and Liu Chung were not close relatives, nor did they have military power. The first-mentioned was Kuang-wu's great-grandfather's brother's great-grandson. He also happened to be the son of the last Marquis of Ch'ung-ling and the senior member of the imperial branch from which Kuang-wu's line had sprung.¹⁾ Being one of the original rebel leaders in Nan-yang, he had in A.D. 24 been rewarded by the Keng-shī Emperor with the kingdom of Ting-t'ao.²⁾ Liu Chung was the great-grandson of another brother of Kuang-wu's great-grandfather, and had also distinguished himself early in the uprising.³⁾ In A.D. 24, the Keng-shī Emperor had enfeoffed Chung's father Hi as King of Yüan-shī.⁴⁾ Chī, Hi, and Chung were respected in Nan-yang and well-known to Kuang-wu. Chī is stated to have been the first member of the imperial clan voluntarily to recognize Kuang-wu. Hi and Chung must have taken the same step soon afterwards (14,44:10b, 11a). Kuang-wu's decision to enfeoff these three men as kings was therefore dictated mainly by political motives.

On Apr. 10, 29, Kuang-wu transferred his uncle Liang from Kuang-yang to the more centrally situated kingdom of Chao. Liang went to reside in his fief (1A:25a; 14,44:8a). He is the only king mentioned to have gone to his kingdom at this time. Liu Chī is expressly recorded to have remained in the capital (14,44:10b). Nothing is known about the other kings.

In A.D. 34, the King of Sī-shui, Liu Hi, died, followed after a few days by his son Chung, the King of Tsī-ch'uan (1B:6b; 14,44:11a). In the following year (A.D. 35), the King of Ch'eng-yang, Liu Chī, also died. He was buried at the Pei-mang Mountain (1B:7a; 14,44:10b). This was a site northeast of Lo-yang, used for state sacrifices. All three kingdoms remained vacant. Although there were heirs in each case, the sources do not record that they were permitted to inherit the fiefs of their fathers.

During A.D. 35, Emperor Kuang-wu also adjusted the geographic distribution of the remaining kingdoms. He transferred his nephew Chang from T'ai-yüan and made him the King of Ts'i (14,44:4a).

Turning to the Former Han kingdoms which were restored to their heirs by Emperor Kuang-wu, the information is much less tangible. HHS nowhere consistently states which kingdoms were involved. It is only in a few cases that the facts are known or can be reconstructed.

When Kuang-wu, then not yet emperor, conducted the campaign against Wang

¹⁾ When the Marquis of An-chung, Liu Ch'ung, had unsuccessfully risen against Wang Mang in A.D. 6 (see vol. I, p. 88), the Marquis of Ch'ung-ling, Liu Ch'ang, feared for the safety of his own house. An-chung and Ch'ung-ling were both situated in Nan-yang commandery. To improve his position, Liu Ch'ang arranged a marriage between his son Chī and the daughter of Chai Sūan. Sūan was a son of the late Lieutenant Chancellor Chai Fang-tsin. This got Liu Ch'ang from the ashes into the fire, since in October, A.D. 7, twenty-odd days after the marriage, Chai Sūan's younger brother Chai Yi rebelled. The authorities arrested and executed Liu Chī's new wife and put him in prison. Liu Ch'ang wrote a flattering memorial in which he apologized to Wang Mang and offered the sincere service of his clan. Liu Chī was spared (TKK 7:2b-3a; HHS 14,44:10a).

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 105; vol. II, p. 53.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 107. ⁴⁾ Cf. vol. II, p. 53.

Lang in A.D. 24, he gained the cooperation of a man who in the texts is referred to as the King of Chen-ting. This was Liu Yang, or "Goitre Yang" as he was nicknamed. He had inherited Chen-ting from his father in 7 B.C. and was later demoted by Wang Mang. Since he again appears as a king in A.D. 24, his kingdom must have been re-established by the Keng-shī Emperor.¹⁾ That Kuang-wu continued to recognize "Goitre Yang", is proved indirectly. An entry for the 1st month of A.D. 26 states that the King of Chen-ting planned to rebel. Liu Yang was trapped and executed, but, for political reasons, his son Te was on June 22, A.D. 26, permitted to succeed to the kingdom of Chen-ting.²⁾ We are also told that on Oct. 1, A.D. 31, Kuang-wu enfeoffed the former king of Ho-kien, Liu Shao, with his kingdom (1B:4b).³⁾ That other Former Han kingdoms must have been restored, becomes clear from the following events.

On Apr. 1, A.D. 37, an edict ordered that the King of Ch'ang-sha, Liu Hing, the King of Chen-ting, Liu Te, the King of Ho-kien, Liu Shao, and the King of Chung-shan, Liu Mao, should all be demoted to marquises (1B:9a-9b; 14,44:11b). This is the first (and last) time that the King of Ch'ang-sha, Liu Hing, is mentioned in the sources. We do not know when he was enfeoffed, nor what his background was.⁴⁾ HHS adds at this point that "those of them who belonged to the imperial house and came to being cut off from their fiefs and [were demoted to marquises, together with those of the imperial house who already] were enfeoffed as marquises, were 137 men" (1B:9b).⁵⁾ It is probable that the demotions were not restricted to the kings of Ch'ang-sha, Chen-ting, Ho-kien, and Chung-shan. The *pen ki* states (1B:9b-10a) that on Apr. 15 of the same year the government abolished 10 Former Han kingdoms as independent administrative units and joined them to neighbouring commanderies.⁶⁾ These included the just-mentioned kingdoms of Chen-

¹⁾ Cf. vol. II, p. 70, and *ibid.* note 5. ²⁾ Cf. vol. II, pp. 121ff.

³⁾ Liu Shao's name is a mystification, since HS does not mention him at all. The text probably has to be amended to: the son of the former king.

⁴⁾ According to HS 14:16a, Liu Shun inherited the Ch'ang-sha kingdom in A.D. 7 and was demoted by Wang Mang. Hing may have been a son of Shun.

⁵⁾ That the figure of 137 men cannot refer exclusively to demoted kings is obvious. There could not have been that many kingdoms. Kuang-wu at no time used prefectures as royal fiefs, and the number of commanderies in A.D. 2 was no more than 103.

⁶⁾ The *pen ki* actually says that 13 kingdoms were abolished, but only enumerates 9: Kuang-p'ing, Chen-ting, Ho-kien, Ch'eng-yang, Si-shui, Tsī-ch'uan, Kiao-tung, Liu-an, and Kuang-yang. Ts'ien Ta-hin maintains that Kao-mi must be added to the list, that the total is 10, and that the figure 13 is an error. He points out that according to the treatise on administrative geography (*chī* 23B:30b) the number of the abolished units was 10 (1B:10a, *Tsī kie*).

While Liu-an disappeared as an administrative entity in 37, it had ceased to be a kingdom earlier. Hou K'ang observes that Liu Shun became Grand Administrator (not Chancellor) of Liu-an in A.D. 32 (14,44:13a). This proves that Liu-an had been a commandery at least since 32 (29. Hou, p. 3).

Among the 10 kingdoms, 3 (Ch'eng-yang, Si-shui, and Tsī-ch'uan) had no longer been held by the original royal houses. Chen-ting and Ho-kien had been restored. Whether the remaining 5 had been granted to respective heirs, cannot be established but is, in the context, a strong probability.

Still other kingdoms may first have been restored and then, as was the case with Ch'ang-sha, have been discontinued and changed into commanderies, without this being recorded.

ting, and Ho-kien, as well as Ch'eng-yang, Sī-shui, and Tsī-ch'uan, the vacant kingdoms of the late Liu Chī, Liu Hi, and Liu Chung. Evidently, the emperor made a clean sweep of all kings enfeoffed for political reasons.

The timing of the demotions is no puzzle. Excepting Lu Fang's presence at the northern border, the civil war had come to an end during the night of Dec. 24, A.D. 36, when Kung-sun Shu had died of his wounds. The emperor was in a position of strength, and he used it to rid himself of all kings outside his intimate family. This means that, whatever lip service was paid to the restoration of the Han dynasty, Kuang-wu in this respect acted as any other dynasty founder. The highest noble prestige became a monopoly of his own house. Tradition and political debts were ignored as soon as he could afford to do so.

To sum up, as of the evening of Apr. 1, A.D. 37, the only kings of the imperial family were Kuang-wu's uncle Liang, and his nephews Chang and Hing. On the following day, the situation was further changed. One of Kuang-wu's chief followers, Chu Yu, had memorialized that in ancient times, when subjects received fiefs, the rank of king had not been granted. He proposed that all kings should become dukes (22,52:2a).¹⁾ The emperor accepted this proposal and on Apr. 2, A.D. 37, demoted his uncle and nephews. Liu Liang was made Duke of Chao. He continued to reside in his fief, but regularly came to court. Liu Chang and Liu Hing became Dukes of Ts'i²⁾ and Lu respectively. They did not live in their duchies (1B:9b; 14,44:8a).

After Apr. 2, A.D. 37, the three highest ranking nobles of the imperial house below the throne were the dukes. With one exception, all kings had disappeared. The exception was the aborigine Jen Kuei, who in A.D. 24 had taken possession of Yüehi commandery in western Sī-ch'uan and had proclaimed himself King of K'iuung-ku. In A.D. 35, he surrendered to Kuang-wu with the entire commandery and was as a reward confirmed in his rank as King of K'iuung-ku. This was a case of expediency, breaking, in fact, the covenant of Emperor Kao. Bowing to pressure, Jen Kuei voluntarily renounced his kingship in A.D. 38.³⁾ Once more, Kuang-wu found it necessary to depart from principle. That was in the 12th month of the Chinese year 40, when Lu Fang, after his sudden surrender, was made King of Tai. That issue solved itself soon, since Lu Fang rebelled again before the end of the 12th month.⁴⁾

After the death of Kung-sun Shu at the end of A.D. 36, which concluded the major part of the civil war, the emperor had intermittently been urged to enfeoff his own sons. This was particularly advocated by the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han. In the 3rd month (Apr. 13-May 11) of 39, Kuang-wu called a court discussion to consider the matter. The consensus of the discussion, in favour of enfeoffment,

¹⁾ Chu Yu's biography gives a paraphrase of his memorial, following an entry for A.D. 39. It adds that the emperor acted on it. Since the emperor's action took place in A.D. 37, that must also be the date of the memorial.

²⁾ 1B:9b states that Liu Chang became Duke of Ts'i from having been King of T'ai-yüan, but, as we have seen, he had been transferred to Ts'i two years earlier. Cf. *supra* p. 24.

³⁾ Cf. vol. II, pp. 60, 193; and *infra* p. 63.

⁴⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 114.

was memorialized by the high officials. They drew attention to the precedents of the past and quoted the Book of Odes for support. In ancient times, the feudal lords had been enfeoffed in order to be a screen for the capital. The Chou house had enfeoffed members of its lineage. The Ode (300:2) says: "I grandly open up for you a domain, to be a support for the house of Chou."¹) When Emperor Kao had founded the Han dynasty, he followed this example. At present, the Meritorious Subjects and members of the imperial clan had all been ennobled, whereas the imperial sons were still without fiefs. It would be proper to settle their designations and positions. The Grand Minister of Works should hand up a geographic map. The Grand Master of Ceremonies should select an auspicious day and make preparations for the ritual. The emperor approved the proposal (1B:11a-12a).

On May 13, Kuang-wu performed a *t'ai-lao* sacrifice (a sheep, an ox, and a pig) in the ancestral temple to announce the coming investiture. On May 22, the enfeoffment took place (1B:12a; 2:1a; 42,72:4a, 5a, 7b, 9a, 16a, 17b, 19a):

Fu became Duke of Yu-p'ing-yi.²)

Ying became Duke of Ch'u.

Yang (the future Emperor Ming) became Duke of Tung-hai.

K'ang became Duke of Tsi-nan.

Ts'ang became Duke of Tung-p'ing.

Yen^a became Duke of Huai-yang.

King^a became Duke of Shan-yang.

Heng became Duke of Lin-huai.

Yen^b became Duke of Tso-p'ing-yi.²)

King^b became Duke of Lang-ya.

Kuang-wu's eldest son with the Empress née Kuo, the Heir-apparent K'iang, did not receive a fief. He was about 15 years old. Yang, the eldest son of the Honourable Lady née Yin, was born in the middle of A.D. 28 (10A:6a), and therefore nearly 11 years old. This means that their respective younger brothers were mere children. All of them remained in the capital. The only duke, who in A.D. 39 resided in his fief, was still Liu Liang. No particular discrimination seems to have been shown in the allotment of the territories. The biography of Liu Ying, Duke of Ch'u, claims that his fief was the poorest and smallest, since his mother, the Beauty née Hü, was not favoured (42,72:5a). This statement cannot be checked. Ch'u was certainly not the smallest duchy in size. It had lost population through the change in the course of the Yellow River, but so had the adjoining fiefs. Unfortunately, exact demographic comparisons are not possible for the time of Emperor Kuang-wu.

¹) 131. Karlgren, p. 259.

²) 1B:12a, in contrast to 42,72:4a, 19a, writes Yu-yi and Tso-yi. Hui Tung is of the opinion that Kuang-wu divided Tso-p'ing-yi into the duchies of Yu-p'ing-yi and Tso-p'ing-yi respectively and conferred them on Fu and Yen^b (1B:12a, *Tsi kie*). Liu Pin, followed by Ts'ien Ta-hin, argues that Yu-yi and Tso-yi are the correct forms, that the sense is "Duke Who Supports on the Right" and "Duke Who Supports on the Left", and that Tso-p'ing-yi commandery never was divided (42,72:4a, *Tsi kie*). It is difficult to see why only two of the dukes should have been singled out for honorific titles, while their brothers received specific fiefs. Hui Tung's interpretation must be correct.

As map 4 shows, the fiefs were spread over a wide area, ranging from Shan-tung and the Great Plain to the Wei River valley.¹⁾

In A.D. 39, the emperor belatedly granted posthumous titles to his brothers.²⁾ Po-sheng was made the Martial Duke of Ts'i, and Chung became the Grieved Duke of Lu (1B:12a; 14,44:4a, 6a).³⁾ This implies that the dukes of Ts'i and Lu were put in charge of the sacrifices to Kuang-wu's brothers. Evidently Chung had no sons of his own.

During A.D. 41, two of the nobles died. Kuang-wu's uncle, the Duke of Chao, Liang, died in the 1st month (Feb. 20–Mar. 21) while visiting the capital. His son Hū inherited the fief (1B:13a, 14,44:8a). On Aug. 15, the Duke of Lin-huai, Heng, also died (1B:13b; 42,72:19a). This son of the emperor with the Honourable Lady née Yin was still a child. There could be no heirs, and the fief lapsed.

In the 4th month (May 20–June 17) of 41, the emperor made a tour of inspection southwards, during which he visited his ancestral home in the Chang-ling prefecture⁴⁾ of Nan-yang. He was accompanied by his sons K'iang, Fu, Ying, Yang, K'ang, and Ts'ang (1B:13b), i.e. three of his sons with the Empress née Kuo, two of his sons with the Honourable Lady née Yin, and the only son with the Beauty née Hū. This was probably the first time that these princes had travelled any distance from the capital.

On Dec. 1, A.D. 41, a series of dramatic events began. The Empress née Kuo was divorced, and the Honourable Lady née Yin became empress instead. The political aspects of this step will be discussed elsewhere. Arrangements had to be made to provide for the former empress, and perhaps also to mollify her sons. Kuang-wu chose this moment to promote all his sons to kings. He also transferred the next-eldest son of the divorced empress, the Duke of Yu-p'ing-yi, Fu, to become King of Chung-shan, with the simultaneous income of the adjoining Ch'ang-shan commandery. The former empress was given the title of Grand Queen of Chung-shan, which would seem to indicate that Fu was made responsible for the support of his mother (1B:13b; 2:1a; 10A:4b, 6b; 42,72:4a, 5a, 7b, 9a, 16a, 17b, 19a). As of the end of 41, China consequently had nine kings, all sons of Emperor Kuang-wu. They remained in the capital. The Grand Queen née Kuo may also have stayed in Lo-yang until her death. There is no clear statement in the sources whether or not she ever left the city. The Duke of Chao, Liu Hū, was, as his father before him, still the only member of Kuang-wu's intimate family to reside in his fief.

¹⁾ The border between Yu-p'ing-yi and Tso-p'ing-yi is hypothetical.

²⁾ *Pen ki* 1B:12a dates this honour May 18, A.D. 39. It would in that case precede the enfeoffment of the imperial sons by four days. But the entry follows on that for the imperial sons. It is impossible to know whether the cyclical characters are wrong or whether the historian inadvertently records the events in the wrong sequence.

³⁾ As pointed out by Ts'ien Ta-hin, the biographies of Kuang-wu's brothers (14,44:4a, 6a) both give their posthumous rank as "king", whereas the *pen ki* (1B:12a) writes "duke". Since there were no kings at all in China at that time, it is probable that the *pen ki* is correct and that the rank was duke (14, 44:4a, *Ts'i kie*).

⁴⁾ On Mar. 9, A.D. 30, Emperor Kuang-wu promoted the Ch'ung-ling district to become the Chang-ling prefecture (1B:1a). Cf. also *infra* p. 41, note 1.

On June 21, A.D. 43, Kuang-wu took the logical step of also promoting to kings the dukes of Chao, Ts'i, and Lu (1B:15a). While it is not explicitly recorded, it seems certain that the emperor's late brothers Po-sheng and Chung were posthumously promoted to kings at this time.

On Aug. 20 of the same year (43), the emperor changed his Heir-apparent. The eldest son of the new Empress née Yin, the King of Tung-hai, was elevated to that position. His tabooed personal name was altered from Yang to the less common Chuang. The former Heir-apparent, the eldest son of the current Grand Queen of Chung-shan née Kuo, became King of Tung-hai instead (1B:15a, 2:1a; 42,72:1a).

One year later, on Aug. 1, A.D. 44, the King of Chung-shan, Fu, was transferred to become King of P'ei, and his mother, the former empress, was simultaneously entitled Grand Queen of P'ei (1B:15b; 10A:4b; 42,72:4a).

In 46, the King of Ts'i, Liu Chang, died and was given the posthumous title of Grieved King. He was succeeded by his son Shī (1B:17a; 14,44:4b).

No further changes took place until the winter of 51, when the King of Lu, Liu Hing, and the King of Ts'i, Liu Shī, were sent to their kingdoms (1B:19b; 14,44:4b, 6a). This slightly relieved the congestion of kings in the capital. Three were gone (those of Chao, Ts'i, and Lu), which only left Kuang-wu's nine sons (not counting the Heir-apparent). The time was near when the ax would fall again and another five were to go to the provinces.

In the 1st month (Feb. 19-Mar. 19) of 52, the emperor transferred the King of Lu, Liu Hing, to become King of Pei-hai (1B:19b; 14,44:6a). Soon thereafter, on July 22, the Grand Queen of P'ei died and was buried at the Pei-mang Mountain (1B:19b; 10A:5a). On Oct. 1, the emperor took the drastic step of sending the Kings of Tung-hai, P'ei, Ch'u, Tsi-nan, and Huai-yang to their kingdoms. Kuang-wu clearly tried to soften this blow, at least as far as his eldest son was concerned. The former Heir-apparent was singled out for special honours which otherwise were reserved for the emperor. He also had his fief of Tung-hai increased with Lu, which recently had become vacant, and was ordered to reside there. HHS gives as the reason that the Ling-kuang Palace, known for its elegance, was still extant. It had been built in Former Han times by a son of Emperor King (1B:20a; 42,72:1a, 4a, 5a, 7b, 16a).

HHS does not record why these particular sons were asked to leave the capital. The order only begins to make sense when we realize that K'iang, Fu, K'ang, and Yen^a all were sons of the former Empress née Kuo, and that the fifth king, Ying, was the son of the Beauty née Hū. The only princes remaining in the capital were the surviving four sons of the Empress née Yin and the youngest son of the former Empress née Kuo, Yen^b. Seen in this light, the statement in Yen's^b biography becomes meaningful: "because Yen^b was the youngest son of the [late] Grand Queen née Kuo, he alone remained in the capital" (42,72:19a), i.e. alone among his full brothers. Evidently, the sons of the first empress were sent away for political reasons.

Whether kings or marquises, most nobles of Han China vastly preferred life in the capital to the boredom of the provinces. Kuang-wu obviously had hesitated

to send away his sons with Kuo Sheng-t'ung, and he did nothing while the mother was alive. The fact that he moved immediately after her death, proves that the situation was ripe for action. Voluntarily or under pressure, and for reasons further to be explored, the emperor relegated to the country one half of his sons.

It is not recorded that K'iang, Fu, Ying, K'ang, and Yen^a came to the capital for the New Year's court congratulations in A.D. 53, 54, and 55. During that period, the emperor visited Lu on Mar. 11, 54, and proceeded from there to Tsi-nan. He must have seen his sons K'iang and K'ang at that occasion. Later in the year 54, Kuang-wu went to Lu a second time (1B:20a, 20b).¹⁾

A number of territorial changes were made in A.D. 54. On June 3, the King of Tso-p'ing-yi, Yen^b, was transferred to become the King of Chung-shan (1B:20a; 42,72:19a). Chung-shan had been vacant from 44 onwards. Since Yen^b, as the youngest son of Kuo Sheng-t'ung, remained in the capital and never had been in Tso-p'ing-yi, he was not directly affected at this time. During 54, the emperor also slightly increased in size the kingdoms of Ch'u, Tsi-nan, and Huai-yang. The exact date of the action is not given. It may have been due to bad conscience or the wish to appease these sons.²⁾ Ch'u was increased by two prefectures,³⁾ Tsi-nan by six,⁴⁾ and Huai-yang by four⁵⁾ (42,72:5a, 7b, 16a).

¹⁾ 1B:20b dates the second visit in the 7th month (Aug. 23–Sep. 20) on the day *ting-yu*, but the sevenths month had no day with these cyclical characters.

²⁾ K'iang already had the largest kingdom, consisting of Tung-hai and Lu combined. Fu's transfer to P'ei in 44, and Yen's^b transfer to Chung-shan in 54, may have brought advantages which are not specified in HHS.

³⁾ The text mentions Ts'ü-lü and Sü-ch'ang, formerly belonging to Lin-huai commandery. Ts'ü-lü was situated SW of the present Sui-ning hien, Kiang-su. Sü-ch'ang must be an error. During Former Han, it belonged to the Tung commandery, during Later Han to the Tung-p'ing commandery. It was located far away from Ch'u and could not conceivably have been added to it. The *Commentary* amends Sü-ch'ang to Ch'ang-yang in Lin-huai commandery. As Hung Liang-ki remarks, Ch'ang-yang was one of the prefectures abolished by Emperor Kuang-wu (42,72:5a, *Commentary* and *Tsi kie*). This does not mean, of course, that its territory disappeared. It may well have been joined to Ch'u. Unfortunately, the emplacement of Ch'ang-yang is unknown.

⁴⁾ The text enumerates Chu-o, An-te, Ch'ao-yang, P'ing-ch'ang, Si-yin, and Ch'ung-k'iu, which all previously had belonged to P'ing-yüan commandery.

An-te prefecture was situated 10 li W of the present Ling hien, Shan-tung.

P'ing-ch'ang prefecture was situated 30 li SW of the present Te-p'ing hien, Shan-tung. It was abolished as a prefectural unit by Emperor Kuang-wu.

No Si-yin prefecture existed in Han times. Ts'ien Ta-hin amends the name to T'a-yin (42,72:7b, *Tsi kie*), which did belong to P'ing-yüan commandery. It was situated 10 li W of the present Lin-yi hien, Shan-tung.

Ch'ung-k'iu was situated NE of the present Liao-ch'eng hien, Shan-tung. It also was abolished as a prefectural unit by Kuang-wu. Since Ch'ung-k'iu was too far away from Tsi-nan to be added to it by a border adjustment, it is questionable whether the entry is correct.

⁵⁾ These were Ch'ang-p'ing, Si-hua, Sin-yang, and Fu-lo, which all previously had belonged to Ju-nan commandery.

Ch'ang-p'ing was situated 18 li NE of the present Si-hua hien, Ho-nan.

Si-hua prefecture was situated S of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

Sin-yang prefecture was situated 60 li NW of the present T'ai-ho hien, An-hui.

Fu-lo prefecture was situated 35 li NW of the present T'ai-k'ang hien, Ho-nan.

In 56, Kuang-wu's sons K'iang, Fu, Ying, K'ang, and Yen*, and his cousin, the King of Chao, Hū, all came to court and participated in the congratulations on New Year's day (Feb. 5) (1B:20b). K'iang did not immediately return to his kingdom. He followed his father in March to T'ai-shan and attended the sacrifices there (42,72:1b). On that occasion, the emperor received in audience on the Eastern Peak his nephew, the King of Pei-hai, and his grandnephew, the King of Ts'i (1B:21a). K'iang then returned to Lo-yang and stayed there until after Kuang-wu's death. He went again to his kingdom in the winter of 57, and died there on July 2, A.D. 58 (2:4a; 42,72:1b-2b).

Map 5 shows the locations and sizes of the kingdoms at the time of Emperor Kuang-wu's death in A.D. 57. A comparison with the kingdoms of A.D. 2 and the duchies of A.D. 39 (maps 3 and 4) gives evidence that the fiefs had been progressively concentrated to the southern part of the Great Plain and to the Shan-tung peninsula. Instead of being scattered, by A.D. 57 all fiefs but two bordered on others, Ch'u even being entirely surrounded.

Map 6 for A.D. 140, which is based on the administrative survey in HHS (ch'i 19-23), demonstrates that this trend continued. The number of kingdoms has grown to twenty, forming a connected mass on the Great Plain and in Shan-tung. Because of the increase in numbers, the fiefs to a greater extent than before have spilled over on the northern plain.

Since the number of kingdoms in A.D. 140 was exactly the same as in A.D. 2, and since census figures are available for both years, it is interesting to make a brief comparison. In A.D. 2, the royal fiefs numbered 1,353,000 households. In A.D. 140, the corresponding figure is 1,892,000. This means that in 140 a considerably larger number of households contributed to the upkeep of the kings.¹⁾

When Emperor Kao established kingdoms, he had set a fateful precedent. Although, after the rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms in 154 B.C., the kings were deprived of all territorial power, they could become the real or imagined focus of opposition to the court. Whether the kings resided in the capital or in their fiefs, followers, sycophants, charlatans, and malcontents flocked to them and tried to exploit them. The rulers were torn between the desire to prevent or suppress scandals in the imperial family, and irritations with and suspicions against their relatives. It would have required a more perceptive man than Kuang-wu to break this trend and to try a different approach. His decision to continue the institution of kingdoms reinforced a harmful tradition. The consequences were not long in coming, and those involving his sons will be briefly described.

Kuang-wu was succeeded by Emperor Ming, who ascended the throne on Mar. 29, A.D. 57, and reigned until 75. He had troubles with three of his brothers. The first of these involved the King of Shan-yang, King*.

King* was a son of Yin Li-hua and therefore a full brother of Emperor Ming. He lived in the capital, having never been ordered to go to his kingdom. Considering

¹⁾ The comparison is valid, even though the figures are slightly modified by the number of marquises located within the kingdoms. The income from such fiefs naturally went to the marquises and not to the kings. In A.D. 2, prefectural marquises within kingdoms numbered 7. In A.D. 140, they were 18.

the strong family ties in Han China, buttressed by clique alignments, King's^a first action makes no sense whatsoever, unless, as seems probable from the later events, he was mentally deranged. On the death of Emperor Kuang-wu, King^a forged a letter to his half-brother, the King of Lu and Tung-hai, K'iang. He sent it by a slave who was instructed to claim that it was written by K'iang's maternal uncle Kuo K'uang. The letter urged the former heir-apparent to nothing less than armed rebellion, playing on the resentment that his mother and he had been demoted. It suggested that if K'iang were willing to claim the throne by force of arms, it would be easier than cracking eggs with T'ai-shan or carrying a feather with four horses. For supernatural support, the letter drew attention to various astrological phenomena. The physiognomists had predicted that K'iang would become Son of Heaven. He was the rightful heir and had the Mandate (42,72:17b-18b).

When K'iang received this remarkable document, he immediately had it sealed and sent to the court. It evidently became part of a dossier which later was utilized by the historian. Emperor Ming kept the affair secret, but removed his brother from Lo-yang to Ho-nan prefecture.¹⁾ King^a continued there to surround himself with astrologers. When this became known, he was transferred from Shan-yang to the lesser fief of Kuang-ling, and in A.D. 58 ordered to go to his kingdom (2:4a; 42,72:18b).

The description of the next impasse is based on the report of a physiognomist, and there is no way of knowing how accurate that was. Although not dated in the sources, the event must have taken place in the early 60's. King^a supposedly called this physiognomist to him, pointed out that he himself in appearance was similar to his late father, observed that Kuang-wu had been 30 years old when he ascended the throne, which happened to be his own age at that time, and asked whether he should raise troops. The physiognomist informed the government, whereupon King^a became afraid and voluntarily went to prison. The emperor again hushed the matter up, but ordered that the officials should keep King^a under surveillance (42,72:18b-19a).

In A.D. 67, King^a was accused of having shamans perform sacrifices and invoke curses, presumably against the emperor. An edict ordered an investigation. When this had been concluded, the officials memorialized that King^a should be executed. Emperor Ming was displeased, but the officials pointed out with some sharpness that the empire did not belong to him personally and that there were precedents for the execution of brothers. King^a was condemned and committed suicide in the 2nd month (Mar. 5-Apr. 3) (2:11b; 32,62:4a-4b; 42,72:19a; chī 11:2a; chī 18:4a).²⁾ Four years later, in A.D. 71, Emperor Ming, probably out of regret, enfeoffed King's^a eldest son Yüan-shou as Marquis of Kuang-ling with the right to use a royal seal

¹⁾ The Ho-nan prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 9^{li} NW of the present Lo-yang hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ Chī 11:2a says that a certain Shen Liang was involved but gives no details. This man is mentioned nowhere else in HHS.

and cord. The fief consisted of six prefectures. Yüan-shou's three younger brothers were made district marquises (2:14b; 42,72:19a).

An affair of much greater dimensions was the supposed plan for rebellion of the King of Ch'u, Ying, the only son of Emperor Kuang-wu with the Beauty née Hū.

Ying, who at first was a favourite of Emperor Ming, showed interest in Taoism (Huang-Lao) but is more famous for his sponsorship of Buddhism. He fasted and performed sacrifices to the Buddha (Fou-t'u),¹⁾ the first documented case of Buddhist practices in China. He also surrounded himself with "Men of Recipes", i.e. adepts in alchemic and magical arts, and fabricated tortoises of gold, cranes of jade (symbols of longevity), and auspicious omens (42,72:5a, 6b).

In A.D. 70, Ying was denounced for these activities by an informant.²⁾ An investigation was ordered. The high officials memorialized that Ying had consorted with rascals, that he had made charts and revelations (*t'u ch'an*), that he had been greatly refractory (*ta ni*) and unprincipled (*pu tao*),³⁾ and that he should be executed. Emperor Ming dismissed Ying from his kingdom and banished him to King prefecture⁴⁾ south of the Yang-tsi, where he received a private estate⁵⁾ of 500 households. When Ying arrived in King, early in A.D. 71, he committed suicide. He was buried in King with the ritual of a Full Marquis, and the emperor contributed to the funeral expenses (2:14a, 14b; 42,72:6b-7a).

Ying's death did not conclude the matter. Thousands were arrested and many executed. The texts mention as key figures Yen Chung and Wang P'ing, both natives of Yü-yang commandery in the north. Nothing is known about the background of Yen Chung, but Wang P'ing was not a nobody. He was the grandson of Kuang-wu's trusted assistant Wang Liang. Yen Chung and Wang P'ing are stated to have been interested in charts and revelations and to have plotted rebellion. On their arrest, they were interrogated, presumably under torture, and before their executions implicated others (22,52:5b; 42,72:6b; ch'i 11:2a). One arrest led to the next. Emperor Ming was clearly convinced that there was a widespread conspiracy, and had worked himself into a fine state of anger. The run-of-the-mill officials were not inclined to oppose him. HHS records that from K'uai-ki commandery alone more than 500 persons were brought to the imperial prison in Lo-yang. Among them were the Grand Administrator, Yin Hing, the Division Head in his office Lu Sü, the Superintendent of Registers, Liang Hung, and the Division Head of the Department of Merit, Si Hün. It looks as though most of the officials in the commandery administration had been detained. More than half of them died in the course of the investigation. Lu Sü and Liang Hung were tortured but did

¹⁾ The ancient pronunciation is *b'ïu—d'uo*. Cf. *Grammata*, ns. 1233 1, 45 i'.

²⁾ His name was Yen Kuang, and he was rewarded with the title of Marquis Who Snaps off Treason.

³⁾ For the legal terms *ta ni* and *pu tao* see 105. Hulsewé, pp. 156ff. He translates *pu tao* as "impious".

⁴⁾ The King prefecture during Han belonged to Tan-yang commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, An-hui.

⁵⁾ The term means verbatim "a town which provides hot water for washing". The revenues from such an estate defrayed the private expenses of the incumbent. Cf. 68. Chavannes, I, p. 287, note 1; 72. Dubs, I, p. 137, note 3.

not change their statements.¹⁾ In the end, Yin Hing, Lu Sü etc. were released (81,111:13a).

Another native of K'uai-ki arrested at this time was the scholar and official Tsiao Huang. He served as Grand Administrator of Ho-tung, was implicated, but died en route to the capital. His wife and children were thrown into the imperial prison and there questioned while being beaten for several years. Tsiao Huang's former student Cheng Hung memorialized and protested the innocence of his master, whereupon the members of the family were released (33,63:12b).

Few of the prosecuting officials seem to have shown courage and fairmindedness. One of the exceptions was Yüan An who in A.D. 71 was made Grand Administrator of Ch'u. On arrival, he checked the list of the many prisoners, and, over the objection of his subordinates, removed the names of all persons whose guilt was not proven. He took the view that people could not be condemned simply on the basis of mutual implication. Yüan An memorialized his findings, obtained the emperor's agreement, and released more than 400 families (45,75:1b-2a).

Of particular interest is the account that Yen Chung and Wang P'ing had implicated four marquises. The nobles stated that they had never even seen Yen Chung and Wang P'ing. One of the investigating officers took it on himself again to question the two prisoners closely. Chung and P'ing became flustered and were unable to answer. Convinced that they had lied, the official memorialized that the four marquises were innocent. The emperor was at first infuriated but two days later visited the prison of Lo-yang and personally set more than 1000 persons free (41,71:18a-19a).

How many were executed, is impossible to know. The texts express themselves in generalities. That the persecution was harsh cannot be doubted. At least ten marquises were abolished and their incumbents either demoted to commoners or executed. Two of these marquises had belonged to members of the imperial clan, and six to descendants of Kuang-wu's chief followers.²⁾ The Minister over the Masses, Yü Yen was involved, according to his biography, through chicanery of the Yin clan, and committed suicide (33,63:11b). The King of Tsi-nan, K'ang, was denounced as having been in touch with Yen Chung and a certain Liu Tsi-ch'an.³⁾ Emperor Ming reduced his kingdom by the prefectures of Chu-o, An-te, P'ing-ch'ang, T'a-yin, and Ch'ung-k'iu, i.e. those which had been added by Kuang-wu in A.D. 54⁴⁾ (42,72:7b).

¹⁾ Lu Sü's biography tells the charming story, perhaps apocryphal, how his mother travelled to Lo-yang in order to find him. She was not permitted to communicate with her son but was able to send him some food she had prepared. Lu Sü, who until then had kept his composure, broke down and wept. The official-in-charge asked him for the reason, whereupon Sü said that his mother had come, and yet they could not see each other. The official became angry, believing that the keeper of the prison gate had passed on a message, but Sü explained that he had recognized his mother from her cooking. When she cut meat, it always was in exact squares, and when she cut onions, she always used her thumb as a measure (81,111:13a).

²⁾ 10A:5a, 5b; 14,44:12b, 13a; 15,45:7a; 18,48:10b; 21,51:7b, 10b; 22,52:5b, 12a.

³⁾ He is mentioned nowhere else in HHS.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 30.

The trials continued for many years, during which Emperor Ming was torn between extreme severity and moderation. The Empress née Ma used her influence towards leniency (10A:9b). But he could never bring himself to call a halt. Only his son and successor, Emperor Chang (reigned 76–88), officially closed the matter on June 2, A.D. 77, when an edict permitted all who had been banished to return home. The eldest son of the late king of Ch'u was enfeoffed as marquis of Ch'u, and his five younger brothers received other marquisates (3:4b; 42,72:7a).

The last scandal occurred in A.D. 73 and involved the King of Huai-yang, Yen^a, a son of Kuo Sheng-t'ung. In A.D. 73, he was accused of having surrounded himself with rascals, made charts and revelations, performed sacrifices, and invoked curses. His biography does not mention any plans for rebellion, whereas the *pen ki* states that revolt was intended. A judicial investigation uncovered real or imaginary ramifications, and a great many persons were implicated and executed. By name are mentioned the Minister over the Masses, Hing Mu, and the Chief Commandant of Attendant Cavalry, Han Kuang, who were put to death on July 18, A.D. 73 (2:15b–16a; 10B:15a; 42,72:16b; *ch'i* 11:2b). Nothing further is known about Hing Mu. Han Kuang was Emperor Ming's and Yen's^a brother-in-law, being married to the Princess of Kuan-t'ao, Hung-fu.

The high officials memorialized that Yen^a also should be executed. The emperor refused to do this, and in the 7th month (Aug. 22–Sep. 20) demoted him to King of Fou-ling, with an income from only two prefectures (2:16a; 42,72:16b).

During the reign of Emperor Chang, Yen^a was in A.D. 76 once more accused of planning rebellion. This time, his son Fang was supposedly involved. The high officials proposed that the two should be brought to the imperial prison by caged cart, but the emperor pardoned Fang and demoted Yen^a to Marquis of Fou-ling, with an income from one prefecture. In 87, Emperor Chang again promoted Yen^a to King of Fou-ling, granting him the income from five prefectures. Yen^a died a natural death on Dec. 8, A.D. 89 (3:4a–4b, 18a; 4:3b; 42,72:16b–17a).

In none of the cases concerning the brothers of Emperor Ming, is the preserved evidence strong enough to prove that serious plots had really been formed. The characters of King^a, Ying, and Yen^a emerge as rather those of unstable men, deeply interested in the occult. The strong element of superstition is present in all three incidents. To which extent these kings were personally culpable, or simply gullible and exploited by charlatans, must remain unsolved. Whatever dreams the accused may have harboured, it seems certain that well-organized plots, dangerous to the security of the state, simply did not exist. They only endured in the suspicious mind of Emperor Ming, and were fed by random names, extracted from prisoners under torture.

The mental atmosphere under Emperor Ming is well summed up in the biography of Liu Mu, son of Hing, grandson of Po-sheng, and King of Pei-hai, even though the story has an apocryphal flavour. This king is described as a gifted man who enjoyed a wide reputation. At the end of each year, all kings sent messengers to the court for the customary New Year's congratulations, unless they went in person. At such an occasion, Mu asked his messenger what he would answer if the

court inquired about him. The man said he would truthfully state that the king was loyal, filial, compassionate, and benevolent, respected worthy persons, and enjoyed the company of gentlemen. Mu exclaimed that this would endanger him. The messenger should say that the king's ambitions had declined, that he amused himself with music and women, and that he loved dogs and horses (14,44:6b-7a).

2. *The high nobility*

The highest regular noble rank below the kings was that of Full Marquis. Since this rank was not granted in automatic perpetuity, it is not comparable to the nobility of the European variety. There existed, however, noble lines which formed a special, privileged group, the supposed senior male heirs of defunct dynasties and certain personalities.

The earliest of these special honours in Han China was conferred by Emperor Wu in 114 B.C., when he enfeoffed Ki Kia as Baron Descendant of Chou (HS 6:19a-19b; 18:9b).¹⁾ In 46 B.C., the title of Kia's grandson Yen-nien was changed to Marquis Who Succeeds to the Greatness of Chou (HS 9:5b; 18:10a).²⁾ Yen-nien's great-grandson Tang was in 8 B.C. elevated to Duke Who Succeeds to the Greatness of Chou (HS 10:15b; 18:10a).³⁾ In A.D. 4, the title of Tang's son Ch'ang was changed to Duke of Cheng (HS 12:7a; 18:10a).⁴⁾ Wang Mang altered his designation once more in A.D. 9 to Duke Who Manifests Peace (HS 19:10a; 99B:5a).⁵⁾

The first enfeoffment of the supposed senior male heir of the Shang-yin dynasty (there is some uncertainty whether he was K'ung Ki or K'ung Ho-ts'i) took place in 8 B.C., when he was given the title of Marquis Who Continues and Honours Yin. During the same year, he was promoted to Duke Who Continues and Honours Yin (HS 10:15a-15b; 18:23a).⁶⁾ In A.D. 4, K'ung Ho-ts'i's title was changed to Duke of Sung (HS 12:7a).⁷⁾ K'ung Hung, presumably a son of Ho-ts'i, was in A.D. 9 by Wang Mang given the lesser rank of Marquis Who Manifests Brilliance (HS 99B:5a).⁸⁾

In A.D. 1, two further enfeoffments were enacted. A presumptive descendant of the Duke of Chou was made Marquis in Recompense to [the Duke of] Lu, and Confucius' descendant K'ung Kün⁹⁾ became Marquis in Recompense for Perfection. Confucius was posthumously entitled Duke Sün-ni in Recompense for Perfection

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 74-75.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 313.

³⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 415.

⁴⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 78.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 275.

⁶⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 414-415. The *pen ki* (10:15a-15b) gives the name of this man as K'ung Ki. According to the Table (18:23a), he was K'ung Ki's son Ho-ts'i.

⁷⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 78. The Table (18:23a) dates this event in A.D. 2. A.D. 4 is undoubtedly correct, since during that year the Duke Who Succeeds to the Greatness of Chou simultaneously was made Duke of Cheng. All sources agree that this happened in A.D. 4.

⁸⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 275.

⁹⁾ His original given name was Mang, but he changed it to Kün in order to avoid Wang Mang's tabooed given name (HS 81:22b).

(HS 12:4a; 18:28b; 81:22b; HHS 79A, 109A:14a).¹⁾ Wang Mang changed the first two ranks in A.D. 9 to Viscount in Recompense to [the Duke of] Lu, and to Viscount in Recompense for Perfection (HS 99B:5b).²⁾

In addition to the four lineages of the Shang-yin and Chou dynasties, of the Duke of Chou, and of Confucius, Wang Mang in A.D. 9 enfeoffed ten men and entrusted them with certain sacrifices. These were to the legendary rulers the Yellow Lord, Shao-hao, Ti-k'u, Chuan-hü, Yao, and the Lord Yü (Shun), to the Hia dynasty, to Shun's minister Kao-yao, to the Minister of T'ang the Victorious (founder of the Shang-yin dynasty) Yi-yin, and to the Han emperors. For the last-mentioned sacrifices, the Young Prince Liu Ying, who never had been formally declared an emperor, was made the Duke Who Establishes Tranquillity (HS 99B: 1a-1b, 5a).³⁾

Emperor Kuang-wu again reduced this privileged group to three lines. Ki Ch'ang was still alive and became on June 22, A.D. 26, the Duke Who Succeeds to the Greatness of Chou (1A:20a; chi 28:12b).⁴⁾ This was his third change of title. K'ung An, who probably was a descendant of K'ung Ho-ts'i, was on Mar. 30, A.D. 29, enfeoffed as Duke Who Continues and Honours Yin (1A:25a; chi 28:12b). On Apr. 15, A.D. 37, these titles were adjusted. Ki Wu⁵⁾ was made Duke of Wei, and K'ung An Duke of Sung (1B:9b; chi 28:12b).

Confucius' senior descendant was re-enfeoffed with less speed. On June 20, A.D. 38, K'ung Kün's son Ch'i became Marquis in Recompense for Perfection (1B:10b; 79A, 109A:14a).⁶⁾

As a result of Kuang-wu's policy, China from A.D. 26 had one, and from A.D. 29 two, ducal lines outside the imperial house. After the last imperial dukes had been promoted to kings on June 21, A.D. 43,⁷⁾ they remained the only ducal houses in the country. In this respect, Kuang-wu simply followed the precedents of 8 B.C. He also enfeoffed Confucius' descendant as a marquis, and thereby followed one of the precedents set by Wang Mang in A.D. 1. But Kuang-wu did not make any allowance to the line of the Duke of Chou, and he did not adopt Wang Mang's departures of A.D. 9. Neither did he continue Wang Mang's antiquated titles of earl, viscount, and baron. He reverted to the system of the twenty ranks, headed by the Full Marquises and the Marquises Within the Passes.

Turning to the Full Marquises, it is necessary to make a lengthy excursion into Former Han in order to gain the necessary perspective on the enactments of Emperor Kuang-wu.⁸⁾

¹⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 69. ²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 276. ³⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 261, 275.

⁴⁾ HS 18:10a says that he became Marquis Who Succeeds to the Greatness of Chou, and gives the date as June 10.

⁵⁾ The texts write Ki Ch'ang. Hui Tung points out that, according to the Table in HS (18:10a), Ki Ch'ang in A.D. 29 had been succeeded by his son Wu, and that he therefore must be the one who became Duke of Wei (1B:9b, *T'ai kie*).

⁶⁾ 79A, 109A:14a dates this enfeoffment in A.D. 37. ⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 29.

⁸⁾ This section is primarily concerned with the numbers of the marquises and the locations of their fiefs. All other aspects will be considered elsewhere.

The Full Marquises were originally called *ch'e-hou*. Their designation was later changed to *t'ung-hou* or *lie-hou* in order to avoid Emperor Wu's tabooed given name (HS 19A:26a). These marquises received fiefs, which consisted of a specified number of households in one or several prefectures (*hien*), in a district (*hiang*), or in a commune (*t'ing*). They drew their income from a certain amount of the taxes paid to the government by the households of their fiefs. Although attempts were made to send the nobles to their marquisesates, these were not generally successful. The attraction of life in the capital was too strong. The marquises enfeoffed with prefectures were technically and socially more distinguished than those who possessed districts and communes, being subdivisions of prefectures.¹⁾ This does not mean that the sizes of the fiefs represented a falling scale. Marquisesates consisting of districts could occasionally count a greater number of households than a prefectural marquisesate. The administration of the marquisesates was in the hands of state-appointed officials, who, while carrying the courtesy title of Chancellor (*siang*), were not responsible to the nobles but to the government alone. The marquises had early lost all influence on the administration of their fiefs, and merely were permitted to appoint a limited number of officials to oversee their immediate personal residences (*ch'i* 28:13a-13b).

The marquises were at first administrated by the Palace Commandant Superintending Noble Ranks, whose title in 144 B.C. was changed to Chief Commandant Superintending Noble Ranks. Under Emperor Wu, the administration of the marquises was transferred to the office of the Grand Herald, who was one of the Nine Ministers (HS 19A:21a-21b; HHS *ch'i* 25:10-11a).

All marquises were divided into three major groups:

The first of these groups originally comprised only imperial grandsons and their descendants, with the exception of three nephews of Emperor Kao. The emperors routinely enfeoffed their sons as kings, and each of the kings transmitted his fief to one son while the others became marquises. If a king was not the son of an emperor but had inherited the kingdom, his other sons were not enfeoffed as marquises. This rule was changed by Emperor Wu. In the spring of 127 B.C., he issued an edict to the effect that from then on the sons of all kings, i.e. also of those kings who descended from the sons of emperors, should become marquises (HS 6:10b; HHS *ch'i* 28:13a).²⁾ This policy greatly increased the number of fiefs held by *Marquises of the Imperial House*.

The second group was formed by the so-called *Meritorious Subjects*, men who

¹⁾ The *Commentary* to 10B:11b states that according to the Han law, the position of marquises with large prefectures was equal to that of the Three Excellencies, that the position of marquises with small prefectures was equal to that of top-ranking ministers, and that the position of marquises with districts and communes was equal to that of officials ranking fully 2000 *shih*. 10B:14a records that the etiquette for imperial daughters who were Elder Princesses corresponded to that of feudal kings, that the etiquette for imperial daughters who were princesses corresponded to that of marquises [enfeoffed with prefectures], and that the etiquette for princesses who were daughters of kings corresponded to that of marquises enfeoffed with districts and communes.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 51.

had distinguished themselves in the service of their country and deserved the reward of a marquise.

The third group consisted of the *Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour* who had obtained their fiefs through a specific act of benevolence on the part of the emperor and not necessarily in recognition of outstanding achievements of their own. It included especially the more prominent of the distaff relatives of the rulers but also other men, such as the Lieutenant Chancellors from 124 B.C. onwards. Emperor Wu introduced the practice of enfeoffing each Lieutenant Chancellor as a marquis on the day of his appointment, provided the man did not hold this rank already.¹⁾ This was a recognition of the office rather than of the individual.

Fortunately, tabular surveys of these nobles are still extant for the entire Former Han dynasty until Emperor P'ing's last year of reign (A.D. 5). They have been preserved in the SK and HS. Tables 6 and 7 of SK (küan 18 and 19) list marquises enfeoffed by Emperors Kao and Hui, the Empress née Lü, and Emperors Wen and King, without, however, distinguishing the three categories mentioned above. Table 8 (küan 20) records the marquises not of the imperial house enfeoffed by Emperor Wu, while Table 9 (küan 21) comprises all sons of kings created marquises by the same ruler. These Tables have been translated by E. Chavannes, who rearranges the marquises alphabetically.²⁾ The HS reproduces the same material and continues the lists until A.D. 5. In contrast to SK, it differentiates the three groups of marquises from the very beginning. Tables 3A and 3B (küan 15A, 15B) concern the sons of kings, Tables 4 and 5 (küan 16, 17) the Meritorious Subjects, and Table 6 (küan 18) the Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour.

Both histories record the marquises chronologically according to the dates of establishment. They begin with the name of the fief, the name of the marquis, and his posthumous title if any. Next, they give the reason for the enfeoffment, followed by the year, month, and day of the investiture, as well as the number of years from this event until the death or dismissal of the marquis. Heirs are mentioned in the same fashion and with the appropriate dates. Sometimes, though far from always, the number of granted households is recorded. The final fate of each marquise is, as a rule, outlined. The last section may give some information about the locality of the fief.

Although these important statistics have been preserved, it would be too much to hope that they are altogether accurate and complete. For instance, one very small category of marquises seems to be entirely excluded, the heirs of imperial princesses. There are other lacunae. To mention only one case as an illustration, the HYKC states³⁾ that Emperor Kao enfeoffed a certain Fan Mu as Marquis of Tu-mien prefecture. Neither he nor his marquise are mentioned anywhere in the entire SK or HS. This does not exclude the possibility that the mistake lies with the notoriously unreliable HYKC.⁴⁾

¹⁾ See 72. Dubs, II, p. 23.

²⁾ 68. Chavannes, III, pp. 127ff.

³⁾ 1:3a (SI pu pei yao edition). ⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 107, note 1.

Fortunately, tests are feasible on the reliability of the statistics, and these will make it clear how far they can be trusted.

The first test is offered by the statement in HS (16:1a) that the number of marquises in 195 B.C. was 143 in all. According to the Tables, Emperor Kao created 143 marquises, but by 195 B.C. their number had shrunk to 139. Even assuming that the fault lies with the Tables, they would underreport the total of 195 B.C. by only 2.8%.

The second test can be based on Emperor's Wu's great purge of marquises in 112 B.C. In the 8th month of each year, the emperor presided at the offering of fermented liquor in the ancestral temple, and on that occasion the marquises were required by Statute to pay the government, in gold, a certain proportion of their income.¹⁾ Emperor Wu claimed that in a great number of cases the required amount had not been presented. According to the *pen ki*, he punished 106 marquises in the 9th month of 112 B.C. by demoting them to commoners (HS 6:22a).²⁾ The Tables only list 97 marquises which ceased to exist during that year, and no more than 92 of them were discontinued because too little gold had been offered.³⁾ Five additional marquises are stated to have been abolished due to the same accusation. Although no date is given for any of these cases, it might be assumed that this occurred in 112 B.C.⁴⁾ That would bring the total back to 97 marquises,⁵⁾ a figure which is still below the one recorded in Emperor Wu's *pen ki*. Nevertheless, provided that the *pen ki* is correct, the discrepancy is not great. The Tables would underreport by 8.5%.

The most important test on the statistics is possible for A.D. 2. Two completely different types of source material exist for that year. These can be compared with each other, providing an excellent opportunity for cross-checking. The Tables are the first category of documents. Undoubtedly, the historian found the relevant information in the archive of the Grand Herald, who was in charge of the marquises. The second category is the administrative survey of the empire for A.D. 2, given in the treatise on administrative geography (HS 28A, 28B). In this case, the historian must have found his sources in the archive of the Grand Minister over the Masses. The administrative survey enumerates by name all prefectures (but not the districts and communes), and specifically notes those which were marquises during the year in question. Starting with the Tables, it is easy to establish which of the marquises existed in A.D. 2, and among them to identify those which were prefectures. The total is 206 prefectural marquises. When we check this list against the marquises noted in the administrative survey, we discover that

¹⁾ See 72. Dubs, II, pp. 126ff. For the Statute, see 105. Hulsewé, p. 38.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 80-81.

³⁾ The remaining 5 marquises expired for other reasons.

⁴⁾ They are Lin-ho, T'u-kün, Ts'ien-chang, Ts'an-tsung, and Yi-ling (HS 15A:29a, 29b, 30a, 55a, 55b).

⁵⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 128, gives the figure as 98. I do not see where he obtains the additional marquise. It could be Nan-luan, which was abolished for the same reason as the others, but in 91 B.C., not in 112 (HS 15A:56a).

the Tables are more complete. The survey only mentions 192 prefectural marquisates.¹⁾ The 14 marquisates making up the difference are not identified as fiefs in the survey, although the Tables make it clear that they did exist in A.D. 2. On the other hand, the survey enumerates 10 marquisates which are not found in the Tables.²⁾ Adding the 10 additional prefectural marquisates of the survey to the 206 derived from the Tables, we get 216 marquisates. This would mean that the Tables have underreported the marquisates by 4.6%.

The three tests show that the Tables probably are not complete, but that the discrepancies are not great. Keeping in mind that a limited margin of error exists, it still seems justified to accept the statistics for interpretation.

Since our purpose is to gain an insight into the volume of enfeoffment during Former Han, the next step must be, on the basis of the Tables, to compute the total number of marquisates extant in each respective year of Former Han, from 202 B.C. until A.D. 5. Secondly, we must establish the totals within each of the three subgroups. It is a tedious but rewarding calculation. The results are shown in graph 1.³⁾

After the death of Emperor Kao, the curve for the total number of marquisates dips slowly until the beginning of Emperor Wu's reign. The short rule of the Empress née Lü shows the only temporary increase. It seems probable that a conscious policy was maintained to keep the number of marquisates below the total established by the founder of the dynasty. Suddenly, Emperor Wu began to create many new fiefs, multiplying them by one and a half times, and the curve soars from 130 B.C. to the peak of 121 B.C. Thereafter with equal resolution, this policy was reversed, and the number of marquisates decreases again, with the biggest drop in 112 B.C., the famous purge described above. Emperor Wu reduced the total by more than half from the peak year of 121 B.C., and at his death the marquisates numbered less than they had done at any time since the death of Emperor Kao. H. H. Dubs explains this great reduction of marquisates in the following way: "Evidently Emperor Wu became angry at his nobles when they all selfishly refused to volunteer for military service at a time when volunteers were lacking, and cashiered a large

¹⁾ The figure is actually 193, but one of the marquisates listed is the Ch'ung-ling district which was not a prefecture. It was the home district of Emperor Kuang-wu, and did not become a prefecture until Mar. 9, A.D. 30, when it was promoted and changed to Chang-ling (1B:1a). While HS is mistaken in listing Ch'ung-ling among the prefectures, the mistake is undoubtedly intentional. It was done in deference to the founder of the Later Han dynasty.

²⁾ 5 of these 10 marquisates are mentioned in the Tables, but none is stated to have existed in A.D. 2: Sin-shi, Chang-hiang (in contrast to other editions, Ts'ien Han shu pu chu does not note this prefecture as a marquisate), Chi, Jao, Shang-hiang (HS 28Ab:51b, 66b, 82b, 84b, 85a). (Wang Sien-k'ien points out that the Table mistakenly writes Ch'eng instead of Jao. See HS 15B:11a).

The other 5 marquisates are not mentioned in the Tables at all: Yang-lo, Fu, Shen-hiang, Yin-shan, Yang-t'ai (HS 28Ac:3a, 3b, 8b, 50b; 28Bb:17a).

³⁾ In cases where the Tables show discrepancies between SK and HS, I have followed SK unless there is a good reason to accept the version of HS. In other cases, where the information is incomplete, emendations were often possible. It is not feasible to account for all instances here. They are not many. 25 marquisates had to be excluded from the statistics altogether, since the years of establishment or discontinuation are unknown and could not be reconstructed.

proportion of them on the technicality of not having paid their full quota of tribute.”¹⁾ No doubt, the emperor did use a pretext, but it seems more plausible that the real cause was a fully conscious and considered reversal of his own tactics, that he had a change of heart and determinedly counteracted his own previous policy, rather than proceeding in a fit of anger. I will return to this point later. After the death of Emperor Wu, the number of marquises steadily increased again, to reach previously unknown levels at the end of the dynasty.

The components of the main curve throw additional light on the history of marquises during Former Han. It becomes evident that the number of fiefs of the Meritorious Subjects increased slightly under the rule of the Empress née Lü. Thereafter, a slow decrease began and lasted until the reign of Emperor Chao. For the rest of the dynasty, status quo was maintained on an exceedingly low level. It is worthwhile observing that Emperor Wu in this respect simply continued the gradual reduction initiated by his predecessors. Although he enfeoffed 75 Meritorious Subjects as marquises (HS 17:6b-25b), their number is smaller than that of the marquises lapsing during his reign. The total decrease continued slowly but persistently, and was little affected by the purge of 112 B.C.

The Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour were always relatively few. Their number also increased somewhat under the Empress née Lü, who enfeoffed a number of men from her own clan. With the reign of Emperor Süan, the marquises began to multiply, and overtook those of the Meritorious Subjects under Emperor Yüan. In A.D. 5, although still not very numerous, they exceeded the latter by about one and a half times.

The total of the Marquises of the Imperial House remained limited until the reign of Emperor Wu. The reason is, as explained before, that originally only imperial grandsons were enfeoffed. In 127 B.C., Emperor Wu officially changed this practice and ordered that henceforth the sons of all kings should become marquises. After having quoted the relevant section of the edict, the HS adds: “Thereupon the tributary kingdoms were first divided and consequently sons and younger brothers [of vassal kings] were all made marquises” (HS 6:10b).²⁾ This policy has been interpreted as a design to restrain the kings, forcing them to cede territories as marquises for their sons, and thereby reducing their income and power.³⁾ A certain modification seems necessary here. As to the date, the new approach of Emperor Wu had been introduced earlier, in 129 B.C., when he enfeoffed as marquises two sons⁴⁾ of the 5th king of Ch’u. The edict of 127 B.C. merely confirmed a policy which was already being implemented. As to the motive, the test is whether the new marquises were really located within kingdoms. While it is possible to establish the rough sizes of kingdoms earlier than A.D. 2, one cannot reconstruct the dependency of each individual prefecture for each particular year of Former Han. Prefectures were occasionally shifted from one commandery or kingdom to another, and these early changes are not recorded. In spite of this handicap, it is perfectly clear that many, and probably the majority, of Emperor

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 128. ²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 51. ³⁾ E.g. 77. Franke, I, p. 293.

⁴⁾ Liu Ch’eng and Liu Pu-hai (HS 15A:10a).

Wu's Marquises of the Imperial House were not enfeoffed within kingdoms. This course was continued after Emperor Wu's death. In A.D. 2, only 7 of the prefectural marquisesates were situated in kingdoms. Since most of the marquisesates at that time were held by members of the imperial clan, the vast majority of the prefectural marquisesates lay outside the kingdoms. This makes it evident that the policy introduced by Emperor Wu cannot primarily have been intended to divide the kingdoms. It follows that he must have acted from a genuine desire to grant special favours to the imperial clan. The great increase of marquises under Emperor Wu is in fact a direct result of the multiplication of the Marquises of the Imperial House, with no corresponding increase for the two other groups of nobles. Later, the emperor evidently came to doubt the wisdom of his decision and in 112 B.C. under the pretext that the full tribute in gold had not been paid, again radically reduced the number of Marquises of the Imperial House. They were not cut down to the former low level, and for all future remained more numerous than the Meritorious Subjects. Yet, for almost 30 years, the total was to stay below that of 112 B.C. Only under Emperor Chao, the steady increase began which was to continue until the end of the dynasty.

The main curve and its three components exhibit the gradual degeneration in the enfeoffment of marquises during Former Han. As far as the total numbers are concerned, the first decadence appears under Emperor Wu, but is counteracted and rectified by this determined ruler. The serious decay sets in with Emperor Chao. The deterioration is illustrated by the fact that the Meritorious Subjects, the only marquises who had really earned fiefs, made up as much as 95% of the total in 195 B.C., at the death of Emperor Kao, but only 7% in A.D. 5, at the end of the dynasty. It is plain that in the long run the Marquises of the Imperial House received the best treatment, next the Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour, and last the Meritorious Subjects. Another proof for this is rendered by the final fate of the various marquisesates. In 80% of all cases involving the Meritorious Subjects, their fiefs did not expire because the families died out, but because they were discontinued through direct government interference. The corresponding figure for the Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour is 76%, and for the Marquises of the Imperial House 73%.¹⁾

There can be no doubt that the earlier rulers were well aware of what they did. They knew through the supervising official in the capital the number of marquisesates which had lapsed, and this seems to have guided their actions. They generally kept the total number of marquises low by establishing fewer fiefs than those which ceased to exist. Only during the later half of the dynasty, this cautious policy was abandoned.

¹⁾ It is interesting, but, considering the clique struggle, not surprising, that the Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour attained the distinction of being disposed of by violent means more often than the others. 34% of all marquisesates within this category expired because the last holder was either executed, died in prison, or was forced to commit suicide. The Meritorious Subjects follow with 21%, and the Marquises of the Imperial House with only 11%.

For Later Han times, the source materials are incomparably less satisfactory. The HHS has no Tables at all, and the names of various marquises mentioned here and there throughout this history or other early records do not even nearly add up to the real totals. No graph is possible. All we can do is to attempt an interpretation of stray notices. The restoration period is fairly rich in such materials, and some important facts emerge.

Kuang-wu enfeoffed marquises even before he had ascended the throne,¹⁾ and afterwards continued to do so for a while in an unsystematic fashion. On Feb. 22, A.D. 26, he introduced a more organized approach. The text states that on that day Meritorious Subjects were enfeoffed as Full Marquises, and that the largest fiefs consisted of 4 prefectures (1A:17b). This is probably not quite correct. Feb. 22 was the date when the matter was set into motion, leading in due course to the enfeoffment of Meritorious Subjects. Kuang-wu issued an edict which praised the achievements of his officers. It ordered the Grand Herald to prepare at once lists of men who had not yet been rewarded. The emperor would then grade them himself (1A:17b-18a). This edict was apparently followed by a court discussion, at which the size of the marquisates was taken into consideration. The Erudit Ting Kung argued that 4 prefectures would be too much, and that it was not in agreement with the laws and regulations. According to ancient precedent, fiefs should not exceed 100 square *li*. One took the thunder as a model.²⁾ The rule was to make the trunk strong and the branches weak. The emperor did not accept this advice. He answered that when of old rulers had lost their states, it always had been because they had been unprincipled. He had never heard that states perished because the fiefs of Meritorious Subjects had been large. Internuncios were immediately dispatched to confer the seals and cords (1A:18a), Kuang-wu's remark either shows an astonishing naiveté and lack of historical knowledge, or else it was intended to flatter his chief followers.

On Jan. 26, A.D. 27, another edict ordered that all marquisates of the imperial house, which had been abolished by Wang Mang, should be restored. A search was made for heirs (1A:21a). How many marquisates were re-established at this time is not known, but they cannot have been very many. It will be seen that the number of all Marquises of the Imperial House in A.D. 37 falls about 100 short of the total in A.D. 5. Many of the fiefs were furthermore new ones, created for Kuang-wu's relatives. Also, of the 159 prefectural marquisates held by the imperial house in A.D. 2, Kuang-wu abolished no less than 127 as prefectural units during his great reduction from A.D. 30 onwards.³⁾ These combined facts indicate that either the majority of the houses had died out, or, more probably, that the government did not overly exert itself in reinstating heirs.

In A.D. 30, the emperor ordered the marquises to go to their fiefs (1B:3a). This order naturally applied to idle marquises in the capital, not to marquises employed

¹⁾ Cf. vol. II, pp. 73, 76.

²⁾ The *Commentary* remarks to this that the Book of Changes says under Diagram 51: "Thunder frightens for 100 *li*". Therefore the territories of the feudal lords were made 100 *li* square.

³⁾ See *infra* p. 143.

in the civil and military service. Similar attempts had been notoriously unsuccessful in Former Han times. To which extent Kuang-wu was obeyed is not mentioned in the sources.

In the latter half of the 30's, a move seems to have been afoot to make only members of the imperial house eligible to become Full Marquises. The high officials memorialized that the other marquises should not be renewed. Nothing is known about the background of this proposal, and the emperor did not accept it (35,65:1 b).

In one respect, Kuang-wu departed conspicuously from Former Han practice. He did not enfeoff his Grand Ministers over the Masses¹⁾ as had been done since 124 B.C. This policy is obscured by the fact that some of Kuang-wu's appointees already held the rank of Full Marquis when they were chosen for the post. There is also a dearth of information for four of the ministers, since they have no biographies. But among the six ministers who have biographies, only one (Fu Chan) seems to have become a Full Marquis on appointment. Two (Teng Yü, Ou-yang Hi) were Full Marquises already. One (Feng K'in) was a Marquis Within the Passes and not promoted. Two (Hou Pa, Ts'ai Mao) were never enfeoffed at all.

The civil war, excepting Lu Fang, came to an end in A.D. 36, and it is probably no coincidence that for the following year HHS is able to give the total number of marquises. No doubt, the records were at that time brought up to date. For the middle of A.D. 37, after the emperor had adjusted feudal positions within the imperial family²⁾ and had distributed further rewards among the victors, the Marquises of the Imperial House are recorded to have been 137 (1B:9b), the Meritorious Subjects 365, and the Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour 45 (1B:10a).

It is lucky that these totals are preserved for all three categories of marquises, that they are synchronic and therefore comparable, and that they are for A.D. 37. The civil war was over, the rewards had been granted, and the major part of China settled down for a period of peace. Although Kuang-wu later created some additional marquises, it is not probable that this radically changed the situation of A.D. 37.

The next step must be to match the totals of A.D. 37 against the corresponding totals for the last year of Former Han. This should give the necessary perspective for an evaluation of Kuang-wu's policy on at least a numerical basis.

Number of marquises	A.D. 5	A.D. 37
Meritorious Subjects	23 = 7%	365 = 67%
Distaff Relatives and Marquises Through Favour	58 = 18%	45 = 8%
Marquises of the Imperial House	236 = 75%	137 = 25%
Total	317 = 100%	547 = 100%

Table 5. The marquises of A.D. 5 and 37.

¹⁾ Corresponding to Lieutenant Chancellor in Former Han. On June 8, A.D. 51, the title was changed to Minister over the Masses (1B:19a-19b).

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 25.

The comparison shows that Kuang-wu, far from counteracting the gradual increase of marquisates which had occurred in the later half of Former Han, continued to augment their number to an unprecedented level. The deterioration proceeded as though the dynasty had never been interrupted. The fiscal loss for the government was actually more considerable than the increase from 317 to 547 marquisates would seem to indicate. The dikes of the Yellow River had meanwhile burst open, parts of the Great Plain had been devastated by the flood, people had perished, and many of the survivors had migrated southwards. The loss of income through the marquisates must therefore proportionately have had a greater impact on the state budget under Kuang-wu than had been the case before the disasters.

On the other hand, the growing disproportion between the Meritorious Subjects and the other marquises had been to some extent corrected. This reversal was partly due to the force of circumstances, the need to enfeoff the men who had helped Kuang-wu to power, but partly seems to have been a conscious policy. Table 6 brings out the trend by showing the numerary relation between the Meritorious Subjects and all other marquises at the death of each Former Han ruler, and by comparing these percentages with the situation in A.D. 37.

Kao	195 B.C.	95%
Hui	188 B.C.	96%
Lü	180 B.C.	91%
Wen	157 B.C.	95%
King	141 B.C.	91%
Wu	87 B.C.	27%
Chao	74 B.C.	21%
Süan	49 B.C.	14%
Yüan	33 B.C.	11%
Ch'eng	7 B.C.	9%
Ai	1 B.C.	9%
P'ing	A.D. 5	7%
	A.D. 37	67%

Table 6. The proportion of Meritorious Subjects to all marquises at the death of each Former Han ruler and in A.D. 37.

Although Kuang-wu never restored the proportions which had existed at the beginning of Former Han, he neither went to the other extreme prevailing at the end of that dynasty. The conclusion must be that in the allotment of fiefs he perpetuated a drift which had shown clear signs of decadence ever since the reign of Emperor Chao. Kuang-wu could or would not break this trend or perhaps was not even conscious of it. But while he took no action to reduce the number of marquisates, he adjusted the apportionment within the system he had inherited. By rejuvenating the old order, he lessened the strain.

One policy of Kuang-wu remains to be discussed which seems to have been radically new: the transfer of marquises from one fief to another. It illustrates his ability to reduce ills inherent in a situation, without actually curing them.

Since HHS has no Tables, the names of the marquises and their marquisates are mostly unknown. The HS, HHS, and TKK mention in all 161 fiefs which were created during Kuang-wu's reign.¹⁾ SKC (3:12a; 11:1b; 13:19b) records 7 additional marquisates, but makes such obvious mistakes that it throws considerable doubt on the reliability of this information. In any event, the number of Kuang-wu's marquisates known by name is far below the total of 547 fiefs in A.D. 37. The situation is somewhat improved when we consider only the prefectural marquisates. 102 are mentioned.²⁾ Although evidence exists that under Kuang-wu, as in Former Han, a district marquisate could be larger than a prefecture marquisate,³⁾ the fact remains that the former were less distinguished than the latter. Since only more prominent men received prefectural marquisates, the chances are that a larger proportion of them is mentioned in the sources than those belonging to the lesser category. However this may be, the exact accuracy of the figure is not of great importance here. The significant fact is that among the 102 prefectural marquisates, 33 show a distinct peculiarity: their incumbents were transferred from one prefectural marquisate to another, occasionally more than once.⁴⁾

The total number of transfers was 44, and, as the map demonstrates, could involve enormous distances. These range from a minimum of 25 miles (40 km) to as much as 764 miles (1,230 km). In studying this problem, one is at first struck by the fact that all of the marquises involved either have biographies in HHS or, with a single exception,⁵⁾ are the sons of men with biographies. One might therefore jump to the conclusion that, while transfers were the normal procedure, the history does not supply such details except when the lives of the persons concerned are fully described in biographies. But it so happens that the majority of the nobles who were not transferred also have biographies or are closely related to persons with biographies. The division into marquises who were transferred and those who were not can therefore not depend on any historiographical reasons but must have its source in a deliberate policy of the emperor.

Among the transferred marquises, 4 seem to be special cases. One was transferred because of a technicality,⁶⁾ and all others most probably as a punishment.⁷⁾ They will not be discussed in the present connection.

For the remaining 29 marquises,⁸⁾ the facts are briefly as follows:

¹⁾ The work of particularly 49. Ts'ien Ta-chao is useful as a check but cannot be relied on alone because of omissions and errors.

²⁾ Excluding 9 marquises of prefectures who were demoted again and the 7 prefectural marquisates recorded in SKC.

³⁾ E.g. the Sin-an district marquisate of Ting Ch'en had 5000 households (37,67:9b), whereas Ma Yüan's prefecture marquisate consisted of 3000 households (24,54:9a).

⁴⁾ See map 7.

⁵⁾ Kuo K'uang. He was a brother of the Empress née Kuo.

⁶⁾ Liu P'an (39,69:8a-8b).

⁷⁾ Liu Ts'an (14,44:14b), Chu Fou (33,63:4a, 6a), Fu Chan (26,56:3a).

⁸⁾ In 8 of these cases, the sons of the original marquises were transferred. They all inherited their fiefs before the end of the civil war. To avoid too much confusion, I will not distinguish between fathers and sons. The term "transferred marquis" will refer to the holders of each fief, irrespective of whether father or son.

1. More than two thirds of the transferred nobles were natives of the Nan-yang commandery and the adjacent Ying-ch'uan commandery.
2. All but one of the transferred marquises received their first fiefs before the end of the civil war, and the majority immediately after Kuang-wu had ascended the throne. The final enfeoffment of more than two thirds of the men involved occurred after the civil war was over.
3. The average distance of transfers is 301 miles (484 km). About half of the men from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan were transferred distances above the average, while all but one of the marquises not from these two commanderies were transferred distances below the average.

The first two points are relatively easily explained. It so happens that 24 of the 29 marquises belong to Kuang-wu's earliest followers. With one exception,¹⁾ they had joined him when he only was Liu Siu, a soldier of fortune in the civil war. After the outbreak of the rebellion in Nan-yang, Ying-ch'uan was the first commandery outside Nan-yang which Liu Siu entered in the course of military operations. It was in these two territories that he first made contacts with a number of men who later rose to become his chief assistants. When Liu Siu received an independent command north of the Yellow River, these same men followed him there, formed the nucleus of his party, became his leading generals, and persuaded him to ascend the throne. As for the remaining 5 men, they were his most prominent relatives, both from his own clan and the distaff side, and all but one of them²⁾ were from Nan-yang. When Liu Siu had become emperor, he hurried to reward these chief followers and most influential relatives with marquises, both in recognition of their former services and as a safeguard for their loyalty in the future. This explains the predominance of the men from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan, as well as their early first enfeoffments.

It is also easy to explain why the majority of the marquises was transferred later than 36. The civil war lasted until the end of that year. Obviously, the emperor had waited until peace had been restored before he redistributed the fiefs. The question is: why the redistribution and why the more distant transfer of about half of the marquises from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan?

Without doubt, one important reason was the desire to give further rewards to these deserving and influential men. It is stated in case after case that they were transferred to marquises with greater numbers of households. But this cannot be the sole answer. If the emperor's only wish had been to increase the fiefs, he could have done so simply by adding neighbouring households to the existing marquises, without transferring the nobles. The mere fact that transfers were resorted to postulates some further motive. Two factors, which must have been the most important ones, will clarify the situation:

1. 12 of the 29 transferred marquises had originally been enfeoffed in their home-commanderies, 3 of them even with their home-prefectures. When the redistri-

¹⁾ Wang Ch'ang.

²⁾ Kuo K'uang. He was from Chen-ting commandery.

bution had been completed, all of these nobles had been transferred from their home-commanderies.¹⁾

2. The transfers were carried out according to a plan, as will become apparent from the following table:

Transferred	Chief followers	Distaff relatives	Members of the imperial clan	Total
From centre to periphery	9			9
Within periphery	9			9
From periphery to centre	2	2		4
Within centre	4	1	2	7
Total	24	3	2	29

Table 7. Emperor Kuang-wu's system of transferring marquises.

It is evident that the vast majority of Kuang-wu's chief followers was either moved out from the centre into the periphery of the area within which marquises were granted, or shifted around within the periphery itself. This explains why so many of the men from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan were transferred distances above the average. They all had joined Kuang-wu earlier than his other close assistants, and were entitled to handsome rewards. Initially, many of them had been favoured with marquises in the central area, often in their own commanderies. When the transfers had been concluded, the majority of the men from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan had been removed from their centrally situated fiefs and sent to the periphery. This automatically meant great distances. The glaring exception to this policy was the treatment of the relatives of the emperor. None of them went into the periphery. They were either shifted to the centre or moved within it.

With this, I think, the problem of Kuang-wu's transfer of marquises has been solved. The emperor had at first a tendency to enfeoff his chief assistants in their home-commanderies or even with their home-prefectures. Where this was not the case, he preferred to give his followers from Nan-yang and Ying-ch'uan marquises within the centre. Later, Kuang-wu must have had a change of mind and concluded that the original distribution of fiefs could be the source of future embarrassment. Through the victory of his party, all his chief assistants automatically rose to become leading members of the society. It was predictable that they would gain a great following in their home-commanderies, which might lead to local and national troubles. While the civil war continued, and the chief assistants of the emperor were kept busy through military campaigns and other service, the danger was not yet acute. Once the war was over, the problem had to be faced. Kuang-wu obviously decided to let no chief adherents remain in fiefs within their home-commanderies. In addition, he singled out most of his closest followers from Nan-yang

¹⁾ One noble (Liu Mao) was however transferred to his home-commandery, Nan-yang. It is significant that he belonged to the imperial clan.

and Ying-ch'uan and transferred them to the fringe of the area set aside for marquisates. This removed the fiefs from the territories where the temptation to mischief was the greatest. Since the emperor owed these men his gratitude, he made the transfers more palatable by granting bigger fiefs. Kuang-wu's relatives were the main exception to this policy. Their marquisates were concentrated in certain central areas, especially the Ju-nan commandery, and this could not have happened without the ruler's knowledge and permission. In the weakness shown towards his relatives, Kuang-wu continued the practices prevailing during the later half of Former Han. This led to tensions during his reign.

It is of some interest to consider, lastly, the geographical distribution of the prefectural fiefs.¹⁾ Map 8 shows the prefecture marquisates of Emperor Kao.²⁾ They are spread mainly over the Great Plain and the Shan-tung peninsula. The fiefs south of the Huai River are relatively few, with the two southernmost marquisates in Hu-nan and Kiang-si. Two fiefs were located in Sī-ch'uan, two in Shen-si, and no less than eight in Shan-si.

Map 9 for A.D. 2 gives evidence of some changes.³⁾ The marquisates are even more than before concentrated to the Great Plain and the Shan-tung peninsula. Only one fief was located in Shan-si, and none in Shen-si and Sī-ch'uan. In Hu-nan, the number of marquisates has grown to four.

The prefectural marquisates, mentioned to have existed under Kuang-wu,⁴⁾ are only part of the real, unknown total. Map 10 has therefore to be interpreted with caution. The fiefs are again spread over a somewhat wider area. Five are located in Shan-si, two in Shen-si, and one in Kan-su. A noticeable decrease on the southern part of the Great Plain may be due to the change in the course of the Yellow River. The population had shrunk, which would have discouraged the assignment of marquisates to the area. A marked increase has taken place in the Ju-nan commandery, north of the Huai River's upper course, where Kuang-wu by preference enfeoffed his relatives.

One additional map can be drawn, based on the administrative survey for A.D. 140 in HHS (chī 19-23).⁵⁾ The most important change in map 11 is the growth of fiefs in central and southern China. Under Emperor Kao, only 17% of all prefectural marquisates had been situated there. The corresponding figure for A.D. 2 is still 17%, so that the proportion had remained unchanged. In A.D. 140, no less than 43% of all prefectural marquisates were located in central and southern China.

¹⁾ Only the sites of prefectural marquisates can be identified, since the administrative surveys rarely have information for districts and communes.

²⁾ The information is extracted from the Tables, guided by Wang Sien-k'ien's notes to HS. I arrive at a total of 103 prefectural marquisates. In 5 cases, the emplacement is unknown.

³⁾ The number of prefectural marquisates was 216 (cf. supra p. 41). In 55 cases, the exact emplacement is unknown. While these marquisates cannot be shown on the map, their general locations were without exception on the Great Plain and the Shan-tung peninsula.

⁴⁾ They were 102 fiefs, of which 2 cannot be identified. One prefecture functioned as a marquisate twice. The localities shown are therefore 99.

⁵⁾ The number of prefectural marquisates was 109, 2 of which cannot be identified.

This dramatic increase must be directly due to the great migration southwards, enabling the government to spread the marquisates more evenly over a wider area.

While honorific, literary titles had rarely been granted in Former Han times, Wang Mang showed a special liking for them,¹⁾ and thereby set a new fashion. HHS claims that Emperor Kuang-wu did away with all of Wang Mang's innovations and again observed the precedents of Former Han, but, as the Keng-shī Emperor before him, he continued the bestowal of honorific literary titles. The reason was no doubt that during the early stages of the civil war this made it possible to confer titles without having to assign specific fiefs.

The honorific literary titles, granted by the Keng-shī Emperor, have already been discussed.²⁾ He was given one himself, when he surrendered to the Red Eye-brows in A.D. 25.³⁾ HHS records eleven honorific literary titles which the future Emperor Kuang-wu bestowed in A.D. 24, while he was in the process of establishing his territorial base north of the Yellow River.⁴⁾ At least one other pretender adopted the same custom.⁵⁾

After Kuang-wu had ascended the throne, he kept the habit of conferring honorific literary titles. Those which are mentioned in the sources are listed here in chronological sequence:

25: Marquis Who Proclaims Virtue (TKK 10:7a; SHS 2:15a; HHS 22,52:14b).⁶⁾

28: Marquis Who Follows Righteousness (SHS 2:7b).

29: Marquis Who Is Not Righteous (12,42:10a).⁷⁾

Marquis Who Chisels Away the Tibetans (13,43:8a).⁸⁾

31: Marquis Who Turns Towards Righteousness (13,43:10a).

32: Marquis Who Assists Righteousness (23,53:8a).

Marquis Who Aids Righteousness (23,53:8a).

Marquis Who Supports Righteousness (23,53:8a).

Marquis Who Perfects Righteousness (23,53:8a; 34,64:1b).

Marquis in Recompense of Righteousness (23,53:8a).

33: Marquis Who Proclaims Kindness (10A:6b; 32,62:11a).

36: Marquis Who Chisels Away the Hu (12,42:11b).

Marquis Who Perfects Righteousness (86,116:14a).⁹⁾

37: Marquis Who Is Enlightened and Affectionate (16,46:6a).

Unknown when:

Marquis in Recompense of Affection (18,48:8a).

Marquis Who Displays Firmness (21,51:10b).

These sixteen cases can only be a fraction of all titles bestowed by Emperor Kuang-wu. The real number is unknown, since HHS nowhere gives a consistent

¹⁾ See 99. Dubs, III, pp. 104–105. ²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 21, 24, 41.

³⁾ See vol. II, p. 100. ⁴⁾ See vol. II, pp. 73, 76 note 1.

⁵⁾ Liu Yung. See vol. II, p. 59.

⁶⁾ This title was given to Cho Mao. HHS 25,55:2b differs from the other sources and says that he became Marquis in Recompense of Virtue.

⁷⁾ See vol. II, p. 131. ⁸⁾ See vol. II, p. 166. ⁹⁾ In A.D. 36 or 37.

account. It does not say what the position of these particular nobles was in relation to the Full Marquises, nor which privileges were connected with the titles. Limited though the material is, some conclusions are possible.

It is, for the first, evident that Kuang-wu continued to confer honorific literary titles beyond the period when this was especially desirable for political reasons. The entire Great Plain had come in his possession by A.D. 30, an area wide enough for the bestowal of fiefs. Nor did he make use of the possibility to change the status of these nobles later by granting them regular fiefs. This was done in only two of the sixteen cases.¹⁾

Secondly, the nobles seem to have received stipends. When Cho Mao in A.D. 25 became Marquis Who Proclaims Virtue, he was given an income from 2000 households (25,55:2b).²⁾ While this is the only recorded incident for the time of Emperor Kuang-wu, it must be assumed that such incomes were routine. If that is true, it would also explain why the same title could be used anew. Liang T'ung had in A.D. 32 become Marquis Who Perfects Righteousness. In 36, he was given a regular fief. During the same or following year, Wen Ts'i was made Marquis Who Perfects Righteousness. This is obviously an instance where a title with its attached stipend fell vacant and then was granted to another man.

Thirdly, the honorific literary titles could be inherited. In 33, Kuang-wu conferred the posthumous title of Grieved Marquis Who Proclaims Kindness on the father of the Honourable Lady née Yin. He ordered that Yin Tsiu, a younger brother of the Honourable Lady, should inherit the title and become Marquis Who Proclaims Kindness (10A:6b). More typical is the case of Cho Mao, who, as we have seen, became Marquis Who Proclaims Virtue in 25. When he died in 28, his son Ch'ung inherited the title (25,55:2b). This does not necessarily mean that every honorific literary title was automatically inherited, a question which must remain open.

The Full Marquises were the 20th rank in the hierarchy of nobles during Han times. Nothing is known about the relative position of marquises with honorific noble titles. The 19th rank consisted of the Marquises Within the Passes.

In theory, the Marquises Within the Passes received no specific fiefs and therefore could not reside in them. They drew their income from a certain number of households, living themselves in the capital (chī 28:13b). It has been shown that this rule was not strictly observed, and that many Marquises Within the Passes were given fiefs.³⁾ Neither HS nor HHS have any Tables for these nobles, so that it is impossible to compute their numbers. It is not even certain whether the Marquises Within the Passes were able to hand down their titles. Some cases of inheritance are recorded, but these may not be typical.

The absence of detailed information for the Marquises Within the Passes is

¹⁾ Yin Tsiu (32,62:11a), Liang T'ung (34,64:1b).

²⁾ While 2000 households did not provide a lavish income, the Tables of HS list many prefectural marquisates whose households numbered less.

³⁾ The present state of research has been summed up by 134. Loewe, pp. 152-154.

equally characteristic for the time of Emperor Kuang-wu. The texts record only nineteen cases in which the title was granted. Judging from a notice in Fu Wu-ki's *Ku kin chu* (2:4b), Kuang-wu attempted to standardize the stipends of these nobles. Otherwise, the sources are silent.

3. *The low nobility*

Below the Marquises Within the Passes came another eighteen noble ranks. These were in falling sequence:

18. Great Prefect of the Multitude (ta shu chang).
17. Prefect of the Multitude With Chariot Drawn by Four Horses (sī kŭ shu chang).
16. Greatly Superior Accomplished (ta shang tsao).
15. Somewhat Superior Accomplished (shao shang tsao).
14. Senior Chieftain of Conscripts (yu keng).
13. Ordinary Chieftain of Conscripts (chung keng).
12. Junior Chieftain of Conscripts (tso keng).
11. Senior Prefect of the Multitude (yu shu chang).
10. Junior Prefect of the Multitude (tso shu chang).
9. Fifth Rank Grandee (wu ta fu).
8. Official Chariot (kung sheng).
7. Official Grandee (kung ta fu).
6. Government Grandee (kuan ta fu).
5. Grandee (ta fu).
4. No Conscription (pu keng).
3. Horse With a Silken Harness (tsan niao).
2. Superior Accomplished (shang tsao).
1. Official Gentleman (kung shī).

These ranks were conferred by the government as a special act of benevolence. The lower ones were particularly often bestowed on heads of households or their heirs. In Former Han, the general practice had been to grant one step at a time, whereas during Later Han usually two or more steps were conferred. Intermittently, the government resorted to the sale of ranks, and these could also be sold by their holders. The steps were cumulative up to a point, but where the barrier went is not fully clear. The general public and the lower officials do not normally seem to have risen beyond the 8th rank. There may have been further barriers, and it is improbable that the 19th rank of Marquis Within the Passes could be reached by accumulation. While privileges were attached to the ranks, their exact nature is not known in every case. The ranks could probably not be inherited. Grants of land do not seem to have been a regular feature. The ranks were usually bestowed on special occasions, and sometimes combined with amnesties and gifts. The most important occasions were the majority or enthronement of an emperor, the installation or majority of an heir-apparent, the installation of an empress, religious ceremonies, and portents.¹⁾

¹⁾ This paragraph has been based on the admirable article by 134. Loewe, to which I refer for all details.

The frequency of the bestowals can be represented in the form of a histogram.¹⁾ It shows that the Former Han bestowals occurred somewhat more often²⁾ than in Later Han,³⁾ and that they increased in the second half of the dynasty. During Later Han, the bestowals were concentrated in about one century between. A.D. 53 and 147. Kuang-wu was slow in reviving the tradition, whereas the sharp drop at the end of the dynasty may be due to increased sale of ranks.

There is no evidence that ranks were sold in the time of Emperor Kuang-wu. He bestowed ranks at four occasions:

In the latter half of March, A.D. 27, he granted on step of rank to all eldest sons who would succeed their fathers as heads of households (1A:22a).

After a long interval, Kuang-wu resumed the bestowal of ranks on Mar. 12, 53, followed by new grants in the 5th month (June 25–July 23) of 54, and on July 8, 55 (1B:20a, 20b). On each of these three occasions, two steps of rank were conferred on heads of households. The emperor also ordered that widowers, widows, orphans, childless people, the seriously ill, and the poor should be given grain. In A.D. 53 and 54, each person was to receive 5 *hu* (2.8 U.S. bushels; 99.8 l.). In 55, the amount was 6 *hu* (3.4 U.S. bushels; 119.8 l.).

The first of the bestowals of rank was in celebration of the Red Eyebrows' surrender on Mar. 15, A.D. 27. Each of the last three bestowals was preceded by a portent, an eclipse of the sun on Mar. 9, A.D. 53, and floods in 54 and 55.

4. *The common people*

The Full Marquises and Marquises Within the Passes comprised an infinitesimal part of the population.⁴⁾ Much greater numbers were recipients of the lower noble ranks. Since steps of rank were frequently conferred on heads of households and their heirs, few, at least of the educated families, would seem to have been without their lesser nobles.

The Chinese nobility was not a closed society, whose members acted in concert to defend its privileges. It was open and dependent on the government. Newcomers were continuously elevated to it through merit or connections, while old nobles were demoted for one reason or another. In discussing Han society as a whole, it is therefore more useful to speak of the gentry or educated class on the one hand, and of the common people on the other. The great gentry families had national influence, and were heavily represented among the nobles. The small gentry families were locally important and merged on the lower levels with the rich peasantry.

¹⁾ Graph 2. For the bestowals during Former Han, I follow 134. Loewe, pp. 165–168. My Later Han materials tally with those of Loewe, *ibidem* pp. 168–171, except that I have two additional cases: A.D. 72, 4th month (2:15a), 124, 2nd month (5:18a).

For technical reasons, the histogram begins with 200 B.C. An earlier bestowal of rank took place in the 5th month of 202. A still earlier one in the 2nd month of 205 precedes the formal establishment of the Han dynasty.

²⁾ 46 cases, to which the omitted one of 202 B.C. must be added as the 47th.

³⁾ 34 cases.

⁴⁾ In A.D. 2, the Full Marquises were 0.0005% of the total.

The merchants were discriminated against, but did not form a clearly defined group. They overlapped with the gentry, which freely and without disgrace engaged in commerce. Neither did the military comprise a conspicuous and separate category. Professional soldiers were relatively few, whereas conscripts returned to civilian occupations at the end of their service. The two main segments of the population were the educated and uneducated, the literate gentry from which the officials were drawn, and the illiterate peasantry. The division between the two was functionally important but not hard and fast. All social boundaries in Han China were elastic and could be crossed. Society was mobile.

We are relatively well informed about the gentry. Since the ancient historian saw the actions of men as the main force in history, and attempted to reconstruct these actions from the archival materials available to him, his scope was necessarily confined. He could only write about those whose positive or negative roles had been important enough to produce documents, by them or concerning them. This means in practice that the historian heavily concentrated on educated men, the emperors and their families, the officials, the scholars, the poets, the virtuous, and the eccentrics, i.e. the political, intellectual, and occasionally moral élite. No bias was involved, and no class history intended. The historian could not write about those who, from his point of view, had made no history. He did pay attention to peasant leaders and their followers if these became important enough to prompt an output of governmental documents, even though they left no written materials themselves. But the daily life of a peasant, his methods of agriculture, his crops, domestic animals, and tools, his budget, festivals and beliefs are not described, since that was not history as then defined.

The educated class of Han China needs no special account here. All volumes of this work are in one way or another concerned with its role. The little which is known about the peasantry, e.g. taxes and relief, or can be reconstructed, e.g. migrations, is also discussed elsewhere in the appropriate chapters. In the present context, only those government measures will be described, by which Emperor Kuang-wu tried to reverse abuses of the civil war years and to restore normalcy for the common people.

On June 25, A.D. 26, an edict ordered that if among the people there were wives married against their will, and children who had been sold, they could return home at will. Those who dared to restrain them, should be sentenced according to the Statute (1A:20a).¹⁾

In A.D. 30, another edict directed that if officials and people during Wang Mang's time had been seized unlawfully and become slaves, they should be freed (1B:2b).²⁾

¹⁾ Translated by 109. Wilbur, p. 466, no. 134. The Statute would seem to be the one on Robbery, which included kidnapping and the peaceable buying and selling of people. See 105. Hulswé, p. 32.

²⁾ Translated by 109. Wilbur, p. 466, no. 135. The edict is dated in the 11th month on the day *ting-mao*. The 11th month lasted from Dec. 14, A.D. 30 to Jan. 12, 31, but it had no day with the cyclical characters in question. Wilbur dates the edict Jan. 14, A.D. 31, which means that he must have amended the 11th month to the 12th month. But one could equally well amend it to the 11th month (in which case the date would be Nov. 15, A.D. 30), or assume that the month is correct and that the cyclical characters are wrong.

These two edicts were addressed to all of China, but in practice limited to the area under Kuang-wu's control. Four further edicts concerned themselves with territories which had been or were in the process of being conquered. After the Shan-tung peninsula and northern Kiang-su had finally been pacified in A.D. 29 and 30, an edict ordered on June 30, A.D. 31, that officials and people who had been kidnapped by the bandits of Ts'ing and Sü provinces and had become slaves and lesser wives, should be permitted to return home at will. Those who dared to restrain them, should be tried according to the Law of Selling People (1B:4b).¹⁾

In A.D. 36, while the great offensive against Kung-sun Shu was in progress, an edict was issued on Apr. 23. It was directed towards Kung-sun Shu's stronghold in Sī-ch'uan, but also to Wei Ao's former domain in eastern Kan-su which had been pacified in A.D. 34. People who had been kidnapped and had become slaves should be set free, even if the litigations were still in progress²⁾ (1B:8a).

This was followed by a further edict on Jan. 24, A.D. 38, which was addressed to Yi province exclusively, i.e. Sī-ch'uan and Yün-nan. All persons who since A.D. 32 had been kidnapped and had become slaves and lesser wives were set free. People who dared to stop those who wished to leave, should be tried in accordance with the Law of Kidnapping People (1B:10b).³⁾

A last edict in this vein, dated in the 12th month of the Chinese year 38⁴⁾, ordered that slaves in the Yi and Liang provinces, i.e. Yün-nan, Sī-ch'uan, and Kan-su, who had plead their cases since A.D. 32, should all be freed. The purchase prices should be forfeited (1B:11a).

These six cases of manumission, three of which also particularly included women who had been forced into concubinage, bespeak a sincere desire to improve the lot of the common people. Kuang-wu may have been inspired by Emperor Kao's order of 202 B.C., freeing those who had sold themselves as slaves because of famine (HS 1B:4b).⁵⁾ How effective the edicts were cannot be established.⁶⁾ It is not a sign of efficiency that the orders concerning Kan-su and Sī-ch'uan had to be repeated once and twice respectively. In frequency and scope, Kuang-wu's six edicts are unparalleled in Han times. But he is ill-served by Lü Sī-mien's singularly unhappy comparison,⁷⁾ acclaiming him as China's Lincoln.

¹⁾ Translated by 109. Wilbur, p. 467, no. 136. The Law of Selling People must be the same Statute referred to above. Cf. *supra* p. 55, note 1.

²⁾ The last part of the edict can only have applied to Kan-su, since Kung-sun Shu was not yet defeated.

³⁾ This law is again the Statute referred to above. 109. Wilbur, p. 467, note 3, refers to this edict and dates it Nov. 25, A.D. 37. The date given in HHS is the 12th month of the Chinese year 37, on the day *kia-yin*, which corresponds to Jan. 24, A.D. 38. Wilbur must have misread the 12th month as the 10th month.

⁴⁾ This would correspond to Jan. 14–Febr. 12, A.D. 39. However, HHS gives the day as *kuei-mao*, which cyclical combination did not occur in that month.

⁵⁾ 72. Dubs, I, p. 104. Also translated by 109. Wilbur, p. 268, no. 9.

⁶⁾ 109. Wilbur, p. 138, is pessimistic.

⁷⁾ 40 Lü, II, p. 514.

CHAPTER III. THE BARBARIANS

1. *The South*¹⁾

Former Han

The Chinese were not the only inhabitants of China. Through territorial expansion, they had subjugated or engulfed various tribes, whom, on linguistic or cultural grounds, they considered as non-Chinese, i.e. barbarian. Chinese farmers appropriated for themselves the fertile lands of the major river valleys, and the aborigines were forced to withdraw into the valleys of the lesser tributaries and into the mountains. This created ferment which, depending on the belligerence or desperation of the barbarians, could break out into uprisings.

The southernmost part of China was incorporated into the empire relatively late. It was only during 214 B.C., that Ts'in Shih-huang's efforts led to the establishment of three new commanderies in that region. Their exact sizes are not known. Kuei-lin seems to have comprised parts of present northern Kuang-tung and eastern Kuang-si, Nan-hai central Kuang-tung along the coast, and Siang southern Kuang-si and probably the Red River delta in Indo-China (SK 6:21a; 113:1a). It is also stated that Ts'in Shih-huang demoted the Yüe (or Min-yüe) rulers in present Fu-kien, and from their domain created the Min-chung commandery (SK 114:1a; HS 95:15b). That commandery existed in name only. Local chiefs may loosely have acknowledged the emperor, but no Chinese administration was imposed, and no colonists entered the territory.

The Ts'in conquests in the south did not survive the fall of the dynasty. A Chinese adventurer, Chao T'o, profited from the confusion during the civil war and founded the kingdom of Nan-yüe. It comprised the major part of present Kuang-tung, the eastern and southern parts of Kuang-si, and the northern coast of Indo-China. The capital was P'an-yü, situated at present Canton. Emperor Kao recognized this state in 196 B.C. (SK 113:1a-2b; HS 1B:9a; 95:7b-8b).²⁾ While the fiction was maintained that Nan-yüe was a vassal kingdom of China, it was in practice an independent state with a mixed Chinese and aboriginal population.

Northeast of Nan-yüe, the Min-yüe state, which also came to be known as Tung-yüe, continued to exist. It was in 202 B.C. recognized by Emperor Kao (SK 114:1b; HS 1B:4a-4b; 95:15b). The aborigines had their own rulers, who claimed descent from the famous king Kou-tsien of Yüe (reigned 496-465). Still another

¹⁾ Here understood to comprise all land south of a line drawn through the Ts'in-ling and Huai Ranges to the Yang-tsai delta.

²⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 239-240; 72. Dubs, I, pp. 133-134.

Yüe kingdom, known as Tung-hai or Tung-ou, was situated in southern Che-kiang. The Han dynasty recognized it in 192 B.C. (SK 114:1b; HS 2:4b; 95:15b-16a).¹⁾ The southeastern Chinese possessions at the beginning of Former Han were consequently restricted to the areas of Hu-nan and Kiang-si.

The relations between China and the three independent states along the south-east coast were not without strain but posed no serious problems. In about 181 B.C., the King of Nan-yüe, Chao T'o, assumed the title of emperor and during that year invaded the Ch'ang-sha kingdom in Hu-nan. He withdrew the troops after one year, and was even persuaded to relinquish his new title, although he may have continued to use it locally (SK 113:2a-2b; HS 3:5a; 95:8b-11b).²⁾

During the rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms in 154 B.C., Nan-yüe and Min-yüe remained neutral, whereas Tung-ou sided with the rebels. After the uprising had been squashed, Tung-ou switched sides and had the King of Wu, leader of the rebels, murdered. The son of the late King of Wu escaped to Min-yüe, where, in revenge, he engineered an attack on Tung-ou in 138 B.C. The Chinese came to the assistance of Tung-ou, whereupon the troops of Min-yüe withdrew (SK 114:1b-2b; HS 6:3b; 95:16a).³⁾ Supposedly on their own request, the people of Tung-ou were evacuated, and 40,000 were settled in Lu-kiang commandery between the Yang-tsü and Huai Rivers in An-hui (SK 22:14b; 114:2b; HS 95:16a).⁴⁾ While this cannot have been its entire aboriginal population, and such evacuation which took place can hardly have been voluntary, the kingdom of Tung-ou ceased to exist. Only Min-yüe and Nan-yüe were left as independent states.

During 135 B.C., a war broke out between the two, in which China came to the assistance of Nan-yüe. Before the Chinese troops had closed in on Min-yüe, its king was murdered by his brother who then, as usual, surrendered in name though not in practice (SK 113:3b-4a; 114:2b-3a; HS 6:4a; 95:11b, 16a-16b).⁵⁾

In 113 B.C., a great-great-grandson of Chao T'o became King of Nan-yüe. His mother was Chinese. By a neat arrangement, the Chinese government sent a former lover of the Queen Dowager as envoy to the court. Aided by this man, she intrigued for a pro-Chinese policy and gained considerable influence over her son. The Chancellor of Nan-yüe, Lü Kia, head of the anti-Chinese party, was reluctant to make a move. When his hand was forced through the machinations of the Queen Dowager and the approach of a small Chinese force, he had the king, his mother, and the Han envoy murdered. The Chinese force was wiped out. A half-brother of the former king, whose mother was a Yüe woman, was put on the throne. This took place in the summer of 112 B.C. In the fall, Emperor Wu launched several armies against Nan-yüe, which in 111 B.C. led to the final collapse of the state. It was

¹⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, p. 251; 72. Dubs, I, pp. 103, 181.

²⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 240-242; 72. Dubs, I, p. 200.

³⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 252-253; 72. Dubs, II, p. 32.

⁴⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, p. 253.

⁵⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 242-243; 253-254; 72. Dubs, II, p. 34.

incorporated into the empire and divided into commanderies (SK 113:4b-8b; HS 6:21a-21b; 95:12a-15b).¹⁾

Tung-yüe (Min-yüe) had during the recent war tried to stay on good terms with both sides, a fact which had not been lost on the Chinese commanders. Although Emperor Wu decided against a new campaign at this stage, the King of Tung-yüe believed that an attack was imminent. To forestall it, he invaded Kiang-si in the autumn of 111 B.C. The Chinese counterattacked vigorously, and, before the end of the winter, the kingdom of Tung-yüe fell apart. Emperor Wu ordered a transfer of its people to the area between the Yang-tsi and Huai Rivers, i.e. probably the very same Lu-kiang commandery to which inhabitants of Tung-ou had previously been moved (SK 114:3a-5a; HS 6:23a-24a; 95:16b-18a).²⁾ The texts claim that Tung-yüe was emptied of people, which, of course, is quite impossible. Since Emperor Wu did not divide Fu-kien into commanderies, he obviously did not gain full control over it. What happened is that Tung-yüe ceased to exist as an aboriginal state. Its sinification had to await the slow and peaceful immigration of Chinese colonists, which began much later, at the end of the 2nd century A.D.³⁾

With these events, the energy of the barbarians in southeast China was temporarily spent, and no clashes occurred for the remainder of Former Han.

In the southwest, the Ts'in dynasty had made no serious inroads, and the border remained unchanged in Han times until Emperor Wu. The commanderies of Shu, Kuang-han, and Pa formed the frontier in Sī-ch'uan. Southern Sī-ch'uan, Kuei-chou, and Yün-nan were aboriginal territories under local chiefs.

Emperor Wu became interested in the area, when he was informed of trade contacts between Shu and the then still independent state of Nan-yüe. If merchants could penetrate, soldiers could as well, and the state of Nan-yüe would be out-flanked. These considerations led in 135 B.C. to the establishment of Kien-wei commandery, situated directly southeast of Shu. Starting at the point where the Min River enters the Yang-tsi, soldiers began to build a road through Kuei-chou in order to reach the river system which drains towards P'an-yü at present Canton. Simultaneously, the Shu commandery was enlarged westwards by extending Chinese control over the barbarians.

The road work did not progress well, the barbarians made trouble, and Emperor Wu had second thoughts. He ordered an inspection in 129 B.C., and then in the fall of 126 abandoned the recently gained territories. As HS (6:11b) grandiloquently puts it: "the southwestern barbarians were dismissed".⁴⁾ Kien-wei was left to its own devices, and only two prefectures were maintained as a foothold in Kuei-chou (SK 116:4a; HS 95:3b).⁵⁾

In 122 B.C., Chang K'ien returned from his mission to Central Asia and captivity among the Hiung-nu. His report made the famous, though over-optimistic, state-

¹⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 244-250; 72. Dubs, II, pp. 79-80.

²⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 254-256; 72. Dubs, II, pp. 82-85.

³⁾ See 122. Bielenstein.

⁴⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 53.

⁵⁾ See 147. Watson, II, p. 293.

ment that trade contacts existed between Shu and Bactria. This contributed to a renewed interest in the southwest, and particularly to an exploration of possible trade routes to what now is Burma.

During the year of 112 B.C., when the Chinese attacked Nan-yüe, they also invaded the southwest. In 111, Kuei-chou and the southwestern part of Si-ch'uan were formally incorporated into the empire. The western section of Yün-nan fell in 109 B.C. and became the Yi-chou commandery. The King of Tien in Yün-nan and the King of Ye-lang in Kuei-chou were recognized by the emperor as chiefs and given the seals of kings (SK 116; HS 6:23a; 95:1a-5a).¹⁾ This is important. The tribal organization was not destroyed as in other conquered regions but permitted to continue. It may well be that the Chinese simply were not strong enough to impose their administration without compromise.

During the remaining period of Former Han, the aborigines in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou proved the least docile of all barbarians in South China. In the spring of 105 B.C., the K'un-ming tribe rose in a rebellion which seems to have been curbed quickly (HS 6:31a).²⁾ The Chinese were less successful in 86 B.C. The barbarians of Yün-nan revolted during the summer, the troubles spilled over into the Tsang-ko commandery of Kuei-chou, and in the end 24 towns were involved. While HS claims that the barbarians were routed, their defeat cannot have been decisive. Probably the rebellion continued to smoulder, since in 84 B.C. Yi-chou was in flames again. The Grand Administrator was killed, and a Chinese army defeated. Only in 82 B.C. did the Chinese recapture the commandery (HS 7:2a-2b, 4a, 4b-5a; 95:5a-5b).³⁾ New troubles broke out in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou during 27 B.C. (HS 26:57b; 95:5b-7a).⁴⁾

Wang Mang

Wang Mang's reign (A.D. 9-23) proved no exception to what had become a trend during Former Han. The major part of the south was peaceful, and only the aborigines in the southwest maintained their belligerence.

In A.D. 12, the barbarians of Tsang-ko commandery killed the Chinese Grand Administrator (HS 95:7a; 99B:20a).⁵⁾ This was in A.D. 14 followed by an uprising in Yi-chou commandery, where the Chinese administrator also perished. A Chinese counterattack was inconclusive. No mention is made of any events during A.D. 15. One year later (A.D. 16), the commanding General of a Peaceful Beginning, Lien Tan, was recalled (HS 95:7a; 99B:26a, 30a).⁶⁾

The HS does not say whether Wang Mang subdued the unrest, and therefore implies that he did not. For instance, an entry for A.D. 19 states that when Lien

¹⁾ See also 147. Watson, II, pp. 290-296; 72. Dubs, II, p. 82.

²⁾ See 72. Dubs, II, pp. 97-98.

³⁾ See 72. Dubs, II, pp. 154-155, 158, 160.

⁴⁾ HS 95 gives as date the ho-p'ing period (28-25 B.C.). HS 26, the Treatise on Astrology, is more explicit and lists the event under the 11th month of 27 B.C.

⁵⁾ See 99. Dubs, III, p. 325.

⁶⁾ See 99. Dubs, III, pp. 348-349, 364.

Tan had attacked the rebels in Yi-chou, "he had not been able to vanquish them" (HS 99C:4b).¹⁾ Another entry in the section on the Southwestern Barbarians claims that the uprising actually spread: "A barbarian of Yüehi, Jen Kuei, in turn killed the Grand Administrator, Mei Ken, and set himself up as King of K'ungku. After a while, [Wang] Mang was defeated, and Han rose, executed [Jen] Kuei, and restored the old appellations" (HS 95:7a-7b). Wang Mang is even blamed for the uprising in the first place, the supposed impetus being that he had attempted to demote a barbarian king to marquis (HS 99B:20a).²⁾

To regain a proper perspective, we should compare the accounts in HS with the statements of HHS. In HS, Wang Mang can do no right. The work was compiled in the early part of Later Han, when the official propaganda against the "usurper" was still virulent. The HHS, on the other hand, received its final form some 400 years after the death of Wang Mang, and its main source, the T'KK, was itself written in five instalments over a period of some 150 years. The need constantly to castigate Wang Mang was receding, and the historians of the later parts, as well as Fan Ye himself, had less cause to be on their guard.

The section on the Southwestern Barbarians in HHS records that after Lien Tan had failed to suppress the unrest by force, a certain Wen Ts'i was appointed Grand Administrator of Yi-chou commandery. He built dikes and artificial ponds, improved the irrigation system, reclaimed 2000 *k'ing* (22,800 acres; 92,200 ha.) of land, drilled troops, and repaired the frontier barriers. The barbarians surrendered, and he obtained their affection (86,116:14a). Wen Ts'i survived Wang Mang by about 13 years, and, refusing to join Kung-sun Shu, remained semi-independent in Yünnan. It is not clear, therefore, how soon his particular policies brought about a temporary pacification. So much is certain, that Wang Mang had selected and appointed Wen Ts'i, and his is the credit of having chosen the right man for the task.

Furthermore, while HHS dwells on some troubles in Yüehi commandery, it makes it perfectly clear that the barbarian Jen Kuei took possession of Yüehi and proclaimed himself King of K'ungku not while Wang Mang was alive but in A.D. 24, the year after his death (86,116:19a).

All indications are that the uprising in the southwest under Wang Mang was simply one of the many which plagued China for centuries in that area. There is no reason to single out this particular rebellion and blame it on Wang Mang, while the earlier and later troubles are blamed on no one. It is also clear that at the time of Wang Mang's death peace either had been, or was about to be, restored. Wang Mang was not unsuccessful in his policy towards the barbarians in South China. Any other impression is due to intentional distortion of facts by HS.

Kuang-wu and Later Han

At the time when Kuang-wu came on the throne, the Chinese lived intermingled with barbarians everywhere in southern China. In Sī-ch'uan, the lower Yang-tsi

¹⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 381.

²⁾ The view that Wang Mang was personally responsible for the loss of the southwest has had much credence also among recent Western historians, e.g. 99. Dubs, III, p. 121; 135. Loewe, p. 7.

valley, Hu-nan, and Kiang-si, co-existence had been peaceful during the entire Former Han dynasty and under Wang Mang. The Yüe, inhabiting a broad belt along the southeast coast from Che-kiang to Indo-China, had all been docile since 111 B.C. Only the aborigines in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou had been a persistent problem. The change for the worse in Later Han times throughout all of southern China was to be dramatic.

When Kuang-wu's troops in A.D. 29 had reached the gorges of the Yang-tsī, the last phase of northeast China's conquest was nearly completed. The only remaining major enemies were Wei Ao and Lu Fang in the northwest, and Kung-sun Shu in Si-ch'uan. In China south of the Yang-tsī, the K'uai-ki and Tan-yang commanderies, i.e. southern Kiang-su, Che-kiang, and southern An-hui, came into Kuang-wu's possession not later than A.D. 26 and 30 respectively.¹⁾ Most other territories south of the Yang-tsī joined him *en bloc* in A.D. 29. They had been isolated from the north ever since the fall of Wang Mang, and the Chinese administrators had, in practice, been independent. With A.D. 29, the situation changed, and Kuang-wu brought political pressure on the south, backed up by a show of arms. This resulted in the voluntary surrender of all commanderies in present Hu-nan, Kuang-tung, Kuang-si, and Indo-China. While the commandery of Yü-chang in Kiang-si is not mentioned in this connection, it must have submitted also. Kuang-wu appointed a new Grand Administrator there in A.D. 31. This only left the Tsang-ko commandery in Kuei-chou and Yi-chou commandery in Yün-nan. The administrator of Yi-chou, Wen Ts'i,²⁾ and aboriginal chiefs in Tsang-ko had established some liaison with Kuang-wu. But as long as Kung-sun Shu's state formed an efficient barrier, these areas could not be reincorporated into the empire.³⁾ With Kung-sun Shu's death on the night of Dec. 24, A.D. 36, the barrier fell. Wen Ts'i was summoned to the court, that is deprived of his base of power, in exchange for which he was made a General Who Maintains in Peace What Is Distant. This was clearly not a real, military rank but a political appointment.⁴⁾ Wen Ts'i was also ennobled as Marquis Who Perfects Righteousness.⁵⁾ He died *en route* before reaching the capital (86,116:14a). Kuang-wu had paid the same price when the other southern administrators had surrendered in A.D. 29. Everyone of them had been enfeoffed as marquises (17,47:14b). But, having been bought off, all were soon replaced, and drop out of sight. None is again mentioned in HHS.

¹⁾ See vol. II, p. 137, note 2; p. 157, note 3.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 61.

³⁾ See vol. II, pp. 109, 157-158. It is interesting that from this time onwards, Tsang-ko disappears from the sources. Apart from its routine mention in the treatise on administrative geography (chi 23:16b ff.,) the only other reference to it is in 86,116:13b, according to which a certain Yin Chen from Tsang-ko went away to study the classics, returned to teach them at home, and in his official career reached the rank of Inspector of King province. Otherwise, there is total silence. No names of officials serving in Tsang-ko are recorded. No events are mentioned. Kuei-chou was not easily accessible. It was by-passed by the two major migration routes, so that the aborigines must have greatly outnumbered the Chinese. The Later Han government therefore probably decided largely to ignore the region.

⁴⁾ See vol. II, pp. 202-203.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 52.

In one case, Kuang-wu was forced temporarily to agree to a higher title than marquis. The aborigine Jen Kuei, who in A.D. 24 had taken possession of Yüe-hi commandery and proclaimed himself King of K'iung-ku, was in A.D. 35 ready to change sides. Having first supported Kung-sun Shu, he went over to Kuang-wu. This was at a time when the campaign against Kung-sun Shu had not yet been completed. Jen Kuei's allegiance was politically valuable, and Kuang-wu rewarded this by recognizing him as King of K'iung-ku (17,47:17a; 86,116:19a).¹⁾ For the three following years, Jen Kuei seems to have ignored the central government, but in A.D. 38, bowing to the inevitable, he sent messengers to the court and presented the registers for the last three years. This signified his assimilation into the provincial bureaucracy. Kuang-wu repented by appointing him Grand Administrator of Yüe-hi (1B:15b; 86,116:19a). While in practice Jen Kuei continued to govern his territory as before, the change from a royal to a bureaucratic title implied that he could be transferred or dismissed whenever the emperor felt strong enough and ready to do so.

For the time being, things seemed to go well in South China. But peace did not last long.

a. *The uprising in Indo-China, A.D. 40-43*

In the 2nd month (Mar. 3-31) of A.D. 40, a great rebellion broke out among the barbarians in Indo-China, under the leadership of the Cheng (Tr'ung) sisters. Cheng Ts'e was the daughter of an aboriginal chief in the Red River delta and had married the son of another. The Chinese sources accuse her of having been headstrong. She ran afoul of the Chinese Grand Administrator of Kiao-chi commandery, and rebelled together with her younger sister Cheng Er.²⁾ The barbarians in Kiu-chen and Ji-nan along the coast to the south of Kiao-chi, and in Ho-p'u on the coast of Kuang-tung responded. Cheng Ts'e proclaimed herself queen and chose the Mi-ling prefecture in the Red River delta as her capital. According to HHS (86,116:6a), she conquered 65 *ch'eng*, which normally would mean walled towns. As Maspero points out, there were not that many prefectural cities in all the four commanderies involved.³⁾ Their combined number was no more than 27. The 65 *ch'eng* cannot have been much else than strongholds of aboriginal chiefs. This is also clear from the fact that the Grand Administrators of the commanderies and the Inspector of the province did not perish but were able to protect themselves. They must have holed up in fortified and predominantly Chinese towns.

In preparation for a military expedition, Emperor Kuang-wu ordered that carts and ships should be assembled in the south, and that the roads and bridges should

¹⁾ Cf. vol. II, p. 193 and *supra* p. 26.

²⁾ This uprising has been well described by 138. Maspero, pp. 11-28, so that it is not necessary here to go over every detail again. The place names in Indo-China pose a particular problem, since the exact ancient sites are not known. 137. Madrolle, pp. 283ff., attempts to give very rough emplacements, but they do not suffice to show Ma Yüan's movements on a map. We have to restrict ourselves to a narrative. The sources for the following account are: HHS 1B:12b, 14a-14b, 15a; 22,52:8b; 24,54:8a-10a; 86,116:6a-6b; SKC 37:6a, 7b, 9a.

³⁾ 138. Maspero, p. 13, note 2.

be repaired. This edict is not dated (86,116:6a-6b). It was not until the 4th month (May 9-June 7) of A.D. 42,¹⁾ more than two years after the uprising, that Kuang-wu dispatched his generals. He chose two men who during the preceding year had cooperated in another campaign against a Chinese rebel, and therefore were used to each other. One of them was the influential Ma Yüan, a man of great regional following in the northwest, who had joined Kuang-wu in A.D. 28.²⁾ He was appointed General Who Calms the Waves, a title of magic overtones which had been used once before and was to be used again. In 112 B.C., Emperor Wu had conferred it on Lu Po-te, when he sent him to attack Nan-yüe (HS 6:21b).³⁾ The other man was Tuan Chī⁴⁾ about whom little is known. He was made a General of Towered Warships, i.e. an admiral. A third member of the expedition was a General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Liu Lung, a member of the imperial clan, who had been under a cloud and briefly in prison. Ma Yüan was in command. He was at this time 56 years old (Chinese reckoning).

The three generals did not depart from Lo-yang with an army. Long-distance troop movements were too expensive, time-consuming, and cumbersome. Military practice was, whenever possible, to mobilize soldiers near the theatre where they were needed. This had the added advantage that the soldiers were familiar with local conditions.

Ma Yüan and his colleagues hurried south and raised troops in the Ch'ang-sha, Kuei-yang, Ling-ling, and Ts'ang-wu commanderies. They moved their forces to Ho-p'u on the Kuang-tung coast, where ships and supplies must have been waiting for them. At that moment, Tuan Chī fell ill and died. Routine required that a report be sent to the emperor, who ordered that Tuan Chī's troops should be placed under Ma Yüan's command. Judging from the latter's report in the following year, which has been partially preserved in SKC (37:9a), his forces numbered 20,000 men and 2000 ships of all sizes.⁵⁾ The navy was too small to carry all the troops, apart from which Ma Yüan, in spite of his title, was no sailor. He went by land, and, since he followed the sea, his vessels must have served to carry supplies. Ho-p'u commandery did not in the west adjoin Kiao-chī, so that the army had to make its way through wilderness for at least 125 miles (ca. 200 km).

We do not know when Ma Yüan reached the Red River delta. Presumably, it was in early 43. He may there have suffered a minor military setback, because he withdrew to an area with a higher altitude. In that terrain, Ma Yüan won a battle against the barbarians, whereupon he divided his army and placed one contingent

¹⁾ This is the date given in HHS *pen ki* (1B:14a-14b). 86,116:6b simply says A.D. 42. Ma Yüan's biography (24,54:8b) places the event in A.D. 41. Since HHK 7:12a also records the time as the 4th month of A.D. 42, Ma Yüan's biography must be wrong. 138. Maspero, p. 14, writes January, A.D. 42, which is an error.

²⁾ See vol. II, *passim*, particularly pp. 165-166.

³⁾ See 72. Dubs, II, pp. 79-80.

⁴⁾ HHK 7:12a gives his name as Yin Chī.

⁵⁾ The same figure is given in Ma Yüan's biography (24,54:9a-9b), so that the report must have been the source of the historian.

under Liu Lung's command. In the 4th month (Apr. 28–May 27) of A.D. 43,¹⁾ Liu Lung defeated and captured Cheng Ts'e. Her sister Cheng Er also fell into the hands of the Han troops. Ma Yüan had them both decapitated and sent their heads to Lo-yang.

After a celebration with his army, Ma Yüan marched to Kiu-chen, situated south of the Red River delta, where some barbarians attempted to make a last stand. He was again supported by his navy. According to SKC (37:9a), he entered the commandery in the 10th month (Nov. 21–Dec. 20) of 43. All resistance disintegrated. Some aboriginal chiefs surrendered, others were captured and decapitated. A few found refuge in the jungle. In typical Chinese fashion, unreliable persons were resettled elsewhere. More than 300 individuals were rounded up and sent to Ling-ling commandery (86,116:6b).²⁾

The sources claim that when Ma Yüan had won the war, he became something of a benefactor. He memorialized that the Si-yü prefecture of Kiao-chi commandery was too large, having 32,000 households. It should be divided. The emperor agreed, whereupon, in addition to Si-yü, the Feng-k'i and Wang-hai prefectures were established. Ma Yüan also built city walls, which must have been more for the protection of the Chinese than the benefit of the aboriginals. The irrigation canals he constructed should have had a wider usefulness. In his attitude to local customs, Ma Yüan seems to have been unbending. He memorialized more than 10 cases where the Yüe statutes stood in contradiction to the Han law. In order to discipline the Yüe people, he explained to them the old regulations of the Han dynasty. Thereafter, the aboriginals "upheld and practiced the precedents of General Ma" (24,54:9b).

Ma Yüan's role in Indo-China becomes clearer from the statement in his biography (24,54:10a) that he took away the bronze drums of the Yüe people. These drums traditionally symbolized and safeguarded the positions of the aboriginal chiefs. Their loss meant the end of power.³⁾ Ma Yüan's confiscation of the bronze drums must therefore have been intended to undermine the power of the chiefs. His purpose was to break down tribal customs, so that the territory, which was no more than a colony, could be more easily governed by its Chinese masters. From the sino-centric point of view, his labours are, of course, presented as a great civilizing effort, the achievement of a man who brought culture to the uncultured.

In popular religion, the General Who Calms the Waves became a god, whom later dynasties granted increasingly higher celestial honours. His worship was centred in parts of southern China, particularly Kuang-tung, Kuang-si, and Hu-nan. Lu Po-te of Former Han times and Ma Yüan fused into one person, although it can be seen from the legends that Ma Yüan predominated. The leitmotif in these legends is bronze: bronze drums, bronze boats, bronze arrows, bronze columns, and even a bronze ox.⁴⁾

¹⁾ HHK 7:14a dates this event in the 1st month (Jan. 30–Feb. 27).

²⁾ HHK 7:14b says "more than 100 families". ³⁾ See e.g. 130. Kaltenmark, p. 23.

⁴⁾ For excellent discussions of the legends see 130. Kaltenmark, and 145. Stein (Appendix IV: *Les travaux de Ma Yüan*).

Ma Yüan returned to the capital in the fall of A.D. 44, having reached the pinnacle of his career. By that time, Emperor Kuang-wu had for two years been embroiled in another war with barbarians. The aborigines in Yün-nan had risen once again.

b. *The uprising in Yi-chou commandery, A.D. 42-45*

In A.D. 42, the barbarians of Yi-chou commandery rebelled and killed their Chinese officials.¹⁾ The tribes of seven prefectures were actively involved: those of Tien-ch'ü,²⁾ K'un-tse,³⁾ Kien-ling,⁴⁾ Lien-jan,⁵⁾ Lung-tung,⁶⁾ Ye-yü,⁷⁾ and Ku-fu⁸⁾ (86,116:14a). Since the last-mentioned one was situated north of the Yang-tsü and belonged to Yüeh-hi commandery, the rebellion was not restricted to Yi-chou. The Chinese Grand Administrator of Yi-chou, Fan Sheng, put up a fight but was defeated and withdrew to Shu-shü⁹⁾ (86,116:14b). Shu-shü belonged to Kien-wei commandery. This meant that the Chinese had abandoned Yün-nan.

Again, it took the central government a fairly long time to act. In the 9th month (Oct. 23-Nov. 20) of A.D. 43, the emperor selected the General Who Is Martial and Stern, Liu Shang, to take command and to mobilize troops in Kuang-han, Shu, and Kien-wei commanderies, as well as among the barbarians around Shu-shü prefecture (1B:15b; 86,116:14b). Little is known about the man, except that Kuang-wu once addressed him as a member of the imperial clan.¹⁰⁾ Liu Shang had participated in the campaign against Kung-sun Shu and was therefore acquainted with the conditions of at least Sî-ch'üan.

The route from Sî-ch'üan to Yün-nan was not through the hostile terrain along the upper Yang-tsü, but went from Ch'eng-tu southwestwards via Yüeh-hi commandery. Liu Shang therefore marched through the domain of the aboriginal chief Jen Kuei, who in A.D. 39 had accepted demotion from King to Grand Administrator. HHS claims that Jen Kuei feared for his own power, once the country to the south

¹⁾ See map 12.

²⁾ The Tien-ch'ü prefecture was situated E of the present Tsin-ning hien, Yün-nan.

³⁾ The text writes K'un-ming. Shen K'in-han points out that Yi-chou commandery had no K'un-ming prefecture, and that K'un-ming must be a mistake for K'un-tse (86,116:14b, *Tsü k'ie*). The K'un-tse prefecture was situated within the area of the present Yi-liang hien, Yün-nan.

⁴⁾ The Kien-ling prefecture was situated NE of the present K'un-ming hien, Yün-nan. The Shao-hing and Palace editions write *ling* with radical 61, whereas the Ki ku ko edition has radical 9. In the treatise on administrative geography of HHS, the Shao-hing and Ki ku ko editions have radical 9, while the Palace edition again has radical 61. HS mentions Kien-ling only once, in the treatise on administrative geography, and has radical 9.

⁵⁾ The Lien-jan prefecture is identical with the present An-ning hien, Yün-nan.

⁶⁾ The Lung-tung prefecture was situated N of the present Yao-an hien, Yün-nan. The Shao-hing edition writes *lung* with radical 75, while the Ki ku ko and Palace editions have radical 64. In the treatise on administrative geography, all editions have radical 75. In HS, *lung* is written without any of the radicals.

⁷⁾ The Ye-yü prefecture was situated NE of the present Ta-li hien, Yün-nan.

⁸⁾ The Ku-fu prefecture was situated SE of the present Yung-pei hien, Yün-nan.

⁹⁾ The Shu-shü prefecture was situated 50 li SW of the present Yi-pin hien, Sî-ch'üan. For the pronunciation of Shu-shü, see Su Lin's (fl. A.D. 220) gloss in HS 28Ac:26a-26b.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. vol. II, p. 197. TTK (12:3a) gives his name as Liu Yü. HHK (7:18b, 8:3a) writes Liu Shang.

would be pacified. He called together the other chiefs and hatched a plan whereby they first would serve poisoned wine to the Han army, and then would attack the survivors. Liu Shang found out about it. He made a surprise attack on K'üung-tu,¹⁾ arrested and executed Jen Kuei, and transferred his relatives to Ch'eng-tu (1B:15b; 86,116:19a). There is no way of knowing whether this account is right. It is equally possible that the imperial forces saw an excellent opportunity for getting rid of Jen Kuei, and that the HHS simply repeats the official version which was given out as a justification.

Liu Shang traversed the Yang-tsī and entered Yi-chou commandery before the end of A.D. 43. All through 44, he fought battles against the barbarians, and rounded up their grain and domestic animals. The campaign cannot be reconstructed in detail, since the text is laconic. Gradually, Liu Shang won the upper hand, and in the 1st month (Feb. 2–Mar. 7) of A.D. 45 reached Pu-wei.²⁾ Although he must have crossed the Mekong, this is not recorded in the sources. The barbarians gave up the fight. HHS mentions that 7000 chiefs were decapitated, that 5700 prisoners were taken, and that 3000 horses and more than 30,000 heads of cattle and sheep were captured (1B:16a; 86,116:14b). The numbers are probably quoted from Liu Shang's report, and may therefore be inflated. It is interesting, however, that this and other reports after successful campaigns against barbarians often include figures for confiscated domestic animals and grain. These confiscations look like a deliberate policy, intended to weaken the economy of the enemy and thereby to retard his recovery.

c. *The uprising in Wu-ling commandery, A.D. 48–49*

During Former Han, there had not been a ripple of trouble in Wu-ling. But in the 12th month of the Chinese year 47, which corresponds to Jan. 5–Feb. 3, A.D. 48, it became the scene of the first among many exceedingly violent rebellions (1B:17b; 86,116:2b; *ch'i* 16:1b).

The insurgents are in Ma Yüan's biography (24,54:11b) referred to as the "Barbarians of the Five Streams". SKC (37:19a) is fortunately more detailed and lists the names of the streams as Hiung, Men, Yu, Wu, and Ch'en. It confirms that the aboriginals who lived along these watercourses were called the "Barbarians of the Five Streams". The Hiung, Ch'en, Wu, and Yu Streams are tributaries to the Yüan River, which today is still known by that name. It has its source in Kuei-chou and debouches into the Tung-t'ing Lake. The Men Stream does not enter the Yüan River, but is a tributary to the Yu Stream.³⁾

Important for us is the fact that a local variant of the Wu 濞 Stream's name was Wu 武 (24,54:11b, *Commentary*), since, with the exception of Ma Yüan's bio-

¹⁾ The K'üung-tu prefecture during Han was the capital of Yüe-hi commandery and was situated SE of the present Si-ch'ang hien, Si-ch'uan.

²⁾ The Pu-wei prefecture was situated 30 li N of the present Pao-shan hien, Yün-nan.

³⁾ For this and the following events see map. 13.

The Yu and Ch'en Streams still have the same names. The Hiung Stream is now called the Wu River, the Men Stream is now the Ming Stream, and the lower course of the Wu Stream is known as the T'o River. See *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, pp. 420:2, 422:1, 475:3, 508:4, 965:3, 1172:2.

graphy, HHS speaks of a barbarian uprising at the Wu 武 Stream (18,48:14b; 22,52:7b; chī 16:1b; chī 18:2b). As will be seen, the first Chinese attack was directed against the very Wu 武 Stream valley. This permits the conclusion that, while the barbarian unrest involved the wider area of the five mountain valleys in general, the strength of the aborigines was centred on the Wu Valley in particular.

The timing of the uprising in Wu-ling may well have depended on another revolt. Aborigines were also living in the Nan commandery,¹⁾ situated between the Yang-tsi and Han Rivers to the northwest of Wu-ling. They had risen and looted Nan commandery in the 1st month (Feb. 14–Mar. 15) of A.D. 47, i.e. less than a year before the rebellion in Wu-ling. When the barbarians of Wu-ling revolted, they not only looted the prefectures in their immediate neighbourhood, but, as one text clearly states, also raided all the way to Nan commandery (chī 16:1b). As becomes manifest from the following events, they must have entered and for a while have maintained themselves in the Kiang-ling prefecture on the Yang-tsi.

The purpose of the thrust into Nan may have been to establish contact with the barbarians rebelling there. If that was intended, the attempt was made too late. The government had, for a change, acted swiftly, probably because more central regions of the empire were involved. The General Who Is Martial and Stern, Liu Shang, victor over the barbarians in Yün-nan during A.D. 45, had been sent to mobilize troops in Nan commandery. He had crushed the uprising and transferred 7000 barbarians from Nan to Kiang-hia commandery, situated across the Han River in Hu-pei (1B:17a; 86,116:10a).

When the rebellion of the Wu-ling barbarians became known at the court, the situation in Nan was already under control. Liu Shang must by this time, and to his misfortune, have been considered as something of barbarian-fighter. Since he was not far from Wu-ling, he was in early A.D. 48 ordered to suppress that rebellion also.²⁾

Liu Shang decided on an amphibian operation. He placed his troops, which had been mobilized in Nan, Ch'ang-sha, and Wu-ling commanderies, on boats. Moving his force up the Yüan River, he seems to have met with no resistance. When he came to the Wu Stream, he attempted to reach the enemy's stronghold by continuing up that river also. Having passed some narrow defiles, the Chinese

¹⁾ There are two earlier references to barbarians in Nan commandery. When Ts'en P'eng in A.D. 29 had stationed his army at the Kiang (Han) Pass and at the Yi-ling and Yi-tao prefectures (cf. vol. II, p. 184), he made an appeal to the barbarians of that area, i.e. Nan, to surrender (17,47:14b). In A.D. 35, Tsang Kung used a ruse to pacify barbarians in the neighbourhood of Chung-lu prefecture (18,48:12b; cf. vol. II, p. 222).

²⁾ The texts do not mention whether Liu Shang, after his mission in Nan was accomplished, returned to Lo-yang and then set out from there anew, or whether he proceeded directly from Nan to Wu-ling. The latter alternative is more probable. 86,116:10a states that Liu Shang commanded 10,000 men in Nan. 86,116:2b says that when he was sent to Wu-ling, he was ordered to mobilize 10,000 men in Nan, Ch'ang-sha, and Wu-ling. It looks as though he simply shifted his army from Nan to Wu-ling, refilling his ranks while he went along.

In one respect, the account in 86,116:2b–3a needs correction. It dates Liu Shang's appointment and Wu-ling campaign in A.D. 47. This is contradicted by all other sources, and must be a mistake.

encountered increasing difficulties due to the swiftness of the current and diminishing provisions. Liu Shang finally tried to turn back, but then the trap closed. The aborigines blocked the defiles, while the Chinese on both sides of the river were hemmed in by mountains. Liu Shang was killed, and his army perished (1B:17b; 24,54:11b; 86,116:2b-3a).

As soon as the court heard about Liu Shang's predicament, but did not yet know that he had died, the emperor sent an emissary in a last minute attempt to redeem the situation. His choice was Sung Kün,¹⁾ who at one time had been Prefect of Ch'en-yang. This was situated in the very heart of Wu-ling commandery, not far from the mouth of the Ch'en Stream. Sung (Tsung) Kün's orders were to hurry to Kiang-hia commandery, to mobilize 3000 Emergency Troops,²⁾ and to relieve Liu Shang. On arrival in Kiang-hia, he found that he was too late (41,71:14a). This may have been lucky for him, since a force of 3000 men would not have carried him far. While it is not explicitly mentioned, Sung (Tsung) Kün must have remained in the Yang-tsai region until A.D. 49, when he joined the next expedition against the barbarians.

The only success the imperial troops achieved at this time was a minor one. The General of the Left of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Tsang Kung, attacked the "Bandits of the Wu Stream" at Kiang-ling and brought about their surrender (18,48:14b). While this pacified the Nan commandery, it did not at all dampen the spirits of the barbarians in Wu-ling. In the 7th month (July 30-Aug. 27) of A.D. 48, they again took up the offensive and sacked Lin-yüan)³⁾ near the Tung-t'ing Lake. One of Kuang-wu's early followers, Ma Ch'eng, who at that time was Grand Administrator of Chung-shan in the north, was sent together with an Internuncio⁴⁾ to stop the advance. They failed. Ma Ch'eng offered his resignation, which was accepted (1B:17b; 22,52:76; 86,116:3a). The major part of Wu-ling commandery seems to have been taken by the barbarians.

At this stage, the General Who Calms the Waves, Ma Yüan, petitioned to be sent against the enemy. He was 62 years old (Chinese reckoning), and the emperor hesitated to approve. Ma Yüan said: "Your subject is still able to wear armour and to ascend a horse." Kuang-wu ordered him to prove it. Ma Yüan then took hold of a saddle and turned his head and eyes this way and that. The emperor laughed and remarked: "He is valiant this old man!" (24,54:11b).⁵⁾ It is possible

¹⁾ Hu San-sing's commentary to *Tsi chi t'ung kien* draws attention to the fact that Chao Ming-ch'eng's (Sung) *Kin shi lu* quotes the inscription on the stèle of a Minister of Works in Han times, named Tsung Kü. HHS (41,71:16a ff.) devotes a biography to a certain HHS Yi, who was the paternal great-great-grandson of a brother of Sung Kün's paternal great-grandfather. Sung Yi's grandson Sung Kü became Minister of Works in the time of Emperor Ling (he was appointed in A.D. 171 and died in office during 173). Hu San-sing therefore rightly concludes that Sung Kü and Tsung Kü are identical and that Sung should be corrected to Tsung. He also points out that HHS itself in one instance (86,116:3a) writes Tsung Kün (41,71:13b, *Tsi kie*). ²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 208-209.

³⁾ The Lin-yüan prefecture belonged to the Wu-ling commandery and during Later Han became its capital. It was situated W of the present Ch'ang-te hien, Hu-nan.

⁴⁾ Li Sung. He is mentioned nowhere else in HHS.

⁵⁾ For the reliability of speeches and events in the presence of the emperor, see vol. I, pp. 50-51.

that Ma Yüan had ulterior motives for his request. That question will be discussed elsewhere.¹⁾

Ma Yüan was given the supreme command, with four Generals of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household as his subordinates: Ma Wu, Keng Shu, Liu K'uang, and Sun Yung. Sung (Tsung) Kün, who already was near the scene of action,²⁾ became Inspector of the Army. That office seems to have carried considerable weight, but next to nothing is known about it. An army of more than 40,000 men was mobilized in twelve unnamed commanderies. It included men whose punishments had been relaxed (shí hing) and who finished the remainder of their sentences as soldiers³⁾ (1B:17b; 22,52:11b; 24,54:11b; 86,116:3a).

At an unspecified time, probably somewhere around the turn of the Chinese year 48/49, the army arrived at Hia-tsüan.⁴⁾ At this point a discussion, apparently heated, took place which way to follow. If one chose the straight route to the Hu-t'ou Mountain, the distance was shorter but water formed obstacles. If one chose the route via the Ch'ung prefecture,⁵⁾ the terrain was better but the distance greater. Since the army had to transport its supplies, the decision posed a real problem. It meant, in effect, whether to go around the northern or the southern shore of the Tung-t'ing Lake. Emperor Kuang-wu had hesitated between the alternatives.⁶⁾ During the discussion of the high officers, Keng Shu made himself

¹⁾ See the chapter on cliques.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 69.

³⁾ See 105. Hulswé's invaluable work on Han law, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁾ The emplacement of this prefecture, which belonged to Ch'ang-sha commandery, is particularly important, as the army from there had the choice of two routes. 24,54:12a, *Commentary* says that Hia-tsüan was identical with the Yüan-ling prefecture (of T'ang times). The *Chung kuo ti ming ta ts'i tien* (p. 20:1) and *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien* (p. 50:3) follow this and state that Hia-tsüan was located NE of the present Yüan-ling hien. As Shen K'in-han points out (24,54:12a, *T'ei kie*), this is patently impossible. The Yüan-ling prefecture was and is situated on the Yüan River, at the point where the Yu River enters into it. This is in the heart of Wu-ling commandery, whereas we know that the ancient Hia-tsüan belonged to Ch'ang-sha. Shen K'in-han agrees with Tu shí fang yü ki yao (by Ku Tsu-yü, 1631-1692) that Hia-tsüan ought to have been located near the modern Yüan-kiang hien. But this is equally impossible. Yüan-kiang is situated in the centre of the Tung-t'ing Lake's southern shore. No choice of routes existed from that point. All the army could have done, would have been to continue along the shore westwards. *Chung kuo ti ming ta ts'i tien* and *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien* draw attention to the fact that the Yüan ho kün hien ch'i (by Li Ki-fu, 758-814) and *Sü t'ung tien* both seek the ancient Hia-tsüan at modern P'u-k'i. They reject this identification in favour of the one advocated by HHS *Commentary*. Wang Sien-k'ien believes on historical evidence that Hia-tsüan ought to have been situated near modern T'ung-ch'eng, Pa-ling (now Yüe-yang), or Lin-siang (24,54:12a, *T'ei kie*). As it happens, the P'u-k'i, T'ung-ch'eng, Yüe-yang, and Lin-siang hien are all located fairly close together east of the Tung-t'ing Lake. This emplacement makes complete sense. While the exact spot of the ancient Hia-tsüan can no longer be established (the site shown on map 13 is hypothetical), it clearly was situated somewhere east of the Tung-t'ing Lake, from where Ma Yüan indeed had the choice of two major routes.

⁵⁾ The Ch'ung prefecture during Han belonged to the Wu-ling commandery and was situated W of the present Lin-li hien, Hu-nan.

⁶⁾ As has been shown (vol. II, pp. 213-214), Kuang-wu was always well informed about the movement of his armies, and insisted on having the final decision even from a distance. In the present case, he clearly had supervised the advance-planning of the campaign.

the champion of the route via Ch'ung prefecture. Ma Yüan disagreed. He considered that the advance through Ch'ung would waste time and provisions. If one took the enemy at the throat, the bandits in Ch'ung would be defeated anyway. The opinions expressed in this discussion were memorialized, and the emperor's reply sanctioned the plan of Ma Yüan (24,54:12a).

Having taken the southern route, the army reached the Lin district¹⁾ in the spring of A.D. 49.²⁾ A battle was fought there, in which Ma Yüan was victorious.³⁾ The defeated barbarians "scattered and fled into the bamboo forests" (1B:18a; 24,54:12a; 86,116:3a).

In the 3rd month (Apr. 22–May 20) of A.D. 49, after a further advance, Ma Yüan's forces halted at the Hu-t'ou Mountain⁴⁾ and built fortifications. For the next seven months, the Chinese and barbarians faced each other from immobile positions. The summer was not an easy one for the Chinese. Supply ships had trouble in fighting the strong current. The heat was oppressive, and many officers and soldiers died of fevers. Ma Yüan himself became ill. He had a room dug into an earth bank, in which he tried to escape the sun (24,54:12a).

At about this time, Keng Shu, who had been overruled in the choice of routes, wrote a letter to his brother Keng Yen, heaping Ma Yüan with accusations. He referred to an earlier memorial by him in which he had argued the advantages of marching on Ch'ung prefecture. While it was true that it would have been more difficult to transport provisions, infantry and cavalry could have been used to their full advantage. At present, the army was stopped at the Hu-t'ou Mountain, and every one was full of anxiety. The bandits could have been annihilated in the battle at the Lin district, if they had been attacked immediately by night. The General Who Calms the Waves was just like a trader among the barbarians of the Western

¹⁾ The Lin district, according to SKC 37:22a, was during the kien-wu period (A.D. 25–55) changed to Yüan-nan prefecture. It was situated on the southern bank of the Yüan River, 70 li SW of the present Ch'ang-te hien, Hu-nan.

²⁾ HHS dates the ensuing battle in the 3rd month (Apr. 22–May 20). TTK (12:3a) says that it was in the 2nd month (Mar. 23–Apr. 21). HHK 8:6a records the battle under the 2nd month, but misdates the entire campaign A.D. 50.

³⁾ Ma Yüan's biography places the encounter at the Lin district and says that the barbarians attacked. The *pen ki* (1B:18a) merely states that the battle was at Lin-yüan. Probably, the barbarians at Lin-yüan tried to cut off Ma Yüan's advance on the Lin district.

⁴⁾ Chi 22:31b states that the Hu-t'ou Mountain was situated within the Yüan-ling prefecture. SKC 37:21a records that the Hu-t'ou Mountain was 100 li (一百里) high (136,400 feet; 41,580 m) and 300 li (三百里) in circumference. This intelligence is repeated by HHS 24,54:12a, *T'ei kie*. The Hu-t'ou Mountain would then have been almost five times higher than Mount Everest. Clearly, the character 百 must be dropped in both figures, in which case we get a mountain ca. 1,350 feet (ca. 400 m) high and ca. 4,100 feet (ca. 1,250 m) in circumference. This mountain must have been near the Yüan River in order to be reached by the supply ships. Hui Tung points out that, according to Yüan ho kün hien chi, the mountain was situated 49 li E of Yüan-ling (24,54:12a, *T'ei kie*). About that distance, NE of the prefecture, map 37 of 90. Ting shows a massif, which is defined as being 400 m high. A northern spur must be the ancient Hu-t'ou Mountain.

Shen K'in-han, without stating his source, believes that the Hu-t'ou was 130 li NE of Yüan-ling (24,54:12a, *T'ei kie*). This is repeated by Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien (p. 887:2). But, at that distance from Yüan-ling, one reaches the plain with no mountains at all.

Region. When he reached one spot, he stopped. Because of this, he had lost the initiative, and now he was ill. All the predictions of Keng Shu were coming true (24,54:12b).

Keng Yen, who was one of Kuang-wu's most trusted followers and advisers, memorialized his brother's letter. The emperor took the accusations seriously, since he ordered the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household Rapid as Tigers, Liang Sung, to hurry by courier service to Wu-ling, to make an investigation, and, presumably substituting Sung (Tsung) Kün, to become Inspector of the Army (24,54:12b).

At this stage, Ma Yüan's biography suddenly becomes curiously silent. All it has to say is: "After a while, [Ma] Yüan died of his illness" (24,54:12b). There is no word about the end of the war. We are left with the impression that Ma Yüan had botched the campaign, and that it was up to Liang Sung to put things right. This, probably intentional, misrepresentation is very far from the truth. The facts permit a less biased reconstruction of the campaign.

It is obvious that Ma Yüan had been able to gather reliable information about the enemy, and had planned his strategy accordingly. By marching straight towards the Yüan River, he had forced the barbarians to evacuate the lowlands. He had halted at the Hu-t'ou Mountain, the point where the terrain was becoming mountainous. The aborigines defended the narrow defiles upstream, which is not to say that they had succeeded in stopping the Chinese advance. In all probability, Ma Yüan had pushed as far as he intended to. He intentionally avoided Liu Shang's mistake of entering too deep into enemy territory. His plan was to bottle up the barbarians until they were ready to make peace. The long summer was hard on the Chinese troops, but meanwhile the barbarians were getting low on provisions. Ma Yüan's strategy began to succeed.

While Ma Yüan's biography obfuscates the issue, Sung (Tsung) Kün's biography and the section on the Southern Barbarians are more honest. The latter says bluntly that the barbarians starved and were in difficulties. They offered surrender. After a while, Ma Yüan died, whereupon Tsung Kün¹⁾ accepted the surrender. All the barbarians were pacified (86,116:3a).

Sung (Tsung) Kün's biography is more detailed. The death of Ma Yüan had evidently come at a most inconvenient moment. The barbarians had just offered surrender, but no one was there to accept it. The proper procedure was to report Ma Yüan's death to the emperor, who would appoint a new commander, who then would deal with the barbarians. By that time, the situation might have changed. Whether Liang Sung would have been empowered to take action, is not known. Anyway, as pointed out by HHK (8:7a), he had not yet arrived. This must have been the reason for Sung (Tsung) Kün's decision to act on his own. He forged an imperial decree, and negotiated the surrender. It took place in the 10th month (Nov. 14–Dec. 13) of A.D. 49. The emperor excused his independence and rewarded him²⁾ (1B:18a; 41,71:14a–14b).

¹⁾ This is the one case, where HHS writes Tsung. Cf. *supra* p. 69, note 1.

²⁾ The forging of imperial edicts was a serious crime, to which the Han Code devoted one section in the Statutes on Banditry. See 105. Hulsewé, p. 33.

Seen in this light, the accusations against Ma Yüan were entirely false. They had no military grounds, but were a chain in an intricate political manoeuvre. I will return to this point in the next volume.

With the suppression of the uprising in Wu-ling commandery, the barbarians kept their peace in South China for the remainder of Kuang-wu's reign. After the great rebellions, they were temporarily exhausted. But the trend was ominous. During the whole Former Han dynasty and Wang Mang's interregnum, the total number of barbarian uprisings had been five (105, 86, 27 B.C., A.D. 12, 14), all restricted to the southwest. Under Kuang-wu alone, three rebellions had broken out, and these covered a much larger territory. The acceleration in the outbreak of barbarian revolts and their geographic expansion were to continue throughout Later Han. This development must be briefly discussed, since it is essential for the interpretation of the phenomenon.

d. *Uprisings after the death of Kuang-wu*

In order to get a comprehensive view of the barbarian uprisings¹⁾ in South China between the time of Kuang-wu's death and the fall of Later Han (i.e. A.D. 57-220), they are listed here according to commanderies and dates. The commanderies are grouped under the modern Chinese provinces.²⁾

Indo-China

Ji-nan:	100, 4th month (4:12a)
	136, 12th month (6:9b)
	144, 10th month (6:14b)
Kiu-chen:	157, 4th month (7:8a)
Kiao-chi:	178, 1st month (8:7a-7b)

Kuang-tung

Ho-p'u:	116, 1st month (5:12a)
	178, 1st month (8:7a-7b)
Kuei-yang:	164 (7:12a)

Kuang-si

Yü-lin:	116, 1st month (5:12a)
Ts'ang-wu:	115 (86, 116:6b)
	116, 1st month (5:12a)

Hu-nan

Ling-ling:	162, 5th month (7:11a)
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¹⁾ The terminology in HHS is not consistent. The barbarians are mostly said to have "rebelled", but sometimes to have "looted". In all rebellions, the barbarians looted the Chinese settlements, so that the terms seem to be interchangeable. I have therefore listed all cases of looting as well as rebellion.

²⁾ The correspondence is only a rough one, since some commanderies straddle the modern borders. Whenever the larger part of a Han commandery falls into a particular modern province, it has been listed under that province.

Ch'ang-sha: 157, 11th month (7:8a)
 160, autumn (7:10a)
 162, 5th month (7:11a)
 Wu-ling: 76, 2nd month (3:3b)
 78, 12th month (3:5a)
 92, 12th month (4:6a)
 94, 11th month (4:8b)
 115, 12th month (5:11b)
 116, 5th month (5:12a)
 116, 7th month (5:12a)
 136, winter (86,116:4a)
 137, 1st month (6:10a)
 151, 7th month (7:5b)
 160, 12th month (7:10a)
 162, 10th month (7:11a)
 163, 7th month (7:11b)
 186, 10th month (8:13a-13b)

Southern An-hui

Tan-yang: 169, 9th month (8:2b)
 Kiu-kiang: 175 (64,94:11b)

Hu-pei

Kiang-hia: 169, 9th month (8:2b)
 180, 4th month (8:9a)
 Nan: 101, 12th month (4:13a)

Southern Shen-si

Han-chung: Before 120 (51,81:2b)
 184 (87,117:22b)

Si-ch'uan

Pa: 179, 10th month (8:8b)
 188, 11th month (8:15a)
 Kuang-han¹): 148, 3rd month (7:3b)
 Shu²): 107 (86,116:21b)
 114, 7th month (5:10a)
 119 (5:14b)
 123, 1st month (5:17a)
 156 (86,116:22a)
 159, 2nd month (7:8b)
 160 (86,116:22a)

¹) Including the Dependent State of Kuang-han, established by Emperor An (reigned 107-125) (chI 23A:24a).

²) Including the Dependent State of Shu commandery, established in A.D. 122 (chI 23A:25b).

Kien-wei¹): 161, 6th month (7:10b)
 Yüe-hi: 58 (2:4a)
 117, 12th month (5:13a)
 118, 1st month (5:13a)
 118, 7th month (5:13a-13b)
 119 (5:14b)

Yün-nan

Yi-chou²): 76, 9th month (3:4a)
 119 (5:14b)
 123, 1st month (5:17a)
 176, 4th month (8:6a)

This list shows an extraordinary territorial spread in barbarian unrest compared to the earlier period. Under Former Han and Wang Mang's reign, only 2 commanderies had been affected. In Kuang-wu's time, 7 commanderies were involved. During the remainder of Later Han, the figure rises to 21. This means that of the 26 commanderies in South China, only 5 were spared barbarian uprisings.

The survey also reveals a striking increase in the frequency of barbarian uprisings. This becomes even more clear from the following table.³)

30-year periods	Number of outbreaks
200 B.C.-171	0
170 -141	0
140 -111	0
110 - 81	2
80 - 51	0
50 - 21	1
20- A.D. 10	0
11 - 40	3
41 - 70	3
71 -100	6
101 -130	14
131 -160	13
161 -190	15
191 -220	0
Total	57

Table 8. The outbreak of barbarian rebellions in South China, 200 B.C.-A.D. 220.

¹) Including the Dependent State of Kien-wei, established in A.D. 107 (chI 23A:26a).

²) Including Yung-ch'ang commandery, which was established in A.D. 69 through division of Yi-chou (29:12b; chI 23A:23a. The latter source mistakenly writes A.D. 59).

³) Each joint uprising has only been counted once. Since more than one commandery could be involved, the total is lower than if the chronological entries in the above tabulation by commanderies simply had been added.

Until A.D. 10, the uprisings were few. They then increased in numbers, reaching their peak during the 2nd century A.D.

The material might be presented somewhat differently by setting forth the number of years during which barbarians clashed with the Chinese on Chinese soil. The territory considered is only that belonging to the empire at each time in question. For instance, the Chinese invasion of Nan-yüe in 112–111 B.C. is excluded, since Nan-yüe only lost its dependence through that campaign.

Graphs 3 and 4 are histograms, which show the number of years during which the Chinese fought with the Southern Barbarians (in all of South China except Yün-nan, Kuei-chou, and Sī-ch'uan) and the Southwestern Barbarians (in Yün-nan, Kuei-chou, and Sī-ch'uan) respectively. Apart from the brief invasion of Ch'ang-sha by Nan-yüe in 181 B.C., the long, peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and the Southern Barbarians during Former Han becomes strikingly clear, as well as the increasing resistance of the barbarians during Later Han. In the southwest, the greater belligerence of the barbarians throughout Former Han and Wang Mang's reign is apparent, whereas during Later Han the increase is relatively less pronounced.

e. Barbarians beyond the border

While the Chinese during Later Han times were singularly unsuccessful in their relations with the barbarians of South China, they faced no strong enemies outside the frontier. The neighbouring tribes were, in contrast to North China, generally friendly, although conditions at the border of Indo-China differed from those at the border of Yün-nan and Sī-ch'uan.

Considering the situation in Indo-China first, the sources record for Later Han ten cases of tribute, submission, or a combination of the two. In A.D. 36, during the reign of Emperor Kuang-wu, an aboriginal chief outside the border of Kiu-chen subordinated himself to China with his people. He was rewarded with the title "Lord of a Hamlet Who Has Attached Himself to Han" (1B:8b; 86,116:6a). In 37, barbarians beyond Ji-nan presented Emperor Kuang-wu with a white pheasant and a white hare (1B:10b; 86,116:6a). These minor gains were wiped out by the uprising of the Cheng sisters in A.D. 40. In 84, a live rhinoceros and a white pheasant were offered by a tribe beyond Ji-nan (3:10a; 86,116:6b). In 107, aborigines surrendered outside the border of Kiu-chen (5:3a; 86,116:6b). In 122, barbarians beyond Kiu-chen paid tribute and submitted (5:17a; 86,116:6b). In the 5th month (May 31–June 29) of 124, aborigines outside Ji-nan submitted, and in the 7th month (July 29–Aug. 27) aboriginal chiefs from the same region arrived in the capital and presented tribute. The two events are probably connected (5:18a, 18b; 86,116:7a). Three further tribute missions are recorded for 131, 173, and 183 from countries beyond Indo-China (6:6a; 8:5a, 10b; 86,116:7a, 8b).

It is, of course, difficult to differentiate clearly between actual submission and the mere paying of "tribute". The latter symbolized recognition of China's overlordship, but is not necessarily synonymous with submission. In practical terms, the barbarians were undoubtedly motivated more by commercial reasons than

political considerations. Tribute was trade, since the barbarian gifts were generously matched by Chinese presents. This is not to say that real submissions did not occur along the border. In such cases, the barbarians were incorporated into the Chinese empire, and henceforth were supervised by appointed Chinese officials in addition to their own chiefs. For bookkeeping reasons, and perhaps as a preliminary for future taxation, the barbarians were also counted. The population figures were reported to the capital and there later available to the historian. He likes to quote them. Total absence of figures, as in the case of Indo-China, would therefore seem to imply that the submissions were in name only.

In contrast to the south, a considerable number of real submissions took place along the southwestern border. The first events fall into Kuang-wu's time. Somewhere on the upper reaches of the Mekong, to the west of Yi-chou commandery, a tribe was living known as Ai-lao. It may have been Thai.¹⁾ Nothing is known about its past, and it is not mentioned in HS. The first time this people appears in history is in A.D. 47, when its king sent warriors to float down the Mekong²⁾ on rafts and boats in order to attack a weak aboriginal tribe near the Chinese border. The Ai-lao were victorious, but a storm came from the south, destroying their crafts and drowning great numbers. The king dispatched another force, which did not fare better. The texts state that the six commanding chiefs were killed in battle and that their corpses later were dug up and eaten by tigers. The attack was called off, and the alarmed king remarked to the elders of his tribe that China must have a sagacious emperor (HHS 86,116:16a; SKC 37:3a-3b). Four years later, he submitted.

This description, apart from the probably authentic fact of the attacks, has all the fictitious elements of a sino-centric reconstruction by the dynastic historian. Seen through the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, this was a case of Kuang-wu's virtue civilizing the outer barbarians. Heaven showed its disapproval of the arrogant king, who then, properly chastised, acknowledged the emperor's moral superiority by a fabricated speech.

Whatever the real motive of the Ai-lao king, he did submit to China in A.D. 51. He was accompanied by 2,770 households and 17,659 individuals of his people (HHS 1B:19b; 86,116:16a-16b; SKC 37:3b). This was in A.D. 69 followed by the further submission of an Ai-lao prince, who brought with him 51,890 households and 553,711 individuals (2:12b; 86,116:11b). To cope with the onrush, Emperor Ming during 69 divided the former territory of the Ai-lao into two new prefectures: Ai-lao and Po-nan.³⁾ He combined them with six adjoining prefectures of the Yi-

¹⁾ The ruling tribe of the Nan-chao state (629-1252) claimed descent from the Ai-lao. See Kiu T'ang shu, *lie chuan* 147:6b-7a (Po na edition).

²⁾ HHS 86,116:16a says that they went down the 江漢, which makes no sense. There was no river with that name, and it could not be a question of the [Yang-tsi] kiang and Han [River]. Shen K'ing-han corrects the entry to Mekong (86,116:16a, *T'ei kie*). SKC 37:3a-3b mentions the attack but not the river.

³⁾ Ai-lao was situated SW of the Pu-wei prefecture, west of the Mekong. Po-nan was situated E of Pu-wei, east of the Mekong. For Pu-wei, see map 12.

chou commandery and established the Yung-ch'ang commandery (2:12b; 86,116:16b). In A.D. 74, six tribes beyond the border, including still other Ai-lao, offered tribute (2:16a). In 94, barbarians outside the new Yung-ch'ang commandery presented a rhinoceros and a large elephant (4:7b; 86,116:18a). In 97, the Shan tribe, whose territory must have been in present upper Burma, and other barbarians paid tribute (4:10a; 86,116:18a). In 107, more than 3000 members of a tribe of pygmies (Tsiao-yao) outside Yung-ch'ang submitted and presented elephants' tusks, water buffaloes, and another species of buffalo (5:3a; 86,116:18a). In 120, the Shan tribe again sent messenger with tribute, consisting of musicians and conjurers. These claimed to come from somewhere to the west of the ocean, and their talents included fire-eating and juggling (5:15a; 86,116:18a). One further tribute mission is recorded for 131 from the Shan state and a She-t'iao state (6:6a; 86,116:7a). For 159 and 161, HHS even mentions embassies with presents from T'ien-chu or India (7:9b, 10b).

Some of these cases, as shown by the registration of aboriginals, were real submissions. These submissions were not restricted to the territory beyond Yi-chou and later Yung-ch'ang commandery. 31,000 households and 167,620 barbarians submitted at the border of Yüehi in 116 (5:12a; 86,116:19b). Outside the Shu commandery, 170,000 barbarians submitted in A.D. 100 (4:11b; 86,116:21b).¹⁾ More than 500,000 Tibetans (K'iang) submitted in 94, 17,280 in 107, and 36,900 in 108 (4:8a; 5:2b, 5b; 87,117:23a). Tibetans submitted voluntarily also outside the western border of Kuang-han commandery. During Kuang-wu's time, more than 5000 households subordinated themselves in A.D. 37 (1B:10b; 87,117:23a), and another 2,400 individuals submitted in 108 (5:5b; 87,117:23a).

Let us summarize these figures in a table.

Outside	Year	Households	Individuals	Number of members per household (calculated)
Yi-chou commandery (after A.D. 69, the Yung-ch'ang commandery) Yüehi commandery Shu commandery	A.D. 51	2,770	17,659	6.4
	69	51,890	553,711	10.7
	107		more than 3,000	
	116	31,000	167,620	5.4
	94		more than 500,000	
	100		170,000	
	107		17,280	
Kuang-han commandery	108		36,900	
	37	more than 5,000		
	108		2,400	

Table 9. The voluntary submissions of barbarians in South China during Later Han.

¹⁾ I have excluded an entry in 86,116:20b, according to which during the yung-p'ing period (58-75) the virtue and majesty of Han spread further westwards to distant barbarians than at any previous time. This was supposedly due to the merit of a certain Inspector of Yi province. Over 1,300,000 house-

Adding the number of individuals, we get a total of nearly 1.5 million. It does not follow that all these barbarians peacefully stayed with China for the remainder of Later Han. Many must have broken away again, as witnessed by the frequent uprising in the southwestern border commanderies. The important point is that these submissions took place at all.

f. *Interpretation*

The problem before us is threefold. Why did the barbarian uprisings in South China cover a vastly larger territory in Later Han than in Former Han? Why did the uprisings immensely increase in frequency? Why did great numbers of barbarians voluntarily submit on the southwestern border and not on the southern? Since all three trends begin to appear in the time of Emperor Kuang-wu, we must return to that period for our first clues.

We should commence by looking at the activities among barbarians of those regular Chinese administrators, who have been specially singled out for praise by the dynastic historian. For Kuang-wu's reign there is information on six of such men, three of whom appear in the chapter on Upright Officials (76,106).¹⁾ They might be described as Chinese cultural apostles.

In the beginning of the *kien-wu* period, which here must mean soon after A.D. 29,²⁾ Jen Yen was appointed Grand Administrator of Kiu-chen commandery in Indo-China. He stayed in that office for four years. His biography claims that on his arrival the people of Kiu-chen did not know to plow with oxen, and that they made their living by hunting. Grain was imported from Kiao-chi commandery in the north. Jen Yen taught them how to forge agricultural implements and how to cultivate the land. He introduced schools, caps, and shoes. Since the Yüe people had no marriage laws, the principle of husband and wife did not exist, each one loved immorally, and children did not know who their fathers were, Jen Yen ordered that males aged 20–50 and females aged 15–40 should form couples. The Chinese officials were instructed to accept reductions in salary, so that from the saved amount betrothal presents could be bought for the poor. More than 2000 persons entered marriage. Heaven showed its approval by granting a plentiful harvest, and children for the first time knew their lineage. Many named their children Jen. The barbarians beyond the border longed for righteousness, so that

holds and 6,000,000 individuals of more than 100 barbarian states are said to have called themselves subjects. This so-called achievement is not mentioned in Emperor Ming's *pen ki*, and is certainly spurious. It is inconceivable that a formal submission of such numbers and from such a large territory was technically possible. The figures were quite probably invented by the Inspector himself and intended to benefit his career. Part of his fulsome memorial on how these distant barbarians joyfully attached themselves to China is quoted in 86,116:20b–21b.

¹⁾ Only such cases have been considered, where the activities of the administrators were intended to benefit the barbarians in particular.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 62.

Jen Yen no longer needed to make use of scouts and garrison conscripts (76,106:1 b; 4a; 86,116:6a).¹⁾

Wei Li retired in A.D. 49 after ten years as Grand Administrator of Kuei-yang, so that he must have been appointed in 39. He established schools and introduced marriage rites. The Yüe people in the southeast corner of the commandery were distant from its capital. They practiced their local customs and paid no taxes. When Chinese officials entered their territory, they instead requisitioned chariots and boats as a form of corvée. This was a hardship. Wei Li opened up the area by building a road and by establishing police posts and postal stations. This enabled him to reduce the corvée. Everything he did was in harmony with the fitness of things (76,106:2a-2b).

Wei Li was succeeded by Ts'i Ch'ung, who taught the people to plant mulberry trees, rear silk worms, grow hemp, and weave sandals. The people profited from it (76,106:2b-3a).

Sung (Tsung) Kün²⁾ was at the young age of 20-odd years appointed Prefect of Ch'en-yang in Wu-ling commandery. Few of its people were literate, and they believed in shamans and ghosts. Sung (Tsung) Kün established schools and prohibited immoral sacrifices. The people were content (41,71:14a).

In A.D. 30, Li Chung was appointed Grand Administrator of Tan-yang. The Yüe people in this commandery had no liking for study, and their marriage rites were inferior to those of the Chinese. Li Chung built schools for them and insisted on ritual behaviour. Each spring and autumn, he performed the ritual of the district banquet.³⁾ The cultivated land increased. He was admired in the commandery (21,51:4a-4b).

Probably soon after A.D. 29, Fan Ye was appointed Shepherd of Yang province.⁴⁾ He stayed in that office for over ten years, and taught the people to plow fields, to plant trees, and to attend to domestic arts (77,107:3b).

The descriptions of these civilizing efforts must be accepted with a grain of salt. Jen Yen was at a later date appointed Grand Administrator of Wu-wei commandery in the northwest, and is there also lauded for his activities. But he was sentenced and demoted to Prefect for having executed Tibetans on his own authority, without having first memorialized the matter (76,106:5a). Li Chung, as Acting Grand Administrator of Sin-tu in A.D. 24, had shown great brutality.⁵⁾ Fan Ye has his biography in the chapter on Cruel (or Harsh) Officials, who applied the law rigourously. He was dismissed from his post as Shepherd of Yang province and demoted to Prefect

¹⁾ Jen Yen's predecessor, Si Kuang, who in A.D. 29 surrendered to Emperor Kuang-wu (cf. vol. II, p. 47, note 3; p. 158), is also singled out for praise. He instructed the barbarians and gradually civilized them (76,106:1 b, 4a-4b; 86,116:6a).

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 69, note 1.

³⁾ For the district banquet, see S. Couvreur S.J., *Li ki ou mémoires sur les bienséances et les cérémonies. Texte chinois avec une double traduction en français et en latin*, vol. II, 1899, pp. 652ff.

⁴⁾ It then consisted of the commanderies of Lu-kiang, Kiu-kiang, K'uai-ki, Tan-yang, and Yü-chang, i.e. it roughly comprised the area of present southern An-hui, southern Kiang-su, northern Che-kiang, and Kiang-si.

⁵⁾ See vol. II, pp. 75, 212.

for having broken law the (77,107:3b).¹⁾ It seems clear, therefore, that the biographies indulge in exaggeration and panegyric.

It is also obvious that, just as in the case of Ma Yüan's activities in Indo-China,²⁾ the description is from a sino-centric point of view. The benefits of Chinese culture were brought to the lesser people, meaning in practice that their customs and tribal organizations were broken down and that sinification was urged on them as the alternative. Depending on their temperament, the barbarians bowed or objected to such future. But, in spite of exaggeration by the ancient historian, the efforts of honest and competent Chinese administrators were probably not altogether calamitous for the barbarians. While they might not care for Chinese rites and etiquette, improved techniques of agriculture would raise their material standard of living.

All this being said, it must be observed that every one of the just-mentioned administrators served before the outbreak of the great barbarian rebellions of Later Han. Jen Yen's labours in Kiu-chen and Sung (Tsung) Kün's in Wu-ling did not prevent the uprisings. The reason is not hard to find. Let us assume that the average length of a Grand Administrator's tenure in the south was ten years, a figure most certainly too high. Let us further take into consideration the time when each southern commandery came under Kuang-wu's control, add the number of years from that moment until his death, and divide the total by 10. The number of Grand Administrators, who should have served in the south, would then be 60-70. Considering such a figure, it is significant that only 4 Grand Administrators are praised by the ancient historian for their efforts to civilize the barbarians.³⁾ The conclusion must be that the cultural apostles, even though their activities were no unmixed blessing for the barbarians, were far too few, and their term in office far too short, to have had any serious impact.

Could the reason for the great increase in barbarian uprisings during Later Han rather lie in the calibre of the other run-of-the-mill Grand Administrators? The answer is no. Granted that the calibre was not high, and that the government, with few notable exceptions, did not send its best men to the south, these conditions must certainly have applied to Former Han as well. If they did not provoke continuous rebellions earlier, it would be illogical to assume that they did so later. We can conclude that the cultural apostles were not good enough and not many enough to prevent the rebellions, and that the other officials generally were not bad enough to provoke them. The bureaucracy cannot be held responsible.

The real and fairly obvious explanation for the uprisings must be the gradual effects of the great internal migration from north to south. In A.D. 2, only about one fourth of the entire registered population had lived in South China. By A.D. 140, this share had increased to nearly one half. The depopulation of the southern part of the Great Plain was well under way when Kuang-wu ascended the throne.

¹⁾ It is possible, however, that his "cruelties" were directed more against prominent men than common people. See vol. II, p. 180.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 65.

³⁾ The other two of the six men were one Shepherd and one Prefect.

The migration from the northwest began during his reign.¹⁾ Chinese settlers went south in increasing numbers, occupying the fertile alluvial soil in the main river valleys and forcing the aborigines to abandon land they considered their own. The magnitude of the Chinese pressure becomes well apparent from a comparison of maps 1 and 2.

While the immigration into southern China was a gradual and steady process, it is unfortunate that we are only well informed on the regional distribution of the population in A.D. 2, before it all started, and in A.D. 140, when the major part of the migration was reaching its end. It would be valuable if we could pinpoint intermediate stages of the migration. This is not possible, since the Chinese government itself had no clear understanding of the phenomenon. Migrants, who had left their prefectures of registration, were an abhorrence to the authorities, mainly because they could not be taxed. Such persons are in the sources described as vagabonds. Endless efforts were made to stop their wandering and to re-enter them into the registers, often with promises of temporary tax exemption. But the approach was piecemeal. Individual Grand Administrators did their best to settle migrants, and they undoubtedly reported their efforts to the government. The latter reacted on an *ad hoc* basis. Lacking statistical method, it most likely never added up the pieces of information and never gained a clear perspective on the whole. As long as the government did not fully understand what happened, it cannot be expected that the dynastic historian was better informed.

The important point for us is to ascertain whether the great uprisings under Kuang-wu should also be explained by the intensified pressure of Chinese colonists on the barbarians, or whether they occurred too early to be affected by the migration. Three stray entries in the sources will help to throw some light on the matter.

When Li Chung was appointed Grand Administrator of Tan-yang in A.D. 30, he occupied himself with local improvements.²⁾ We are told that the cultivated land increased, and that within three years more than 50,000 vagabonding people attached themselves to the registers (21,51:4b).

Wei Li became Grand Administrator of Kuei-yang in about A.D. 39,¹⁾ and during his term of office vagabonding people gradually settled down (76,106:2b).

In A.D. 43, after his victory in Indo-China, Ma Yüan memorialized that the Si-yü prefecture in Kiao-chi commandery was too large and should be divided.³⁾ According to the memorial, Si-yü at that time had 32,000 households (24,54:9b). This figure is an important clue. The total number of households of Kiao-chi commandery in A.D. 2 had been 92,440, divided among 10 prefectures (HS 28Bb:9b). This would mean an average of just over 9000 households per prefecture. That a single of them could have had 32,000, seems quite impossible. The high figure must be explained by population increase between A.D. 2 and 43.

If Kiao-chi commandery showed a considerable population increase by A.D. 43, and if vagabonding people were settling in the intermediate areas of Kuei-yang

¹⁾ See *infra* pp. 140ff.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 80.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 65.

and Tan-yang, the conclusion is justified that pressure through migration was building up in south China well before the outbreak of the rebellions, and that it must have been their cause. The situation in southwest China is somewhat more complicated and will be discussed presently. It is possible, however, to answer our first two questions now. The barbarians uprisings in Later Han covered a vastly larger territory and were immensely more frequent than in Former Han because they were the response to relentless Chinese pressure on an unprecedented scale. It would be futile to seek close correlations between the population increase in particular areas and the number of rebellions. The reaction of the aborigines depended on many unknown factors, such as their relative strength, their belligerence, and the degree to which they were oppressed and exploited by the Chinese. But where uprisings did take place, the basic cause was the migration.

Turning to the peculiar situation in the southwest, it has been noted that the population in Si-ch'uan and Yün-nan increased not only through Chinese immigration from the northwest, but also through voluntary surrender of barbarians beyond the border. The influx of Chinese colonists throughout the major part of Later Han provided a motive for barbarian revolts. Another element was the warlike spirit of the aborigines in Yün-nan, proved by four great uprisings during Former Han and Wang Mang's reign, and another five in Later Han. The willingness and ability of these barbarians to resist may partly have been due to the fact that their tribal organization does not seem to have been destroyed completely,¹⁾ and partly due to the fact that their ranks were continuously replenished by aborigines crossing the border. The situation in the border areas of Yün-nan and Si-ch'uan was therefore more complex than in the other parts of South China. The natural belligerence of the barbarians was heightened by the Chinese migration. Simultaneously, tribes outside the border were sufficiently attracted by China that they surrendered voluntarily, even though in some cases they broke away again and participated in barbarian uprisings.

The attempt should now be made to answer the remaining question: why did aborigines surrender voluntarily on the southwestern border and not on the southern? While it will not be possible to achieve complete certainty, a strong hypothesis may be formed.

We have seen that after the second major surrender of the Ai-lao barbarians in A.D. 69, at which time the Chinese authorities counted 51,890 households and 553,711 individuals, Emperor Ming incorporated their territory into the new Yung-ch'ang commandery. That commandery numbered 231,897 households and 1,897,344 individuals in A.D. 140. The average number of members per household was 8.2, the highest average in the empire except the 8.5 of Tsang-ko commandery in Kuei-chou. These extraordinarily high averages, completely out of proportion with any other ones in South China, need explanation. The clue might be found in the count of the Ai-lao at their submission in A.D. 69, when the average number of members per barbarian "household" was 10.7.²⁾ A household is a Chinese unit,

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 60.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 78, table 9.

whose average number of members through history has fluctuated around the figure 5. It is a term not easily applicable to non-Chinese people with a different social organization. The Chinese officials, thinking in customary channels, knew that population always was counted by households and individuals. Unperturbed by the fact that the Ai-lao had no households in the Chinese sense, they must have chosen some tribal unit, whatever this may have been, as the nearest equivalent. Since it was not a real counterpart, the average number of its members differs sharply from the Chinese norm.

The Ai-lao were naturally not the only inhabitants of Yung-ch'ang commandery. There were barbarians of other tribes, and there must have been a fair number of Chinese. Assuming, however, that the barbarians continued to cross the border, without each instance being formally recorded in the history, until they outnumbered the Chinese in the population registers, and assuming further that in the census of A.D. 140 the same unit was considered a barbarian "household" as in the precedent of A.D. 69, the high average figure of members per household in A.D. 140 (8.2) can be explained.¹⁾

If this is true, the high average of members per household in Yung-ch'ang, A.D. 140, was due to the barbarian and not the Chinese contingent of the population.²⁾ This view is supported by the even higher average number of 8.5 for Tsang-ko commandery in Kuei-chou. There also, the inclusion of barbarians into the registers must have driven up the average, although nothing is known about the exact circumstances. Kuei-chou was virtually ignored during Later Han. Yün-nan was not ignored but on the contrary kept under Chinese domination with considerable effort. What justified this effort? What made Yün-nan different?

The only conceivable answer is the India trade. Facts about this trade are illusive. It must have flourished, but the sources do not dwell on it. The evidence is circumstantial. We have seen that frequent tribute missions reached the Later Han court from countries beyond the Yung-ch'ang border. Some of these countries seem to have been situated in Burma, and their delegations went to China on what later came to be known as the Burma Road. It stands to reason that the tributary trade must have been greatly outweighed by the unofficial one. It is interesting in this connection that L. C. Goodrich draws attention to a persistent legend, according to which the first suspension bridge over the Mekong³⁾ was built in the reign of Emperor Ming (A.D. 58-75).⁴⁾ The logical time for constructing such a bridge would have been after the Ai-lao submission of A.D. 69. Following the description of the surrender, HHS has the entry: "For the first time, one penetrated the mountains of Po-nan and crossed the Mekong" (86,116:16b). This remark

¹⁾ If, for instance, the Chinese numbered 100,000 households, and the aborigines 130,000 "households", and if the former figure is multiplied by 5 and the latter by 10.7, the total would be very close to that of A.D. 140.

²⁾ I reverse my earlier position (64. Bielenstein, p. 143) that the high average of members per household was due to large merchant households.

³⁾ Located SW of the modern town of King-tung in Yün-nan.

⁴⁾ 127. Goodrich, p. 3.

indicates improved communications, which may well have included a suspension bridge over the Mekong.

The most convincing argument for the India trade is the very submission of the barbarians. If, as seems to have been the case, the trade route went from Yung-ch'ang, through Yüe-hi, Shu, and Kuang-han, across the Ts'in-ling Range, and then down the Wei River valley, this would explain the voluntary surrender of the barbarians along its southern extension. The Chinese capital on the one extreme, and Burma and India on the other, were only termini. Trade must have flourished along the entire route. To ensure profits, the merchants had to deal in luxury articles and avoid bulky and cheap goods. Luxury articles were ideally suited to impress the barbarians and to woo them into the Chinese orbit. This was not part of a policy, but simply a by-product of the India trade. The aboriginals in general, and their chiefs in particular, responded to the stimulus of luxury. They submitted in the expectation of gaining easier access to it. If these surrenders were due to the India trade, they in turn accelerated it by increasing the demand and facilitating the communications.

This development was detrimental to long-range Chinese interests in Yün-nan. The surrenders were not sincere. Although entered into the Chinese population registers, the aboriginals kept their tribal organizations, preserved a high degree of autonomy, and could rebel again at will. As long as the government was determined to hold on to Yün-nan, it would have been far wiser to maintain friendly relations with the foreign barbarians from the base of a gradually sinified commandery, rather than permitting them as an unstable element into the empire. Kuang-wu inaugurated the policy, and as short-range expedient it worked reasonably well. But it ensured that Yün-nan remained predominantly barbarian, and the emergence of Nan-chao in the 7th century as an independent state was the logical conclusion.

2. *The North*

Former Han

While geography favoured Chinese military and peaceful expansion in the south, the steppes and deserts of Central Asia were inhospitable. Rainfalls were irregular and insufficient, the soil was arid, and farmers could not make a living. In Han times, the voluntary migration was southwards, whereas people had to be forced to move into the northern border areas.

In the south, the troubles encountered by the Chinese were within the empire. The barbarians were engulfed or partially assimilated, and some fought back. Their rebellions were a burden to the nation, but no immediate serious danger. All through Han times, China's military superiority over the southern barbarians was never in doubt. In the north, China rarely had the initiative. The Hiung-nu raided China with ease, while the Tibetans in the west and the Koreans in the northeast were unreliable neighbours.

The situation in the north was therefore different. The problem did not lie within

but without the border. It had to be tackled by a combination of diplomatic and military means, where the advantage generally rested with the barbarians. Geographical conditions in Central Asia made a permanent military victory over the Hiung-nu impossible. When the Hiung-nu pillaged China, they could live off the land. When the Chinese invaded the territory of the Hiung-nu, they were handicapped by supply difficulties and the elusiveness of the enemy. Appeasement was cheaper and could be disguised as a diplomatic victory. These shifting relations between China and its northern neighbours are a necessary background to the full understanding of Kuang-wu's policies, and must briefly be discussed.

When Emperor Kao founded the Han state, the Great Wall of Ts'in times formed its northern defense from the Yalu River to Shan-si. The frontier then cut diagonally through the Ordos Region, the major part of which had been lost during the civil war. Korea on the one extremity, and the Kan-su corridor west of the Yellow River's upper course on the other, did not yet belong to the Chinese empire.

While the Koreans and Tibetans during the early period caused no trouble in the east and west, the Hiung-nu proved all the more formidable in the north. They lived as nomads on the vast steppes, tending large herds of horses, cattle, sheep, and camels. Little is known about their ethnic background and linguistic affiliation. T'ou-man, a contemporary of the Ts'in dynasty (221-207), and his son Mo-tun succeeded in welding them into a tribal federation, which controlled an enormous Central Asian territory. The supreme rulers, all descendants of Mo-tun, had the title of Shan-yü, under whom hereditary dignitaries governed fixed areas of the state. Far from being uncouth neighbours, as the Chinese preferred to regard them, the Hiung-nu had a civilization of their own, giving cultural impulses to China as well as receiving them.

The Han dynasty had hardly been established, when the first clash between the Hiung-nu and Chinese took place.¹⁾ The fighting was to continue for well over one hundred years, until it temporarily abated. It should be stressed that the spells of Hiung-nu aggressiveness cannot mechanically be correlated to periods of Chinese weakness. Disorder in China might attract its predatory neighbours, but this was by no means an automatic response.

During Emperor Kao's reign, the Hiung-nu invaded Shan-si three times, in 201, 200, and 196 B.C.²⁾ At the end of 201, the emperor fell into the famous trap at P'ing-ch'eng³⁾ in northern Shan-si, where he was besieged for seven days, and from which he extracted himself with difficulty.

In 192 B.C., peace was restored. The Chinese confirmed it by giving a girl of the imperial house as a wife to the Shan-yü. This set the tone for the future. The

¹⁾ If not otherwise indicated, the following survey is based on the *pen ki* and the chapters on the Hiung-nu in SK and HS (SK 110; HS 94A-B). See also 128. de Groot, I (whose translations are poor), 72. Dubs, I-II, 99. Dubs, III, under the respective years, and 147. Watson, I-II (particularly II, pp. 155-192). The tables of 118, 119. Shen are not helpful, since they are incomplete.

²⁾ For the raid of 196 B.C., see SK 93:3b; HS 33:8b. Cf. also 147. Watson, II, p. 236.

³⁾ The P'ing-ch'eng prefecture during Han belonged to the Yen-men commandery and was situated E of the present Ta-t'ung hien, Shan-si. It is shown on map 15.

Hiung-nu attitude to China was to alternate between outright war and demands for peace on their terms, including an alliance by marriage (ho ts'in).

Soon the raids began again, and in 182, 181, and 177 B.C., the Hiung-nu looted parts of Shan-si and Shen-si. During the 170's and 160's, they also extended their territory into western Kan-su by dislodging the Yüe-chi. The Chinese exchanged rich gifts with Shan-yü Mo-tun in 174, and soon afterwards sent another girl of the imperial house to his successor. That did not stop the raids for long. In 169, the Hiung-nu pillaged parts of Shen-si, and in 166 a raid carried them within sight of the imperial capital, Ch'ang-an.

Peace was again concluded in 162 B.C. Although the Hiung-nu asked for an alliance by marriage, there is no evidence that a girl of the imperial house was sent at this occasion. It was agreed that the Great Wall should be respected as the border between the Chinese and the Hiung-nu, in addition to which Emperor Wen pledged yearly gifts in fixed quantities. Raids into northern Shan-si and Shen-si followed during 158 B.C. After inconclusive peace talks in 156 and 155, the Hiung-nu seem to have been on the verge of participating in the rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms of 154. This was prevented through the swift collapse of the uprising. Peace was restored once more in 152, and a girl of the imperial house was sent to the Shan-yü. In 148, the Hiung-nu sacked the northernmost part of the Great Plain, and in 144 and 142 they raided Shan-si and Shen-si.

The Hiung-nu had the initiative during this entire period, and the Chinese remained on the defensive. Far from living up to his claim of being the one and only Son of Heaven, the Chinese emperor in all correspondence addressed the Shan-yü as an equal, and the regular annual gifts to the Shan-yü were little better than a euphemism for tribute. These years of appeasement ended with Emperor Wu (reigned 140-87). Since the history of his Hiung-nu wars is well known, it will not be necessary here to enter into details.

An ambitious attempt was made in 133 B.C. to lure the Shan-yü into a trap in northern Shan-si. He became suspicious, saved himself in the last moment, and retaliated with a raid in 129. Emperor Wu dispatched four generals during the same year, one of whom reached the capital of the Shan-yü, Lung-ch'eng (the "Dragon City") in present Outer Mongolia. In 128, the Hiung-nu invaded China. A new Hiung-nu raid in 127 led to a Chinese counterattack, the reconquest of the northern Ordos Region, and the establishment of Wu-yüan and Shuo-fang commanderies. These territories had been lost since Ts'in times.

The seesaw struggle continued. The Hiung-nu invaded China in 126, 125, 124, 122, and 121. The Chinese struck at the Hiung-nu in 124, 123, and 121. That last year, an important event took place, the first major surrender of Hiung-nu. One of their kings, who had fallen out with the Shan-yü, went over to the Chinese with, it is stated, more than 40,000 men. His allotted territory had been the Kan-su corridor. Between 121 and 101 B.C.,¹⁾ all of Kan-su west of the Yellow River was divided into commanderies and incorporated into the empire. The surrendered

¹⁾ The dates in HS are contradictory.

Hiung-nu were placed in five specially created Dependent States. These were situated beyond the regular frontier and administered by Chinese Chief Commandants.

A Hiung-nu raid in 120 B.C. was to be the last for several years. The military initiative had shifted to the Chinese who, in 119, crossed the Gobi and inflicted a great defeat on the enemy. In 111 and 107, Emperor Wu even invited the Shan-yü to surrender. Much had changed since the time of appeasement. The Hiung-nu were on the defensive, but they were by no means beaten. Emperor Wu's proposal shows that he had come to overestimate his victories.

Meanwhile, energetic attempts were made to fill the newly established commanderies with Chinese settlers. People were not willing to move voluntarily into these regions, and therefore had to be forced. Major transfers are recorded for 127, 120, 118, 111, and 100. Great searches in 99 and 92 probably resulted in forced transfers to the northwest. The fortifications were extended to protect also the Kan-su corridor.

A by-product of the Hiung-nu wars was the Chinese conquest of the Western Region. Various small states of the Tarim Basin had previously recognized the overlordship of the Shan-yü. In 101 B.C., a Chinese general succeeded in reaching Ta-yüan (Ferghana) beyond the basin. During the following decades, China gradually established itself as master of the territory.

The reign of Emperor Wu ends on an inconclusive note. While not regaining their former strength, the Hiung-nu had begun to rally. They raided China anew in 107, 102, 98, 91, and 90. Chinese attacks in 103, 99, 97, and 90 were not uniformly successful. New raids followed after Emperor Wu's death, in 87, 83, 80, 78, and 77. Soon after Emperor Süan had come to the throne, he formed an alliance with the Wu-sun, a western neighbour of the Hiung-nu, and in 71 B.C. dispatched five great armies. These were unable to engage the enemy, but the Wu-sun, led or advised by a Chinese Colonel, won a victory. This was the last but one military encounter during Former Han in which both Chinese and Hiung-nu were involved.

The pendulum had swung both ways and then halted in the middle. For the first seven decades of the Han dynasty, China had been on the defensive. Its northern commanderies had been sacked by the Hiung-nu, people had been kidnapped and carried off. Peace had to be bought by what amounted to tribute. During the next two and a half decades, China had taken the offensive. While it had not been able to gain decisive victories, it had wrested northern Ordos and western Kan-su from the Hiung-nu, and had kept them off balance by invasions of their own domain. During the last four and a half decades, an equilibrium had been reached, where the Hiung-nu could not recover their lost territories, and where the Chinese could not bend the enemy to their will. But a chain of events was about to begin among the Hiung-nu, which would bring about the first real peace Han China had known at the northern border.

In 60 B.C., the Shan-yü died. A schism occurred, and during eight years a number of men fought for the throne.¹⁾ The peak of confusion was reached in 57 B.C., when there were five claimants. Gradually, two main factions emerged, headed

¹⁾ For these events, see also the summary by 72. Dubs, II, pp. 191-193.

by brothers or half-brothers. One took the title of Hu-han-sie Shan-yü,¹⁾ the other that of Chī-chī Shan-yü. During the fighting between the factions, some high nobles and their people surrendered outright to China. They were in 55 B.C. placed in the Dependent States of Si-ho and Pei-ti, the first of which with certainty, and the second probably, was situated in the Ordos Region. While within the Great Wall, these territories were suited for nomads but not for Chinese farmers.²⁾ But even the claimants thought it opportune to establish friendly relations with China. The Hu-han-sie Shan-yü sent a younger brother to the imperial court in 54 B.C. and, as HS (8:20b) puts it, "declared himself a subject". In early 53, he sent a son. His rival, the Chī-chī Shan-yü, countered this by also sending a brother and a son.

At the beginning of 51 B.C., the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü took the unprecedented step of proposing a personal visit to the Chinese court. Emperor Sūan called his high officials to a court conference in order to discuss the matter. The majority argued that the Shan-yü, being a barbarian, should be classified as a king but ranked below the Chinese kings. This delicate and illusory point of etiquette was not accepted by the emperor, who, on more sensible advice, decided to treat the Shan-yü as an equal. When the Shan-yü arrived, he was presented with an imperial seal and rich gifts, and was feasted for one month. Chinese troops and officials escorted the Shan-yü on his return. He took up his residence north of the Chinese border. The Chī-chī Shan-yü realized that he could not fight both his rival and the Chinese. He withdrew westwards, and was in 36 B.C. defeated and killed by an expeditionary Chinese force. The Hu-han-sie Shan-yü paid further visits to the imperial court in 49 and 33.

At the last visit, Emperor Yüan ordered that the Shan-yü should be presented with five ladies of his own harem. HS does not dwell on the details, while HHS gives a full, though perhaps somewhat imaginative, account. Since the event of 33 B.C. has bearing on Later Han history, it requires attention. It so happened that among the harem ladies was a certain Wang Chao-kün (style: Ts'iang³⁾) from a good family. Having been in the palace for several years without ever being noticed by the emperor, she told the Prefect of the Lateral Courts that she was willing to be given to the Shan-yü. When the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü was on the point of leaving, the emperor ordered the five ladies to be brought before him. Wang Chao-kün created a sensation, walking to and fro and turning her head. The emperor belatedly wanted to keep her, but, since he could not break faith, he had to present her to the Shan-yü. She gave birth to two sons.⁴⁾ When the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü died in 31 B.C., the son of his principal wife succeeded him (table 10). According to Hiung-nu habit, this son, the Fu-chu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü wished to make Wang Chao-kün his wife also. She sent a memorial to the Chinese court, asking permission

¹⁾ I follow H.H. Dubs in reading *sie* rather than *ye*. The prefixes before the Shan-yü titles have not been satisfactorily explained.

²⁾ Some of these Hiung-nu broke away again in 48 B.C. (HS 9:3a; 72. Dubs, II, p. 305).

³⁾ HS 9:13a writes Ts'iang with radical 75, 94B:6b with radical 90, and HHS 89,119:2b with radical 38.

⁴⁾ HS 94B:8b says: one son. So much is certain, that only one son, Yi-t'u-chī-ya-shī, reached adulthood.

to return, but Emperor Ch'eng ordered that she should follow the customs of the barbarians (89,119:2b-3a). In her new marriage, she had two daughters.

The Fu-chu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü visited the Chinese court in 25 B.C. He died in 21 and was succeeded by his brother, the Sou-hie-jo-ti Shan-yü. When the latter died in 12 B.C., his half-brother became the Kü-ya-jo-ti Shan-yü. This ruler died in 8 B.C., whereupon his brother ascended the throne as Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü. The successors of the Fu-chu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü all sent sons as hostages to China in 20, 11, 8, and 7 B.C.,¹⁾ but the only one to go to Ch'ang-an himself was the last. The Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü paid an official visit in 1 B.C., which did not come off well. Emperor Ai had been persuaded that the Shan-yü would bring with him evil influences from the north, and his lodgings were astrologically chosen in such a way as to counteract any possible danger. This was not lost on the Shan-yü, who naturally became irritated.

Hu-han-sie Shan-yü Ki-hou-shan ∞ a) } sisters from b) } Hu-yen lineage c) X d) Wang Chao-kün	a) Fu-chu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü Tiao-t'ao-mo-kao (reigned 31-21 B.C.) ∞ Wang Chao-kün	{ daughter Yün (†A.D. 23) ∞ Sü-pu Tang daughter X ∞ Tang-yü X
	a) Sou-hie-jo-ti Shan-yü Tsü-mi-sü (reigned 21-12 B.C.)	
	b) Kü-ya-jo-ti Shan-yü Tsü-mo-kü (reigned 12-8 B.C.)	
	b) Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü Nang-chi-ya-si (reigned 8 B.C.-A.D. 13)	{ Hu-han-sie Shan-yü Pi (reigned A.D. 49-56) SOUTHERN HIUNG-NU
	a) Wu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü Hien (reigned A.D. 13-18)	
	c) Hu-tu-er-shi-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü Yü (reigned A.D. 18-46)	{ Shan-yü Wu-ta-ti-hou (reigned A.D. 46) Shan-yü P'u-nu (reigned A.D. 46-83) NORTHERN HIUNG-NU
	d) Lu-li King of the Right Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi	

Table 10. Selective genealogy of the house of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü.

In the Chinese records, all events from 51 B.C. onwards are dressed up as a submission of the Hiung-nu, e.g. the Shan-yü "knocks at the border", he "declares himself a subject", he presents "memorials". H. H. Dubs accepts this terminology, and in his summary flatly speaks of the "subjugation" of the Hiung-nu.²⁾ Was it really a subjugation? It is true that between 54 and 51 B.C. the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü,

¹⁾ Cf. 148. Yang's interesting article "Hostages in Chinese History", particularly pp. 45-46.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 193.

because of the fight with his rival, was at a disadvantage. But even in his weakest hour, he was received by the Chinese emperor as an equal. His strength recovered soon after the Chi-chi Shan-yü had given up the contest, and he returned with his people to the pastures in the north (HS 94B:5b). The institution of sending hostages was a diplomatic mechanism to ensure peace, but by no means is proof of real submission. We have seen, for instance, that, although Wei Ao in A.D. 29 gave a son as hostage to Emperor Kuang-wu, he remained stubbornly independent until his death. Even when Kuang-wu in A.D. 32 gave him a final choice between submission or execution of his son, Wei Ao valued autonomy higher than the son's life.¹⁾ Neither did the five visits of various Shan-yü between 51 and 1 B.C., novelty though they were, necessarily imply submission. The stereotype vocabulary of the Chinese dynastic historian was simply unsuited for describing such unprecedented visits, and these were therefore stylized into homage.

In one sense only, the Chinese had the upper hand. The Hu-han-sie Shan-yü had volunteered to come to court, and the traffic was one-sided. Weighed against this, the visits were lucrative for the Hiung-nu. In 51 B.C., the Chinese gifts to the Shan-yü were a cap, a belt, clothing, a sword with a guard of jade, a knife worn at the belt, a bow with 4 arrows, 10 lances, one comfortable carriage, one saddle and bridle, 15 horses, 20 *kin* of pure gold (10 lb. 12 oz. avoirdupois; 4.88 kg.), 200,000 cash, 77 outer garments, 8000 bolts of brocade, flowered silk, fine silk, and various kinds of plain silk, and 6000 *kin* of silk floss (3,225 lb.; 1,464 kg.) (HS 94B:3b). When the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü departed, he was in addition given 34,000 *hu* of grain (19,210 U.S. bushels; 678,919 l.) (HS 94B:4a). In 49 B.C., the etiquette and presents were the same, except that the garments were increased to 110, the brocade and silk to 9000 bolts, and the silk floss to 8000 *kin* (4,300 lb.; 1,952 kg.) (HS 94B:4a). When Emperor Yüan had ascended the throne (49 B.C.), the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü asked to be supplied with grain and was given 20,000 *hu* (11,300 U.S. bushels; 399,364 l.) (HS 94B:4b-5a). At the visit of 33 B.C., the etiquette and gifts again followed the precedent of 51 B.C., except that the presents of garments, silk, and silk floss were doubled over and above the amounts of 49 B.C. (HS 94B:6a). This means that the garments numbered 220, the various kinds of silk 18,000 bolts, and the silk floss 16,000 *kin* (8,600 lb.; 3904 kg.). At the visit of 25 B.C., the gifts followed the precedent of 33 B.C., with, however, the silk increased to 20,000 bolts, and the silk floss to 20,000 *kin* (10,750 lb.; 4,880 kg.) (HS 94B:10a). In 3 B.C., 50 bolts of embroidered and plain silk, and 10 *kin* of pure gold (5 lb. 6 oz. avoirdupois; 2.44 kg.), were sent to the Shan-yü (HS 94B:14b). At the visit of 1 B.C., the Chinese gifts were increased to 370 garments, 30,000 bolts of brocade, flowered silk, embroidered silk, and plain silk, and 30,000 *kin* of silk floss (16,125 lb.; 7,320 kg.). All other gifts followed the precedent of 25 B.C. (HS 94B:14b-15a). Adding the totals of the major gifts, we get for the period 51-1 B.C.:

110 *kin* of pure gold (59 lb. 2 oz. avoirdupois; 26.44 kg.)
1,000,000 cash

¹⁾ See vol. II, pp. 166, 175.

997 garments

85,050 bolts of various types of silk

80,000 *kin* of silk floss (43,000 lb.; 19,520 kg.)

54,000 *hu* of grain (30,510 U.S. bushels; 1,078,283 l.)

The value of the garments and the silk floss is not known. The rest can be calculated to have been worth very roughly U.S. \$2 million.¹⁾ While the real figure must be higher, considering the unknown value of the other items, it cannot have been a serious strain on the Chinese budget. Over a 50 year period, the amount is not large enough to indicate systematic extortion on the part of the Hiung-nu. The gifts were sufficiently impressive, however, that greed cannot be ruled out as a motive for the visits of the Shan-yü. Such a motive is more credible than the wish to render homage to the Son of Heaven.

The facts seem to indicate that troubles persuaded the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü in 51 B.C. to make peace with China. It was a peace between two independent nations. China was the more powerful of the two, so that the treaty to some extent was unequal. From the formal point of view, the Hiung-nu sought peace, and the Chinese granted it. The Hiung-nu sent hostages, and the Chinese did not. The Shan-yü called on the Son of Heaven, which psychologically put him at a disadvantage. But, in practical terms, the Hiung-nu were neither subjugated, nor did they, in fact, submit. They promised to protect the Chinese border, which meant no more than that they ceased their own raids. They received rich gifts when they came to the court. While it cannot be said that the Chinese bought peace, the initiative did not entirely, or perhaps not even primarily, rest with them. It suited the Hiung-nu that there should be peace and a period of recovery. In spite of the stylized vocabulary of the dynastic historian, the Chinese had no political hold over the Shan-yü. The Hiung-nu could resume their raids whenever they were so inclined.

It is from the last century B.C., that rich materials are available on daily routine at the Kan-su border. The wooden slips, discovered by Sir Aurel Stein during 1913-1915 in the Tun-huang region, and by the Sino-Swedish expedition at Etsingol (the ancient Kū-yen) in 1930,²⁾ permit a fascinating insight into the military life at the Great Wall, the manning of the watchtowers, and the use of smoke and fire signals by day and night. The wealth of the finds can, no doubt, be explained by

¹⁾ According to the recent research by 136. Loewe, pp. 64, 73, the terms *hu* and *shi* denoted the same unit of capacity. 101. Eberhard, p. 2, estimates that the average value of one *shi* of grain in Han times was 30 cash, and that one bolt of good silk was worth 1000 cash (p. 11). 99. Dubs, III, p. 458, note 25.4, shows that 10,000 cash corresponded to one *kin* of pure gold. This makes it possible to convert the gifts of cash, silk, and grain into gold, and to translate the amount into modern currency.

²⁾ The most important publications of these slips are by 139. Maspero, and 115, 116. Lao (superseding his earlier work of 1943-1944). The Kū-yen slips have also been published by the Academia Sinica, Peking, in 114. Kū-yen Han kien kia pien. Except for a few additions, the photographs are the same as those printed by Lao Kan. For excellent surveys of our present state of knowledge on the wooden slips, see 129. Hulsewé and 133. Loewe.

Kū-yen was a military outpost in the Gobi desert, shown in vol. II, p. 258, map I, as an appendix to Chang-ye commandery. It had been established in 102 B.C. (HS 6:32b; 72. Dubs, II, p. 102).

the generally peaceful conditions on the border, which gave the Chinese mania for detailed recording free rein to accumulate large archives.

To the east of the Hiung-nu, and tributary to them, the Wu-huan were living in what is now southeastern Mongolia. In 78 and 75 B.C., they looted Liao-tung commandery (HS 7:6a, 10a),¹⁾ but otherwise did not trouble China during Former Han. Still another tribe in that area, the Sien-pi, does not appear in HS at all, although it existed and was tributary to the Hiung-nu. The Wu-huan, and particularly the Sien-pi, were to play a forceful role in Later Han times.

In northern Korea, the state of Ch'ao-sien had maintained itself until the time of Emperor Wu.²⁾ It was defeated in a campaign lasting from 109–108, whereupon its territory was divided into Chinese commanderies (HS 6:27a, 27b–28a).³⁾

This leaves only the Tibetans (K'iang) to be discussed, a semi-nomadic people which had some agriculture in addition to herds of cattle, horses, and sheep.⁴⁾ The Tibetans remained peaceful until 112 B.C., when they invaded Lung-si commandery. They were defeated during the same year (HS 6:22b).⁵⁾ In 61 B.C., Tibetan horsemen attacked Kin-ch'eng commandery, surrendered in 60, and were settled in the Dependent State of Kin-ch'eng (HS 8:16b; 17a–17b).⁶⁾ A Tibetan uprising during 42 B.C. in an unspecified area was squashed in the following year (HS 9:9a).⁷⁾ For the next forty-five years, the Tibetans made no hostile moves. Their disruptive influence in Former Han times had been negligible.

Where in the northwest Chinese and barbarians lived side by side within the border, it is the technique of the ancient historian to refer to the Tibetans by name (i.e. K'iang), and to lump all other tribesmen together as Hu. With three exceptions, coexistence between China and these barbarians had been peaceful. Two of the exceptions have been noted.⁸⁾ The third consists of the Po-ma-ti ("White Horses Ti") who inhabited the Wu-tu commandery, athwart the Ts'in-ling Range. The Po-ma-ti rose twice. The first time was in 108 B.C. They were defeated, and some of the tribesmen were transferred to Tsiu-ts'üan commandery in the Kan-su corridor. This did not prevent a second uprising in 80 B.C. (HS 6:28a; 7:6a; HHS 86,116:23a, 23b).⁹⁾ After briefly reappearing during the civil war after the death of Wang Mang,¹⁰⁾ the Po-ma-ti sink into oblivion.

In summary, it is manifest that during Former Han, the Hiung-nu had been

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 163, 173.

²⁾ An earlier attempt to establish the Ts'ang-hai commandery in Korea, 128 B.C., was not successful. The territory was abandoned again in 126 (HS 6:10a, 11a; 72. Dubs, II, pp. 50, 52; HHS 85,115:9a).

³⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 90–91, 92–93. See also SK 115 and 147. Watson, II, pp. 258–263.

⁴⁾ That the Tibetans engaged in some agriculture can be seen from Chinese reports of confiscated grain.

⁵⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 81.

⁶⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 241, 242–243.

⁷⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 322, 323.

⁸⁾ The break-away of the surrendered Hiung-nu in 48 B.C., and the minor uprising of the Tibetans in 42 B.C.

⁹⁾ 72. Dubs, II, pp. 93, 163–164.

¹⁰⁾ See vol. II, pp. 108, 163, 180.

the only major enemy in the north, until they were willing to cease their raids. If we are to trust the dynastic historian, the period of peace came to an end when Wang Mang rose to power and proceeded to cause wrack and ruin.

Wang Mang

The accusations against Wang Mang, generally echoed by the modern scholars,¹⁾ are as follows: In A.D. 9, he demoted the Shan-yü of the Hiung-nu by exchanging his former "imperial" seal against the "official" seal of a noble. The Shan-yü repented by resuming the raids on Chinese territory. In A.D. 10, Wang Mang ordered that the Hiung-nu should be attacked by 300,000 troops, and that their territory should be divided. Since the undertaking was planned on too grandiose a scale, the armies never set out. The Hiung-nu continued their raids, and the people suffered. A new Shan-yü came on the throne in A.D. 13 and was prepared to make peace. When he discovered that his son, a hostage in China, had been executed by Wang Mang, he continued the war. Chinese border troops engaged in banditry. Through Wang Mang's inept policies, the Western Region was lost to the Hiung-nu.

Discussing these accusations, it should first be noted that the predominant Chinese attitude to the barbarians was unrealistic. Whatever the hard facts of political circumstances, China was always considered to take precedence over its neighbours. By an elastic capacity for double-think, cultural superiority was construed as moral supremacy, entitling China to fit the lesser peoples into an imaginary political pyramid with the Son of Heaven at its summit. When the advisers of Emperor Sün in 51 B.C. proposed that the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü should be ranked below the Chinese kings, they no doubt reacted almost instinctively. The emperor had the good sense to refuse their counsel and to treat the Hiung-nu ruler as an equal. His act of granting the Shan-yü an imperial seal became a precedent which could not be changed by his successors. But this is not to say that the greater number of high officials approved of it. Most of them were probably unable to reconcile it with their Confucian universe. When Wang Mang had overthrown the Han dynasty, it was a matter of routine to continue formal relations with the barbarians by granting them new seals. No longer bound by Han practice, and a convinced Confucianist himself, he could take steps to redress the situation. He acted from no demented motives, and certainly won the hearty approval of his advisers. The new seal was carried to the Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü in A.D. 9 and exchanged against the old one without difficulty. The lesser status of the new seal was only discovered on the following day. The Shan-yü asked to get his old seal back, but the Chinese envoy had meanwhile thoughtfully smashed it. Later in the year, Wang Mang refused a second request for the restoration of the old seal (HS 94B:16b-17b; 99B:11a-11b, 13a).²⁾

The affair of the seal shows a deplorable lack of finesse on the Chinese side, and undoubtedly was a mistake. It might have aggravated tensions. But it is

¹⁾ E.g. 123. Chavannes, p. 155, note 2; 99. Dubs, III, pp. 120-121; 124. Drake, pp. 147-150; 135. Loewe, p. 7; 141. Samolin, p. 31.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, 295-296, 300; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 266-269.

improbable that it was the main cause for the resumption of the raids. The dynastic historian accuses Wang Mang of being personally responsible, since it must be shown that the "usurper" did not possess the Mandate of Heaven. He criticizes Wang Mang, but withholds criticism from Han emperors for similar actions. Emperor Ai's egregious tactlessness against the very same Shan-yü in 1 B.C. has already been described.¹⁾ The historian does not emphasize Emperor Ai's insult, and in his *pen ki* restricts himself to the sentence: "The Shan-yü was not pleased" (HS 11:8a).²⁾ Elsewhere, he blames the incident on bad advice (HS 45:16b). Emperor Kuang-wu, with less reason, was to show flagrant rudeness in another seal affair, involving the King of So-kü (Yarkand).³⁾ The historian records the facts of that impasse, but abstains from any form of censure. In short, the action of Wang Mang has been singled out and distorted. It was neither rash nor eccentric, and undoubtedly had a wide support in China. The Shan-yü, on his part, had reason to be annoyed, but hardly would have gone to war on that account. Placed in proper perspective, Wang Mang's policy on seals was as little the main *casus belli* in the north as it had been in the south.⁴⁾

Wang Mang's execution of the hostage is also less extreme than the historian implies. After one border raid in A.D. 9 (HS 94B:17a-17b; 99B:13a),⁵⁾ and two others in A.D. 11 and 12, Wang Mang had the Hiung-nu prince Teng publicly executed (HS 94B:18b, 20a; 99B:18b).⁶⁾ The Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü died in A.D. 13, and was succeeded by Teng's father Hien, the Wu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü. This ruler made peace ouvertures, whereupon the Chinese tried to conceal Teng's execution. The truth came out in A.D. 14, and the new Shan-yü retaliated with another raid (HS 94B:20b-21a; 99B:25b, 26a).⁷⁾ The decapitation of the hostage proved unfortunate and unwise, but Wang Mang was perfectly within his rights to order it. He simply followed established Chinese custom. This does not prevent the historian from again censuring Wang Mang for mismanagement, where others get off scot-free. In A.D. 32, Kuang-wu executed the hostage Wei Sün, whose father Wei Ao had refused to surrender.⁸⁾ It had no influence on the general political balance, since Wei Ao was adamant anyway to preserve his autonomy. But the execution may well have contributed to making Wei Ao's resistance even fiercer. Another case, which concerned a son of the King of Lou-lan, developed in the time of Emperor Wu. The king died in 92 B.C., whereupon his son, a hostage in China, was invited to return home and ascend the throne. This hostage had for some reason been castrated on Emperor Wu's order. The castration was concealed

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 90.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 37.

³⁾ Cf. *infra* pp. 132 ff.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 61.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 301; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 267-269. HS 99B:13a mentions the raid under A.D. 10. As pointed out by Dubs (*ibidem* note 13.2), the description serves to introduce an incident in Turfan during A.D. 10, the raid itself having taken place in A.D. 9.

⁶⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 318-319; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 272, 276.

⁷⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 347, 348; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 280-281.

⁸⁾ See vol. II, p. 175.

from the envoys, who were told that the emperor was fond of the hostage and did not wish to let him go. Lou-lan should choose the son who was next in order. This led to complications, through which Lou-lan temporarily fell under the influence of the Hiung-nu (HS 96A:12b).¹⁾ The accounts concerning Emperors Wu and Kuang-wu are given without innuendo, whereas Wang Mang is depicted as a megalomaniacal bungler.

Turning to Wang Mang's plan for an attack on the Hiung-nu, he ordered in the winter of A.D. 10/11 the mobilization of 300,000 men. They were to carry provisions for 300 days, defeat the Hiung-nu, and divide their country into fifteen states, each under a separate ruler (HS 94B:18b; 99B:14a-14b).²⁾ The General Yen Yu³⁾ remonstrated against the enterprise, pointing out that the army was too large and that the provisions would be difficult to transport. HS copies this criticism, as it seems, in full, notes that Wang Mang did not accept it, and adds: "Therefore, the empire became agitated" (HS 94B:19a-19b).⁴⁾ Again, Wang Mang is supposed to be at fault. His army was too grand, its mobilization caused hardship, it never set out, and the troops did as they pleased. Looking more closely at the evidence, we find that Wang Mang, in spite of his detractors, acted with good reason. Following general practice, he made no attempt to assemble the soldiers in a single locality. They were divided among twelve generals so that the individual units on average counted 25,000 men. These were to cross the border at selected points along a broad front, stretching from Ho-pei to Kan-su. Such a procedure made it easier to draw up and supply the troops, and it reduced the hardship for the local population. Seen in this light, the army was not too large. Emperor Wu in 133 B.C. assembled 300,000 men in northern Shan-si alone (HS 6:6a).⁵⁾ In 119 B.C., he sent out four generals with 50,000 cavalry each, and several hundreds of thousands of foot-soldiers to follow (HS 6:16a).⁶⁾ Compared to Emperor Wu, Wang Mang's endeavour looks almost modest. The mobilization naturally caused hardship in the personal sense, that under Wang Mang as well as any other emperor no man enjoyed being sent to the frontier. But economically speaking, the recruitment probably had beneficial results rather than the reverse. The first great break of the Yellow River's dikes had occurred, and peasant families were destitute. The mobilizing, clothing, and feeding of young men must have relieved at least some of the local hardship.

If there is nothing unreasonable in Wang Mang's mobilization of the armies, there also is nothing strange in their not setting out. The simple reason must be that this proved unnecessary, and that the show of force sufficed to put teeth into Wang Mang's foreign policy. On the other hand, as long as no stable peace had been restored, the border reinforcements could not be withdrawn. For A.D. 15,

¹⁾ 128. de Groot, II, pp. 56-57.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 304-306; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 273, 278.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 112, note 1.

⁴⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 273-275.

⁵⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 39.

⁶⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 65.

some marauding of these troops is recorded, due to famine during that and the preceding year (HS 99B:26a, 27b).¹⁾ But it is out of the question that this instance of slackened discipline could have had any wide repercussions. The statement of HS (99B:27b)²⁾ that "the border commanderies were indeed almost on the point of becoming emptied" is a sheer absurdity. It is a cliché, a formalized accusation against Wang Mang. The depopulation of the northwest began later, under Kuang-wu, and affected a much wider area than the commanderies along the border.

Neither could the Hiung-nu raids have set any large-scale migration into motion. The amazing fact is that once the stereotype accusations are discarded, the raids turn out to be few and minor. Those of A.D. 9, 11, 12, and 14 have been mentioned. One further raid is vaguely alluded to for about A.D. 19 (HS 24B:26b; 99C:4b).³⁾ All these raids seem to have been on a small scale. It is the historian's habit to record which Chinese territories were affected by the major incursions. For Wang Mang's time, such information is almost totally lacking in HS, both from his biography and from chapter 94B on the Hiung-nu. The only commanderies mentioned to have been raided are Shuo-fang and Yen-men. The former was situated on the Ordos bend of the Yellow River, the other in the northernmost part of Shan-si. The conclusion can only be that the raids barely penetrated the border. This is borne out by the wooden slips found at Etsingol (Kü-yen) and Tun-huang.⁴⁾ They show no major chronological break for Wang Mang's reign, proving that the border fortifications, including the outpost in the Gobi, were intact. The recriminations of the dynastic historian notwithstanding, Wang Mang was always in control of the situation on the northern border. This was well summed up by the memorial of a military man in A.D. 21, which stated that anxiety did not rest with the Hiung-nu, but lay within the borders (HS 99C:14b).⁵⁾

The intact condition of the border fortifications in the northwest, and the observation that the Hiung-nu menace has been much exaggerated, do not accord with the accusation that the Western Region in Central Asia was lost to the Hiung-nu through Wang Mang's incompetence. An unbiased reading of the sources shows, in fact, that the troubles in the Western Region were not caused by Wang Mang. Nor were they primarily due to Hiung-nu interference. They had a local background, were centred on Yen-k'i (Karashahr), and did not prove insoluble.

In A.D. 10, the King of Farther Kü-shī⁶⁾ planned to go over to the Hiung-nu. The matter became known, and the Chinese Protector General of the Western Region, Tan K'in, had him executed. A brother of the king with some of the people surrendered to the Hiung-nu and joined them in a raid on Farther Kü-shī (HS 94B: 17b-18a; 96B:34a-34b).⁷⁾

¹⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 347, 356.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 356.

³⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 381.

⁴⁾ 116. Liao, pp. 1-236.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 416.

⁶⁾ Situated north of Turfan beyond T'ien-shan. For this and the following events, see map 14.

⁷⁾ 128. de Groot, I, p. 270, II, p. 179.

A brief complication followed when two Chinese officers, Ch'en Liang and Chung Tai, rebelled on Sep. 15, A.D. 10. They murdered their colonel, declared themselves for the defunct Han dynasty, and also joined the Hiung-nu (HS 94B:18a; 96B:34b-35a; 99B:13a).¹⁾ These disturbances were minor and did not affect Chinese control over the Western Region.

In A.D. 13, a serious uprising took place. For unknown reasons, the state of Yen-k'i (Karashahr) rebelled and killed the Protector General of the Western Region, Tan K'in (HS 96B:25b; 99B:22a).²⁾ The text adds: "[Wang] Mang was unable to punish [Yen-k'i]" (HS 96B:25b). That is quite untrue. He did send out an expedition in A.D. 16, commanded by the General of the Five Majestic [Principles], Wang Tsün, and a new Protector General of the Western Region, Li Ch'ung. The various states welcomed them and offered tribute. Yen-k'i (Karashahr) pretended to surrender but secretly prepared an ambush. Three other states were involved, among which the most important was Ku-mo (Aksu).³⁾ Wang Tsün, leading auxiliary troops from Kiu-ts'i (Kucha) and So-kü (Yarkand), fell into the trap and was killed, but the Chinese took revenge. The officer Kuo K'in made a surprise attack on Yen-k'i (Karashahr), before its troops had returned, and massacred part of its population. He then marched his soldiers back to China via Kü-shi (Turfan) (HS 96B:35b-36a; 99B:30b).⁴⁾

At this point, Wang Mang's biography remarks bleakly: "From this time onwards, the Western Region was cut off" (HS 99B:31a).⁵⁾ The chapter on the Western Region, is fortunately, more explicit. It turns out that the Protector General of the Western Region, Li Ch'ung, did not leave Central Asia but maintained himself in Kiu-ts'i (Kucha). Yen-k'i (Karashahr) had been chastised. So-kü (Yarkand), under a sinophile king, and Kü-shi (Turfan) had never broken away. Since the Chinese dominated Kü-shi, Yen-k'i, Kiu-ts'i, and So-kü, i.e. Turfan, Karashahr, Kucha, and Yarkand, they thereby controlled the entire northern silk route through the Tarim Basin. This throws an altogether different light on the conditions in Central Asia, conditions which did not change for the remainder of Wang Mang's reign. The chapter on the Western Region concludes its description with the most revealing statement: "After several years, [Wang] Mang died. [Li] Ch'ung thereupon perished, and the Western Region consequently was cut off" (HS 96B:36a).⁶⁾ Contrary to the assertion in Wang Mang's biography, it is clear that he kept possession of at least that part of the Western Region which was most important to China, the northern silk route. Only during the civil war, i.e. after Wang Mang's death, did the Chinese hold on the Tarim Basin fail.

Although it has been possible to restore a less biased perspective on Wang Mang's actions in the north and northwest, the reasons for the new restlessness of the

¹⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 301; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 270-271, II, p. 180. See also my vol. I p. 92.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 333; 128. de Groot, II, p. 181.

³⁾ The other two were Wei-li and Wei-sü, situated near Karashahr.

⁴⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 365-366; 128. de Groot, II, p. 181.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 366.

⁶⁾ 128. de Groot, II, p. 182.

Hiung-nu and the real purpose of Wang Mang's moves have not yet been discussed. Contrary to the insinuations of the ancient historian, it seems probable that the years of peace came to an end through unilateral action by the Hiung-nu themselves. It was not Wang Mang, who through demented policies goaded the Hiung-nu into war. It was, I think, a mounting tension among the Hiung-nu, a polarity of friendship for and hostility against China, which was responsible for their changed attitude. Central to this issue was the marriage of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü to the Chinese lady Wang Chao-kün.

Relatively little is known about Wang Chao-kün's life among the Hiung-nu. She was given to the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü in 33 B.C., who himself died in 31. This means that their son Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi must have been born in 32, 31, or possibly 30 B.C. When the new Shan-yü, according to custom, wished to make her his wife also, she had asked the Chinese emperor for direction. Clearly, she continued to consider herself Chinese. As the wife of two Shan-yü, she must have had a powerful position, and it may be assumed that she inculcated pro-Chinese sentiments in her son and the two daughters of her second marriage. The texts do not record when Wang Chao-kün died, nor do they have much to say about Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi and the younger daughter. They are more detailed for the elder daughter Yün (table 10).

Yün was married to Sü-pu Tang, who had the hereditary rank of Ku-tu-hou of the Right. Sü-pu was one of the four most important Hiung-nu lineages which regularly intermarried with the house of the Shan-yü. Ku-tu-hou of the Left, followed by Ku-tu-hou of the Right, were the highest positions held by others than members of the ruling family. The offices belonged to the most influential in the Hiung-nu state, and seem to have been concerned with law and internal security.¹⁾ The meaning of Ku-tu-hou, which must transliterate Hiung-nu words, is not known.

In A.D. 2, Yün was sent to the imperial court in Ch'ang-an to spend some time in the entourage of Grand Empress Dowager, née Wang. According to the chapter on the Hiung-nu, this visit had been arranged by Wang Mang, who then was regent (HS 94B:15a; 99A:8b).²⁾ Her stay in Ch'ang-an confirmed Yün as a devoted partisan of China. Sü-pu Tang, probably influenced by his wife, also became a champion of China. HS says that "Yün constantly wished that [the Hiung-nu] should make peace and an alliance by marriage with China" (HS 94B:20a), and that "the Ku-tu-hou of the Right, Sü-pu Tang, and his wife, the daughter of Wang Chao-kün, had attached themselves inwards (i.e. to China)" (HS 99C:5a). Evidently, a pro-Chinese party had formed among the Hiung-nu, and Yün and her husband belonged among its leaders.

Ever since the death of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü, succession to the throne had been by generation and seniority. All sons of Shan-yü were eligible within the same generation, and the succession went by age from elder brother to younger brother or cousin. The Heir-apparent was usually designated by the title Worthy King

¹⁾ For the organization of the Hiung-nu state, see 140. Pritsak.

²⁾ 128. de Groot, I, p. 262; 99. Dubs, III, p. 154.

of the Left. The sons of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü had followed one upon the other, and, when Wang Mang became emperor of China, the fourth son was Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü of the Hiung-nu. That only left three sons: Hien, Yü, and Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi. Provided that their predecessors died in time, each had a chance of becoming Shan-yü. Hien, as is clear from the subsequent events, was under the influence of Sü-pu Tang and his wife Yün. Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi was the son of Wang Chao-kün. He could not have been older than 41 years in A.D. 9, so that his prospects for becoming Shan-yü were reasonably good. This means that in A.D. 9 the Chinese party among the Hiung-nu was strong. The Heir-apparent Hien, his half-brother Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi, his half-sister Yün, and the latter's husband Sü-pu Tang must all have belonged to it. The obvious goal of this party was to bring about a closer relationship between the Hiung-nu and China.

Such an intention undoubtedly aroused opposition, and alarmed the conservatives among the Hiung-nu. The emergence of a pro-Chinese party logically should have rallied the anti-Chinese elements. It is obvious from the sources that the Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü himself and his half-brother Yü belonged to the latter faction. The most effective way of checking the influence of the Chinese party was to precipitate a break with China, and thereby to heighten the anti-Chinese sentiments. In A.D. 9, the Shan-yü ordered a resumption of the raids. The affair of the seal may have given him the pretext he needed, but it was probably not the real reason. The raids resulted from political struggle among the Hiung-nu.

Wang Mang's response shows a considerable degree of diplomatic acumen.¹⁾ In A.D. 11, he enthroned the Shan-yü's half-brother Hien as a counter Shan-yü, granting him 1000 *kin* of pure gold,²⁾ 1000 bolts of embroidered silk, and 10 lances. Hien's sons Tsu and Teng were taken as hostages to Ch'ang-an. Tsu was also declared a Shan-yü. When he died soon afterwards, the title was transferred to his brother (HS 94B:18b, 20a; 99B:17b).³⁾ The texts imply that Hien and his sons were tricked, and that on his release Hien hurried to the Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü and apologized. This version can only be due to the historian's bias against Wang Mang. It seems inconceivable that the Hiung-nu Heir-apparent and members of his family could so easily have been trapped by the Chinese. They must have co-operated, and, since Hien listened to his half-sister and her husband, this is not at all surprising. Wang Mang tried to increase the dissention among the Hiung-nu and to help the pro-Chinese party to power. He had the support of Hien, who might have hoped to isolate the ruling Shan-yü. That proved not to be the case, whereupon Hien had no choice but to surrender to his half-brother.

¹⁾ Shortly before Wang Mang came on the throne, he had advised the Wu-huan to pay no more taxes to the Hiung-nu. This led to a brief and murderous encounter between the two peoples (HS 94B:16a-16b; 128. de Groot, I, pp. 265-266). While this could have been a miscalculation on Wang Mang's part, which increased the irritation of the Hiung-nu against China, he more probably acted in the hope of engaging the Hiung-nu elsewhere. He must have been in touch with his supporters among the Hiung-nu and realized the increasing danger for China from the anti-Chinese party.

²⁾ 537 lb. 8 oz. avoirdupois, 244 kg., corresponding to about U.S. \$226,000.

³⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 272, 275-276; 99. Dubs, III, p. 316.

There followed the unfortunate execution of Teng in the summer of the next year (A.D. 12). Wang Mang learned through prisoners that some border raids had been commanded by Teng's brother K'ue, and ordered the public decapitation in revenge. While he was in his right to do so, this certainly was a blunder. Future friendly relations with Teng's father Hien were much more important than making a point. The only possible explanation of the affair, apart from the fact that Wang Mang was a stickler for proper observance of the law, would be that Hien after the debacle of the preceding year had been demoted. Wang Mang may have assumed that he could be politically discounted. That was not the case.

The Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü died in A.D. 13. There must have been opposition to Hien's candidature. He was compromised in the eyes of the anti-Chinese party, and in addition had been demoted. But his half-sister Yün succeeded in having him enthroned as Wu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü. She and her husband then persuaded him to make peace with China (HS 94B:20a-20b; 99B:25b).¹⁾ This account proves the influence of Yün and her husband on the Shan-yü and makes it probable that they were the driving force in the pro-Chinese faction. Wang Mang gracefully and shrewdly sent two maternal cousins of Yün, the brothers Wang Hi and Wang Li, to congratulate the new Shan-yü and to present gifts. They said nothing about the execution of the Shan-yü's son Teng. The Shan-yü, on his part, surrendered to the Chinese the officers Ch'en Liang and Chung Tai, who during A.D. 10 had revolted in the Western Region. They were brought to Ch'ang-an in cages and there burned alive (HS 94B:20b-21a; 99B:25b).²⁾

In the following year (A.D. 14), it became known that Teng had been decapitated. The raid that year was most probably a retaliation. But the Wu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü was too firmly in the Chinese camp to change his course, in addition to which Wang Mang's peaceful attitude was strongly backed by his armies at the border. Peace was restored. Since no major raids are recorded until the end of this Shan-yü's reign, it seems to have lasted.

The Wu-lei-jo-ti Shan-yü died in A.D. 18 and was succeeded by his brother Yü, the Hu-tu-er-shi-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü. The latter was not a friend of China and had ample opportunity for proving this during his long reign until A.D. 46. One of his first worries must have been the future inheritance of the throne. The only remaining brother and candidate was Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi, the son of Wang Chao-kün. He cannot have been more than 50 years of age in A.D. 18. Should the new ruler die soon, the Chinese party would come back to power. HHS suggests that the Shan-yü wished to transmit the dignity to his son. This may have been a secondary motive. In any case, he killed Yi-t'u-chi-ya-shi at an unknown date (89,119:2b). His hostile attitude to China was shown by a raid as early as A.D. 19.

Wang Mang's retort was the same which he had used before. He brought Sü-pu Tang, his wife Yün, and their son She to Ch'ang-an, and there enthroned Tang as counter Shan-yü. Again HS claims that this was done by trickery. That is not

¹⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 279, 280; 99. Dubs, III, p. 347.

²⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 280-282; 99. Dubs, III, p. 347.

probable, considering the pro-Chinese attitude of Sü-pu Tang and his family. He must have voluntarily cooperated in Wang Mang's attempt to curb a hostile Shan-yü. But Sü-pu Tang died soon afterwards, and the experiment was not repeated. Yün and her son She remained in Ch'ang-an and perished together with Wang Mang in A.D. 23 (HS 94B:21b-22a; 99C:5a-5b).¹⁾

To summarize, it is evident that under Wang Mang the long period of uninterrupted peace had come to an end. For internal reasons, the Hiung-nu again began to disturb China's northern border. Wang Mang countered this by military and diplomatic measures. Rigidity in his attitude made him err in the case of the seal and the hostage. On balance, however, he responded to the renewed Hiung-nu pressure intelligently and efficiently. At his death, the northern border was intact, the major part of the Western Region was held, and the power balance was in China's favour. This achievement is not restricted to the encounter with the Hiung-nu, but is equally true of Wang Mang's relations with the Tibetans and Koreans.

While still a regent, Wang Mang succeeded in extending Kin-ch'eng commandery to Ts'ing-hai (Kukunor). The name of the commandery was changed to Si-hai²⁾ (HS 12:8a; 99A:23b-24b).³⁾ The Tibetans reacted by rising in A.D. 6 but were easily defeated in the following year (HS 99A:30a).⁴⁾ This was the greatest Chinese achievement in the area since Chao Ch'ung-kuo had established military agricultural colonies there in the time of Emperor Sün.

In the east, tension had developed between China and Kao-kou-li, and Wang Mang ordered a campaign in A.D. 12. One of his high officials advised against it and was overruled. The action was a complete success, and the head of the Korean leader was sent to Ch'ang-an. Wang Mang thereupon changed the name of Kao (high)-kou-li to Hia (low)-kou-li (HS 99B:20a-20b).⁵⁾ No further troubles developed in the eastern quarter.

In short, Wang Mang had done as well in his confrontation with the barbarians of the north as he had done with those of the south. The performance of the celebrated Emperor Kuang-wu was not going to measure up to that of the despised "usurper".

Kuang-wu

a. Lu Fang, the Hiung-nu, Wu-huan, and Sien-pi

After Wang Mang had been killed on Oct. 6, A.D. 23, it looked for a while as though the empire might be unified under the Keng-shī Emperor. He had been enthroned on Mar. 11, A.D. 23, and Wang Mang's provincial officials shifted their allegiance to him over a wide area. This included the northwestern border, as proved

¹⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 286-287; 99. Dubs, III, pp. 383-385.

²⁾ Ts'ing-hai was during Han called Si-hai, the Western Sea, so that the new name for Kin-ch'eng commandery was taken from the lake.

³⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 80, 213-216. The *pen ki* dates this event in A.D. 4, Wang Mang's biography in A.D. 5.

⁴⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 234.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 325-327.

by the wooden slips from Etsingol (Kü-yen). Two of these are dated keng-shī 2nd year (A.D. 24) and one keng-shī 3rd year (A.D. 25).¹⁾

In the winter of A.D. 24, the Keng-shī Emperor sent the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household and Marquis of Kuei-te,²⁾ Liu Li,³⁾ and the Commissioner over the Army of the Commander-in-chief, Ch'en Tsun, to carry a new imperial seal to the Shan-yü. This was standard procedure after the establishment of a new dynasty. While it is interesting that the new seal was an imperial one, this is probably less significant than it seems to be. Since the Keng-shī Emperor considered his reign a continuation of the Han dynasty, he necessarily had to revert to its practice. The embassy did not meet with any success. According to HS, whose account must be based on the report of the envoys, the Hu-tu-er-shī-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü treated the Chinese officials with arrogance. He claimed that the situation had changed, that the Hiung-nu had become the stronger of the two nations, and that he expected proper respect on the part of China (HS 94B:22a).⁴⁾ This reaction is not surprising, considering the anti-Chinese standpoint of the Shan-yü. Neither was it entirely unjustified as long as China was torn by civil war.

It was at this time that the Hiung-nu began actively to interfere into the Chinese power struggle. Luckily for China, they did this in a haphazard and halfhearted fashion. At the end of A.D. 24, the first recorded military encounter took place. A Hiung-nu force, operating on the very north of the Great Plain, was defeated by Feng Yi, a Lieutenant General of the future Emperor Kuang-wu (17,47:2b).

Events moved swiftly in A.D. 25. The Keng-shī Emperor abdicated at the end of that year. Kuang-wu had ascended the throne earlier, on Aug. 5. His base of power was the northern part of the Great Plain, where the Grand Administrator of Yü-yang, P'eng Ch'ung, had given him valuable support. P'eng Ch'ung felt that his reward had not been commensurate with his service, in addition to which he clashed with a favourite official of the new emperor.⁵⁾ He rebelled in A.D. 26. During the following year (A.D. 27), he entered into an alliance with the Hiung-nu, on whose territory his commandery bordered. P'eng Ch'ung presented the Shan-yü with one of his daughters and silk. The latter contributed horsemen and scouts (12,42:9b; 89,119:1b). The imperial troops took the offensive in A.D. 28, routing a Hiung-nu cavalry unit and killing its two commanders.⁶⁾ One year later, P'eng Ch'ung was dead, and the Hiung-nu had missed the opportunity to exploit the situation.

The Shan-yü involved himself more actively with another colourful adventurer

¹⁾ 116. Lao, pp. 79, 89.

²⁾ The Kuei-te prefecture during Han belonged to the Ju-nan commandery. It was abolished during Later Han. The emplacement is unknown.

³⁾ In the Table of marquises in HS (17:30b), his name is given as Liu Feng. He was a grandson of Sien-hien-ch'en, a member of the Hiung-nu ruling house, who had surrendered to China in 60 B.C. and in 59 had been made a Chinese marquis (See also HS 8:17b; 72. Dubs, II, p. 243; and *supra* p. 89). He must have been granted the imperial surname of Liu, although this is not recorded.

⁴⁾ 128. de Groot, I, pp. 287-288.

⁵⁾ See vol. II, pp. 124ff.

⁶⁾ See vol. II, pp. 127, 130.

of the civil war, Lu Fang. This man was a native of the San-shui prefecture, which belonged to the Dependent State of An-ting. He headed there one of the secondary rebellions at the fall of Wang Mang, and mobilized troops including Tibetans and other non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu) (12,42:10b).¹⁾ Lu Fang must have been influential, since he had the support of the "Braves and Stalwarts" (hao-kie), i.e. powerful members of the local gentry. His rise became possible through the prevalence of regional forces typical of the time, and was therefore at first by no means exceptional.²⁾

After the Keng-shī Emperor had transferred his capital to Ch'ang-an in A.D. 24, he summoned Lu Fang during that year and appointed him a Chief Commandant of Cavalry. While this was a relatively lowly rank, he also authorized him to return and pacify all land from An-ting westwards (12,42:10b). This meant in practice that the emperor recognized Lu Fang's *de facto* regional power, and gave him a free hand to enlarge his territory. In the 12th month of the Chinese year 25 (corresponding to Jan. 8–Feb. 5, A.D. 26), two months after the abdication of the Keng-shī Emperor, the Braves and Stalwarts of San-shui proclaimed Lu Fang Supreme General, and King Who Pacifies Westwards (1A:17b; 12,42:10b).

It must have been about this time that Lu Fang fabricated a highly imaginative genealogy. He claimed that his real name was not Lu Fang but Liu Wen-po, and that he was a great-grandson of Emperor Wu (reigned 140–87) with his empress, a Hiung-nu princess. This lady had three sons. Her eldest son was the Heir-apparent. He perished together with her during the witchcraft persecution (91 B.C.). The second son Ts'i-k'ing, escaped to Ch'ang-ling. Ho Kuang enthroned him later, which would imply that he was Emperor Sūan (reigned 73–49). The third son, Hui-k'ing, escaped to the Left Valley of San-shui. He refused Ho Kuang's invitation to return. His son Sun-k'ing was the father of Wen-po (12,42:10b).

As has been pointed out already,³⁾ this extraordinary flight of fantasy is contradicted by all evidence. Emperor Sūan's style was Ts'i-k'ing, but he was a grandson of the Heir-apparent and not his brother. Emperor Wu's empress, who committed suicide during the witchcraft case, belonged to the Wei clan and was not a Hiung-nu princess. No Hui-k'ing is mentioned in the imperial genealogy of Former Han. He and his descendants must be pure inventions. While spurious, Lu Fang's "genealogy" is nevertheless shrewd. By insisting on descent from both the Chinese and the Hiung-nu ruling houses, he could demand recognition from both nations. Some may have been taken in by his claim. Wei Ao, a man who jealously guarded his independence in the northwest until his death, referred in A.D. 27 to Lu Fang

¹⁾ The text states that the troops were mobilized in the Dependent State of San-shui. That is not quite correct. San-shui was the capital of the Dependent State of An-ting (HS 28Ba:22a). This Dependent State is not listed in the administrative surveys of A.D. 2 and 140, but appears elsewhere. It is, in addition to the present case, mentioned for 1 B.C. (HS 36:35a), A.D. 45 (1B:16a; 12,42:12b), and 155 (7:7b). It is also referred to during the last period of the Later Han dynasty, although without exact dates (SHS 3:9b; HHS 65,95:4a, 4b).

²⁾ See vol. II, p. 25, map 2; p. 46, map 5. San-shui is shown *ibidem*, p. 34, map 4.

³⁾ Vol. II, p. 26.

as Liu Wen-po (13,43:7b), although this may have been prompted more by political expediency than real conviction.¹⁾

Whether or not Lu Fang was assisted by his claim, he allied himself with the Tibetans and Hiung-nu in A.D. 26 or soon thereafter. The Shan-yü sent a cavalry force to welcome Lu Fang, who followed them to their nation together with his brother's K'in and Ch'eng. He was there enthroned as Emperor of Han. Lu Ch'eng returned to An-ting in command of Hiung-nu horsemen (12,42:10b-11a; 89,119:1b).²⁾

It is not clear to which extent Lu Fang acted as a free agent or under pressure from the Shan-yü. Although perhaps more a candidate than a pawn of the Hiung-nu, it is evident that Lu Fang never rose above the stature of an adventurer. His chances of mobilizing armies in the sparsely populated northwest were nil, and the Hiung-nu never concentrated all their efforts on his cause. It is particularly difficult to see what Lu Fang expected to gain from leaving China altogether. He could never hope to set up abroad even the semblance of an imperial administration, without which no pretender could be taken seriously. No military necessity seems to have existed for Lu Fang's departure. Perhaps the Shan-yü thought that the move would increase his influence on him. But, in the long run, no political advantage accrued from a pretender who did his pretending outside the Chinese border. It was therefore decided to return Lu Fang to his home land.

Again it is not clear who was the driving force. The text implies that the Shan-yü took the initiative, although he equally well might have acted as Lu Fang's ally and with his approval. In A.D. 28, the Shan-yü sent a high dignitary into the Ordos Region and there negotiated or enforced an alliance of local leaders in support of Lu Fang. These men had made themselves independent early in the civil war and had assumed the titles of generals. They were Li Hing and Sui Yü from Wu-yüan commandery, T'ien Li from Shuo-fang commandery, and Shī Wei³⁾ and Min K'an from Tai commandery (12,42:11a). Tai had since A.D. 24 been under the control of Kuang-wu,⁴⁾ so that Shī Wei and Min K'an could no longer have been active in their home territory. They evidently had joined the regional power faction of Wu-yüan and Shuo-fang, in which Li Hing seems to have been most influential. He and his followers represented one of the many centrifugal forces of the civil war, whose purpose was to maintain autonomy at least until the winning pretender could be identified. It must have been unwelcome to be forced into an early choice. But the vulnerable location of Wu-yüan and Shuo-fang gave no alternative.

In A.D. 29, Li Hing and Min K'an went to the residence of the Shan-yü and escorted Lu Fang to Wu-yüan. He chose Kiu-yüan⁵⁾ as his capital (12,42:11a).

¹⁾ See vol. II, p. 165.

²⁾ TTK 23:4a has a slightly different version. The Hu of Ts'an-man prefecture revolted, and Lu Fang made common cause with them. When the Hiung-nu force arrived, it asserted itself over the Hu, whereupon Lu Fang followed the Hiung-nu and went with them to their territory.

HS and HHS give the name of the prefecture as Ts'an-luan, i.e. the second character without radical 142. It was situated NW of the present K'ing-yang hien, Kan-su.

³⁾ Shī Wei is not again mentioned in the texts. ⁴⁾ Cf. vol. II, p. 77.

⁵⁾ The Kiu-yüan prefecture during Han was the capital of Wu-yüan commandery and was situated E of the present Wu-yüan hien, Sui-yüan.

The *pen ki* records that in the 12th month of that year (corresponding to Jan. 23–Feb. 21, A.D. 30) he declared himself Son of Heaven (1A:26a). This statement is peculiar, since, as we have seen, the biography places his ascension to the throne in A.D. 26 or 27. If the account of the *pen ki* is correct, it would indicate that Lu Fang repeated the ceremony on Chinese soil, perhaps in order to strengthen his claim. In addition to Wu-yüan and Shuo-fang, he was recognized in the commanderies of Yün-chung, Ting-siang, and Yen-men. It is clear from later events that he appointed Li Hing as Grand Administrator of Wu-yüan and T'ien Li as Grand Administrator of Shuo-fang, i.e. acknowledged the authority of these men in their home commanderies. Lu Fang also appointed Grand Administrators for the other three commanderies, as well as Prefects for the various prefectures. This again must mean that he generally accepted actual conditions. His army consisted of Chinese and Hiung-nu (12,42:11a). Lu Fang's possessions were consequently restricted to border commanderies, stretching from the Ordos into northern Shan-si. Emperor Kuang-wu's only response was to place a garrison under a Lieutenant General in Tai commandery (30A,60A:1a).

Diplomatic and military activities accelerated during A.D. 30. For the first time in his reign, Emperor Kuang-wu sent an envoy to the Shan-yü.¹⁾ It is not recorded whether the granting of a new seal was involved. When the Shan-yü had responded with messengers and presents, the Chinese emperor dispatched still another embassy with gifts of gold and silk.²⁾ But the Shan-yü treated the envoys arrogantly and rudely, and nothing came of the diplomatic contacts (1B:3a; 89, 119:1b–2a). Kuang-wu's attempt to restore peaceful conditions was not well timed. The Hiung-nu were in the ascendancy, Lu Fang had returned to China less than one year earlier, and the civil war had not yet come to an end. The emperor's position was still relatively weak, and the Shan-yü knew it.

Lu Fang took the offensive in the 6th month (July 19–Aug. 17) of A.D. 30. His general Kia Lan invaded Tai commandery with Hiung-nu cavalry, and in a battle at Kao-liu³⁾ killed its Grand Administrator Liu Hing (1B:2a; 12,42:11a).⁴⁾ While this is not stated in the texts, it seems evident that Kuang-wu lost the entire Tai commandery. He contented himself in A.D. 31 with ordering the General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry, Tu Mao, to establish military agricultural colonies in

¹⁾ According to 89,119:1b, this was the Marquis of Kuei-te, Liu Li (cf. *supra* p. 103, note 3). Chou Shou-ch'ang speculates that Kuang-wu must have renewed Liu Li's title (HS 94B:22a, *Pu chu*). While this is true, it is certain that Liu Li was dead in A.D. 30. His son Siang had succeeded to the marquise in 26. HHS is therefore mistaken in considering Liu Li a member of the embassy in A.D. 30. The real name of the envoy is unknown.

²⁾ It was led by the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household Han T'ung, about whom otherwise nothing is known.

³⁾ The Kao-liu prefecture during Han belonged to the Tai commandery and was situated NW of the present Yang-kao hien, Shan-si.

⁴⁾ For these and the following military events see map 15.

According to TTK 1:7a, Liu Hing had uncautiously counterattacked. When Kuang-wu received the report, written before Liu Hing set out, he predicted his defeat and death. For Kuang-wu's close touch with military operations, see vol. II, pp. 213–214.

Tsin-yang¹⁾ and Kuang-wu.²⁾ This means that the front line went through southern Yen-men commandery, with a second line of defense further south in T'ai-yüan commandery.

Some time during the year 31, the emperor's strategic position improved somewhat through no action of his own. Lu Fang executed the Grand Administrator of Wu-yüan, Li Hing, and his brothers (12,42:11b). No reason is given. Since Li Hing seems to have been the most influential among the local leaders, and his recognition of Lu Fang had not been entirely voluntary, it is probable that the latter decided to rid himself of an unwilling or ambitious partner. What Lu Fang must not have foreseen was the resulting defection from his own ranks during the winter of 31. T'ien Li with Shuo-fang commandery, and a certain K'iao Hu³⁾ with Yün-chung commandery surrendered to Kuang-wu. The emperor confirmed their ranks of Grand Administrators (1B:4b; 12,42:11b; ch'ī 18:2a). Nothing more is heard about K'iao Hu, but T'ien Li continued his career as one of Kuang-wu's officials. As a result of these events, Lu Fang's territorial base shifted eastwards. He had lost Shuo-fang and Yün-chung, retained Wu-yüan, Ting-siang, and northern Yen-men, and had gained Tai commandery. Wu-yüan was less isolated from the others than the map might seem to indicate, since Lu Fang had free passage through the Hiung-nu territory beyond the Chinese border.

Status quo was maintained during A.D. 32. In the 1st month (Feb. 18–Mar. 19) of 33, the imperial government ordered that all officials and people of Yen-men commandery should be "evacuated" southwards and settled in the adjacent T'ai-yüan commandery (1B:5b). Kuang-wu's troops only controlled the southern part of Yen-men, so that this evacuation order is puzzling. It probably meant no more than that refugees were offered shelter in T'ai-yüan, and that officials were permitted to abandon their posts and would not be prosecuted under the article on Cowardice in the Face of the Enemy.⁴⁾

In the same 1st month of 33, Wei Ao died. Lu Fang was the only remaining enemy in the north, and Kuang-wu could send larger forces against him. During the 6th month (July 16–Aug. 14), he dispatched the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, with the General-in-chief Who Traverses the Open Country, Wang Ch'ang, the General-in-chief Who Establishes Righteousness, Chu Yu, the General Who Exterminates the Caitiffs, Wang Pa, the General Who Routs the Traitors, Hou Tsin, and more than 50,000 men to attack Kao-liu. It is not stated from which direction this attack was launched. Probably it came from the east or southeast, since Tu Mao afterwards struck from the southwest. Kia Lan and Min K'an,⁵⁾ assisted by Hiung-nu cavalry, offered firm resistance, and, aided by a heavy rainfall, defeated

¹⁾ The Tsin-yang prefecture during Han was the capital of T'ai-yüan commandery and is identical with the present T'ai-yüan hien, Shan-si.

²⁾ The Kuang-wu prefecture during Han belonged to the Yen-men commandery and was situated 15 li W of the present Tai hien, Shan-si.

³⁾ 1B:4b, in contrast to 12,42:11b, writes K'iao with radical 75.

⁴⁾ Cf. 105. Hulsewé, p. 41.

⁵⁾ Since Min K'an was a native of Tai, he evidently had returned to his home commandery after Kia Lan had conquered it in A.D. 30.

the imperial army. Wu Han returned to Lo-yang after having placed his troops in strategic locations. Hou Tsin was stationed in Yü-yang commandery,¹⁾ Wang Ch'ang in Ku-an prefecture,²⁾ and Chu Yu in Nan-hing-t'ang prefecture.³⁾ In addition, the emperor appointed Wang Pa as Grand Administrator of Shang-ku commandery. He was to retain his rank of general and command of troops, and should attack the enemy within and without the borders of the commandery⁴⁾ (1B:6a; 12,42:11b; 15,45:7a; 20,50:4b-5a; 22,52:2a). The garrisons, stretching from Tsin-yang prefecture to Yü-yang commandery, formed a strong line of defense, obviously intended to protect the lower Fen River valley and the Great Plain from Lu Fang and his Hiung-nu allies.

At the end of A.D. 33, one further attempt was made against Lu Fang. The General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry, Tu Mao, aided by Yen-men's Grand Administrator, Kuo Liang,⁵⁾ attacked the prefectures of Kuo and Fan-chi⁶⁾. These were defended by Lu Fang's officer Yin Yu. The campaign seems to have been coordinated with a sortie from Shang-ku by Wang Pa.⁷⁾ Kia Lan, with a large force of Hiung-nu cavalry, came from Kao-liu to Yin Yu's rescue. A major battle was fought at Fan-chi, in which the imperial armies again were completely routed. Tu Mao retreated into Lou-fan prefecture.⁸⁾ Wang Pa returned to Shang-ku commandery (1B:6a; 20,50:5a; 22,52:6a). The year 33 had been singularly unsuccessful for Kuang-wu in the north.

A.D. 34 did not bring much improvement. In the 1st month (Feb. 8-Mar. 8), the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, with 60,000 men, once more attacked Kia Lan at Kao-liu. The Grand Administrator of Shang-ku, Wang Pa, and the Grand Administrator of Yü-yang, Ch'en Hin, led the vanguard. As usual, Hiung-nu cavalry arrived to assist Kia Lan. Wang Pa is stated to have defeated them at P'ing-ch'eng and to have pursued them beyond the border (1B:6a; 20,50:5a). But since the text, probably based on a optimistic report, only records several hundreds of Hiung-nu killed, the achievement was not an outstanding one. Kao-liu remained intact, and, reading between the lines, it is obvious that the campaign had fizzled out. As long as Lu Fang and his officers had the support of the Hiung-nu, they were practically invulnerable. Their strategic position must not be seen from the Chinese

¹⁾ The exact location is not known, and the one shown on map 15 is hypothetical.

²⁾ The Ku-an prefecture during Han belonged to the Cho commandery and was situated SE of the present Yi hien, Ho-pei.

³⁾ The Nan-hing-t'ang prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'ang-shan commandery and was situated NE of the present Hing-t'ang hien, Ho-pei.

⁴⁾ Normally, the activities of Grand Administrators were categorically restricted to the territories of their commanderies.

⁵⁾ Since the imperial forces held only the southernmost part of Yen-men, he can have been no more than a Grand Administrator designate.

⁶⁾ Both Kuo and Fan-chi prefectures during Han belonged to Yen-men commandery and were situated W of the present Hun-yüan hien, Shan-si. Since their relative positions are unknown, only Fan-chi has been shown on map 15.

⁷⁾ 20,50:5a dates Wang Pa's sortie in A.D. 34. This is contradicted by the other sources.

⁸⁾ The Lou-fan prefecture during Han belonged to Yen-men commandery and was situated N of the present Kuo hien, Shan-si.

point of view, grimly holding on to sparsely populated border commanderies. They represented, as it were, outposts on Chinese soil of the Hiung-nu empire, whose swift-moving horsemen came to their aid when needed. The curious part of this situation is not that the Chinese were unable to cope with a pretender, backed by the might of the Hiung-nu; it is the inability or unwillingness of the Shan-yü to exploit the opportunity to greater advantage. The texts say nothing about his motives. He may not have trusted Lu Fang completely. He may have concluded that Emperor Kuang-wu could not be unseated. Or he may have lacked political vision. Whatever his reasons, he restricted himself to propping up Lu Fang and to harassing northern China by repeated raids.

While the Shan-yü's objectives perhaps were more limited than politically necessary, he had no cause to be displeased with the results. In A.D. 34, the Chinese "abolished" Ting-siang commandery and "transferred" its people to Si-ho commandery (1B:6b). Ting-siang was held by Lu Fang, so that the imperial government once more simply took note of actual conditions and tried to settle the refugees. In the following year (A.D. 35), Shuo-fang province was abolished¹⁾ and added to Ping province (1B:7b; 31,61:2a). Whether this was prompted by administrative desirability or reflected a weakening hold on the territory is impossible to say. A competent and respected official, Kuo Ki, was appointed Shepherd of Ping province and announced a price on Lu Fang's head (31,61:2b).

Ever since early A.D. 30, Lu Fang seems to have stayed in his capital Kiu-yüan. He personally took command during 36 in an attempt to regain the Yün-chung commandery. It had been in imperial possession from A.D. 31 onwards. Kia Lan attacked simultaneously, which must mean that Yün-chung was invaded from the west and east. For his absence, Lu Fang put Sui Yü in charge of Kiu-yüan. This man wished to surrender to Kuo Ki, and seems to have tried capturing Lu Fang. The fact that the latter was forced into headlong flight with only a handful of horsemen, while his troops went over to Sui Yü, would seem to indicate a carefully prepared plot. No details are known about it. Lu Fang made good his escape and went to live again among the Hiung-nu (1B:9a; 12,42:11b; 31,61:2b).²⁾ Sui Yü and his younger brother Hien were summoned to the imperial capital, Lo-yang. There, the former was appointed as Grand Administrator of his native commandery Wu-yüan and made the Marquis Who Chisels Away the Hu. Hien became Marquis of Wu-tsin,³⁾ not exactly a handsome marquisate as far as its location is concerned (12,42:11b).

¹⁾ This province is something of a puzzle. It was not one of the thirteen regular provinces and is not referred to elsewhere in HHS. HS (71:10b; 79:7b; 89:1b) mentions three Inspectors of Shuo-fang province in the time of Emperor Ch'eng. It may be assumed that the province consisted of the commanderies of the Ordos Region, i.e. Shuo-fang, Wu-yüan, and perhaps Yün-chung. In that case, Ping province would until A.D. 35 only have comprised central and northern Shan-si, and northern Shen-si.

²⁾ Lu Fang's biography (12,42:11b) dates the escape in A.D. 36. According to the *pen ki*, he left China in the 2nd month (Mar. 6-Apr. 4) of 37. (31,61:2b gives no date.) It is possible that Lu Fang lingered on the border for a short time, and that the date of the *pen ki* refers to his final departure.

³⁾ The Wu-tsin prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ting-siang commandery. It was situated N of the present Ho-lin-ko-er hien, Sui-yüan. It is shown on map 15.

Kia Lan is no longer mentioned in the sources, which makes it probable that he perished during the abortive invasion of Yün-chung. With his disappearance, Tai commandery must have come into imperial hands. Yen-men was also repossessed in A.D. 36. Yin Yu, the defender of P'ing-ch'eng, was killed by his officers Kia Tan, Ho K'uang, and Hie Sheng, after Lu Fang's defeat had become known. They surrendered and were enfeoffed as marquises. Tu Mao's army moved north from southern Yen-men, probably from Lou-fan where he had taken refuge in A.D. 33, and soon all of Yen-men commandery had submitted (22,52:6a).¹⁾

Lu Fang had lost his foothold in China, and Kuang-wu had regained the border commanderies. This had not been brought about by military victories but by diplomacy. Lu Fang's officers had succumbed to the temptation of seeking imperial rewards and noble titles. In spite of this success, it cannot be said that Kuang-wu's control of the northwest was firm. The Hiung-nu retained the initiative. With the exception of the Kan-su corridor west of the Yellow River's upper course, where Tou Jung had kept the fortifications in good repair and had put up a spirited defense (23,53:1b, 2b), the Hiung-nu roamed freely through the northwest.

In about A.D. 35, a court discussion had been held on the question of how to cope with the continuous raids of the Hiung-nu. The details of this discussion are not preserved. We are only told that the Superintendent of the Imperial Household, Kuo Hien, violently argued against a Chinese offensive. He had earlier, in A.D. 32, unsuccessfully opposed the attack on Wei Ao. His argument was the same on both occasions: the empire was exhausted. It looks as though Kuo Hien represented a minority view. After ardent remonstrations, he threw himself on the ground, claimed to be dizzy, was led away between two Gentlemen, and refused to salute the emperor (82A, 112A:4b).²⁾ While this gives the impression that the majority of the participants in the court discussion were in favour of attacking the Hiung-nu, no such attack took place. Even after Lu Fang's position had collapsed in A.D. 36, the Chinese attitude remained wholly defensive. It found expression in building large-scale fortifications.³⁾

In A.D. 36, the emperor dispatched the General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry, Tu Mao, and an Internuncio by the name of Tuan Chung to repair, build, and garrison the border fortifications. They were put in charge of men whose punishments had been relaxed (*shī hing*), in addition to which they mobilized troops in the border commanderies (1B:8b-9a; 22,52:6a). The *pen ki* and Tu Mao's biography do not state where these activities were carried out. They cannot have begun earlier than A.D. 37, i.e. only after Lu Fang had been forced to withdraw. It so happens that in 37 the Grand Administrator of Shang-ku, Wang Pa, was ordered to command more than 6000 men whose punishments had been relaxed and convicts, and to

¹⁾ 1B:11a places Yin Yu's death in the 9th month (Oct. 18-Nov. 15) of 38. This version must be wrong. The imperial general Wang Pa built fortifications at P'ing-ch'eng during A.D. 37, which would not have been possible had that city still been held by Yin Yu.

²⁾ The text says that Kuo Hien subsequently excused himself from office. Since he retired in A.D. 35, the court conference was probably that year.

³⁾ See map 16.

join forces with Tu Mao. Their combined labours are described in his biography. While it is not impossible that Tu Mao also reconstructed unspecified fortifications elsewhere, it looks as though his major efforts were coordinated with those of Wang Pa. On the one hand, the two men directed the repairs of the Fei-hu ("Flying Fox") Road,¹⁾ which had strategic importance. It went from Shang-ku commandery via Tai prefecture²⁾ through the Fei-hu Pass, and connected in the south with other roads.³⁾ On the other hand, Tu Mao and Wang Pa built a barricade with watch-towers and fire and smoke signals from the P'ing-ch'eng prefecture to Tai, using earth and stone as building material. The location of the barricade is a problem. Tai could be the name of either the commandery or the prefecture. In the first case, this would simply mean that the fortifications stretched into Tai commandery, its terminus being unknown. In the second case, there could be no doubt about its emplacement. The only clue is the statement that the wall was 300-odd li (ca. 78 miles; 125 km) long. This happens to be the distance from P'ing-ch'eng to Tai prefecture. It is probable, therefore, that the barricade crossed the Wen River. The purpose must have been to block the river valley which, together with the Fen River valley, formed the natural gateway into central and southern Shan-si. The emperor sent gold, plain silk, embroidery, and silk floss as payment for the army and as gifts for the border people. Donkey-drawn carts were employed for transports, but on Wang Pa's suggestion, the Wen River⁴⁾ was also used for cheaper and more convenient shipping. The Hiung-nu and Wu-huan caused continuous interruptions in the work, and more than a hundred engagements were fought against them. Wang Pa suggested that one should seek peace and an alliance by marriage with the Hiung-nu, but while the emperor was in favour of the proposal, there was nothing he could do about it in practice. At this time, Tu Mao also established military agricultural garrisons at the border, but no exact sites are mentioned in the sources (20,50:5a-5b; 22,52:6a).

It may have been at this time that Kuang-wu also experimented with mobile border fortifications. He had vehicles constructed which had turrets and were drawn by several oxen each. They were placed on the border and apparently moved as conditions demanded (89,119:3b). Nothing is known about their effectiveness.

As a further precaution against Hiung-nu raids onto the Great Plain, the emperor in the 2nd month (Mar. 6-Apr. 4) of 37 stationed the General Who Seizes the Caitiffs, Ma Wu, together with two Chief Commandants of Cavalry at the Hu-t'o River.

¹⁾ This road must have received its name in Han times from the Fei-hu Pass. No prefecture with that name existed. The Fei-hu Pass is today still known by that name, and is shown on 90. Ting, map 23. 20,50:5a, *Commentary*, describes the Fei-hu Road in T'ang terms and says that it went from the Huai-jung prefecture (identical with the modern Huai-lai hien, Chahar) to the Fei-hu prefecture (identical with the present Lai-yüan hien, Ho-pei).

²⁾ The Tai prefecture during Han belonged to the Tai commandery and was situated 20 li E of the present Yü hien, Ho-pei.

³⁾ The latter are not shown on map 16.

⁴⁾ Shen K'in-han points out that other names of this river were Wen-yü River, Lei-yü River, and Ch'i River, but that its proper name was Lei River. See 41. Shen, 2:13b-16a. The modern name is Yung-ting River.

Half of the force was placed at Hia-k'ü-yang north of the river, and the other at Lin-p'ing south of it (1B:9a; 22,52:11a; ch'i 10:7a).¹⁾ Obviously, the valley of the Hu-t'o formed an avenue of access to the Great Plain.

None of these measures stopped the Hiung-nu. In the 5th month (June 3–July 1) of 37, they rode deep into Chinese territory without being halted, and raided Hotung commandery in southeastern Shan-si (1B:10b; 89,119:2a). The Chinese government reacted by stubbornly continuing the policy on which it had embarked: more walls.

In A.D. 38, the General Who Manifests Firmness, Ma Ch'eng, was sent to garrison the Ch'ang-shan and Chung-shan commanderies on the central part of the northern plain. He was simultaneously put in charge of the troops previously commanded by the General-in-chief Who Establishes Righteousness, Chu Yu, which implies that the garrison at Nan-hing-t'ang prefecture was still maintained. Ma Ch'eng was also ordered to replace Tu Mao in building and repairing fortifications. This work lasted for five or six years and involved constructions on a large scale. The texts give no detailed information on the exact course of the barricades, but enough is known to provide at least a rough idea.

Four walls were built. The first stretched from the Wei Bridge to Si-ho commandery. The bridge spanned the Wei River near Ch'ang-an.²⁾ Si-ho straddled the Yellow River and comprised parts of central Shan-si, northern Shen-si, and north-eastern Ordos. This makes it probable that the wall extended from the Wei River to the Yellow River, and that its northern segment followed the course of the wall of 353 B.C.

The second wall went from Ho-shang to An-yi prefecture. An-yi was situated in southern Shan-si. Ho-shang was an ancient name of the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery, at whose northern border a barrier had existed for some time. The future Emperor Kao had repaired it in 206 B.C.³⁾ Ma Ch'eng apparently reconstructed the earlier fortifications and continued them beyond the Yellow River.

The third wall was built from T'ai-yüan commandery to Tsing-hing prefecture⁴⁾ on the edge of the Great Plain. It must be assumed that this fortification went in a more or less straight westerly direction from Tsing-hing in order to protect the rich agricultural region at the Fen River in central Shan-si.

The fourth and last of the walls extended along the western limit of the northern plain, from Ye prefecture in the south to Chung-shan commandery in the north. The northern border of Chung-shan was probably the terminus of that barrier.

Along all the walls, watchtowers were built at intervals of 10 li (ca. 2.4 miles; 4 km) and the usual fire and smoke signals were installed (22,52:7a–7b).

Taken as a whole, the walls were an ambitious endeavour to devise defense in depth. If the Hiung-nu struck through the Ordos Region, they would, hopefully,

¹⁾ The treatise (10:7a) records this event under A.D. 36, which is contradicted by the other sources.

²⁾ It is mentioned several times in HS, e.g. 4:2b–3a (72. Dubs, I, p. 226).

³⁾ HS 1A:30b (72. Dubs, I, pp. 73–74, 73 note 3).

⁴⁾ The Tsing-hing prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'ang-shan commandery and was situated N of the present hien with the same name, Ho-pei.

be stopped at the Wei River—Yellow River barrier. If they attacked from the north, the walls in Tai commandery, central Shan-si, and southern Shan-si offered three successive lines of resistance. Should the Hiung-nu swing east from Shan-si, and attempt to reach the Great Plain through one of the passes, they would run against the barrier along its western edge. While it would seem probable that attempts were made to keep up the fortifications further north on the traditional border itself, the very need for additional walls proves that the Hiung-nu could penetrate them at will. The Chinese were falling back, and none of the barriers was proving really efficient.

In the 2nd month (Mar. 14–Apr. 12) of 39, the court retreated further. Officials and people from Yen-men,¹⁾ Tai, and Shang-ku commanderies were evacuated and resettled on the northern plain east of the Kü-yung and Ch'ang-shan passes.²⁾ This evacuation was carried out by the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, by Ma Ch'eng, who was engaged in building the fortifications, and by Ma Wu, who was still stationed at the Hu-t'o River. The texts state that more than 60,000 persons were transferred. The Hiung-nu moved into the abandoned territory and lived within the Chinese border (1B:11a; 18,48:6b; 89,119:2a; chī 10:7a).

This government-sponsored evacuation must have been greatly outnumbered by the gradual, voluntary emigration from the border commanderies. The population of Yen-men, Tai, and Shang-ku shrunk from A.D. 2 to 140 by 218,000 individuals, and, whether with or without government assistance, it is evident that most refugees settled in the adjacent areas in the east. A comparison of the population maps (maps 1 and 2) shows a very obvious increase of inhabitants below the Kü-yung and Ch'ang-shan passes.

The official evacuation simply recognized a process which must have been under way for some time. It follows that the second line of defense in Tai commandery had become obsolete as soon as it was finished. The Hiung-nu had begun to live permanently in China itself, and those who had entered Yen-men outflanked the barrier of Tai.

In the 12th month of the Chinese year 39 (corresponding to Jan. 4–Feb. 1, A.D. 40), Lu Fang returned and took up residence in Kao-liu, i.e. among his Hiung-nu allies.³⁾ In the 10th month (Nov. 23–Dec. 22) of A.D. 40, he unexpectedly sent Kuang-wu his imperial seal and surrendered together with Min K'an and the latter's younger brother Lin (1B:12b, 13a; 12,42:11b; chī 10:7b). Nothing whatever is known about Lu Fang's motives. HHS insinuates that the Hiung-nu were the prime movers and attributes to them a bizarre incentive. They supposedly coveted the price which had been placed on Lu Fang's head. But Lu Fang, cunningly, made no mention of their motive. No reward was made, and the Shan-yü was ashamed to reveal his plan (89,119:2a). This innuendo fails by its absurdity. Had the Shan-yü really wished to collect the reward for Lu Fang's head, he would have

¹⁾ This was the second official "evacuation" of Yen-men. Cf. *supra* p. 107.

²⁾ The Ch'ang-shan pass was another name for the Fei-hu pass. Cf. *supra* p. 111, note 1.

³⁾ In contrast to the *pen ki*, 12,42:11b dates both events in A.D. 40. Possibly, Lu Fang returned at the very end of the Chinese year 39, and chose Kao-liu as his residence in the very beginning of 40.

made sure to send it in a bag. Quite the contrary, he and Lu Fang remained on good terms; he assisted him in A.D. 42 to return to Hiung-nu territory, and he and his successors were Lu Fang's hosts until he died. The account of HHS merely reflects the Chinese predilection for ascribing to the Hiung-nu the basest motives.

Lu Fang may simply have tired of his life among the Hiung-nu. By shedding his imperial title, which never had won much acceptance, he could spend the last years of his life in China. This presented Kuang-wu with the unexpected possibility of gaining a diplomatic advantage, but he failed to exploit the chance. In the 12th month of the Chinese year 40 (corresponding to Jan. 22–Feb. 19, A.D. 41), he enfeoffed Lu Fang as King of Tai, appointed Min K'an his Chancellor, and made Min Lin his Grand Tutor. This cost the court nothing. Tai commandery had been *de facto* abandoned, and all the government did was to recognize the three men's standing among their local Chinese and Hiung-nu supporters. Furthermore, the emperor sent Lu Fang 20,000 bolts of embroidered silk and asked him to use his influence for peace with the Hiung-nu. Lu Fang responded with a memorial which, although he still claimed imperial descent, was conciliatory in tone. An edict ordered him to come to the capital for audience in the 1st month (Feb. 20–Mar. 21) of A.D. 41. Lu Fang set out, but when he reached the Ch'ang-p'ing prefecture below the Kü-yung pass, another edict informed him that the audience had been postponed for one year. He became suspicious, turned back, and revolted again before the end of the Chinese year 40 (1B:13a; 12,42:11b–12a). His submission had lasted less than three months. Through capriciousness and lack of tact, Kuang-wu had missed the opportunity of using Lu Fang as a diplomatic intermediary.

Min K'an and his brother Lin did not revolt again with Lu Fang. They resisted him in local fighting, after which they permanently drop out of sight. In the 5th month (June 8–July 6) of A.D. 42, Lu Fang left China for the last time. The Shan-yü sent horsemen who escorted him with wife and children to Hiung-nu territory, where he died after ten-odd years (1B:14b; 12,42:12a). He had not become one of the major figures of the civil war. Whatever his ability, he had always stood in the shadow of the Hiung-nu.

A.D. 43 was a peaceful year, but 44 was all the more disastrous. The government officially abandoned still another territory by abolishing Wu-yüan commandery and transferring its officials and people to Ho-tung commandery in southern Shan-si.¹⁾ No figures are given, and the majority of the people was undoubtedly left to its own devices. During this year, the raids began again. In the 5th month (June 15–July 13), the barriers notwithstanding, the Hiung-nu looted Shang-tang in southwestern Shan-si. Another contingent sacked the T'ien-shui commandery in the upper Wei River region, and reached Yu-fu-feng further downstream, northwest of Ch'ang-an (1B:15b; 24,54:11a; 89,119:2a). In the 12th month (corresponding to Jan. 8–Feb. 5, A.D. 45), the Hiung-nu once more looted T'ien-shui (1B:16a).²⁾

¹⁾ Or to "the east of the [Yellow] River", i.e. all of Shan-si.

²⁾ 24,54:11a dates the pillage of Yu-fu-feng in the 10th month (Nov. 9–Dec. 8). It is conceivable that the Hiung-nu entered T'ien-shui in the 5th month, reached Yu-fu-feng in the 10th, and returned via T'ien-shui in the 12th.

According to one entry (24,54:11a), the Wu-huan participated in the raid of Yu-fu-feng. They and the Sien-pi were tributary people of the Hiung-nu, living to the northeast of China. Both tribes had in Later Han times frequently joined in the attacks of the Hiung-nu, apparently under the latter's command. No independent incursions are recorded. The subordinated role of the Wu-huan and Sien-pi is also illustrated by the fact that the texts describe their parts in the raids by generalities and rarely give exact dates.¹⁾

In the 9th month (Oct. 11–Nov. 8) of A.D. 44, Ma Yüan had victoriously returned from his campaign in Indo-China. He was one of the most celebrated military men of his time, and immediately requested permission to attack the Hiung-nu and Wu-huan. This was granted. But since Ma Yüan was given the absurdly small force of 3000 cavalrymen, nothing could be expected from the enterprise, and no real offensive was possible.

The General Who Calms the Waves left Lo-yang in the 12th month of the Chinese year 44 (corresponding to Jan. 8–Feb. 5, A.D. 45) and encamped in the Siang-kuo prefecture.²⁾ In the 10th month (Oct. 30–Nov. 27) of 45, he marched through the Wu-küan pass,³⁾ which seems to be still another name for the Fei-hu pass.⁴⁾ Having reached Kao-liu, he proceeded to inspect the barriers of Tai, Yen-men, Shang-ku, and Yu-pei-p'ing commanderies. He also seems to have attempted one incursion into Wu-huan territory. The enemy avoided engagement, and Ma Yüan was only able to take a hundred heads. As soon as he turned back, the Wu-huan began to attack, and the Chinese retreat turned into flight. Ma Yüan lost one third of his horses, presumably with their riders, and the entire action ended in failure (1B:16a; 24,54:11a; 90,120:3a).

Ma Yüan's misadventure had not been the only military encounter in the north during A.D. 45. When Lu Fang had first rebelled in the Dependent State of An-ting, he had been allied with non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu) of Ts'an-luan prefecture.⁵⁾ These were also known as the Hu of the Ts'ing Mountain.⁶⁾ They had surrendered to Kuang-wu's general Feng Yi in A.D. 30 (17,47:9a). In the 4th month (May 6–June 3) of A.D. 45, they rose again. HHS gives as the reason bitterness against their Chinese officials and the corvée these exacted. The uprising was suppressed without difficulty, and the Hu were transferred to Ki prefecture in T'ien-shui commandery, south of the Wei River⁷⁾ (1B:16a; 12,42:12a–12b).

In the fall of 45, a large force of Hiung-nu and Sien-pi attacked Liao-tung and

¹⁾ 19,49:2b, 10a; 20,50:5a, 10a, 10b; 90,120:2b–3a, 5a. The major part of the chapter on the Sien-pi in HHS has been translated by 144. Schreiber, pp. 166ff.

²⁾ The Siang-kuo prefecture during Han belonged to the Chao kingdom and was situated S of the present Hing-t'ai hien, Ho-pei. It is shown on map 16.

³⁾ For the pronunciation see 90,120:3a, *Tsi kie*.

⁴⁾ 90,120:3a, *Commentary*, places the pass in Tai commandery. Hui Tung (*ibidem*, *Tsi kie*) says that it was situated in the Kuang-ch'ang prefecture of Tai commandery. This Han prefecture was in turn located N of the present Lai-yüan hien, i.e. at the Fei-hu pass.

⁵⁾ See *supra* p. 105, note 2.

⁶⁾ Ch'i 23A:36b states that the Ts'an-luan prefecture had a Ts'ing Mountain.

⁷⁾ This prefecture is shown in vol. II, pp. 174, 179, maps 31 and 32.

began to loot it. This commandery had been governed since A.D. 41 by the capable Grand Administrator Chai T'ung, who had used the intervening years for putting the defense in order. He succeeded in defeating and expelling the invaders (1B:16a; 20,50:10a; 90,120:5b).

The year 45 ended with one great raid, in which the Hiung-nu entered Shang-ku commandery and from there penetrated to Chung-shan commandery on the northern plain (1B:16a; 89,119:2a-2b). This was the last violent encounter between the Hiung-nu and Chinese during Kuang-wu's reign.

Emperor Kuang-wu had been unable to cope with the Hiung-nu. It is true that the civil war lasted until A.D. 36, and that uprisings of the southern barbarians had necessitated campaigns during A.D. 42-45. But the emperor had felt militarily strong enough to order a major demobilization of troops on Apr. 14, A.D. 31, even before Wei Ao had been defeated and the great offensive against Kung-sun Shu had begun.¹⁾ The fact that not a single attempt was made to assault the Hiung-nu in their own territory, can therefore not be blamed on the exhaustion of the empire. From A.D. 37 onwards, particularly, a military attack was technically possible. The building of the five great barriers was undoubtedly a burden for the population, aggravated by the fact that the Hiung-nu generally proved able to break through or go around them. Yet the court had not considered the country too exhausted for the construction of these fortifications. The alternative of raising armies for offensive action was not seriously considered. The crux of the matter was that the emperor's whole attitude to the northern frontier problems was defeatist. He seemed to prefer peace at almost any price. The border commanderies from Shang-ku to Shuo-fang were, for all practical purposes, lost. The Hiung-nu had begun to live on what had been Chinese soil, and their pressure was not abating. The Tibetans, as will be seen, moved in from the west.

At this stage, by a stroke of luck, China's situation was miraculously improved through new dissention among the Hiung-nu.

The policies of the Hu-tu-er-shī-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü had been anti-Chinese throughout. He was the last surviving son of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü ever since he had killed his youngest half-brother Yi-t'u-chī-ya-shī. It has been seen that this step must have been intended to prevent the return to power of the pro-Chinese party through the enthronement of Wang Chao-kün's son. The Shan-yü had also taken the unorthodox step of appointing his eldest son Worthy King of the Left, the title given to the Heir-apparent. HHS declares that this was the reason for the execution or murder of Yi-t'u-chī-ya-shī. The Shan-yü wished to transmit the dignity to his own son (89,119:2b). This may have been a consideration, but it cannot have been the main reason. Otherwise, the Shan-yü should logically have killed another man also, who legally stood between his son and the succession: Pi, the son of the Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü.

After the death of the Hu-tu-er-shī-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü, the generation of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü's sons would be exhausted, and it would be necessary

¹⁾ See vol. II, p. 210.

to move down to the sons of Shan-yü in the next generation. In that generation, Pi was the eldest. He should therefore have been made the Worthy King of the Left. When, against the rules of inheritance, he was by-passed in favour of the Shan-yü's own son, he was displeased and became suspicious. He avoided the Shan-yü's court and stayed in his own regional domain. The Shan-yü, feeling in turn uneasy about Pi, sent two Ku-tu-hou to keep him and his troops under surveillance¹⁾ (89,119:2b-3a).

It is not probable that Pi started out as pro-Chinese. His father had come to represent the conservative elements among the Hiung-nu, and in A.D. 9 had broken the long peace with China. There is no reason to assume that the son had felt otherwise. But as soon as Pi's rightful claim to become Worthy King of the Left had been ignored, the growing enmity between him and the Shan-yü brought a new political element into the situation. By the nature of power struggles, as long as the Shan-yü led the anti-Chinese war party, Pi would receive support from the pro-Chinese peace party. The contest between the Shan-yü and his sons on the one hand, and Pi and his followers on the other, was therefore probably intensified by a revival of this deep-seated political dissention.

In A.D. 46, the Hu-tu-er-shi-tao-kao-jo-ti Shan-yü died and was succeeded by his son, the Worthy King of the Left. The new ruler, Shan-yü Wu-ta-ti-hou, immediately appointed his own younger brother Worthy King of the Left. He died himself during the same year of 46, whereupon his younger brother came on the throne as Shan-yü P'u-nu (89,119:3a).

46 was a disastrous year for the Hiung-nu. Their country suffered under a severe drought, aggravated by a plague of locusts. Animals and people died. HHS claims that those who perished were "more than half" (89,119:3a), which, of course, is no more than another cliché.²⁾ The Wu-huan, who had been cowed by the Hiung-nu for over two centuries, recognized their opportunity, threw off their yoke, and defeated their former masters. The Chinese emperor expressed his pleasure by presenting them with silk (1B:17a; 90,120:3a).³⁾

At about this time, Kuang-wu asked his General of the Left of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Tsang Kung, for advice on the situation in Central Asia. Tsang Kung offered to lead a cavalry force against the Hiung-nu (18,48:14b). Political events moved too fast to implement such an offensive, even if the emperor had seriously contemplated it.

Shan-yü P'u-nu was fully aware of his vulnerable military position. He dispatched envoys to go to China and suggest peace and an alliance by marriage. Kuang-wu responded by sending a General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household to the court of the Shan-yü (89,119:3a). Nothing is known about the negotiations.

¹⁾ Since the official duties of the Ku-tu-hou seem to have included law and internal security, this was for the Shan-yü the proper action to take. Cf. 140. Pritsak, p. 197.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 14ff.

³⁾ The statement of 90,120:3a that after the victory of the Wu-huan the Hiung-nu fled northwards and that the land south of the Gobi became empty is an obvious exaggeration. No such claim is made in the chapter on the Hiung-nu. Pi, for instance, remained close to the Chinese border. No mention is made of his evacuating his territory.

If the previous reconstruction is correct, this was a serious moment for Pi. Through force of circumstances, he had become the champion of the pro-Chinese party. As long as he had ambitions to overthrow his rival, he needed that support and could not tolerate that Shan-yü P'u-nu stepped into the foreground as the peace-maker with China. He had to follow the same course, and, after the Shan-yü had taken the first step, he was forced to go further. Pi had no choice but to offer China a higher prize. He secretly sent a Chinese in his employ, named Kuo Heng, to the border and presented a map of the Hiung-nu territory (79,119:3a). Such an action traditionally signified submission.¹⁾

Before the end of 46, Emperor Kuang-wu, somewhat precipitately, took note of the changed conditions by demobilizing the officers and soldiers manning the watchtowers in the border commanderies (1B:17a). This order can only have had a limited application, since the Hiung-nu had previously overrun the greater part of the barriers between the Ordos Region and southern Chahar. Only further west, in Kan-su, and further east, in southern Jehol and Liao-ning, did the frontier fortifications remain fully intact. It was there that the demobilization must have taken place. This is corroborated by the fact that the Chinese outpost of Kü-yen was abolished. The last of the discovered wooden slips from Etsingol (Kü-yen) for Kuang-wu's reign are dated A.D. 31. Then follows a lacuna of close to sixty years. Lao Kan remarks that it is impossible to know the exact year when the fortification was abandoned. Kü-yen might have been discontinued as a result of the reduction in prefectures ordered in A.D. 30.²⁾ It might have been abolished during A.D. 46, or at some time between 30 and 46.³⁾ We can, I think, be a little more precise. Tou Jung stayed in control of the Kan-su corridor until he and his followers were summoned to the capital in A.D. 36. The sources stress Tou Jung's forceful defense of his territory, and state that the Hiung-nu and Tibetans learned to avoid it.⁴⁾ Kü-yen was part of Tou Jung's domain. This makes it probable that he kept it intact not only until A.D. 30 but until he left for Lo-yang.⁵⁾ The plausible time for the abandonment of the outpost is therefore the decade from 37 to 46. Tsien Po-ts'an may be right in preferring 46 as the date.⁶⁾

During the earlier part of A.D. 47, Pi again sent envoys to China. The two Ku-tu-hou, who had a fairly good idea of his intention, used the opportunity of the state sacrifice on June 20⁷⁾ to report to the Shan-yü, and to advise Pi's execu-

¹⁾ 1B:17a gives a garbled account of these events. It states that Pi asked for peace and an alliance by marriage, and that the emperor sent the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household to him. The fuller account in the chapter on the Hiung-nu is superior.

²⁾ See *infra* pp. 141ff.

³⁾ 116. Lao, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁾ E.g. 23,53:2b.

⁵⁾ An interesting point is that the wooden slips, at least from A.D. 27, were dated according to Kuang-wu's reign title (*nien hao*), although Tou Jung did not join him officially until A.D. 29.

⁶⁾ 45. Tsien, p. 457.

⁷⁾ According to 89, 119:4b, the Hiung-nu performed each year three state sacrifices to the Spirits of Heaven. These were held in the 1st, 5th, and 9th months on the first day with the cyclical character *mou*. The present reference is to the sacrifice of the 5th month. It is noteworthy that the Hiung-nu used the Chinese sexagenary cycle for dating.

tion. The latter got news of this plan through a younger brother who happened to belong to the guards of the Shan-yü. A breach could no longer be prevented. Pi mobilized the troops of his territory and awaited the return of the two Ku-tu-hou. HHS says that he intended to kill them. The Ku-tu-hou learned his intention in time, escaped, and informed the Shan-yü. The Shan-yü sent out a force to attack Pi, which, seeing itself outnumbered, returned without a fight (1B:17b; 89,119:3a-3b).

In the 1st month (Feb. 4-Mar. 3) of A.D. 48, the chiefs of eight tribal divisions agreed that Pi should make peace with China, and that he should inherit his grandfather's designation. Before the end of the 1st month, Pi sent envoys to China, offering that he and his descendants perpetually would protect the Chinese border against enemies (1B:17b; 89,119:3b). Emperor Kuang-wu called his high officials to a court discussion. With the exception of one official, all agreed that the offer should not be accepted. The arguments are not preserved, except such generalities as that internal problems should be tackled before external ones, and that "truth and falsehood of the barbarians were difficult to know". The General over All the Offices of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Keng Kuo, disagreed. He drew attention the precedent in Emperor Sün's time. If Pi did ward off the other Hiung-nu in the north, and the Sien-pi in the east, it would be possible to re-establish the border commanderies. This rare opportunity offered peace for generations. The emperor sided with the minority view of Keng Kuo and accepted Pi's offer. On Jan. 25, A.D. 49, Pi proclaimed himself Hu-han-sie Shan-yü (TKK 22:1a; HHS 1B:17b-18a; 19,49:10a-10b; 89,119:3b).¹⁾ From this historic date onwards, the Hiung-nu were divided into Southern and Northern Hiung-nu, and in China their rulers were generally referred to as the Southern and Northern Shan-yü.

In the 1st month (Feb. 22-Mar. 22) of A.D. 49, the Southern Shan-yü again dispatched envoys to the imperial capital (1B:18a; 89,119:4a). Wu-huan nobles arrived during the same month, and presented slaves, cattle, horses, bows, and furs of tigers, leopards, and sables. They were received in audience (1B:18a; 20,50:10b; 26,56:14b; 90,120:3a). The example of the Southern Hiung-nu had obviously made a deep impression. In the 3rd month (Apr. 22-May 20), the Southern Shan-yü sent another embassy which escorted a son as hostage to the court (1B:18a; 89,119:4a).

The Southern Shan-yü was automatically and irrevocably in war with his cousin, the Northern Shan-yü. Although the majority of the Hiung-nu seems to have remained loyal to the Northern Shan-yü, the Wu-huan and Sien-pi could be induced to attack the Northern Hiung-nu on their flank. This helped to tip the scale slightly in favour of the south. But no easy victory was in sight for either faction.

As early as the 1st month of 49, the Southern Shan-yü had ordered his younger brother Mo to attack the Northern Hiung-nu. Mo was the Heir-apparent with the traditional title of Worthy King of the Left, which proves that the Southern Shan-yü had revived the rules of succession by generation and seniority. Mo was extremely

¹⁾ Only TKK records the exact date.

successful. He defeated the guard of the Northern Shan-yü, captured alive the latter's younger brother, and took 7000 horses and 10,000 heads of cattle and sheep. 10,000 men went over to his side (1B:18a; 89,119:3b). This victory was probably facilitated by an attack of the Sien-pi, which is dated A.D. 49 and may have been simultaneous. Their nobles had been persuaded by Chai T'ung, Grand Administrator of Liao-tung, to strike against the Northern Hiung-nu. He had promised a reward for each head taken. The Sien-pi delivered more than 2000. Having discovered this profitable source of income, the Sien-pi kept up a brisk exchange of heads for rewards during the following years (20,50:10a-10b; 90,120:5b).

For the time being, the Northern Shan-yü was on the defensive, and kept his distance on the other side of the Gobi. Two of his Ku-tu-hou deserted him and joined the Southern Shan-yü, with, the text says, more than 30,000 men (89,119:3b-4a).

The political situation was briefly complicated during the summer of A.D. 50 by the appearance of a third Shan-yü. The younger brother of the Northern Shan-yü, who had been captured in the preceding year, and who apparently had enjoyed complete freedom among the Southern Hiung-nu, allied himself with five southern Ku-tu-hou, led his and their troops (supposedly 30,000 men), broke away, returned to the north, and at some distance from the northern court proclaimed himself Shan-yü. If this was an attempt to reunite all Hiung-nu under a ruler who was less compromised than either the Northern or Southern Shan-yü, it failed. For more than a month, the new pretender, and his elder brother, the Northern Shan-yü, attacked each other. The five Ku-tu-hou were killed, and the pretender committed suicide. Sons of the five Ku-tu-hou inherited the respective commands, and during the winter tried to fight their way back to the south. The Northern Shan-yü had them pursued, and captured them with their entire forces. The Southern Shan-yü had meanwhile also dispatched an army. It arrived too late to save the Ku-tu-hou. A head-on clash took place between the Southern and Northern Hiung-nu, in which the former were defeated (89,119:4a-4b, 5a-5b). In spite of this victory, the Northern Shan-yü could not but maintain a cautious attitude towards China. He released the Chinese who had been kidnapped earlier and permitted them to return (89,119:5b).

The Northern Hiung-nu had proved their military superiority over the southern branch. This fact is dwarfed by other events which were to have a profound influence on the history of China. Let us first consider these events in sequence before attempting their interpretation.

In the spring of A.D. 50, Emperor Kuang-wu had sent a General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Tuan Ch'en, together with a Lieutenant Colonel, Wang Yü, to go to the residence of the Southern Shan-yü, 80 li (ca. 21 miles; 33 km) beyond the border of the western regional division of Wu-yüan commandery. HHS states that when the Chinese envoys were received by the Shan-yü, they told him that he had to prostrate himself while receiving the imperial edict. The Shan-yü turned his head and hesitated, but in the end did as he was told, and declared himself a subject. Those who were present wept. After the ceremony, the Shan-yü

informed the Chinese through interpreters that he had only been enthroned recently, that he had been embarrassed, and that he requested not to have to make obeisance again in public. The Southern Shan-yü was then given an imperial seal of pure gold,¹⁾ a cap, a belt, garments, a comfortable carriage with a feather cover and flower ornaments, a chariot with a team of four horses a precious double-edged sword, a bow and arrows, three black insignia, two extra horses, 10,000 bolts of silken materials embroidered with pure gold, 10,000 *kin* of silk floss (5,375 lb.; 2,440 kg.), musical instruments, drum chariots, lances with silk covers, halberds, military equipment, and miscellaneous vessels for drinking and eating. He was also supplied with 25,000 *hu* of dried rice (14,050 U.S. bushels; 499,205 l.), and 36,000 heads of cattle and sheep. The Southern Shan-yü sent a son as hostage to the court and presented the emperor 2 camels and 10 piebald horses (1B:19a; 89,119:4a-4b). An edict permitted the Southern Shan-yü to take up his abode in Yün-chung commandery (89,119:4a).

In the winter of A.D. 50, another edict ordered the Southern Shan-yü to move from Yün-chung and henceforth to reside in the Mei-tsi prefecture of Si-ho commandery.²⁾ This means in all probability that he and his personal tribal division were given control of the Ordos Region within the horseshoe of the Yellow River, outside the line of fortifications which Kuang-wu had constructed in Shen-si. The Southern Shan-yü, in turn, stationed the other seven tribal divisions in the Chinese border commanderies of Tai, Yen-men, Ting-siang, Yün-chung, Wu-yüan, Shuo-fang, and Pei-ti.³⁾ Each continued to be ruled by hereditary chiefs and was supposed to act as the "ears and eyes" of the commanderies against attacks from beyond the border (89,119:5b). It would be wrong to draw from this the conclusion that the Southern Hiung-nu were thinly spaced out along the border. The fact that they continued to be led by their own chiefs proves that the tribal organization was not destroyed. They did not become farmers but remained herdsmen. From this it follows that they needed grazing grounds and therefore must have roamed freely through the border commanderies and the central Ordos Region.

The emperor appointed a special official to act as liaison between himself and the Southern Shan-yü. His title was General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household in Charge of the Hiung-nu. Its first holder was the same Tuan Ch'ên who already had gained expertise in negotiating with the Southern Shan-yü. He was ordered together with his Lieutenant Colonel Wang Yü to establish headquarters in Mei-tsi and to appoint Division Heads and Attendant Officials. The text mentions in particular a Division Head of Pacification in command of 50 men whose punishments had been relaxed and who were armed with crossbows.⁴⁾ Si-ho commandery

¹⁾ The *pen ki* records that the seal was presented at this occasion. That must mean that the other gifts were offered then also. The chapter on the Hiung-nu gives a different account. It describes the ceremony in greater detail and says that when this was finished the envoys returned to China. The seal and gifts were bestowed later, in the autumn. The version of the *pen ki* makes more sense.

²⁾ This prefecture was situated in the northeastern Ordos Region. The exact location is unknown. Map 17 gives the approximate emplacement.

³⁾ See map 17.

⁴⁾ The Shao-hing and Ki ku ko editions write 50 men. The Palace edition says 5000 men.

was ordered to assist the general with 2000 mounted troops and 500 men whose punishments had been relaxed, under the command of the Chief Clerk. This contingent was rotated each year. The overt function of the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household in Charge of the Hiung-nu was to protect the Southern Shan-yü and to take part in his administration of the law. Covertly, his duty was to report on the activities of the Hiung-nu (1B:19a; 89,119:4b, 5b).

During the same winter of A.D. 50, the emperor made an attempt to send the Chinese refugees back to their native border commanderies. Mentioned by name are Pei-ti, Shuo-fang, Wu-yüan, Yün-chung, Ting-siang, Yen-men, Tai, and Shang-ku. Internuncios, in charge of men whose punishments had been relaxed, were ordered to repair the city walls of the prefectures. The refugees were promised food and money to assist their return (1B:19a; 89,119:5b).

Relations between the Chinese emperor and the Southern Shan-yü quickly settled down into routine. At the end of each year, the latter sent a new son as hostage to the court, escorted by Hiung-nu envoys and an Attendant Official of the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household in Charge of the Hiung-nu. Simultaneously, an Internuncio set out from Lo-yang to escort back to the Shan-yü the son who had been hostage during the past year. The two delegations met *en route*. When the New Year congratulations and ceremonies had been completed, the Hiung-nu envoys returned from Lo-yang to Mei-tsi. They were accompanied by Chinese Internuncios who carried the imperial New Year gifts. The Southern Shan-yü received 1000 bolts of coloured silken materials, 4 *tuan*¹⁾ of brocade, 10 *kin* of gold (5 lb. 6 oz. avoirdupois; 2.44 kg.), and imperial foodstuffs from the stores of the Grand Provisioner. The mother of the Southern Shan-yü, his principal wives, his sons, and the highest dignitaries, received jointly 10,000 bolts of silken fabrics. These gifts were the same every year (89,119:4b). The fact that the Southern Shan-yü in A.D. 53 was given several tens of thousands of sheep (89,119:7b), shows that Emperor Kuang-wu did not restrict his grants to the ceremonial occasions.

Hu-han-sie Shan-yü Pi died in A.D. 56 and was succeeded by his younger brother, the K'iu-fou-yu-ti Shan-yü Mo. The General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household in Charge of the Hiung-nu, Tuan Ch'en, paid a visit of condolence and sacrificed wine and rice. Kuang-wu dispatched an envoy with a letter of sympathy, and presented the new Shan-yü with an imperial seal, caps, three unlined red garments, one knife worn at the belt, and one embroidered belt. In addition, he granted him 4000 bolts of coloured silken fabrics and asked him to distribute them among his dignitaries. This became a standard procedure at the death of each Shan-yü. The K'iu-fou-yu-ti Shan-yü died as early as A.D. 57, i.e. in the same year as Emperor Kuang-wu, and was in turn succeeded by his younger brother, the Yi-fa-yü-lu-ti Shan-yü Han (89,119:7b).

Meanwhile, the Northern Hiung-nu had not been inactive. Since they were at war with the Southern Hiung-nu, and were raided by the Sien-pi in the east, it was obviously to their advantage to make peace with China. Envoys of the Northern

¹⁾ The *tuan* was a measure of length. Its exact value in Han times is not known.

Shan-yü arrived at the border of Wu-wei commandery in A.D. 51 and proposed peace and an alliance by marriage. The Grand Administrator of Wu-wei detained the envoys and reported to the capital, whereupon Kuang-wu called a court discussion. As usual, when Hiung-nu policy was discussed, the high officials could not agree. The Imperial Heir-apparent (the future Emperor Ming) spoke up in the end and suggested that contacts with the Northern Hiung-nu should be avoided, since otherwise the Southern Shan-yü might grow suspicious. The emperor agreed with this and ordered the Grand Administrator of Wu-wei to send the envoys back (89,119:5b-6a).

Not everyone concurred with this policy. Tsang Kung and Ma Wu, two military men and early supporters of Kuang-wu, who both held the rank of General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household at the time, memorialized jointly in A.D. 51 that the Northern Hiung-nu should be attacked. They argued that these only coveted profit and lacked propriety and sincerity. When they were weak, they knocked their heads on the ground. When they were strong, they raided and looted. At present, they were so feeble that their power did not match that of a single Chinese commandery. This would be the moment to annihilate them. Military matters should not be neglected because of exclusive emphasis on civilian achievements. Spurred by the promise of rewards, the Koreans, Wu-huan, and Sien-pi should be enticed to attack the Hiung-nu on one flank, while the Tibetans and non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu) of T'ien-shui, Lung-si, and the four commanderies west of the [Yellow] River¹⁾ struck at them on the other. Tsang Kung and Ma Wu, who apparently knew their emperor, added that the unique chance should not be lost through his "benevolence and mercy" (18,48:14b-15a). Kuang-wu answered in a lengthy edict. He may have felt the need to clarify his policy and quoted the Huang shi kung ki²⁾ and Lun yü for support. His contention was that the soft can restrain the hard, and that the weak can restrain the strong. The soft and weak are the same as virtue and benevolence. A sovereign who has virtue gives joy to his people and not to himself. Then his joy will last long. He who puts aside what is near and plans for what is far away will toil and yet achieve nothing. He who puts aside what is far away and plans for what is near will be at leisure. A government which is at leisure will have many loyal subjects, while one which toils will face much disorder. To seek far-reaching territories is reckless. To covet the possessions of others is oppressive. An oppressive government will inevitably fail. At present, the state has no good government. Portents have not ceased. The people are alarmed. Moreover, the northern barbarians are still strong. Rumours are constantly inaccurate. If it really were possible to annihilate the bandits by mobilizing the resources of

¹⁾ I.e. Wu-wei, Chang-ye, Tsiu-ts'üan, and Tun-huang.

²⁾ The Huang shi kung ki, or Record of His Excellency of the Yellow Rock, is also known as the Huang shi kung san lüe, or Three Strategies of His Excellency of the Yellow Rock. This work in 3 k'üan is listed among the books on military matters in the bibliographical chapters of the Sui, T'ang and Sung histories, and is still extant. It is attributed to an eccentric oldster who claimed to be a yellow rock and who is said to have appeared to Emperor Kao's assistant Chang Liang (SK 55; HS 40. See 147. Watson, I, pp. 135-136).

half the empire, how would that not be desirable? But as long as it is not the right time, it is better to let the people rest. The text adds that after this, the officers did not dare to speak again of military matters (18,48:15a-15b).

The Northern Hiung-nu, in spite of their rebuff, again sent envoys in A.D. 52, and this time seem to have reached the capital. Once more, they proposed peace and an alliance by marriage, presented horses and furs, and held out the promise of delivering the Western Region to China. They also requested musical instruments. The emperor asked his high officials for advice. The man who played a decisive role at this occasion was a Division Head in the yamen of the Minister over the Masses, none other than the historian Pan Piao. His memorial on the subject begins with a reference to a decree by Emperor Sūan, according to which the nation of the Hiung-nu stayed in continuous flux, and it was easy to improve relations if one received them in a friendly fashion. The Southern Shan-yü had attached himself to China, and therefore the Northern Hiung-nu feared that he plotted against their country. This was the reason why they begged for peace and an alliance by marriage. They also paid much tribute, and held joint markets with Han. The purpose was to display their wealth and strength. But experience had shown that the richer the present, the more hollow was their nation. The fact that they asked for an alliance by marriage proved that their fears were great. It would not be wise to reject their advances altogether. Presents are always given in return for presents, and they should approximately equal each other in value. It should be made clear that the emperor was guided by the precedent of the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü and Chī-chī Shan-yü¹⁾, Pan Piao appended to his memorial the draft for an edict addressing the Northern Shan-yü. It was written in the emperor's name, even including the imperial "We". The contents is briefly as follows: You, Shan-yü have not forgotten the kindness of Han, and you remember the covenant of your late grandfather.²⁾ You wish to make peace and an alliance by marriage. The plan is most eminent. In the past, the Hiung-nu often showed cunning and disorderliness. The Hu-han-sie Shan-yü and Chī-chī Shan-yü were enemies of each other. Both were protected by Emperor Sūan's gracious kindness, and therefore both sent sons as hostages. Later, the Chī-chī Shan-yü cut himself off from imperial favour and was annihilated. The Hu-han-sie Shan-yü attached himself, formed an alliance by marriage, and was succeeded by his sons and grandsons. The Southern Shan-yü had knocked at the border and submitted, because his rights to the throne had been disregarded. He frequently begs for troops and officers to return and sweep away your Northern Court. But his words cannot be listened to alone. Since you, Northern Shan-yü, in recent years have offered tribute and proposed peace and an alliance by marriage, it has not yet been allowed. Han is stern and sincere. Its righteousness makes no difference between near and far. Those who submit are rewarded. Those who rebel are exterminated. If you really are sincere in your wish of restoring peace, why do you offer to deliver the Western Region? If the Western Region is sub-

¹⁾ I.e. that China had made peace with the former and killed the latter.

²⁾ The first Hu-han-sie Shan-yü.

ordinated to you, and you to Han, it means that the Western Region is subordinated to Han. Now you are presented with 500 bolts of miscellaneous silken fabrics, a bow, a bow sheath, a quiver, and four arrows. The Ku-tu-hou of the Left and the Lu-li King of the Right, who presented horses, are each granted 400 bolts of miscellaneous silken fabrics and a sword which decapitates horses.¹⁾ You have said that the musical instruments,²⁾ which were bestowed on the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü, are broken. As long as you regard fighting as the essential, bows and sharp swords are more useful to you. Musical instruments are for peaceful times. We do not like trivia. May you choose to your advantage (89,119:6a-7a).

Emperor Kuang-wu accepted the draft and sent it (89,119:7b).

The last official contact between the Northern Shan-yü and Kuang-wu took place in A.D. 55, when the former once more sent envoys with presents. Kuang-wu responded with a letter stamped with the imperial seal and a gift of coloured silken fabrics, but did not send envoys of his own (1B:20b; 89,119:7b).

That is the chain of events, which we now should attempt to interpret. To begin with, the Chinese sources describe all relations between Emperor Kuang-wu and the Hiung-nu from the usual sino-centric of view. The Southern Shan-yü "knocks at the border", he "declares himself a subject". The Hiung-nu "covet profit" and "lack sincerity", whereas China shows "gracious kindness", is "stern and sincere", "rewards" and "punishes". Pan Piao's draft edict, in spite of its merits, is written in an insufferably condescending tone and treats the peace feeler as though it were an abject offer of surrender. It has been seen that the contacts between the Former Han dynasty and the Hiung-nu from 51 B.C. onwards were officially depicted in the same stereotype vocabulary.³⁾ This is not to say the the first Hu-han-sie Shan-yü, and the second, one hundred year later, were in the same political situation.

The first Hu-han-sie Shan-yü, except for perhaps a very brief period, never lost the initiative. He went through motions which the Chinese dynastic historian interpreted as submission, but which really resulted in a peace between two independent nations. When his rival, the Chī-chī Shan-yü had been forced to withdraw westwards, the Hu-han-sie Shan-yü led his people back to their old grazing grounds north of the Gobi. In the contest of the two Hiung-nu pretenders, he had been the stronger.

In contrast, the future second Hu-han-sie Shan-yü Pi was in a much more vulnerable position. The very fact that his rightful succession to the throne had been prevented, proves that his party was outweighed by the opposition. When the famine of A.D. 46 forced Shan-yü P'u-nu to seek peace with China, Pi was in danger of losing the little political manoeuvrability left to him. If he were to claim the throne at all, it had to be done quickly. Pi's hurried action was therefore mo-

¹⁾ A heavy sword with which one supposedly could decapitate a horse in one stroke.

²⁾ The text mentions three kinds of instruments, the *yü*, *se*, and *k'ung-hou*. The *yü* was a wind instrument, consisting of 36 reed pipes connected to a single mouthpiece. The *se* and *k'ung-hou* were string instruments. The characters for *k'ung-hou* are more commonly written with radical 118.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 90.

tivated by apprehensiveness. In the contest between him and Shan-yü P'u-nu, he was, and remained, the weaker.

After Pi had broken with his cousin and on Jan. 25, A.D. 49, had proclaimed himself the second Hu-han-sie Shan-yü, he may have hoped that the majority of the Hiung-nu would rally to him. This proved not to be case. One reason must have been that both the Northern and Southern Shan-yü were ready to make peace with China. We do not know how vigorous the once strong pro-Chinese peace party was at this time, but so much is certain, that it no longer needed to make a choice among the claimants on the grounds of their attitude to China. Pi was therefore in danger of being crushed between Shan-yü P'u-nu in the north and China in the south. This explains why he had to go to unprecedented length in seeking Chinese support. However one may regard the presentation of the map in A.D. 46, his public prostration in A.D. 50 cannot be interpreted in any other way than symbolizing submission. No Hiung-nu Shan-yü had ever kotowed to a Chinese emperor or his delegate before, and Pi's embarrassment emerges clearly from the report of the envoys.¹⁾ The fact that Kuang-wu granted him an imperial seal is, in this connection, less significant than the parallel event of 51 B.C. Kuang-wu must simply have felt compelled to follow the Former Han model.

In this situation, the initiative rested with Emperor Kuang-wu. He had three choices. Firstly, he could have declined the peace offers of both Shan-yü out of hand and let matters take their course. This had been advised by the majority of the participants in the court discussion of A.D. 48. The result would probably have been that the Northern Hiung-nu defeated the Southern. While such a fraternal struggle would have weakened the Hiung-nu temporarily, it would, generally speaking, have left things as they had been before. Secondly, the emperor could have allied himself with the Northern Shan-yü and in a joint campaign have wiped out the Southern Hiung-nu. Such a Machiavellian action would not have been alien to the Chinese way of thinking. It did, however, involve one unknown quantity, the attitude of the Northern Shan-yü. There was no guarantee that, once he was victorious, he would not resume the raids into China. Lastly, the emperor could accept the peace offer and symbolic surrender of the Southern Shan-yü. Following the advice of Keng Kuo, this is what he did.

So far, one can find no fault with Kuang-wu's decision. But this decision postulated a sequence. As the generals Tsang Kung and Ma Wu had pointed out with eminent logic in A.D. 51, the Northern Hiung-nu should be attacked forthwith. While the military men were probably optimistic in expecting help from the

¹⁾ According to HS 94B:15b (128. de Groot, I, p. 263), Chinese envoys, sent by Wang Mang during the yüan-shi period (A.D. 1-5) to the residence of the Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti Shan-yü, instructed the latter to kotow, and he complied. If this account is true, Wang Mang achieved what no Former Han emperor had been able to. But it seems out of the question that the Shan-yü, who was no great friend of China, in his own residence meekly would have obeyed such an unheard-of Chinese demand. More probably, the Chinese envoys simply invented the whole matter in order to curry favour on their return. While it cannot be excluded that Tuan Ch'en and Wang Yü in A.D. 50 committed the same fraud, the details of the prostration are described rather convincingly. Historically speaking, the first kotow is against all available evidence, whereas the second fits in well with the facts.

Koreans and Tibetans, the Sien-pi could be counted on, and perhaps the Wu-huan as well. The Southern Shan-yü was naturally eager to participate in a campaign, and, from political necessity, would have been a reliable ally. No more was needed than purposeful Chinese leadership, backed up by a Chinese army. It is inconceivable that the Northern Hiung-nu could have withstood a coordinated Chinese—Southern Hiung-nu—Sien-pi assault. The larger of the two Hiung-nu factions would have been defeated and decimated. Pi would have been the sole Shan-yü, installed in the traditional residence north of the Gobi, and deeply indebted to China. The border commanderies would have been recovered. The threat of a combined Chinese—Sien-pi attack, would have exerted a salutary influence on the Shan-yü in the future, and prevented any significant change of attitude. After 51 B.C., the Chinese had enjoyed friendly relations with the Hiung-nu for half a century. There was no reason why no new era of peace should dawn.

There is no question but that China could have afforded such a campaign. In A.D. 50, the civil war had been over for fourteen years. Apart from raids by the barbarians, North China had not suffered from other disturbances for seven years. The possibility of mobilizing an army existed. The failure to do so did not depend upon internal conditions or military inadequacy, but on the mentality of the emperor. He committed a blunder which must rank among the most consummate in Chinese history.

After the Southern Shan-yü in A.D. 50 had been permitted to take up his residence in the Mei-tsi prefecture of the Ordos Region, he had stationed seven tribal divisions in seven adjoining commanderies, from Pei-ti to Tai.¹⁾ The Hiung-nu had moved freely through the major part of that territory before, so that this was less a novelty than more of the same. The texts do not mention whether Kuang-wu took the initiative in the permanent settlement of the Hiung-nu within the border, but it is clear that such an important step would have been impossible without, at least, his acquiescence. What was his motive?

The Southern Shan-yü had offered to protect the border of China. This he could have done from without as well as from within. While it is likely that he himself preferred the relative safety of the frontier wall against the Northern Hiung-nu, that argument would not have weighed heavily with the Chinese. Kuang-wu must have had a reason of his own. He probably took the peace offer of the Southern Hiung-nu seriously, and looked on them as a convenient pool of fighting men, useful for emergencies. But he did not trust them completely, and here we glimpse, I think, the purpose of letting them stay within the fortifications. The barrier was to keep the Southern Hiung-nu in, as much as the Northern Hiung-nu out. It was intended to prevent a reunification of their nation. A precedent on a much smaller scale had been Emperor Sün's decision in 55 B.C. to settle some surrendered Hiung-nu in the Dependent States of Si-ho and Pei-ti.²⁾ A clue that this motive may have been in Kuang-wu's mind is a memorial of about A.D. 51. It proposed

¹⁾ See map 17.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 89.

that the office of the General Who Crosses the Liao [River], with a subordinate Colonel of the Left and Colonel of the Right, should be re-established.¹⁾ The incumbent should permanently garrison the Wu-yüan commandery north of the Ordos bend of the Yellow River in order to prevent escape. The escapees in question could naturally not have been Chinese, but were the Southern Hiung-nu. Kuang-wu did not act on this suggestion. His son, Emperor Ming, adopted it (19,49:10b). The interesting point is that the memorial was written by none other than the same Keng Kuo who had advised the acceptance of the Southern Shan-yü's peace offer. This makes it next to certain that he also conceived the plan for letting the Hiung-nu live within the barrier. The brief account of the court discussion in HHS does not mention it, but completeness is not a virtue of the dynastic histories. If this assumption is correct, the officials opposing Keng Kuo in the discussion had a stronger reason than HHS gives them credit for.

Once Emperor Kuang-wu had refused the idea of an allied campaign against the Northern Hiung-nu, and had officially admitted the Southern Hiung-nu into northwest China, it followed that peace offers of the former should not be repulsed. It is within this situation that Pan Piao's memorial and draft edict, in spite of the phrasing, make complete sense. They outlined the only sensible course which under the circumstances remained open.

The suspicion is strong, however, that Kuang-wu's policy towards the Hiung-nu was adopted not only for the reasons mentioned but also because it was the easiest. The emperor's attitude to the northern border problems had consistently been marked by *laissez faire* and a genuine distaste for military involvement. He never seems to have grasped the full significance of the issues. The border commanderies had been abandoned by him, and the Hiung-nu had moved in. It was so much simpler to let them stay and to permit others to follow. Qualms could be soothed by the thought that the Chinese refugees would be enabled to return home, and that this would redress the ethnic balance in China's favour. The trouble was that under the conditions the refugees had no wish to go back to the border commanderies. Although the government in A.D. 50 had promised assistance for the return journey, the response must have been negative. This is proved by the fact that Emperor Ming on June 15, A.D. 57, admitted defeat, rescinded the order, and permitted the refugees to do as they pleased (2:2b).

The Southern Hiung-nu were virtually unchallenged in their possession of the border commanderies. They formed an alien element, keeping the traditional tribal organization and customs. Each year, at the state sacrifices of the 1st, 5th, and 9th months, the Southern Shan-yü assembled the chiefs of the tribal divisions and discussed the affairs of government (89,119:4b-5a). Although at these occasions he is said simultaneously to have sacrificed to the deceased Han emperors, this cannot have been more than a gesture. To which extent the General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household in Charge of the Hiung-nu was able to intervene effectively

¹⁾ HS briefly refers to this office in the time of Emperors Chao and Süan. The only mentioned holder was executed in 66 B.C. (HS 8:10b; 72. Dubs, II, p. 226).

is not recorded. The relations between the Southern Shan-yü and the emperor were therefore ambiguous. The Chinese liked to consider the former a vassal. Pi had certainly given the appearance of submitting. But he never came to the capital. One prostration must have been enough for him. The only time during the entire Later Han dynasty that a Southern Shan-yü went to the court was in A.D. 216 (9:11a). That is not the normal behaviour of vassals. The first Hu-han-sie Shan-yü and his successors, who had remained firmly independent, had come more often. It might be argued that the Chinese declined such visits because of the drain on the exchequer. They doubtlessly paid enough as it was. The major New Year gifts, instituted by Kuang-wu, amounted to 11,000 bolts of silken fabrics and 10 *kin* of gold, corresponding to about U.S.\$ 250,000. This means that from A.D. 51 to 57, the year when Kuang-wu died, the value of the New Year gifts alone was \$1,750,000. To this must be added the substantial presents of silk and grain in A.D. 50 as well as at the time of Pi's death in 56, which brings the figure to over 2 million. During a mere eight-year period, the total value of all gifts was probably not much different from what the Former Han emperors had granted in half a century.¹⁾ It looks as though Emperor Kuang-wu and his heirs had to pay for the collaboration of the Southern Shan-yü. If that is true, they could hardly have declined requests for visits to the court. The fact that Pi and his successors nevertheless stayed away, may well indicate that they did not wish to put themselves into a potentially humiliating situation.

In short, the symbiosis between China and its alien allies was uneasy. The Southern Hiung-nu formed a state within the state, not really dependent, and yet not fully independent. At times, fighting broke out during Later Han, in which the Chinese were always victorious. They were numerically and strategically in the stronger position. At other times, the Southern Hiung-nu substantially assisted the Chinese in defeating the Northern Hiung-nu, Sien-pi, and Tibetans.

Gradually, the relationship between the two nations changed. Through the growing power of the Southern Hiung-nu, and through Tibetan encroachment, China's grip on the northwest slackened. The number of the Southern Hiung-nu increased through surrender of Northern Hiung-nu. To make a numerical assessment of their strength is difficult. According to the Chinese sources, the Southern Shan-yü in A.D. 90 controlled 237,300 individuals and 50,170 able-bodied soldiers (89,119:11b), figures which most certainly are too low. It cannot have been in the interest of the Hiung-nu to let the Chinese know the real totals, and the latter had no way of making a realistic assessment.²⁾ The political initiative shifted slowly to the Southern Hiung-nu, and during the centuries their relations with the Chinese

¹⁾ A difficulty is that the total value of all gifts cannot be calculated with any reasonable accuracy.

²⁾ The sources mention that more than 1000 Northern Hiung-nu surrendered in A.D. 59, 3000-4000 in A.D. 76, 38,000 (with 20,000 horses and more than 100,000 heads of cattle and sheep) in A.D. 83, and 200,000 with 8000 able-bodied soldiers in A.D. 87 (89,119:7b, 8b-9a, 10a). This would come to about 250,000 individuals alone, not counting the Southern Hiung-nu who had followed Pi from the beginning. Even if some of those who surrendered later broke away again, it seems that the figures for A.D. 90 are a gross underestimation.

grew steadily worse. In A.D. 308, the great Hiung-nu wars began, which in 316 led to the collapse of the Western Tsin dynasty. North China was abandoned and fell under the domination of barbarian rulers.¹⁾

The blame for this development cannot be placed on Kuang-wu alone. It is shared by the later emperors and politicians who proceeded on the same path, until the trend no longer could be reversed. But Kuang-wu set the precedent and lacked the vision to realize its consequences. He prepared the ground for the victory of the northern barbarians.

Once Kuang-wu had settled on a policy of officially accepting barbarians within the Chinese border, there was no reason why he should restrict it to the Hiung-nu. We know from HHS that he also admitted Wu-huan. The text gives a general and flattering description of how various barbarians paid audience without end. Among them were 81 Wu-huan chiefs, to whom the emperor gave Chinese noble titles. They wished to remain as guards in China. Kuang-wu ordered them to summon their people, and provided them with clothing and food. They settled in the border commanderies and acted as scouts for China (90,120:3a-3b). The *Wei shu*²⁾ is more explicit. It says that 9000 Wu-huan under 80 chiefs were settled in the commanderies of Liao-si,³⁾ Yu-pei-p'ing, Yü-yang, Kuang-yang, Shang-ku, Tai, T'ai-yüan, Yen-men, and Shuo-fang.⁴⁾ This would, on the average, mean 1000 Wu-huan in each commandery. The numbers are not large enough to have had a serious impact, and no mention is made of any additional Wu-huan being admitted during Later Han. They never posed a mounting internal problem comparable to the Southern Hiung-nu.

The decision to accept barbarians within the border must have been made at the court conference of A.D. 48. The Wu-huan were admitted in 49. Soon afterwards, the historian and Division Head in the yamen of the Minister over the Masses, Pan Piao, again gave important advice. He memorialized that the character of the Wu-huan was frivolous and crafty. If they were permitted to run wild without being controlled, they would again raid and plunder the settled people. To place those who had surrendered under the charge of a Division Head would not be useful. It would be better to appoint a Colonel [Protecting] the Wu-huan. This would lessen tensions at the border. The emperor implemented the proposal. The Colonel [Protecting] the Wu-huan was stationed in the Ning prefecture⁵⁾ of Shang-ku commandery, where he had his headquarters and commanded a garrison. His duties included the supervision of seasonal markets in Ning with the barbarians,

¹⁾ These results of Kuang-wu's policy have also been brought out by 120. Uchida, A, pp. 581-582.

²⁾ This is not the *Wei shu* of the *San kuo chi* but a separate work of which only a few quotations are preserved. It was written in 48 kuan by Wang Ch'en (died A.D. 266) with the assistance of Sün K'ai and Yüan Tsi. The fragments concerning the Wu-huan and Sien-pi have been translated by 144. Schreiber. The entry of the *Wei shu* referred to above is quoted by the commentary to the *Wei shu* of the *San kuo chi* 30:3a-3b (Wu chou t'ung wen edition), and is translated by 144. Schreiber, pp. 157-158.

³⁾ The text also mentions the Dependent State of Liao-tung, which is an anachronism. It was only established in the time of Emperor An (reigned 107-125) (*chi* 23B:22a).

⁴⁾ See map 17.

⁵⁾ It was situated NW of the present Süan-hua hien, Chahar. See map 17.

and also the reception of hostages from and presentation of rewards to the Sien-pi (90,120:3b).

The surrender of the 9000 Wu-huan did not prevent raids by others of their kin. These began in about A.D. 54, were directed mostly against Shang-ku commandery, and were only halted in A.D. 58 with the help of the Sien-pi (2:4a; 20,50:10b; 90,120:5b). The latter had so far played an entirely secondary role. They had participated in Hiung-nu raids until A.D. 45, and then, just as the Wu-huan, had gained their freedom through the split among the Hiung-nu. The Sien-pi promptly began to attack their former masters and their Wu-huan neighbours, while establishing friendly relations with China. During A.D. 49, they sent interpreters and presents. Two of their chiefs arrived in Lo-yang in the 1st month (Jan. 28–Feb. 26) of 54,¹⁾ paid audience, tendered congratulations, and offered gifts. The emperor granted them noble titles (1B:20a; 90,120:5b). Only from the end of the 1st century onwards, did the Sien-pi become a scourge for China.

b. *The Western Region*

When the Northern Hiung-nu in A.D. 52 offered to deliver the Western Region,²⁾ they could promise no more than the eastern half of the Tarim Basin. Their influence in that region came fairly late, and had grown only after A.D. 45.

It has been seen that Wang Mang did not lose the Western Region as the dynastic historian claims.³⁾ Only with the civil war after his death, were the various states of the Tarim Basin put adrift. Even then, at least one state remained a staunch friend of China. This was So-kü (Yarkand). Its king Yen had as a young prince been a hostage at the court of Emperor Yüan (reigned 48–33), had become an admirer of the country, and had stoutly supported Wang Mang's Protector General of the Western Region, Li Ch'ung. When Yen died in A.D. 18, Wang Mang conferred on him the posthumous title of King Who Is Loyal and Martial. Yen was succeeded by his son K'ang, who had been educated in a pro-Chinese spirit. Probably in early 29, K'ang sent a large embassy to China in which some of the neighbouring states took part. It escorted the widow and children of the late Protector General of the Western Region, Li Ch'ung, and his officers and soldiers, in all several thousands of individuals. A letter by K'ang expressed his admiration for and attachment to the Han dynasty (88,118:19b).⁴⁾

At this time, Wei Ao was still an independent warlord in Kan-su east of the upper course of the Yellow River, and obstructed the roads to the capital. The embassy was therefore halted in the Kan-su corridor west of the Yellow River, where Tou Jung had been in control since A.D. 25. His family was, and continued to be, known for its experts on Central Asia. The text says that Tou Jung received an imperial decree to confer on K'ang two titles, that of King of So-kü Dependent on Han Who Establishes Merit and Cherishes Virtue, and that of Grand Chief

¹⁾ HHK 8:15a places this event in A.D. 55.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 124ff.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 97ff.

⁴⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, p. 196.

Commandant of the Western Region. K'ang was put in charge of the 55 states of the Western Region (88,118:19b).¹⁾ The first of these titles, excepting its frills, was no more than a confirmation of what he was already. The second was something altogether different. It delegated to K'ang the authority to enforce peace among the various states, and to act as the arbiter in disputes. He became, as it were, the representative of China to oversee its dependent states, in a capacity not different from that of a Protector General of the Western Region.

Such an appointment is inconsistent with Kuang-wu's generally cautious attitude to foreign policy. Most certainly he was influenced by Tou Jung. The latter officially recognized Kuang-wu in May, A.D. 29, a major diplomatic achievement for the imperial cause.²⁾ Either at that occasion, or later during the year, Tou Jung must have informed Kuang-wu about the arrival of the embassy, and, from his considerable knowledge of Central Asian affairs, have advised the proper course of action. The political relations with Tou Jung were so delicate in 29, that the emperor had little alternative but to agree to the proposal. This reconstruction of the events is strengthened by the fact that Kuang-wu was to turn again to Tou Jung in A.D. 41 for counsel in a similar matter.

K'ang died in A.D. 33 and was succeeded by his younger brother Hien.³⁾ During 38, he joined with Shan-shan (Lou-lan) in sending messengers and tribute to the imperial court. HHS states that at this time Hien dominated all states east of Pamir (1B:11a; 88,118:19b-20a).⁴⁾ Kuang-wu seems to have accepted the tribute, but otherwise to have ignored the problem posed by the Western Region.

In A.D. 41, Hien sent another envoy with presents. He requested that a Protector General of the Western Region should be appointed. The emperor questioned Tou Jung on the matter. Tou Jung, who then was Grand Minister of Works, stressed that Hien and his closest relatives wished to serve Han, and that their sincerity could not be doubted. He should be encouraged. Kuang-wu thereupon followed Tou Jung's advice and did what Hien undoubtedly had hoped for. He appointed Hien himself Protector General of the Western Region. Hien's envoy received for his master the appropriate seal, chariots, banners, pure gold, brocade, and flowered silk (1B:14a; 88,118:20a).⁵⁾

In A.D. 41, the Hiung-nu were still a major danger to China. If the emperor wished to avoid any direct Chinese engagement in the Tarim Basin, this decision could be justified. Under the circumstances, he could do no better than delegating authority to the King of So-kü (Yarkand). Hien was an ambitious man, whose interests happened to coincide with those of China. His appointment as Protector General of the Western Region cost China nothing and could be extremely advantageous. It was a stroke of genius. It also was out of character for Kuang-wu.

When Hien's appointment became known, the Grand Administrator of Tun-

¹⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, pp. 196-197.

²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 166-167.

³⁾ Since K'ang had two sons (88,118:19b), this indicates inheritance by generation and seniority.

⁴⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, p. 197.

⁵⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, pp. 197-198.

huang, P'ei Tsun, memorialized that a barbarian could not be granted great authority. He evidently lacked Tou Jung's good judgment, and suffered from the common Chinese arrogance of underestimating foreigners. Kuang-wu was persuaded by him. He issued an edict which ordered that the seal of Protector General of the Western Region should be taken back, and that Hien instead should be given the seal of a General-in-chief of Han. P'ei Tsun intercepted the envoy in Tun-huang on his return journey, and, when the latter refused to return the first seal, took it away by force and exchanged it against the lesser one. Hien was naturally resentful. He assumed the title of Grand Protector General and began to pursue an aggressive policy of his own (88,118:20a).¹⁾

In the winter of A.D. 45, the last delegation during Kuang-wu's time arrived from the Western Region. The kings of sixteen states, among which were Shan-shan (Lou-lan), Nearer Kū-shī (Turfan), Farther Kū-shī, and Yen-k'i (Karashahr), sent sons as hostages to the court. When received in audience, they offered presents and asked for the appointment of a Protector General. The emperor took the view that China had to be consolidated first, that the northern border was not yet secure, and that there was not yet leisure for external affairs. He did not accept the hostages and sent them back with rich gifts. The kings thereupon wrote to Tun-huang's Grand Administrator, P'ei Tsun, and requested that the hostages should be detained in Tun-huang. This would give the impression that a Protector General would be sent, which might put a stop to the hostilities by the King of So-kü (Yarkand). P'ei Tsun reported this in a memorial, and the emperor agreed to the proposal (1B:16a, 88,118:20a-20b; 24b).²⁾

By A.D. 46, Hien seems to have come to the conclusion that no Chinese Protector General was forthcoming. He wrote to the King of Shan-shan (Lou-lan) and asked him to bar the road to China. When the king refused, Hien attacked and defeated him. During the winter of the same year, Hien killed the King of Kiu-tsī (Kucha) and annexed the state. The hostages in Tun-huang were meanwhile getting worried, departed, and returned home. The King of Shan-shan wrote to the emperor for the last time, offered a son as a hostage, and asked for a Protector General. Kuang-wu answered that he could not send out an army, and that the various states of the Western Region should do as they pleased. Shan-shan and both Kū-shī consequently submitted to the Hiung-nu (88,118:20b).³⁾

During the following years, the Hiung-nu gained possession of the eastern half of the Tarim Basin, including Kiu-tsī (Kucha). Hien controlled the western half of the basin, including Ku-mo (Aksu) and Yü-t'ien (Khotan) (88,118:7a; 20b-21a).⁴⁾

In sum, Kuang-wu's attitude to the Western Region can only be described as the worst possible combination of wrong action and non-action. Yet no voice of criticism is raised against him in HHS. He is always favourably contrasted with

¹⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, p. 198.

²⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, pp. 198-199, 211.

³⁾ Cf. 123, Chavannes, pp. 199-200.

⁴⁾ Cf. 123. Chavannes, pp. 171, 200-201.

Wang Mang, whatever the real facts of the situation. Much is made of Wang Mang's tactlessness in sending the Shan-yü a lesser seal, although that matter pales in comparison with Kuang-wu's vascillation and the burlesque of his enforced exchange of seals.

The historical facts are that Wang Mang did not lose the northern silk route, and that, as soon as the civil war permitted a resumption of contacts, the major states of the Western Region were eager to return to the Chinese fold. The King of So-kü (Yarkand) had been educated in a pro-Chinese spirit. With greater tact, his considerable energy could perhaps have been channelled for the benefit of China. If this succeeded, Kuang-wu would not have lost a single soldier. If it did not succeed, he would not have been worse off than before. What the emperor should have avoided at all cost was antagonizing his potentially best ally.

Naturally, the Western Region was a side issue. While Kuang-wu could have done better than he did, direct Chinese domination of the Tarim Basin depended in the last analysis on the Northern Hiung-nu. Whether the peace offer of A.D. 52 could have been exploited to permanent advantage for China is doubtful. But if the Northern Hiung-nu had been defeated in a joint effort by the Chinese, Southern Hiung-nu, Sien-pi, and perhaps the Wu-huan, not only would the border commanderies have been saved, the Western Region would also have fallen into China's lap without an effort.

c. The Tibetans

In contrast to the situation in Former Han, the Hiung-nu were not the only major problem in the north. The Sien-pi and Wu-huan have already been discussed. The Tibetans (K'iang) proved even more belligerent. They had only caused minor troubles during Former Han. Wang Mang had even succeeded in extending Kin-ch'eng commandery to Ts'ing-hai (Kukunor), and had easily put down the Tibetan uprising of A.D. 6. After Wang Mang's death, the conquests at Ts'ing-hai were lost and not regained during Later Han (87,117:6b).

Tibetans lived intermingled with the Chinese in the entire area corresponding to present Kan-su. During the civil war, they increased their numbers by steady infiltration. Their particular strongholds became Kin-ch'eng and Lung-si commanderies which had exposed borders. Kin-ch'eng had originally been part of Tou Jung's territory, but he was unable to hold it. The Sien-lien Tibetans had invaded it early in the civil war, had killed its Grand Administrator, and had stayed there (23,53:6b; 24,54:6a; 87,117:6b).¹⁾ The warlord Wei Ao, who maintained himself until A.D. 33 in Kan-su east of the Yellow River, was not strong enough to defeat the Tibetans. He recognized their power by forming an alliance with their chiefs in Lung-si and Kin-ch'eng, which gave him some influence on at least Lung-si commandery (15,45:11b; 23,53:6b; 87,117:6b). Tou Jung was meanwhile able to dominate the Tibetans in the Kan-su corridor, and also engaged in trade with them.

¹⁾ See vol. II, p. 163.

It is recorded, for instance, that in Ku-tsang prefecture¹⁾ four markets were held each day (23,53:2a-2b; 31,61:5b).

In A.D. 30, Kuang-wu launched an offensive against Wei Ao from the east, coordinated with an attack by Tou Jung from the west.²⁾ Preparatory to his part in the campaign, Tou Jung invaded Kin-ch'eng commandery, where he defeated the Sien-lien Tibetans and took 10,000 heads of cattle, horses, and sheep, as well as several tens of thousands *hu* of grain³⁾ (23,53:6b). We witness here again the confiscation of domestic animals and grain, which looks like a calculated policy to impoverish the enemy.⁴⁾ Having secured his flank, Tou Jung waited on the left bank of the Yellow River for the arrival of Kuang-wu's forces. The imperial offensive broke down, and Tou Jung returned to his domain. This must mean that the Tibetans in Kin-ch'eng commandery were able to recuperate.

In the new offensive of A.D. 32, Tou Jung succeeded in joining forces with Emperor Kuang-wu, and for the first time met him face to face. He brought with him a sizable army, including Tibetans (23,53:7b).⁵⁾

Wei Ao died in the following year (A.D. 33). He had been a buffer between the emperor and the Tibetans. From 33 onwards, they became Kuang-wu's direct problem. It can be no coincidence that Pan Piao chose this moment to write a memorial on the Tibetan question. He was deeply interested in Chinese relations with the barbarians, and had already given good advice concerning the Northern Hiung-nu and Wu-huan. His memorial of A.D. 33 pointed out that the Tibetans lived intermingled with the Chinese. Since their customs were different and their language unintelligible, they were frequently taken advantage of by junior officials and crafty people. They reached the end of their resources, were full of resentment, yet unable to do anything about it. This caused rebellions. All disturbances by barbarians could be traced back to this. One should follow the ancient precedent of appointing a Colonel Protecting the Tibetans.⁶⁾ He held the Staff of Authority⁷⁾ and rectified injustices. Each year, he made inspections seasonally and inquired into the resentment and suffering of the Tibetans. He also frequently sent out messengers and interpreters⁸⁾ who investigated their activities, and he employed barbarians outside the barrier to act as the ears and eyes of the Chinese officials. If one adopted this procedure, one would always be prepared in advance (87,117:6b). The emperor accepted Pan Piao's proposal. He appointed Niu Han as Colonel

¹⁾ The Ku-tsang prefecture during Han belonged to Wu-wei commandery and is identical with the present Wu-wei hien, Kan-su. It is shown on map 18.

²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 169-171.

³⁾ 10,000 *hu* would correspond to 5,650 U.S. bushels; 199,682 l.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 67.

⁵⁾ See vol. II, p. 175.

⁶⁾ This office had existed during Former Han and under Wang Mang.

⁷⁾ See vol. II, p. 35, and *ibidem* note 8.

⁸⁾ The Shao-hing and Ki ku ko editions write "couriers", i.e. the same phoneticum with radical 187 instead of 149. Liu Pin corrects "courier" to "interpreter" (87,117, *Kiao pu* 2b), which is followed by the Palace edition.

Protecting the Tibetans with the Staff of Authority.¹⁾ But when Niu Han died, he did not fill the office again (13,43:12-12b; 87,117:6b-7a).

Niu Han was an excellent choice, at least as far as his background is concerned. As a native of Ti tao²⁾ in Lung-si commandery (13,43:12a), he must have had first-hand knowledge of the Tibetans. He had been a general of Wei Ao until A.D. 32, when he went over to the imperial side.³⁾ It is not known in which year he died. No reasons are given why Kuang-wu subsequently left the office vacant. It was a retrograde step. From Emperor Ming's reign onwards, the office was again filled until the end of Later Han.

It is interesting that Pan Piao put part of the blame for the Tibetan unrest on the Chinese. He was making an important point, but probably it had no effect. We have seen that some Chinese officials are praised in HHS for their civilizing influence in South China. Such cultural apostles are conspicuously absent in the north. This is all the more surprising as three of the southern reformers also served in the northwest. Some time after Jen Yen had disseminated Chinese civilization among the barbarians of Kiu-chen commandery,⁴⁾ he was appointed Grand Administrator of Wu-wei commandery.⁵⁾ He engaged in many useful activities, such as improving the irrigation system and building schools, but these seem primarily to have benefited the Chinese, not the Tibetans. In fact, Jen Yen was demoted to Prefect for having executed Tibetans without authority (76,106:5a). Fan Ye, as Shepherd of Yang province, had introduced improvements in agriculture and domestic industry.⁶⁾ After Wei Ao's defeat and death, Fan Ye became Grand Administrator of T'ien-shui commandery. He died in that office fourteen years later. Fan Ye was one of the cruel (or harsh) officials who rigorously upheld the law, and whose presence in T'ien-shui was intended to prevent the revival

¹⁾ The biography of Wen Sü, in the chapter on Outstanding Conduct, states that in A.D. 30 Kuang-wu appointed him Colonel Protecting the Tibetans. He was captured by an officer of Wei Ao and committed suicide (81,111:6a). In the *T'ei kie* to that passage, Shen K'in-han points out that the *T'ei ch'ü t'ung kien* simply writes Colonel. SI-ma Kuang (1019-1086) explains this emendation in his *K'ao yü* by drawing attention to the appointment of Niu Han. Since the office only was established in A.D. 33, and Niu Han was its only holder, Wen Sü could not have filled it. Shen K'in-han adds that Liang province (where the Tibetans lived) was controlled by Wei Ao and Tou Jung and that neither of them had the office in question in their local hierarchies.

Nevertheless, I think that the earlier appointment of Wen Sü is historically correct. His biography gives two clues. Before he committed suicide, he killed some of Wei Ao's men with the Staff of Authority. This insignia belonged *ex officio* to the Colonel Protecting the Tibetans, offering a strong support that Wen Sü really possessed that rank. Secondly, Wen Sü was captured in Siang-wu prefecture (shown on map 18), i.e. had traversed almost the entire territory held by Wei Ao before he was caught. This makes it fairly clear that Kuang-wu in A.D. 30 really had appointed Wen Sü as Colonel Protecting the Tibetans and that he had sent him secretly to travel through Wei Ao's domain, to reach the Tibetans, and to induce them to attack Wei Ao from the rear. Wen Sü was captured in the last moment before accomplishing the first half of his mission.

²⁾ Ti' tao during Han was the capital of Lung-si commandery and is identical with the present Lin-t'ao hien, Kan-su. For the *tao* cf. *infra* p. 149.

³⁾ See vol. II, pp. 175, 230.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 79-80.

⁵⁾ For this and the following events see map 18. ⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 80.

of separatist movements among the Chinese.¹⁾ His biography records that the officials, people, Tibetans, and other non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu) feared him (77, 107:3b). Ma Yüan, who supposedly had improved conditions among the barbarians in Indo-China,²⁾ was in A.D. 35 appointed Grand Administrator of Lung-si commandery. He stayed in that office for six years. After campaigns against the Tibetans, he engaged in peaceful activities.³⁾ Whether these profited the Tibetans is not clear (24,54:7a). The only man who unequivocally is stated to have been popular with the barbarians is K'ung Fen, a descendant of Confucius. Tou Jung appointed him in A.D. 29 Acting Prefect of Ku-tsang prefecture. During his stay in office, K'ung Fen is said not to have enriched himself, and, when Tou Jung and his officials were summoned to the capital in A.D. 36, he alone travelled in a single cart. The people of Ku-tsang, including Tibetans, wished to present him with cattle, horses, and objects, and they escorted him for a long distance, but he accepted nothing (31,61:6a). The question is not whether this account is entirely trustworthy. It has elements which cannot be reliable, such as what people privately said to each other about K'ung Fen. The point is that, true or false, this is the only case of barbarian affection for a Chinese official in the northwest which HHS mentions for Kuang-wu's time at all. This confirms Pan Piao's statement. Relations between the Tibetans and Chinese must normally have been strained.

A.D. 34 was the year when the late Wei Ao's last forces were mopped up in the northwest. It also brought about the first direct confrontation between the imperial troops and Tibetans. Fighting broke out immediately. The Sien-lien Tibetans in Kin-ch'eng commandery engaged in looting, while another branch of this particular tribe defended a stronghold at Wu-k'i agglomeration in Lung-si commandery. At the end of 34, the latter was defeated by Kuang-wu's General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Lai Hi, who took more than 10,000 heads of cattle and sheep, and several hundreds of thousands *hu* of grain.⁴⁾ Among his officers were Liu Shang and Ma Yüan, both of whom were to become renowned barbarian fighters (1B:6b; 15,45:11b; 87,117:7a).⁵⁾

In the 4th month (May 26–June 24) of A.D. 35, the Sien-lien Tibetans again looted Lung-si commandery, in particular Lin-t'ao prefecture.⁶⁾ The court responded by adopting Lai Hi's recommendation to appoint Ma Yüan Grand Administrator of Lung-si. Ma Yüan attacked the Tibetans at Lin-t'ao and defeated them. According to his biography, he captured more than 10,000 heads of horses, cattle, and sheep.

¹⁾ See vol. II, p. 180.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 65.

³⁾ See *infra* p. 139.

⁴⁾ 100,000 *hu* of grain would correspond to 56,500 U.S. bushels; 1,996,820 l.

⁵⁾ 87,117:7a does not mention the site of the battle. According to 1B:6b, it was fought at Wu-k'i. TTKK 11:2a says that Lai Hi defeated the Six Hordes of Wu-k'i. Only Lai Hi's biography (15,45:11b) places the battle in Kin-ch'eng commandery. This must be a mistake. The biography states that Lai Hi came from the Lo-men agglomeration, and, after the defeat of the Tibetans, marched on Siang-wu prefecture. Wu-k'i was situated between Lo-men and Siang-wu, so that this must have been the site of the battle. Wu-k'i is shown on map 18. For Lai Hi's campaign, see vol. II, p. 180, and p. 179 map 32.

⁶⁾ The Lin-t'ao prefecture is identical with the present Min-chou hien, Kan-su.

More than 8000 Tibetans are said to have surrendered (1B:7a; 24,54:6a; 87,117:7a). Ma Yüan then took up the offensive against the Sien-lien Tibetans in Kin-ch'eng. This proves that he had been given greater authority than usual. A Grand Administrator was normally not permitted to lead troops out of the territory under his supervision. Another sign of Ma Yüan's prerogative was his command over the General Who Manifests Firmness, Ma Ch'eng. They attacked and defeated the Tibetans in a pass of Kao-men prefecture,¹⁾ whereupon these withdrew to a valley in Yüan-ya prefecture.²⁾ Ma Yüan approached the valley secretly, struck, and again put the Tibetans to flight. They escaped to the T'ang-yi Valley,³⁾ where Ma Yüan defeated them once more. The Tibetans made their final stand on a mountain. Ma Yüan deployed his forces facing the mountain, while a cavalry contingent quietly moved to the rear of the Tibetans. At nightfall, the Chinese started fires and beat drums. The Tibetans withdrew, presumably beyond the border. Ma Yüan, who had been wounded on the shinbone by an arrow, was too short of troops to pursue them. His victory can therefore not have been complete. He merely rounded up the grain and animals of the enemy and returned. Kuang-wu rewarded him with a letter stamped with the imperial seal, and presented him with several thousand heads of cattle and sheep. These must have been selected from the animals he had taken (24,54:6a-6b).

The *pen ki* (1B:7b) records a victory by Ma Yüan over the Sien-lien Tibetans in the 10th month (Nov. 20-Dec. 18) of A.D. 35, but does not say whether this refers to the campaign in Lung-si or Kin-ch'eng. Presumably the date marks the completion of the entire Tibetan campaign in 35. Captured Tibetans were transferred to the commanderies of T'ien-shui, Lung-si, and Yu-fu-feng and settled there (1B:7b; 87,117:7a).⁴⁾

One unforeseen result of Ma Yüan's victory over the Sien-lien Tibetans was the

¹⁾ For the pronunciation, see Yen Shī-ku's gloss in HS 28Ba:7a, and HHS 24,54:6a, *Commentary*. The Kao-men prefecture during Han belonged to the Kin-ch'eng commandery and was situated E of the present Lo-tu hien, Kan-su.

²⁾ For the pronunciation see Ying Shao's gloss in HS 28Ba:7a, and HHS 24,54:6a, *Commentary*. The Yüan-ya prefecture during Han was the capital of Kin-ch'eng commandery. There is no general agreement about its emplacement, so that the locality shown on map 18 is hypothetical. According to SKC 2:35a, 42a, Yüan-ya was situated S of the Huang River and N of the Yellow River. Shen K'in-han quotes the *Tu shī fang yü ki yao* to the effect that Yüan-ya is to be sought 300 li NW of Lan-chou (the present Kao-lan hien). See 24,54:6a, *T'ei kie*.

³⁾ Shen K'in-han believes that the T'ang-yi Valley mentioned in HHS and the T'ang-shu Mountain mentioned in SKC were in the same locality (41. Shen 2:39a). Tung Yu-ch'eng (1791-1823) in his commentary to the SKC passage (2:25a) says that according to the Yüan ho kün hien chī, T'ang-shu was another name for the Tsi-shī Mountain, which in Ts'ing times was called Siao-tsi-shī Mountain. This mountain still has the same name and is shown in 90. Ting, map 21. It is marked on my map 18. This locality cannot be right, since it is too far to the east. Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682) says in his *T'ien hia kün kuo li ping shu* that the T'ang-yi Valley was situated W of the Yüan-ya prefecture (24,54:6a, *T'ei kie*). This identification, which Shen K'in-han offers as an alternative (41. Shen 2:39a), makes much more sense. In fact, HHS chī 23A:33b says that the Yüan-ya prefecture had a T'ang Valley. This must be the same as the T'ang-yi Valley of 24,54:6a.

⁴⁾ Hui Tung quotes Tu Yu's *T'ung tien*, according to which their number was 7000. See 1B:7b, *T'ei kie*.

liberation and rise to power of the Shao-tang Tibetans. They had been a poor and maltreated tribe, living in the Ta-yün Valley beyond the Chinese border.¹⁾ In about A.D. 36, they routed and temporarily eclipsed the Sien-lien Tibetans. It seems evident that they made use of the opportunity offered by the weakening of their enemy through Ma Yüan's campaign. The Shao-tang Tibetans then moved into the Ta-yü Valley,²⁾ where they remained and grew in strength (87,117:7a). The valley was beyond the Chinese border, but close enough that its inhabitants were a danger. The first clash between the Shao-tang Tibetans and the Chinese occurred in the 9th month (Oct. 17–Nov. 15) of A.D. 57, soon after Kuang-wu's death (2:3a; 87,117:7b).

While Ma Yüan's campaigns had brought no permanent solution, they did reduce Tibetan pressure for the time being. The court does not seem to have realized this. In the defeatist spirit, which is typical for Kuang-wu's policy in the north, Kin-ch'eng commandery was abolished in A.D. 36 and added to Lung-si commandery of which Ma Yüan was then the Grand Administrator (1B:8b). Not content with that, the court officials considered whether all land west of the P'o-k'iang prefecture³⁾ should be abandoned completely, because it was far away and often looted. It is interesting that officials in the provinces, at least in the territories directly concerned, could make themselves heard from a distance at court discussions. It also implies that these discussions could drag on over a period of time. Ma Yüan memorialized that the wall west of P'o-k'iang was mostly unbroken and easily could be depended on. The arable land was fat. The irrigation system functioned. The Tibetans should not be let into Huang-chung.⁴⁾ It could not be abandoned. As a result of this memorial, the official policy was reversed. An edict ordered that the Grand Administrator of Wu-wei should send back the refugees from Kin-ch'eng. We are told that those who returned were over 3000 persons. Ma Yüan repaired the inner and outer walls of the towns, and built ramparts and watchtowers. He gave instruction about irrigation, agriculture, and stock raising (24,54:6b–7a).

A return of some 3000 individuals is, of course, negligible. Kin-ch'eng had a population of 150,000 inhabitants in A.D. 2. This number had been reduced to only about 19,000 in A.D. 140. The overwhelming majority of the people had emigrated, and not to Wu-wei commandery in the north but across the Ts'in-ling Range southwards. This means that few could be sent back from Wu-wei by government decree.

In A.D. 37, the court re-established Kin-ch'eng commandery as a separate administrative unit (1B:10b), a decision most certainly due to Ma Yüan's persuasion.

¹⁾ According to 87,117:7a, the valley was located N of the Yellow River. No further details are known.

²⁾ SKC 2:20a, 21a says that the Yellow River passed N of the Ta-yü and Siao-yü Valleys before reaching the Lung-si commandery. The site shown on map 18 is an approximation. If it is correct that the Ta-yün Valley was situated N, and the Ta-yü Valley S of the Yellow River, this would mean that the Shao-tang Tibetans had crossed that river.

³⁾ The P'o-k'iang prefecture during Han belonged to the Kin-ch'eng commandery and was situated 50 li E of the present Lo-tu hien, Kan-su.

⁴⁾ I.e. the land on both sides of the Huang River.

At about that time, he won one further victory over the Tibetans. The Shen-lang Tibetans were living in Wu-tu commandery, which bordered on Lung-si in the southeast. They rose in A.D. 36, killing Chinese officials and looting. Ma Yüan attacked these Tibetans, probably in 37.¹⁾ They had entered Lung-si commandery and stationed themselves on a mountain at Ti tao.²⁾ Ma Yüan avoided battle, and simply cut off the Tibetans from water and pasture. This soon led to their surrender (1B:8b; 24,54:7a; 87,117:7a).

After this encounter, the Tibetans held their peace for almost twenty years. Ma Yüan may have contributed to this through the amicable contacts he established with them, assisted by one of their chiefs (24,54:7a). Only just before Kuang-wu's death, in A.D. 56, the Shen-lang Tibetans of Wu-tu rebelled again. They were defeated by the troops of Wu-tu and Lung-si commanderies (1B:22b; 87,117:7a-7b).

d. *The depopulation of the northwest*

While HHS has passing references to the depopulation of northwestern China, this does not mean that either Emperor Kuang-wu and his officials, or the ancient historian, had a clear picture of what was going on. For them, it was a question of vagabonding people. The government knew that the farmers were leaving their land. There is no hint that it was fully aware of the large-scale migration southwards across the Ts'in-ling Range. The dynastic historian was therefore reduced to generalities. He says that the people of Wu-wei commandery left their land because they feared to be looted and seized by the Hiung-nu and Tibetans (76,106:4b), that the people of Lung-si commandery starved and vagabonded (15,45:11b), and that great numbers of people escaped from the commanderies of An-ting, Pei-ti, and Shang (23,53:2b). He does not say where they went, or, when he does, he is misinformed. When he states that the refugees from An-ting, Pei-ti, and Shang attached themselves to Tou Jung in the Kan-su corridor west of the Yellow River, this is at best a cliché to illustrate the supposedly high quality of Tou Jung's administration. It is not a historical fact. The census of A.D. 2 and 140 prove that the Kan-su corridor did not gain but lose population, and that the general trend of the migration was southwards.

The migration was due to pressure from the Hiung-nu and the Tibetans. It did not begin under Wang Mang, since during his reign the northwest was generally peaceful. The migration started under Kuang-wu. The depopulation of the northern border commanderies, sanctioned by the government through the official abolish-

¹⁾ 1B:8b and 87,117:7a place the uprising and defeat of the Tibetans in A.D. 36. Ma Yüan's biography dates the rebellion and campaign in A.D. 37. It is possible that the uprising took place in 36, and the campaign in 37.

²⁾ This Ti^b tao is not to be confused with the Ti^a tao mentioned above (p. 136, note 2). Chung kuo ti ming ta ts'i tien (p. 526:3) and Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien (p. 222:2) both say that Ti^b tao was situated SW of the present Ts'ing-shui hien, Kan-su. That is not possible, since Ts'ing-shui lies on the northern side of the Wei River, an area to which Lung-si commandery did not extend. Wang Sien-k'ien believes (ch'i 23A:27b) that Ti^b tao was located SW of Ts'in-chou (the present T'ien-shui hien, Kan-su). Shen K'in-han seeks it near Si-ho hien (41. Shen 2:39b), i.e. in the same general area as Wang Sien-k'ien, only slightly further south. Their opinion is to be preferred.

ment of whole commanderies, has already been described.¹⁾ The split of the Hiung-nu brought no relief. Kuang-wu's decision to let the Southern Hiung-nu stay in the northwest, within the Chinese border, perpetuated and increased the friction between the sedentary Chinese and the nomadic Hiung-nu. Meanwhile, the infiltration of Tibetans intensified the pressure from another direction. The Chinese settlers yielded, and in growing numbers abandoned their fields. How edgy the Chinese were is shown by an event towards the end of Ma Yüan's stay as Grand Administrator in Lung-si. On a false rumour that the Tibetans had rebelled, people streamed from the country into the walled towns (24,54:7b). The situation in the northwest is therefore the exact opposite to the one in South China. Barbarian pressure mounted against the Chinese in the northwest. Chinese pressure mounted against the barbarians in the south.

The census of A.D. 2 and 140 make it possible to assess the extent of depopulation in the northwest. The decrease is ca. 6 million people, or about 70% of the total in A.D. 2. Not all the refugees went south. We have seen that there was an influx from the northwestern border commanderies to the northernmost part of the Great Plain.²⁾ Not all of the refugees left due to barbarian pressure. The decline in political and economic importance of Ch'ang-an and its surrounding territories must have left their mark. But the majority of the survivors migrated southwards, and the main cause was the barbarians.

It might be argued that the evacuation of the northwest only accelerated gradually and was not yet in full operation under Kuang-wu. That it continued for a long time is beyond question. But fortunately it can be settled that it was very much in progress during Kuang-wu's reign. The evidence is his reduction in the number of prefectures.

On Aug. 11, A.D. 30, Emperor Kuang-wu issued an important edict. It pointed out that, while the households and individuals had decreased, the prefectural offices and posts for lower official were still many. The Colonel Director of the Retainers and the Provincial Shepherds should each examine how the numbers of offices in their administrative regions could be reduced. Furthermore, an investigation should be made which prefectures could be abolished altogether by being joined to neighbouring ones. The results should be memorialized to the two yamen of the Grand Minister over the Masses and the Grand Minister of Works. The outcome was that more than 400 prefectures were abolished (1B:2a; chi 23B:30b). A comparison between the treatises on administrative geography in HS and HHS shows that this is a fact. The introduction to the treatise in HHS also draws attention to the reduction and says unequivocally: wherever the treatise of HS has names of prefectures which do not reappear in HHS, the reason is that these had been abolished by the Epochal Founder (chi 19:2a).

The first question to consider is which prefectures were discontinued. Chou Ming-t'ai's survey³⁾ may be taken as a starting point, but has to be used with

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 107, 109, 113, 114.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 113.

³⁾ 112. Chou.

caution. It contains errors, in addition to which it also includes prefectures which were abolished by Kuang-wu's successors. His list of the prefectures existing in A.D. 2, and no longer existing in 140, must therefore be adjusted. According to my findings, the number of prefectures discontinued by Kuang-wu is 443. That figure may not be exactly correct. In some cases it is not clear whether a certain prefecture was abolished during Kuang-wu's reign or later. In other cases, corrupt rendering of prefectural names leaves room for doubt. Still, 443 prefectures must be close enough to the truth.

The second question is when the prefectures were abolished. In A.D. 30, Emperor Kuang-wu was not yet in possession of western China, whether north or south. Even after the civil war, some of the later abolished prefectures continue to be mentioned in the sources. The last reference to any of them is for A.D. 41. Everything points to the fact that the order was carried out gradually. The final stages of the reduction must have been reached in the 40's, except in the border commanderies of Shan-si and the Ordos Region. There the edict could hardly have been implemented until after the peace with the Southern Hiung-nu.

The third question is where the 443 prefectures were situated, and which conclusions can be drawn from their emplacements.¹⁾ One problem immediately arises. In 118 cases of the 443 prefectures, the sites are no longer known. The explanation is that these prefectures disappeared from history, that they were not re-established in later times, and that the memory of their locations was lost. In this impasse, the 118 prefectures have been indicated on the map by single circles in the centre of each respective commandery, the dimension of every circle standing in direct proportion to the number of prefectures.

If the statement of the edict is correct, that a decrease in the number of households and individuals was the reason for the reduction, a map of the abolished prefectures should reflect the losses in population. These losses are not a result of the civil war. It has been brought out already that the Han histories are untrustworthy on the numbers of soldiers killed in battle.²⁾ Remarks about the suffering of the civilian population are equally unreliable. All devastations caused by the war are exaggerated, and cannot be accepted as historical facts. This is confirmed by the distribution of the abolished prefectures. In some areas, where the fighting was fierce, e.g. the Shu and Kuang-han commanderies in Sī-ch'uan, no prefectures were discontinued at all. In other territories, such as Pei-ti and An-ting commanderies in the northwest, no fighting took place, and yet the number of prefectures was reduced. Even more convincing is the following fact. During the civil war until A.D. 36, 78 prefectural cities were taken by direct assault, and another 22 prefectural cities suffered sieges of various lengths.³⁾ Should there be any truth in the persistent belief that conquered cities were butchered, it would stand to reason that these 100 prefectures would have been among the first to be abolished. But only 8 of them were actually demoted to lesser administrative units. This

¹⁾ See map 19.

²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 227-228.

³⁾ See vol. II, p. 226.

makes it clear that the map of abolished prefectures will not show traces of the civil war. It should mirror the depopulation of the southern plain due to the cumulative effects of the change in the course of the Yellow River, and the depopulation of the northwest because of the pressure from the barbarians.

This does not mean that the correlation between depopulation and reduction in the number of prefectures can be complete. It must be blurred. A thinning out of prefectures could not be accomplished according to a simple and unvaried formula. Local conditions had to be considered. For example, the population decreased in the Kan-su corridor, but no prefectures were abolished there. These were strung out over a large territory, located at oases, and surrounded by arid land. It was not possible to decrease their number without doing harm to the communications.

Secondly, a major aim of the emperor was to reduce government expenditure by reducing the provincial bureaucracy. This led to another important departure from the rule of being guided by the degree of depopulation. While the sources do not say so, it becomes apparent that a preferred course was the demotion of former marquisates, and what must have been fairly new prefectures.

The total number of prefectural marquisates in A.D. 2 had been 216. Wang Mang had routinely discontinued the Han marquisates. When Kuang-wu restored the dynasty, he avoided a wholesale restoration of the old marquisates. Perhaps to discourage possible claimants once and for all, he went one step further. He abolished 169, or 78%, of the 216 old marquisates as prefectural units.¹⁾ By wiping them out, he combined expediency with economy.

The new prefectures were another, though overlapping, category. In A.D. 2, 46 prefectures had existed, whose names were made up by two characters, the second of which was *hiang*. 41 of these were abolished by Kuang-wu. The fact that 32 of the 41 prefectures were former marquisates, may not be significant. If 41, or 89%, of all prefectures were abolished which had *hiang* as the second element of their names, it seems probable that the names had something to do with the measure.

The clue to this problem is the fact that *hiang* means "district". A district was the largest administrative unit below the level of prefecture. When a new prefecture was established, it meant in practice that a district was elevated to prefectural status. The 46 prefectures of A.D. 2, with *hiang* as the second character of their names, must therefore simply have been former districts which had been promoted to prefectures. In these cases, the character *hiang*, from having denoted administrative status, became part of the name. For instance, the Mi district (Mi *hiang*) became the Mi-hiang prefecture. That this development continued, can be shown by a comparison of HS and HHS. Among the 51 new prefectures established during Later Han, 4 have names ending with *hiang*: the Nan-hiang and Siang-hiang prefectures in Nan-yang commandery (ch'ī 22:17a), the Kin-hiang prefecture in Shan-

¹⁾ 159 of the 216 prefectural marquisates had formerly been held by members of the imperial house. 127 of these, or 80%, were abolished.

yang commandery (chī 21:13a), and the Siang-hiang prefecture in Ling-ling commandery (chī 22:7b). None of these is mentioned in the treatise on administrative geography in HS, and consequently they were not prefectures at that time. That they were districts is proved by the Tables for marquises, in which all four are listed as district marquises (HS 15B:48a, 40a, 51a; 18:30b).¹⁾

The reason why new prefectures were singled out for abolition is not hard to find. When the government decided to economize, it evidently preferred not to demote the old and well-established prefectural cities which offered many amenities of urban life. It rather did away with the more recently created and less inviting prefectures.

Adding the 9 cases of former districts which in A.D. 2 were prefectures but not marquises, to the 169 abolished marquises, we get a total of 178. This means that in at least 40% of the 443 cases, Kuang-wu's reduction in the number of prefectures does not necessarily stand in direct proportion to the depopulation. This fact in particular is responsible for the great number of abolished prefectures on the northern plain, north of the Yellow River. 52 of these, or three fifths of all discontinued prefectures in that area, were former marquises and new prefectures.

All this having been said, and the blurring effect having been noted, the general correlation between population decrease and reduction in the number of prefectures is still perfectly recognizable. This becomes very clear from a comparison of maps 19 and 20. Map 20 might be described as a negative population map. It shows all regions where the population decreased from A.D. 2 to 140. With the reservations stated above, the agreement between the two maps is striking. It proves conclusively not only that the depopulation of the southern plain was well advanced in Kuang-wu's time, but also that the emigration from the northwest was in full operation.

e. *Korea and Japan*

Emperor Kuang-wu gained possession of the former Chinese commanderies in Korea during A.D. 30. A native of Lo-lang commandery by the name of Wang T'iao, whether Chinese or Korean is not known, had made himself independent there in about A.D. 25. He was killed by his followers in 30, who then welcomed the imperial officials.²⁾ During the same year, Kuang-wu "abolished" the Chief Commandant office, or offices, over the Wo-tsü and Wei-mo tribes, and gave Chinese noble titles to their chiefs (85,115:8b, 9b). The Wei-mo lived east of Lo-lang commandery, between the Chinese border and the Pacific Ocean. To the

¹⁾ Since the majority of prefectural names was made up by two characters, the temptation to retain the element *hiang* was strong in those cases where the name of the district had consisted of a single character.

When the 46 prefectures, whose names ended with *hiang*, had been promoted from districts, cannot be established. The very fact that 41 of them were demoted again supports the inference drawn above. They must have been relatively young.

The policy of abolishing new prefectures in preference to old ones was naturally not restricted to those with *hiang* in their names. But where the names give no clue, the texts are not informative enough to permit conclusions.

²⁾ See vol. II, pp. 112, 158.

north of them, on the coast, was the domain of the Wo-tsü, and, further inland, that of Kao-kou-li. North of the Wo-tsü and Kao-kou-li lay the territory of Fu-yü. It is obvious that any Chinese control over these far-flung tribes must have been tenuous at best, and that it must have lapsed altogether during the civil war. Kuang-wu could not divest himself of what he did not possess. In spite of the obliqueness of HHS, the emperor did no more than recognize hard facts. He renounced all Chinese hegemony over the Korean tribes beyond the border.

From this time onwards, until the end of Kuang-wu's reign, Chinese-Korean relations were generally friendly, excepting one large raid by Kao-kou-li into China during the 1st month (Feb. 22–Mar. 22) of A.D. 49 (1B:18a; 85,115:7a). Tribute, i.e. trade, missions are recorded from Kao-kou-li in the 12th month of the Chinese year 32 (corresponding to Jan. 20–Feb. 17, A.D. 33) (1B:5b; 85,115:6b), and again in A.D. 49 (20,50:10b). Fu-yü also sent a mission in 49 (1B:18a; 85,115:4b). In addition, three chiefs from Kao-kou-li, with more than 10,000 people, came to Lo-lang commandery and submitted in the 10th month (Nov. 7–Dec. 6) of A.D. 47 (1B:17b; 85,115:6b).

In the southern part of Korea, south of the Chinese possessions, various Han 韓 tribes were living. In the autumn of A.D. 44, a Han chief came to Lo-lang commandery with presents. The *pen ki* describes this as submission. The emperor bestowed on him a Chinese noble title (1B:15b–16a; 85,115:11a). No contacts with other Korean tribes are recorded for Kuang-wu's time.

HS has nothing to say about Japan, except that the Wo People were divided into more than one hundred states, and that they yearly came and paid tribute (HS 28Bb:61a). HHS repeats that there were more than one hundred states in the ocean, and adds that some thirty of them had sent envoys to China (85,115:11b). This would seem to refer to unofficial trade relations. There is no reference in HS to any Japanese mission being received at court. HHS has the important entry that the King of the Wo-nu in the 1st month (Feb. 23–Mar. 24) of A.D. 57, i.e. just before Kuang-wu's death, sent envoys. They were received in audience, and the emperor bestowed on their king a seal (1B:22b; 85,115:11b).¹⁾ This was the beginning of official Japanese relations with China.

While this was a historically important event, the initiative had been taken by Japan. It is manifest that during Kuang-wu's reign the general political retrenchment applied to Korea as well, and that foreign relations on the Chinese side were passive.

Later Han after Kuang-wu's death

The general direction which Chinese—barbarian relations had taken in the north during Kuang-wu's reign, was only modified in one major aspect after his death: the relation to the Northern Hiung-nu. Otherwise, the development continued along earlier trends. This development will be represented through histograms,

¹⁾ Cf. 146. Tsunoda, Goodrich, pp. 1–2. A seal found in 1784, and purporting to be the one conferred by Kuang-wu, is probably spurious. See *ibidem*, p. 5, note 12.

which, by 10-year periods, show the number of years during which fighting with the barbarians occurred on Chinese soil. Only the immediate empire has been considered, and all clashes in the Western Region have been excluded. The histograms make no distinction between raids from without and barbarian uprisings within, since, in contrast to South China, the difference is not always clear.

Graph 5 sets forth the Chinese relations with the Hiung-nu. During Former Han, the Hiung-nu had been the only great enemy in the north, and no decade from 200 to 70 B.C. was free from their attacks and pillage. Then followed the period of peace, which, for reasons beyond China's control, came to an end with Wang Mang's reign. After five decades of fighting, the Hiung-nu split A.D. 49 into the southern and northern branches, so that the events during the last seventeen decades of Later Han have to be shown by two separate histograms.

The Northern Hiung-nu alternated for a while between invading China and seeking peace. Their relations with China entered into a new phase, when Emperor Ming decided to abandon the passive attitude of his father, and to take the offensive.

In A.D. 73, four armies were simultaneously launched against the Northern Hiung-nu. One of these was led by the Chief Commandant of Imperial Equipages, Tou Ku, nephew of Tou Jung, and brother-in-law of Emperor Ming. He belonged to the outstanding and powerful family which had produced several experts on Central Asia. Having defeated a high dignitary of the Northern Hiung-nu, Tou Ku left a garrison at Yi-wu-lu, the present Hami, and returned (2:15b; 23,53:10b-11a).

From this time onwards, Chinese pressure on the Hiung-nu increased, culminating in the great offensive of A.D. 89. This was led by Tou Jung's great-grandson Tou Hien, the man who later during that year, on Oct. 29, became the first regent of Later Han, and who committed suicide in 92. Crossing the Gobi, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Northern Hiung-nu (4:3a; 23,53:13b-14a). Campaigns in the next few years followed up the advantage. Simultaneously, the Sien-pi stepped up their attacks from the east (90,120:5b). The tribal federation of the Northern Hiung-nu began to crack. Their last raid into China is recorded for A.D. 121 (51,81:3b). Gradually, the Northern Hiung-nu fell under the domination of the Sien-pi.

Through the victories over the Northern Hiung-nu, the Western Region was again drawn into the Chinese orbit. When Tou Ku attacked the Hiung-nu in A.D. 73, Pan Piao's son Ch'ao was among the troops as an Acting Major. He distinguished himself, and was sent by Tou Ku to the Western Region (47,77:1b). He remained there for three decades, and returned to Lo-yang only in the 8th month (Aug. 31-Sep. 29) of A.D. 102. One month later, he died (47,77:11a). During his long stay in the Western Region, Pan Ch'ao slowly succeeded in reasserting China's overlordship. This would not have been possible without the defeat of the Northern Hiung-nu, nor without his own courage, tact, and patience.

Pan Piao (died A.D. 54) has, perhaps unjustly, been overshadowed by Ku and Ch'ao, but he united in his person the interests and talents which, divided between his sons, secured them immortal fame. He began the Former Han History which was continued by Pan Ku, and he showed in astute memorials the deep knowledge of Central Asian affairs which Pan Ch'ao later translated into action.

For half a century after Pan Ch'ao's death, China held on to the Western Region, after which it again was lost. The trouble was that the offensive against the Northern Hiung-nu had come too late. It should have been launched by Emperor Kuang-wu. When it was finally undertaken, the victories changed the situation very little. The Sien-pi simply moved into the vacuum and became China's most dangerous enemy in the north. One foe had replaced the other, while the Southern Hiung-nu remained firmly entrenched in northwestern China. The opportunity to defeat the Northern Hiung-nu and to install a friendly Southern Shan-yü north of the Gobi had come in the time of Kuang-wu. That opportunity had been missed, and nothing done by Kuang-wu's successors could change the fact.

That the relations between the Chinese and the Southern Hiung-nu soon became strained is shown by the graph. The Southern Shan-yü still cooperated with the Chinese and participated in Tou Hien's great attack during 89 (4:3a; 89,119:11a). In 90, he rendered similar assistance (4:4a; 89,119:11a-11b). But in 93 the troubles began. During eight of the remaining thirteen decades, the Chinese and Southern Hiung-nu clashed. While there were periods of renewed assistance against the Tibetans and especially the Sien-pi, the Southern Hiung-nu would periodically pillage northwestern China. They even looted the northern part of the Great Plain in 110 (5:7b; 89,119:14b).

While the Southern Hiung-nu came to form a frequently hostile state within the state, which acted in concert with China only when it suited its purpose, the Wu-huan and Sien-pi developed into a major menace at the northern border.

Graphs 6 and 7 show that the Wu-huan had invaded China during only two years of Former Han, and that the Sien-pi had not done so at all. The reason is, of course, that these tribes only gained their emancipation from the Hiung-nu in A.D. 49, when the latter split into the northern and southern branches. Before that date, the Wu-huan and Sien-pi had undoubtedly participated in the Hiung-nu raids, and sometimes the sources make particular reference to their presence. But, excepting the Wu-huan attacks of 78 and 75 B.C., they and the Sien-pi acted under the orders of the Hiung-nu. Their activities had not been independent, and are therefore not included in graphs 6 and 7.

From A.D. 97 to 186, the Sien-pi raided China every decade, with peaks in the 120's and 170's. The interesting point is that the graph for the Wu-huan is the mirror image of that for the Sien-pi. When the latter reduced their efforts, the Wu-huan stepped up theirs. Nothing is said in the sources which could throw any light on the matter, although a connection clearly exists. A possible explanation might be that the Wu-huan themselves were so hard pressed by the Sien-pi, that they could only indulge in major ventures when the Sien-pi for some reason had troubles of their own.

The Tibetans raided China at will during Later Han times (graph 8). They proved a still greater menace than the Sien-pi and fought with the Chinese during all but five of the decades. Their particular target was the Wei River valley, and in 108 and 111 they even penetrated as far as the Great Plain (5:5b, 8a; 87,117:14a). In 108, the Tibetan chief Tien-lien went so far as to declare himself Son of Heaven

(5:5b; 87,117:13b). He died in 112 and was succeeded by his son Lien-ch'ang, who continued to use the imperial designation (5:9b; 87,117:15a). In 117, the Chinese engineered Lien-ch'ang's murder (5:13a; 87,117:17a). While no further claimants appeared among the Tibetans, the fact remains that the Chinese were on the defensive and steadily losing ground.

Only in the northeast, the picture was slightly brighter. Although the Koreans also were more belligerent than in Former Han times, their uprisings and invasions were sporadic and alternated with tribute missions. Kao-kou-li sent tribute in 109 and 111 (5:6a; 85,115:7a), and the state of Fu-yü in 120, 122, 161, and 174. In addition, Fu-yü assisted China against other Koreans in 121 and 122, and in 136 its king came in person to the Chinese court and paid audience during the New Year celebrations (5:15a, 16a; 6:9b; 7:10b; 8:5a; 85,115:4b). In short, Korea proved no great drain on China's resources.

One further peaceful contact with Japan is recorded for Later Han. An embassy arrived in A.D. 107 and presented 160 slaves (5:4a; 85,115:12b).¹⁾

3. Conclusion

Two main facts have emerged from the foregoing discussion. Firstly, the Chinese of Han times lived intermingled with the barbarians to a greater extent than has perhaps been generally realized. Secondly, China's relations with the barbarians inside and outside the borders deteriorated greatly during the Later Han dynasty.

Map 21 gives a composite picture of all territories with both Chinese and barbarian population. Whenever the texts of HS and HHS mention that barbarians lived indigenously in a certain area, voluntarily moved into it, or were settled there by the Chinese authorities, this has been shown on the map. The habitats of the barbarians are not a matter of prime concern for the dynastic historian, so that the source material for the map consists of stray remarks throughout the two histories. There is no reason, however, why it should not fairly faithfully reflect the conditions after the time when Emperor Kuang-wu had agreed to the permanent settlement of the Southern Hiung-nu in northwestern China.

The map is necessarily simplified. If a certain region is shown to have had barbarian population, it does not mean that this was evenly distributed throughout the territory. It simply means that barbarians lived here and there within the area. The map has to be schematic, since greater refinement is not possible. It also excludes two regions where aboriginals must have been living during Han, but where clear textual evidence is lacking. These are the major part of Kiang-si, and southern Kiang-su and northern Che-kiang. Ti-wu Lun's biography records that, when he became Grand Administrator of K'uai-ki in A.D. 53, he prohibited the reckless slaughtering of oxen for sacrifices. The people had been under the influence of shamans and believed that if they did not sacrifice the oxen, they would themselves start to low and then die. Ti-wu Lun prosecuted the shamans and eradicated the superstition (41,71:1b). This may well be a case of a Chinese official interfering

¹⁾ Cf. 146. Tsunoda, Goodrich, p. 2.

into aboriginal customs, but the text does not mention barbarians specifically. The people might have been partially sinified aboriginals, they may have been Chinese who had developed or adopted local customs, or they might have been both. For the sake of stringency, I have excluded this and similar cases, where the ancient historian does not express himself with sufficient clarity. It is nevertheless a safe assumption that aboriginals lived south of the Yang-tsī delta and in Kiang-si. In fact, the *San kuo chī* has frequent references to "mountain people" or "mountain bandits" in these regions, terms which probably designated aboriginals.

It is therefore certain that in all of South China, barbarians and Chinese lived side by side. On minor plains, such as the Yang-tsī delta and the Red Basin in Sī-ch'uan, the Chinese were probably settled rather compactly. But in the river valleys, they were strung out on the alluvial soil along the banks, and the aboriginals who resisted sinification were forced up into the mountains.

In North China, Koreans had lived within the borders to the northeast, and Tibetans towards the northwest, ever since Emperor Wu had conquered these territories. In addition, non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu) were sprinkled throughout the northwest, and some Wu-huan and Sien-pi inhabited Liao-si and Liao-tung. The balance changed to China's disadvantage, when Kuang-wu officially admitted the Southern Hiung-nu into the northwest, and simultaneously to a lesser degree also accepted Wu-huan within the border. Meanwhile, Tibetans infiltrated the empire in increasing numbers. The government could not cope with them, except resorting to the negative device of transferring Tibetans to the lower Wei River valley.

Map 21 also shows the sites of the *tao*, or "marches" as H. H. Dubs translates the term. It is explained by both dynastic histories as a prefecture which administered barbarians (HS 19A:30b; HHS chī 28:7a). Again, the map gives a composite picture. The treatise on administrative geography in HS lists 30 *tao*, all but 3 of which can be identified. 12 of these were abolished by Emperor Kuang-wu. This simply indicates his wish to economize, not a sudden disappearance of the barbarians. 2 of the *tao* were changed to prefectures during Later Han. In addition the Later Han dynasty established 3 new *tao*, so that the total listed in HHS is 19. The map shows the 27 Former Han *tao* which can be identified, plus the 3 new *tao* of Later Han. It demonstrates conclusively that the *tao* were restricted to certain areas. *Tao* cannot have been a universal term for prefectures with barbarians, since otherwise the map would have had hundreds. It was clearly an administrative device for controlling barbarians in sensitive areas, particularly in the border regions.

The territory where the Chinese lived alone was severely limited. It consisted of the Great Plain, the Shan-tung peninsula, southern Shan-si, and the Nan-yang basin in southern Ho-nan and northern Hu-pei.

No conclusions can be drawn from map 21 about how the Chinese and barbarians got along where they were neighbours, nor does it necessarily follow that where the Chinese lived alone they were untroubled by barbarians. To elucidate these points, it is necessary to show which areas suffered under wars with or raids by the barbarians.

Map 22 marks all Chinese territories where, from 202 to 1 B.C., fighting took place with indigenous barbarians, or where barbarians raided from beyond the border. The map has to be simplified, since the sources normally do not record which parts of a given commandery were affected. Whenever a commandery has been mentioned to have been involved, the map shows its entire area.

In the north, it is the border region and the northwest which suffered. Tun-huang and Wu-wei commanderies in the Kan-su corridor, and Hsüan-t'u commandery in the northeast appear as unharmed, but this is probably due more to gaps in the textual evidence than to actual conditions.

In South China, only three regions were troubled: Yün-nan and Kuei-chou through repeated barbarian uprisings, and Ch'ang-sha through a single raid in 181 B.C.

Turning to map 23, for the period A.D. 1 to 220, the situation is dramatically changed. The Chinese and aboriginals fought everywhere in South China, excepting the major part of the lower Yang-tsī Valley and Kiang-si. The Yüé people had been docile since the time of Emperor Wu, which explains the generally peaceful conditions in southeast China. The only other exception is Kien-wei commandery in Sī-ch'uan. If it really was as tranquil as it appears to have been, the reason is not clear. The only barbarian unrest recorded there was in its Dependent State, situated between the Yang-tsī and the lower course of the Min River.¹⁾

In North China, conditions had also worsened. The entire northwest and all the border commanderies were affected, including the Korean possessions. In addition, parts of the northern plain had been raided for the first time.

The increased vulnerability of the Chinese to clashes with the barbarians was actually greater than a comparison of maps 22 and 23 would seem to indicate. One must also take into consideration the depopulation of the southern plain, due to the change in the course of the Yellow River. In A.D. 2, 85% of the total Chinese population had lived in areas safe from barbarians attacks. That proportion had shrunk to 63% by A.D. 140.

Table 11 arranges the material in a different way. It shows by 30-year periods the number of years during which any kind of fighting occurred on Chinese soil.

Troubles with the barbarians increased greatly during the latter half of the period in both north and south. Throughout the 420 years, disturbances in the north steadily outnumbered those in the south, except during A.D. 41-70, when the frequency was the same. Fights with Chinese rebels also multiplied. The deterioration is illustrated by the shrinkage in the number of peaceful years. During the 210 years from 200 B.C. until A.D. 10, they numbered 145, but during the following 210 years only 42, a reduction from 69% to 20%.

Graph 10 sets forth the same material by 10-years periods and in the form of a histogram. The enormous worsening of the situation in Later Han becomes clearly visible.

¹⁾ It should be observed that for Tsang-ko commandery no troubles at all are recorded after A.D. 12. The reason must be, that the region was practically ignored during Later Han.

30-year periods	With barbarians		With Chinese rebels	Total number of peaceful years ¹⁾
	North	South		
200-171	5	1	7	20
170-141	11	0	1	18
140-111	11	0	0	19
110- 81	9	5	2	16
80- 51	6	0	1	23
50- 21	2	1	1	26
20-A.D. 10	3	0	7	23
11- 40	18	5	24	3
41- 70	9	9	3	16
71-100	12	9	0	16
101-130	26	10	4	4
131-160	19	13	17	3
161-190	25	14	18	0
191-220	2	0	30	0
Total	158	67	115	187

Table 11. Years during which fighting occurred on Chinese soil, 200 B.C.-A.D. 220.

Emperor Kuang-wu stands on the threshold between two phases of Chinese-barbarian relations. The renewed belligerence of the Hiung-nu had begun under Wang Mang, who, as far as can be judged from the sources, was not basically at fault. He succeeded in preventing a resumption of large-scale wars through a combination of skillful diplomacy and military intimidation. Kuang-wu's position was more difficult, since the civil war until A.D. 36 had to take precedence over border fighting. Neither can he be blamed for the outbreak of hostilities with the barbarians. This does not change the fact that, while he suppressed barbarian uprisings in South China determinedly, he lacked vision in foreign policy. Kuang-wu consistently took the easy way out, sacrificing long-range imperatives for what seemed to be short-range advantages. He set a dangerous precedent in Yün-nan by admitting the Ai-lao into the empire. He was inept in his attitude to the Western Region. He let the Southern Hiung-nu stay in the northwest, and thereby became fundamentally responsible for the loss of North China in A.D. 316.

In history, Wang Mang has been depicted as a scheming usurper with delusions of grandeur, while Kuang-wu has been praised as the sagacious restorer of the Han dynasty and as a model for later emperors.²⁾ A less biased view must absolve Wang

¹⁾ This is the real number of completely peaceful years in each 30-year period. The figure cannot be arrived at by simply adding the years of fighting in the preceding three columns, and subtracting that total from 30, since fighting with barbarians in north and south, as well as with Chinese rebels, frequently overlapped chronologically.

²⁾ The official prejudice against Wang Mang is well illustrated by the following account.

In A.D. 1, barbarians beyond the southern border presented one white pheasant and two black pheasants (HS 12:2a; 99A:5a; 99. Dubs, III, pp. 64, 141). HS 99A:5a says to this: "First, [Wang Mang] had hinted that Yi-chou [commandery] should cause the barbarians beyond the barrier to present

Mang from failure in his dealings with the barbarians, and blame Kuang-wu for a shortsightedness fateful to his country.

a white pheasant." H. H. Dubs draws attention to the tradition that, whenever China had a True King, this would be signalled by the presentation of a white pheasant (99. Dubs, III, p. 64, note 2.3). He accepts the insinuation that Wang Mang engineered the gift (see *ibidem*, p. 51).

HHS records that in A.D. 37 barbarians outside the border of Ji-nan presented Kuang-wu with a white pheasant and a white hare (1B:10b; 86,116:6a). This time, the event is recorded straightforwardly, and without innuendo.

White pheasants and hares were auspicious, and symbols of wise government. During T'ang times, they were part of the Middle Auspicious Token (142. Schafer, p. 199; 143. Schafer, p. 547). Such gifts were useful for propaganda purposes, and in many cases the offers most probably were manipulated. If Wang Mang did so, as he may well have done, there is no reason to believe that Kuang-wu or his officials did not do the same. The important point is that, for historiographical reasons, the manipulations are stressed in the case of Wang Mang, and suppressed in the case of Kuang-wu. By this device, the sympathies of the reader are immediately marshalled against Wang Mang and for Kuang-wu, reinforcing the consistently negative picture of the former, and the positive one of the latter, which the dynastic historian strives to give.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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BULLETIN OF THE MUSEUM OF FAR EASTERN ANTIQUITIES

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Wittenborn and Company, 1018 Madison Ave. nr. 79 Str., New York N. Y. 10021.

The Isseido, 7, 1-chome, Jimbocho, Kanda, Tokyo.

Printed in Sweden

Price: 60 Sw. Crowns

ELANDERS BOKTRYCKERI AKTIEBOLAG GÖTEBORG 1967

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